

V. I. LENIN

Selected Works

VOLUME I

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
NOTE	9
PART I THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PREREQUISITES OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION	
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN RUSSIA AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY	13
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA	95
Preface to First Edition	95
IX Conclusions to Chapter I	97
XIII Conclusions to Chapter II	100
Chapter III The Landowners' Transition from the Barsh- china System to the Capitalist System of Farming	116
I The Main Features of the Barshchina System	116
II The Combination of the Barshchina System with the Capitalist System of Farming	118
III Description of the Otrabotochni System	123
IV The Fall of the Otrabotochni System	131
VII The Employment of Machinery in Agriculture	136
VIII The Significance of Machinery in Agriculture	146
IX Wage Labour in Agriculture	154
X The Significance of Free Wage Labour in Agri- culture	159
Excerpt from Chapter IV The Growth of Commercial Agriculture	169
IX Conclusions Concerning the Significance of Capital- ism in Russian Agriculture	169

	<i>Page</i>
Excerpt from Chapter VII The Development of Large Scale Machine Industry	177
I The Scientific Conception of the Factory and the Significance of "Factory" Statistics	177
V Does the Number of Workers in Big Capitalist Enterprises Increase?	179
VII The Growth of Large Factories	190
X Appendages to the Factory	195
XI The Complete Separation of Industry from Agriculture	198
XII Three Stages in the Development of Capitalism in Russian Industry	203
Chapter VIII The Formation of the Home Market	213
I The Growth of Commodity Circulation	213
II The Growth of the Commercial and Industrial Population	218
1 Growth of the Towns	218
2 The Significance of Internal Colonisation	220
3 The Growth of Factory, Commercial and Industrial Towns and Villages	224
4 Non Agricultural Migratory Trades	227
III Increase in the Employment of Wage Labour	239
IV The Formation of the Home Market for Labour Power	244
V The Significance of the Outlying Regions Home or Foreign Markets?	250
VI The "Mission" of Capitalism	254
PART II THE FIGHT FOR THE HEGEMONY OF THE PROLETARIAT	
WHAT THE "FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE" ARE AND HOW THEY FIGHT AGAINST THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS	263

CONTENTS

7

Page

Excerpt from Part I	263
Excerpt from Part III	263
THE ECONOMIC CONTENT OF NARODISM AND THE CRITICISM OF IT IN MR STRUVE'S BOOK	330
Excerpt from Chapter III The Presentation of Economic Problems by the Narodniki and by Mr Struve	330
DRAFT AND EXPLANATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY	341
Draft Programme	341
Explanation of the Programme	345
THE TASKS OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS	369
A PROTEST BY RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS	390
EXPLANATORY NOTES	403

NOTE

The literary legacy of V I Lenin when fully published in English will require over thirty large size volumes. The Marx Engels Lenin Institute edition of the *Selected Works* in twelve volumes therefore represents the largest body of Lenin's writings, reports and speeches in English extant.

The *Selected Works* contains the most important and popular of Lenin's writings, arranged both chronologically and topically. It covers all the periods and phases of Lenin's active life. The material included deals mainly with questions that arose in the different historical periods of the Russian and international labor movement and, since the Revolution of 1917, with the building of socialism in the Soviet Union.

All the volumes of this edition are furnished with explanatory notes which are given at the end of the volume, and are intended to provide brief but necessary information. There are two kinds of notes: (1) introductory remarks to the various writings contained in this edition, or to others closely related to them, (2) notes on special passages in the text. The introductory remarks are intended to give the reader in concise form an idea of the historical background of the work in question, the occasion on which it was written, or, if a speech, delivered. These notes will also direct the reader's attention to the main ideas of the work and its connection with other works of Lenin, thereby helping him to determine its importance for the period in question and for the development of Lenin's basic ideas. The notes on particular passages give the necessary factual information, without which the passage might not be clear to the reader.

Explanatory notes are indicated by an asterisk in the text and the note in question can be found under the number in the explanatory notes corresponding to the number of the page on which it occurs. Where more than one note occurs on a page, subsequent notes are indicated by two or more asterisks, as the case may be.

At the end of each work is the date on which the article or book appeared or the speech delivered. In cases where the work was published some time after it was written, the date of writing is also given.

PART I

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PREREQUISITES OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN RUSSIA AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY*

THE object of the present article is to give a brief outline of the sum total of the social and economic relations in Russian agriculture. A work of this kind cannot bear the character of a piece of special research. It must sum up the results of a Marxian investigation, it must indicate the place of every feature of any importance in the economics of agriculture in the general system of Russian national economy, it must trace the general line of development of agrarian relations in Russia and reveal the class forces that determine that development in one way or another. Therefore, we will examine from this point of view the system of landownership in Russia, then we will examine the landlord and peasant systems of economy, and in conclusion we will sum up and show what our evolution during the nineteenth century has brought us to and what tasks it left as a legacy to the twentieth century.

I

We are able to describe the system of landownership in European Russia at the end of the nineteenth century from the returns of the latest land statistics of 1905 (published by the Central Statistical Committee St Petersburg, 1907)

According to this investigation, the total area of land registered in European Russia amounted to 395.2 million dessiatins.¹ This area was divided into three main groups as follows

	<i>Million dessiatins</i>
First Group Private Lands	101.7
Second Group, Allotment Lands	138.8
Third Group State Lands etc	154.7
Total in European Russia	395.2

* Asterisks indicate explanatory note. See appendix.—Ed Eng ed.

¹ Dessiatin: 27 acres.—Ed Eng ed

It must be stated that the state lands include more than one hundred million dessiatins of land in the Far North, in the Archangel, Olonetsk and Vologda Gubernias. A great part of the state lands must be excluded from our calculations since we are dealing with the actual amount of land available for agriculture in European Russia. In my work on the agrarian programme of the Social Democrats in the Russian revolution (written in 1907, but publication was delayed through no fault of the author), I gave the amount of land actually available for agriculture in European Russia at approximately 280 million dessiatins.¹ In this I included in the item, state lands, not 150 million dessiatins, but 39.5 million dessiatins. Hence, of the total land fund in European Russia, *less than one seventh* is not in the possession of the land lords and peasants. Six-sevenths are in the hands of these two antagonistic classes.

Let us examine the distribution of the land among these classes, which differ from each other also in estate, for the greater part of the privately owned lands are lands of the nobility, while the allotment lands are peasant lands. Out of a total of 101.7 million dessiatins of privately owned land, 15.8 million dessiatins belong to companies and associations, while the remaining 85.9 million dessiatins belong to private persons. The following table shows the distribution of the latter category of land according to estates in 1905 as compared with 1877.

Estate	1905		1877		Inc. or dec. in 1905	
	Mill. dess.	%	Mill. dess.	%	Mill. dess.	How many fold
Nobility	53.2	61.9	79.1	79.9	-19.9	-1.40
Clergy	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.2	+0.1	+1.74
Merchants and Honorary Citizens	12.9	15.0	9.8	10.7	+3.1	+1.90
Citizens (<i>Meshchyan</i>)	8.8	4.4	1.9	2.1	+1.9	+1.85
Peasants	13.2	15.4	5.8	6.3	+7.4	+2.21
Other estates	2.2	2.5	0.3	0.3	+1.9	+8.07
Foreign subjects	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	-0.1	-1.52
Total privately owned	85.9	100.0	91.5	100.0	-5.6	-1.09

¹ See Volume III of this series—Ed

Thus, the principal private landowners in Russia are the nobility. They own an enormous amount of land. But the trend of development is in the direction of a diminution of the share owned by the nobility. The share of land owned by classes outside of the estates is growing, and growing very rapidly. The group to increase most rapidly in the period between 1877 and 1905 was the "other estates" (increased eightfold in the 28 years), and then follow the peasants (increased more than twofold). We see therefore that the peasants are more and more throwing up social elements which become transformed into private landowners. This is a general fact. In our analysis of peasant economy we shall have to reveal the social and economic mechanism by which this new class is produced. For the time being, we must definitely establish the fact that the trend of development of private landownership in Russia is the transition from estate ownership to non-estate ownership. At the end of the nineteenth century, the feudal or serf owning landed property of the nobility still comprised the overwhelmingly greater part of the privately owned land, but the trend of development is obviously towards the creation of bourgeois landownership. Privately owned land acquired by inheritance from former royal bodyguards, patrimonies and government officials, etc., is diminishing. Privately owned land, acquired simply with money, is increasing. The power of land is declining, the power of money is growing. Land is being more and more drawn into the stream of commerce, and later on we shall see that this is going on to a far greater extent than the mere statistics of landownership indicate.

But to what extent the "power of land," that is to say, the power of the mediæval landownership of the feudal landlords, is still strong at the end of the nineteenth century is very strikingly shown by the figures of the distribution of privately owned land according to size of property. The source from which we quote the figures gives in particular detail the figures of large private estates. The following are the figures of distribution according to size of property:

<i>Group of Properties According to Dimension</i>	<i>No of Properties</i>	<i>Total Area</i>	<i>Average Dessiatins per Property</i>
10 dess and less	409 864	1,625,226	3 9
10 dess to 50 dess	209,119	4,891,031	23 4
50 dess to 500 dess	106,065	17,326 495	163 3
500 dess to 2 000 dess.	21,748	20,590 708	947 0
2 000 dess to 10,000 dess	5 386	20,602,109	3,825 0
Over 10,000 dess	699	20 798,504	29,754 0
<hr/> Total over 500 dess	<hr/> 27 833	<hr/> 61,991,321	<hr/> 2,227 0
Grand Total European Russia	752,881	85,834,073	114 0

The above figures show that small properties represent an in significant share of privately owned land. Six sevenths of the total number of landowners—619,000 out of 753,000—only own 6·5 million dessiatins of land. On the other hand the latifundia¹ are boundless: *seven hundred owners own, on the average 30 000 dessiatins of land each.* These seven hundred owners own three times as much land as is owned by 600,000 small owners. And the latifundia represent a distinguishing feature of Russian private landownership. If we take all properties over 500 dessiatins, we will get 28,000 owners, owning among them 62 million dessiatins, or an average of 2,227 dessiatins each. These 28,000 own three fourths of the total privately owned land.² Most of the owners of these enormous latifundia belong to the nobility. Of the total of 27,833 properties, 18,102, *i.e.*, almost two thirds, belong to members of the nobility, and they own together 44·5 million dessiatins of land, *i.e.*, more than 70 per cent of the total latifundia land. It is clear from this that in Russia, at the end of the nineteenth century, an enormous amount of land, and the best land at that, as is known, is concentrated as before (that is to say, in the mediæval

¹ Very large landed estates.—*Ed Eng ed*

² In order not to overburden the text with quotations, we will state now that most of our data are taken from the above mentioned work and from *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, second ed., St Petersburg, 1908 (*Cf Collected Works*, Russ ed., Vol. III, Extensive excerpts are given in this volume.—*Ed*.)

way) in the hands of the privileged nobility, of the serf owning landlords of yesterday. We will describe below in detail the forms of economy developed on these latifundia, for the moment we will briefly add the well known fact, which has been strikingly described by Rubakin,¹ that it is the high officials of the bureaucracy that figure, one after another, as the owners of latifundia of the nobility.

Let us now examine the allotment properties. Except for 1.9 million dessiatins, which are not distributed according to size of property, the whole of the land in this category, amounting to 136.9 million dessiatins, belongs to 12.25 million peasant households. On the average this makes 11.1 dessiatins per household. But allotment land is also distributed unequally. Almost half, i.e., 61 million dessiatins out of 137 million dessiatins, belongs to 2.1 million rich households, i.e., to *one sixth* of the total number of peasant households.

The following table shows the distribution of allotment land in European Russia.

<i>Size of Allotment</i>	<i>No of Households</i>	<i>Total Dess</i>	<i>Average Dess per Household</i>
Up to 5 dess	2 857 650	9 030 333	3.1
5 to 8 dess.	3 317 601	21 706,550	6.5
Total up to 8 dess.	6 175,251	30 736 883	4.9
8 to 15 dess	3,932,485	42 182,923	10.7
15 to 30 dess	1,551,904	31 271,922	20.1
Over 30 dess	617,715	32,695,510	52.9
Total in European Russia	12,277 355	136 887,238	11.1

Thus, more than half of the allotment households, 6.2 million out of 12.3, have up to 8 dessiatins per household. Taken on the whole, this amount of land is not sufficient to maintain a family in Russia. In order to judge the economic conditions of these

¹ In an article entitled *Our Ruling Bureaucracy in Figures* in *Syn Otechestva* (*Son of the Fatherland*) No 54, May 3 (April 20), 1905—Ed.

households, we will recall the general returns of the military horse census¹ (the only statistics which periodically and regularly cover the whole of Russia) From 1896 to 1900 there were in 48 gubernias in the European part of Russia, with the exception of the Don Region and the Archangel Gubernia, 11,112,287 peasant households Of these, 3,242,462, i.e., 29.2 per cent, had no horses and 3,361,778, or 30.3 per cent, had one horse each What a horseless peasant represents in Russia is well known (of course we refer to the average and not to exceptional districts where suburban dairy farming or tobacco growing is developed) The poverty stricken condition of the peasant who owns only one horse is also well known Six million households means a population of from 24 to 30 millions And this mass of the population consists of paupers, beggars, who have been allotted insignificant plots of land which are insufficient to provide a livelihood, on which the only thing to do is to die of starvation If we assume that in order to make ends meet, a well to do family requires no less than 15 dessiatins, then there are 10 million peasant households that are below that standard, and these together possess 72.9 million dessiatins of land

To proceed In regard to allotment land, a very important feature must be noted The inequality of distribution of allotment land among the peasants is not nearly so great as in the distribution of privately owned land On the other hand, among the peasantry, there are a large number of other distinctions, divisions and partitions. These are the distinctions between the various categories of peasants that have arisen historically in the course of many centuries In order to illustrate these distinctions, we will first of all take the total returns for the whole of European Russia The statistics for 1905 give the following main categories: former owned peasants, on the average, 6.7 dessiatins allotted land per household, former state peasants, 12.5 dessiatins, former imperial family peasants, 9.5 dessiatins; colonists, 20.2 dessiatins, Tchinsheviki, 3.1 dessiatins, Rdajoschi, 5.3 dessiatins,

¹ The military horse census was taken every six years for the purpose of determining how many horses there were in the country fit for mobilization in the event of war.—Ed

Bashkirs and Teptyars,¹ 283 dessiatins, Baltic peasants, 369 dessiatins, Cossacks, 527 dessiatins. From this alone it is clear that peasant allotment landownership is purely mediæval. Serfdom still prevails in this multiplicity of distinctions which has survived among the peasantry. The various categories differ from each other, not only in the amount of land they possess, but also in the payments they have to make, in the terms of purchase, in the character of their tenure, etc. Instead of taking the figures for the whole of Russia, let us take the figures for a single gubernia and we will see what all these distinctions mean. Take the Zemstvo Statistical Returns for the Saratov Gubernia. In addition to the categories that we find in Russia as a whole, i.e., those already enumerated above, we find that the local investigators distinguish the following additional categories: peasant holders of gift land, full owners, state peasants with communal land tenure, state peasants with individual land tenure, state peasants, formerly landlords' serfs, tenants on state land, colonist owners, settlers, voluntarily released peasants, peasants exempt from quit rent, free farmers, former factory workers, etc. This system of mediæval distinctions is carried to such an extent that sometimes peasants living in the same village are divided into totally different categories, as for example "formerly belonging to Mr N N" or "formerly belonging to Madame M M." The writers in the Liberal Narodnik camp, who are incapable of examining Russian economic relations from the evolutionary point of view, as the transition from feudal relations to bourgeois relations, usually ignore this fact. As a matter of fact the history of Russia of the nineteenth century, and particularly the direct results of this history, the events of the beginning of the twentieth century in Russia, cannot be understood unless the significance of this fact is appreciated. A country in which exchange is growing and capitalism is developing cannot avoid crises of all kinds if in the principal branch of national econ-

¹ *Tchinshevks*, perpetual leaseholders, particularly in Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine. *Rdsjoschi* Bessarabian peasants who privately owned land but still in some respects belonged to the village commune. *Teptyars*, a Tartar tribe of Finnish stock living among the Bashkirs in the Trans-Volga.—Ed Eng ed

omy mediæval relations are an obstacle and hindrance at every step. The notorious village commune—the significance of which we will have occasion to speak about later—while it does not save the peasant from becoming proletarianised, as a matter of fact serves as a mediæval obstacle which disunites the peasants who are as if chained to small associations and to categories which have lost all “*raison d’être*”

Before proceeding to draw our conclusions from the system of landownership prevailing in European Russia, reference must be made to another aspect of the question. Neither the figures of the amount of land owned by the “upper 30,000” landlords and by the millions of peasant households nor the data concerning the mediæval distinctions in peasant landownership are sufficient to enable us to calculate the degree to which the peasants are “hemmed in,” forced to the wall and crushed by these living survivals of serfdom. In the first place, the land allotted to the peasants after the expropriation of the peasants for the benefit of the landlords that is called the Great Reform of 1861* is undoubtedly of inferior quality as compared with the land owned by landlords. This is proved by the enormous literature describing local conditions and by the investigations of Zemstvo statisticians. It is proved by the mass of irrefutable evidence of the lower yield on peasant lands as compared with that on the landlords’ lands, it is generally admitted that this difference is due primarily to the inferior quality of the allotment land and only secondarily to the inferior methods of cultivation and the defects of impoverished methods of farming. Secondly, in a large number of cases, when the peasants were “emancipated” from the land by the landlords in 1861, the land was allotted to the peasants in such a way that the latter found themselves ensnared by “their” landlords. Russian Zemstvo statistical literature has enriched the science of political economy with descriptions of the remarkable, original and peculiar methods employed in the management of Russian landlords’ estates, methods which, perhaps, have never been employed anywhere else in the world. This is the method of managing by means of *otrezki* lands.¹ The peasants in 1861 were “emanci-

¹ Literally means ‘cut off lands’ See note to this page **—Ed Eng. ed.

pated" from the pastures and water so necessary for their farms. The peasants' lands were wedged in between lands belonging to the landlords in order to provide the latter with an assured—and noble—revenue from fines for trespass, etc. "No room for a chicken to run about in"—thus bitter peasant truism, this 'jest on the scaffold,' expresses better than long quotations from books the peculiar features of peasant landownership, which cannot be expressed in statistics. Needless to say, this peculiar feature is serfdom of the purest water, both in its origin and in the effect it has upon the method of organisation of landlord economy.

We will now draw our conclusions regarding landownership in European Russia. We have shown the conditions of landlord and peasant landownership taken separately. We must now examine them in their connections with each other. In order to do so we will take the approximate figure quoted above of the dimensions of the land fund in European Russia—280 million dessiatins—and see how this mass of land is distributed among the various types of landowners. We shall describe the various types in detail later on, for the moment we will take tentatively the main types. Properties up to 15 dessiatins per household we will put in the first group—ruined peasants, crushed by the exploitation of serfdom. The second group will consist of the middle peasantry—properties ranging from 15 to 20 dessiatins. The third group—well to do peasants (peasant bourgeoisie) and capitalist landowners—properties ranging from 20 to 500 dessiatins. Fourth group—feudal latifundia—exceeding 500 dessiatins. By combining these groups of peasant and landlord properties and by rounding off the figures,¹ and making an approximate calculation (which I have explained in the work mentioned above), we get the following picture of Russian landownership at the end of the nineteenth century.

¹For example, the latifundia include 62 million dessiatins of landlord land, 51 million dessiatins of appanage lands and 36 million dessiatins of land belonging to 272 trading and industrial companies each of which owned more than 1,000 dessiatins.

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PREREQUISITES

LANDOWNERSHIP IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA AT THE END
OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

	<i>No of Properties (millions)</i>	<i>Area Dessiatins</i>	<i>Average Dessiatins per Property</i>
a) Ruined Peasants Crushed by Feudal Exploitation	10.5	75.0	7.0
b) Middle Peasantry	1.0	15.0	15.0
c) Peasant Bourgeoisie and Cap italist Landownership	1.5	70.0	46.7
d) Feudal Latifundia	0.03	70.0	2 333.0
Total	13.03	230.0	17.6
Not Distributed According to Size of Property	—	50.0	—
Grand Total	13.03	280.0	21.4

We repeat the correctness of the economic characterisation of the groups taken will be proved later on. And if particular details of this picture (which cannot but be approximate) give rise to criticism, we will ask the reader to take care that criticism of details is not used as a screen for smuggling in a denial of the substance of the case. And the substance of the case is that at one pole of Russian landownership we have 10.5 million households (about 50 million of the population) owning 75 million dessiatins of land, and at the other pole *thirty thousand families* (about 150,000 of the population) owning 70 million dessiatins of land.

In order to finish with the question of landownership we must go beyond the confines of European Russia proper and examine, in general outline, the significance of colonisation. In order to give the reader an idea of the total land fund in the Russian Empire (with the exception of Finland) we will refer to the figures compiled by M. Mertvago. For the sake of convenience we have put the figures in the form of a table and have added the figures of the population according to the census of 1897. [See opposite page.]

These figures clearly show how little we know as yet about the outlying districts of Russia. Of course it would be extremely absurd to believe that the agrarian problem in Russia could be solved by migration to the outlying districts. There cannot be any

	Total Land		Of Which		Of Which			Population 1897	
	Sq. Vershs (Thous- and)	Desiatins (Millions)	No Inform- ation (Mill. Des.)	Registered Lands (Mill. Des.)	Million Desiatins			Total (Thous- ands)	Average per Square Versh
					Tillage	Hay fields	Woods		
10 Gubernias in the Kingdom of Poland	111.6	11.6	—	11.6	7.4	0.9	2.5	9 402.2	84.3
38 Gubernias West of the Volga	1 755.6	183.0	—	183.0	93.6	18.7	34.0	—	—
12 Gub. North and East of the Volga	2 474.9	208.0	—	258.0	22.3	7.1	132.0	—	—
Total Gubernias European Russia	4,230.5	441.0	—	441.0	123.3	26.7	168.5	93,442.9	22.1
Caucasus	411.7	42.9	22.1	20.8	6.5	2.2	2.5	9,289.4	22.6
Siberia	10 986.1	1 142.6	639.7	502.9	4.3	3.9	121.0	5,758.8	0.5
Central Asia	3,141.6	327.3	157.4	169.9	0.9	1.6	8.0	7 746.7	2.5
Total Asiatic Russia	14,519.4	1,512.8	819.2	693.6	11.7	7.7	131.5	—	—
Total Russian Empire	18,861.5	1 965.4	819.2	1 146.2	135.0	34.4	300.0	125 640.0	6.7

doubt whatsoever that only charlatans could propose "solutions" like that, there can be no doubt that the contradictions between the old latifundia in European Russia and the new conditions of life and economics in this very same European Russia, to which we referred above, will have to be solved by some change or other within *European Russia* and not outside of it. It is not a question of emancipating the peasants from serfdom by migration. The question is that, side by side with the agrarian problem in the centre, there is the agrarian problem of colonisation. It is not a question of concealing the crisis in European Russia by the question of colonisation, but of showing the fatal effects of the feudal latifundia *both* on the centre and on the outlying districts. Russian colonisation is being *hindered* by the survivals of serfdom in Central Russia. Without an agrarian revolution in European Russia, without liberating the peasants from the oppression of the feudal latifundia it will be *impossible* to release and regulate Russian colonisation. This regulation should consist not of bureaucratic "solicitude" for migration and not in "organising migration," about which the writers in the Liberal Narodnik camp love to talk, but in removing the conditions which condemn the Russian peasant to ignorance, wretchedness and degradation in permanent bondage to the owners of the latifundia.

Mr Mertvago, who, in conjunction with Mr Prokopovich, wrote the pamphlet *How Much Land Is There in Russia and How Do We Utilise It?* (Moscow, 1907), justly points out that the growth of culture transforms bad land into good land. Academicians Beer and Helmersen, experts on the subject, wrote in 1845 that the Taurida Steppe "would *always* remain poor and difficult to cultivate because of its climate and the shortage of water"!! At that time the population of the Taurida Gubernia produced 1.8 million quarters of grain. In sixty years the population doubled and now produces 17.6 million quarters, *i.e.*, almost ten times as much.

These are very true and important remarks, but Mr Mertvago forgot one thing, *viz.*, that the principal condition that permitted the rapid colonisation of Novorossia was the *fall of serfdom* in Central Russia. It was the change at the centre alone that

made possible the rapid, broad migration to, and industrialisation of, the South in the American manner (a great deal has been said about the *American* growth of the South after 1861) And now also, only a change in European Russia, only the abolition of the survivals of serfdom, the emancipation of the peasantry from the mediæval latifundia will *really* open a new era of colonisation

The colonisation question in Russia is a question that is subordinated to the agrarian question in the centre of the country The end of the nineteenth century confronts us with the alternative either liquidation of serfdom in the "primordial" gubernias of Russia, and if that is done the rapid, broad American development of the colonisation of our outlying districts is assured, or, the agrarian question in the centre drags on, and in that case a long delay in the development of productive forces and the retention of serf traditions in the sphere of colonisation as well are inevitable. In the event of the first happening, agriculture will be carried on by the free farmer; in the event of the second happening, agriculture will be carried on by the enslaved muzhik and by the landlord "managing" by means of *otrezki* lands

II

We will now examine the organisation of landlord farming It is generally known that the main feature of this organisation is the combination of the capitalist system ("free hire") with the labour rent (*otrabotochnu*) system What is this system?

In order to reply to this question we must glance back to the organisation of landlord economy under serfdom Everyone knows what serfdom was from the juridical, administrative and social points of view But very rarely do people ask themselves what, in substance, were the economic relations between the landlord and the peasant under serfdom. At that time the landlords allotted land to the peasants Sometimes they loaned the peasants other means of production, for example, woodland, cattle, etc What was the significance of this allotting of landlords' land to the serf peasants? At that time the allotment was a *form of wages*, to employ a term applicable to modern relationships Under the capitalist mode of production, wages are paid to the workers in the

form of money. The profit of the capitalist is realised in the form of money. Necessary labour and surplus labour (*i.e.*, the labour necessary to maintain the worker and the labour producing unpaid surplus value for the capitalist) are combined in a single process of labour in the factory, in a single working day at the factory, etc. The situation is different under the labour rent system. Here, too, there is necessary labour and surplus labour, just as it exists under the system of slavery. But these two forms of labour are separated in time and space. The serf peasant works three days for his master and three days for himself. He works for his master on the master's land or his granaries. He works for himself on his allotment, producing for himself and for his family the grain that is necessary for maintaining labour power for the landlord.

Consequently, the serf, or labour rent system (*barshchina*),¹ is similar to the capitalist system in this respect—that under both systems the workers receive only the product of necessary labour and give the product of surplus labour gratis to the owner of the means of production. The serf system, however, differs from the capitalist system in the following three respects. First, the serf system is a natural, self-sufficing system, whereas the capitalist system is the money system. Second, under the serf system the instrument of exploitation is the *tying* of the worker to the land, allotting him land, whereas under the capitalist system the instrument of exploitation is the releasing of the worker from the land. In order to obtain revenues (*i.e.*, surplus product), the serf owning landlord must have on his land a peasant who possesses an allotment, implements and livestock. A landless, horseless and farmless peasant is useless as an object of serf exploitation. The capitalist, in order to obtain revenues (profit), must have precisely a landless, farmless worker who is compelled to sell his labour power on the free labour market. Third, the allotment holding peasant must be *personally dependent* upon the landlord, because, possessing land, he will not go to work for a master except under compulsion. The system gives rise to “non-economic compulsion,” serfdom, juridical dependence, lack of

¹ The common Russian term for labour rent under serfdom proper — *Ed Eng ed*

rights, etc. On the other hand, "ideal" capitalism implies complete freedom of contract on the free market—between the property owner and the proletarian.

Only by distinctly understanding the economic essence of the serf, or what is the same thing, the labour rent system (*barshchina*) will it be possible to understand the historical place and significance of the *otrabotochni* system.¹ The *otrabotochni* system is a direct survival of *barshchina*. The *otrabotochni* system is the transitional system from *barshchina* to capitalism. In essence, the *otrabotochni* system amounts to this: the peasant cultivates the landlord's land, with his own implements, partly for pay in money and partly in kind (use of land, use of *otrezki*, use of pastures, loans granted in the winter, etc.). What is known as share cropping (*metayer* system) is a form of the *otrabotochni* system. The landlord *otrabotochni* system requires that the peasant shall have an allotment and implements and cattle, if only of the poorest kind, it requires also that the peasant be crushed by want and compelled to place himself in bondage. Bondage instead of free hire is an essential concomitant of the *otrabotochni* system. Under this system the landlord is not like the capitalist employer who owns money and all the necessary instruments of labour. Under this system the landlord is like a usurer, who takes advantage of the poverty of a neighbouring peasant and acquires his labour almost for nothing.

In order to illustrate this more clearly we will quote the data of the Department of Agriculture—a source that is above all suspicion of being unfriendly towards the landlords. The well known

¹ The Russian term for the labour rent system in vogue after the emancipation of the serfs, Marx, in his chapter on rent, *Capital* Vol III refers to *Arbeitsrente* literally 'labour rent' (the translation given in the English translation of *Capital*, Vol III), as the form of rent under serfdom which in Russian would be *barshchina*. In a footnote to *Conclusions to Chapter II of Development of Capitalism in Russia* in this volume page 102 Lenin explains that the literal translation of *Arbeitsrente* into Russian as *trudovaya renta* is incorrect: the correct translation is *otrabotichnaya renta* which fully describes the concept *Arbeitsrente*. In Russian, therefore, there are two distinct terms to denote the labour rent system under serfdom and after serfdom was officially abolished. For this reason we are obliged to employ the respective Russian terms when, in the text, the two systems of labour rent are put in juxtaposition.—Ed Eng ed

publication, *Freely Hired Labour in Economy, etc* (Vol V, *Agricultural and Statistical Information Obtained from Employers*, St Petersburg, 1892), gives information concerning the Central Black Earth Belt for eight years (1883-91) the average payment for the complete working of a dessiatin of winter crop by a peasant working with his own implements must be calculated at 6 rubles. If we calculate the price of the same amount of labour performed by a freely hired worker—says this same publication—we will get 6 rubles 19 kopeks for the work of the man alone, that is, *not counting* the work of the horse, the latter cannot be calculated at less than 4.50 rubles (*Ibid*, page 45, quoted in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, page 141¹). Consequently, the work of a free labourer is valued at 10 rubles 69 kopeks and that of a peasant on *otrabotki* is valued at only 6 rubles. How is this phenomenon to be explained, if it is not something casual, or exceptional, but normal and usual? Words like bondage, usury, extortion, etc., merely describe the form and character of the transaction, but they do not describe its economic substance. How can a peasant over a number of years perform work that is worth 10.69 rubles for 6 rubles? He is able to do it because his allotment covers part of the expenditure of his family and *makes it possible* for his wages to be forced down below the “free wage worker’s” level. The peasant is compelled to do so precisely because his wretched allotment ties him down to the neighbouring landlord, because he cannot obtain a livelihood on his farm. Of course, this phenomenon can be “normal” only as one of the links of the process by which capitalism squeezes out the labour rent (*barshchina*) system. For the peasant is inevitably ruined by these conditions and is slowly but surely transformed into a proletarian.

The following are similar, but more complete data concerning the Saratov Uyezd. The average wage for tilling one dessiatin of land, including reaping, carting and threshing the grain, is 9.60 rubles if contracted in the winter, and 80 to 100 per cent of the wage is paid in advance. When the work is done in payment for rent of land the wage is 9.40 rubles. The wage of a

¹ *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Vol. III, pp. 147-48.—Ed.

free labourer for the same work is 17 50 rubles¹ Reaping and carting is paid for at the rate of 3 90 rubles per dessiatin if the work is done in payment for rent, and at the rate of 8 50 rubles per dessiatin to free labourers, etc Each of these figures contains a long story of the endless poverty, bondage and ruination of the peasants Each of these figures proves to what extent serf exploitation and the survivals of the labour rent system (*barshchina*) still exist in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century

It is very difficult to calculate to what extent the labour rent system (*otrabotki*) is prevalent. Usually, on the landlords' farms the labour rent system is combined with the capitalist system and both are applied in various operations in agriculture An inconsiderable part of the land is tilled with the aid of the landlords' implements and free labourers A great part of the land is rented to the peasants on the share cropping or labour rent system The following are a number of illustrations taken from the detailed work written by Mr Kaufman, who has compiled new data on privately owned farms¹ Tula Gubernia (the data refer to 1897-98) "the landlords have retained the three field system the more distant land is taken by the peasants", the cultivation of the privately owned lands is extremely unsatisfactory Kursk Gubernia "the distribution of land to the peasants in dessiatins, which is profitable owing to the high prices prevailing has led to the exhaustion of the soil" Voronezh Gubernia "the middle and small properties are cultivated exclusively with the aid of peasants' implements or are leased out on the majority of the estates methods are practised which are distinguished by the complete absence of any kind of improvements"

Facts like these show that the characterisation of the various gubernias of European Russia given by Mr Annensky, in his book *The Influence of Harvests*, etc, in regard to the prevalence of the *otrabotochni* or capitalist system can be fully applied to the conditions prevailing at the end of the nineteenth century We will quote this characterisation in the form of a table

¹ *Agrarian Question* published by Dolgorukov and Petrunkevich Vol II, 1907, pp 442-628, *The Cultural and Economic Significance of Private Land-ownership*

	No Gubernias			Total Privately Owned Cultivated Land (Thousand Dess.)
	Black Earth Belt	Non Black Earth Belt	Total	
I. Gubernias where capitalist system predominates	9	10	19	7 407
II Gubernias with mixed systems	8	4	7	2 222
III Gubernias where <i>otru</i> <i>botochni</i> system pre- dominates	12	5	17	6 281
Total	24	19	43	15 910

Thus, the labour rent system undoubtedly predominates in the Black Earth Belt, but retreats into the background in the total of the 43 gubernias included in the above table. It is important to note that Group I (capitalist system) includes localities which are not characteristic of the central agricultural districts, *i.e.*, the Baltic gubernias, the Southwest (sugar beet districts), the South and the two capital districts (St Petersburg and Moscow).

The influence the labour rent system has on the productive forces of agriculture is excellently illustrated by the material compiled in Mr Kaufman's book

"There cannot be any doubt," he writes, "that small tenant farming and share cropping represent one of the conditions which most of all retards the progress of agriculture."

In the reviews of agriculture in the Poltava Gubernia repeated reference is made to the fact that "the tenants till the soil badly, use bad seed and allow the land to become weed grown."

In the Mogilyov Gubernia (1898), "all improvements to the farm are hindered by the disadvantages of the share cropping system." This system is one of the main reasons why "agriculture in the Dneprovsk Uyezd is in such a state that it is futile to expect any innovations or improvements."

"Our material," writes Mr Kaufman (p. 517), "definitely indicates that on one and the same property, land that is rented out is cultivated by obsolete methods, whereas on land that is cultivated by the owners, new and improved methods are employed."

For example, on the land that is rented out, the three field system is retained and sometimes the land is not even manured;

on the big landlord farms, however, the rotation of crops system has been introduced. The share cropping system hinders the introduction of grass sowing, hinders the extension of the use of fertilisers and retards the employment of better agricultural implements. The result of all this is strikingly reflected in the figures of the yield. For example, on a certain large estate in Simbirsk Gubernia, the yield of rye on landlord farms is 90 poods¹ per dessiatin, wheat 60 poods, oats 74 poods. On the share cropping farms, however, the yield is 58, 28, 50 poods respectively. The following table shows the position in this respect in a whole uyezd (Gorbatovsky Uyezd, Nizhni Novgorod Gubernia):

YIELD OF RYE IN POODS PER DESSIATIN

Category of Soil	Allotment Land	Privately Owned Lands		
		Big Landlord Farms	Share-Croppers	Rented Land
I	62	74	—	44
II	55	63	49	—
III	51	60	50	42
IV	48	69	51	51
All Categories	54 ²	66	50	45 ²

Thus, *landlords'* lands, cultivated by feudal methods (share cropping and small tenant farming), produce a *smaller* yield than allotment lands! This fact is of tremendous importance, because it irrefutably proves that the main and fundamental reason for the agricultural backwardness of Russia, for the stagnation of the whole of national economy and the degradation of the farmer to a degree unparalleled anywhere else in the world, is the labour rent system, *i.e.*, the direct survival of serfdom. No credits, no land reclamation, no "aid" for the peasant, none of the favourite measures of "assistance" proposed by the bureaucrats and the liberals will be effective as long as the yoke of the serf latifundia and the traditional systems are allowed to remain. On the other hand, the agrarian revolution, which will abolish landlordism and destroy the old mediæval village commune (the nationalisation of the land, for example, will destroy it, not in the police

¹ Pood—about 36 pounds—Ed. Eng. ed.

² In Mr Kaufman's book, page 521 there is obviously a misprint of these two figures.

and bureaucratic manner), will unfailingly serve as the basis for a remarkably rapid and really wide progress. The incredibly low yield on share crop and tenant lands is due to the system of "working for the squire." Not only would the yield on these lands increase if the present tillers of those lands were relieved of the duty of "working for the squire," but the yield on the allotment lands would inevitably increase also, simply because the feudal hindrances to farming would be removed.

In the present state of affairs there is some capitalist progress, of course, on the privately owned farms but it is exceedingly slow and burdens Russia for many years with the political and social domination of the "wild landlord." We will now see how this progress manifests itself and try to define certain of its general results.

The fact that the yield on "big landlord farms," *i.e.*, the capitalistically cultivated landlords' lands, is higher than on the peasant lands reveals the technical progress of capitalism in agriculture. This progress is due to the transition from the labour rent system to the wage labour system. The ruination of the peasants, their loss of horses and implements, the proletarianisation of the farmer, compel the landlord to adopt the system of cultivating his land with his own implements. The employment of machinery in agriculture is increasing and this raises the productivity of labour and inevitably leads to the development of purely capitalist relations of production. In 1869-72, agricultural machinery was imported into Russia to the value of 788,000 rubles, in 1873-80, to the amount of 2.9 million rubles, 1881-88, to the amount of 4.2 million rubles, 1889-96, to the amount of 3.7 million rubles and in 1902-03, to the amount of 15.2 million and 20.6 million rubles respectively. The output of agricultural machinery in Russia was (approximately, according to the rough statistics of the factories) 2.3 million rubles in 1876, 9.4 million in 1894, 12.1 million in 1900-03. It cannot be disputed that these figures indicate progress in agriculture, capitalist progress, of course. But it cannot be disputed, however, that this progress is very slow compared to what is possible in a modern capitalist state for example in America. According to

the census of June 14, 1900, land occupied by farms in the United States amounted to 838.6 million acres (i.e., about 324 million dessiatins). The number of farms was 5.7 million, so that on the average each farm occupied 116.2 acres (about 60 dessiatins). And yet the production of agricultural implements for these farms amounted to 157.7 million dollars in 1900 (in 1890, 145.3 million dollars, in 1880, 62.1 million dollars)!¹ The Russian figures are ridiculously small in comparison with these, and they are small because the feudal latifundia in Russia are big and strong.

The extent to which improved agricultural implements were employed by landlords and peasants respectively in Russia was the subject of a special investigation carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture in the middle of the nineties of the last century. The results of this investigation, which are given in detail in Mr Kaufman's book, are summarised in the following table.

District	Extent of Employment of Improved Agricultural Implements (In Percentages)	
	Landowners	Peasants
Central Agricultural	20—51	8—20
Middle Volga	18—66	14
Novorossisk	50—91	33—65
White Russia	54—86	17—41
Lake District	22—47	1—21
Moscow	22—51	10—26
Industrial	4—8	2

The average for all these districts is 42 per cent among the landlords and 21 per cent among the peasants.

In regard to the employment of manure, all the statistics irrefutably prove that "in this respect the landlords' farms have been all the time, and are now, a long way ahead of the peasant farms" (Kaufman, p. 544). Moreover, the practice of the landlord purchasing manure from the peasant has been widespread in post Reform Russia. That is the result of the extremely poverty stricken condition of the peasants. Recently, this practice has been declining.

¹ *Abstract of the Twelfth Census 1900*, third edition, Washington, 1904, pp. 217 and 302—agricultural implements.

Finally, precise and abundant statistics are available on the question of the level of agricultural technique on landlord and peasant farms respectively, in regard to the practice of grass sowing (Kaufman, p 561) The following are the principal figures:

AREA OF CULTIVATED GRASS LAND IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA

Year	Peasant Farms in Dess	Landlord Farms in Dess
1881	49,800	491,600
1901	499 000	1 046 000

What is the effect of this difference between landlord and peasant farming? All we have available to enable us to judge are the returns showing the relative yields of the harvest Through out the whole of European Russia the average yield over a period of eighteen years (1883 1900) was as follows (in quarters)

	Rye	Winter Wheat	Spring Wheat	Oats
Landlord Farms ,	60	5 75	50	85
Peasant Farms	50	50	4 25	70
Difference	16 7%	13 0%	15 0%	17 6%

Mr Kaufman is quite right when he says that the "difference is not very great" (Page 592) But we must bear in mind not only that in 1861 the peasants were left with the *worst land*, but also that the average for the whole of the peasantry conceals (as we shall see in a moment) considerable differences among the peasantry

The general conclusion we must arrive at from the examination of landlord farming is the following Capitalism is quite obviously beating a path for itself in this field The change is taking place from the labour rent system to the free wage labour system The technical progress of capitalist agriculture compared with the labour rent system and small peasant farming is quite definitely observed in all directions But this progress is exceedingly slow for a modern capitalist country The end of the nineteenth century finds Russia involved in the extremely acute contradiction between the requirements of the whole of social development and serfdom which, in the form of the landlord and

aristocratic latifundia and the labour rent system, retards economic development, and is a source of oppression, barbarity, and of innumerable forms of oriental despotism in Russian life

III

Peasant farming is the central point in the modern agrarian question in Russia. We indicated above what were the conditions of peasant landownership and now we must deal with the organisational form of peasant farming—not in the technical sense of the term, but in the sense of political economy.

At the outset we encounter the question of the village commune. A very extensive literature is devoted to this question, and the Narodnik trend in public thought in Russia links the main points of its philosophy with the national peculiarities of this "equalitarian" institution. In regard to this it must be stated, in the first place, that in the literature on the Russian village commune two distinct aspects of the question are interwoven and very often confused, these are the agricultural and social aspect, on the one hand, and the political economic aspect, on the other. In the majority of works on the village commune (V Orlov, Trigorov (Keyssler, V V), so much space and attention are devoted to the first aspect of the question that the second aspect is left in the shade. This method of treating the subject is totally wrong. There is not the slightest doubt that agrarian relations in Russia differ from those of all other countries, but there are no two purely capitalist countries, generally recognised capitalist countries, whose agrarian life, history of agrarian relations, forms of landownership, land tenure, etc., did not differ to the same degree. It is by no means the agricultural and social aspect that gave the question of the Russian village commune its importance and acuteness and which, since the second half of the nineteenth century, has divided the two main trends in Russian public thought, *i.e.*, Narodniki and Marxists. Perhaps local investigators had to devote considerable attention to this aspect of the question in order to be able to study the local features of agricultural life

and also to repel the ignorant and arrogant attempts of the bureaucracy to introduce a system of petty and police imbued regulations. But an economist cannot allow the study of the various types of land distribution, the technique of distribution, etc., to obscure the question of the *types of economy* contained within the commune, how these types are developing, what relations grow up between those who hire workers and those who hire themselves for labouring work, between the well-to-do and the poor, between the farmers who are improving their farms and employing modern technical appliances and those whose farms are being ruined, who are abandoning their farms and deserting the village. No doubt the fact that they were conscious of this truth induced our Zemstvo statisticians—who have collected invaluable material for the study of the national economy of Russia—to abandon, in the eighties of the last century, the *official* grouping of the peasantry according to commune, allotment, the number of registered or available males and to adopt the only really scientific grouping, according to *economic status* of households. We recall the fact that at that time, when very great interest was being displayed in the economic study of Russia, even a "party" writer on this subject like V V heartily welcomed "the new type of Zemstvo statistical publication" (the title of V V's article in *Severni Vestnik* [*Northern Herald*], 1885, No. 11) and declared that

"These statistics must be adapted not to the agglomeration of the most varied economic groups of the peasantry, like the village, or the commune, but to these very groups themselves."

The fundamental feature of our village commune, to which the Narodniki attach special importance, is the equality of land tenure. We will leave aside entirely the question as to how the commune achieves this equality and turn immediately to the economic facts, to the results of this equality. As we have shown above on the basis of definite data, the distribution of the total allotment land in European Russia is by no means equal. Nor is the distribution of land among the various categories of peasants, among the peasants of different villages, among the peasants ("formerly") belonging to different landlords in the

same village in the least equal. Only within the small communes does the apparatus of distribution create the equality of these small, exclusive associations. We will examine the Zemstvo statistics and see how the allotment land is distributed among the households. In doing so, of course, we must group the households, not according to the size of families, not according to the number of workers in the family, but according to their *economic status* (area of land, number of draught animals, number of cows, etc.), for the essence of the capitalist evolution of small farming lies in the creation and growth of inequality in property within the patriarchal associations, and in the transformation of simple inequality into capitalist relationships. Hence, we would obscure all the peculiar features of the new economic evolution if we did not set out to study especially the differences in the economic status among the peasantry.

We will take, at first, a typical uyezd (the house to house investigation of Zemstvo statistics with detailed combined tables adapted to separate uyezds) and then we will present the arguments which induce us to apply the conclusions which interest us to the peasants of the whole of Russia. The material is taken from *The Development of Capitalism*, Chap. II.¹

In the Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, where communal peasant landownership prevails exclusively, allotment land is distributed in the following manner:

	Per Household ¹	
	No. in Family Both Sexes	Allotment Land in Dess.
Do not cultivate land	3.5	9.8
Cultivating up to five dessiatins	4.5	12.9
Cultivating five to 10 dessiatins	5.4	17.4
Cultivating 10 to 20 dessiatins	6.7	21.8
Cultivating 20 to 50 dessiatins	7.9	28.8
Cultivating over 50 dessiatins	8.2	44.6
Total average	5.5	17.4

It will be observed that with the improvement in the economic status of the household, the size of the family increases with absolute regularity. Clearly, large families is one of the factors

¹ *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Vol. III—Ed.

in peasant prosperity. This is indisputable. The only question is, what social economic relations does this prosperity lead to in the present state of national economy as a whole? In regard to allotment land we see unevenness in distribution, although not to a considerable extent. The more prosperous a peasant household is the more allotment land it has *per member of family*. The lower group has less than three dessiatins of allotment land per head of both sexes, in the other groups, having about 3 dessiatins—three dessiatins, about 4 dessiatins—four dessiatins, and finally, in the last high group, over 5 dessiatins of allotment land per head of both sexes. Hence, large families and large allotments of land serve as the basis of prosperity of a *small minority* of the peasants, for the two highest groups represent together only *one tenth* of the total number of households. The following table shows the percentage of the various groups to the total number of households, the total population and distribution of land.

	Percentage of Households	Percentage Population Both Sexes	Percentage Allotment Land
Do not cultivate land	10.2	6.5	5.7
Cultivating up to five dessiatins	30.3	24.8	22.6
Cultivating from five to 10 dessiatins	27.0	26.7	26.0
Cultivating from 10 to 20 dessiatins	22.4	27.3	29.3
Cultivating from 20 to 50 dessiatins	9.4	13.5	15.5
Cultivating over 50 dessiatins	0.7	1.2	1.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

The above figures clearly show that there is proportion in the distribution of allotment land and that we do take into account commune equality. The percentage of the population of each group and the share of allotment land per group are fairly close to each other. But here, too, the effect of the economic status of certain households is to be seen: among the lower groups the share of land is *lower* than their percentage of the population, and among the higher groups it is *higher*. And this does not occur in single cases, or only in a single uyezd, but over the whole of Russia. In the work mentioned above, I have compiled identical data for 21 uyezds in 7 gubernias in the most varied parts of Russia. These data, which cover half a million peasant

households, show the same relation in all places well to do peasant households represent 20 per cent of the total households, 26.1 to 30.3 per cent of the population and have 29 to 36.7 per cent of the total allotment land. The poorest households represent 50 per cent of the total households, 36.6 to 44.7 per cent of the total population and have 33 to 37.7 per cent of the total allotment land. We therefore observe a certain proportion in the distribution of the land everywhere, and everywhere we observe that the trend of the village commune is towards the peasant bourgeoisie, departure from proportion everywhere proceeds in favour of the higher groups of the peasantry.

Hence, it would be a profound mistake to think that in studying the grouping of the peasantry according to economic status we ignore the "equalising" influence of the commune. On the contrary, by means of precise data we measure the real economic significance of this equality. We indicate to what extent this equality really exists and to what the whole system of redistribution is leading in the *final analysis*. Even if this system provides for the best distribution of land of various qualities and various appurtenances, it is an indisputable fact that the position of the well to do peasants is superior to that of the poor peasants even in the matter of the distribution of allotment land. The distribution of land, other than allotment, as we shall show in a moment, is immeasurably more unequal.

The importance of renting land in peasant farming is well known. The need for land gives rise to an extraordinary variety of forms of bondage relations on this basis. As we have already shown above, very often peasant tenant farming is, in essence, the *otrabotochni* system of landlord farming—it is a serf system of providing labour for the landlord. Hence, there cannot be any doubt as to the serf character of peasant tenant farming in Russia. But since the country we are studying is in a state of capitalist evolution, we must make a special study of the question as to whether, and in what manner, *bourgeois* relations manifest themselves in peasant tenant farming. For this purpose we also require data on the various economic groups among the peasantry and not on whole communes and villages. For ex

ample, in his *Summary of Zemstvo Statistics*, Mr Karyshev has to admit that "natural rent" (i.e., rent, not in money but in kind, or labour) as a general rule is *everywhere* higher than money rent, and considerably higher at that, sometimes twice as high, that natural rent is *most widespread among the poorest groups of the peasantry*. The peasants who are at all well to do strive to rent land at money rents "The tenant takes advantage of every opportunity to pay his rent in money and, in this way, reduce the cost of hiring other people's land" (Karyshev, p. 265.)

Hence the whole burden of the serf features of our tenantry system falls upon the poorest peasants. The well to do peasants try to escape from the mediæval yoke, and they succeed in doing this only to the extent that they possess money. If they have money they can rent land for a money rent at the prevailing market rate. If they have no money then they must go into bondage, pay three times the market price for the land they rent, either in the form of a share of their crop or in labour. We have seen above how much cheaper labour performed in payment of rent is than free labour. And if the conditions of tenancy are different for peasants of different economic status, it is clear that we can not (as Karyshev does) group the peasants according to allotments, for such a method of grouping *artificially* mingles together peasant households of different economic status, it mixes up the rural proletariat with the peasant bourgeoisie.

As an illustration we will take data covering the Kamyslin Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, which consists almost entirely of village communes (out of 2,455 communes in this gubernia, 2,436 own land in common). The following table shows the relation between the various groups of households in regard to renting land.

Group of Households	Percentage of Total	Average	
		Dessiatins per Household Allotment	Rented Land
Without draught animals	26.4	5.4	0.3
With one head of animals	20.3	6.5	1.6
With two head of animals	14.6	8.5	3.5
With three head of animals	9.3	10.1	5.6
With four head of animals	8.3	12.5	7.4
With five and more animals	21.1	16.1	16.6
Total	100.0	9.3	5.4

We already know how the allotment land is distributed the well to do households are better provided with land than the poor households, calculated on the amount of land per unit of the population. But the distribution of rented land is *ten times more unequal*. The highest group has three times as much allotment land as the lowest group (16.1 as against 5.4), but in regard to rented land the highest group has *fifty times as much* as the lowest groups (16.6 as against 0.3). Hence, the renting of land does not equalise the economic position of the peasants but on the contrary increases their inequality to an enormous degree. The opposite conclusion which is repeatedly met with in the writings of the Narodnik economists (V.V., N.—on Maress Karyshev, Vikhlyayev and others) is due to the following error. They usually take the peasants according to the amount of allotment land they hold and show that those who have little allotment land rent a larger amount of land than do those who have a large amount of allotment land—and there they stop. They do not point out that it is mainly the well to do households in the communes which have little allotment land that rent land and consequently, the seemingly levelling effect of the commune really covers up the extreme inequality of distribution within the commune. Karyshev, for example, admits that "large amounts of land are rented by a) the categories that are less provided with land, but b) by the more well-to-do in each category" (*Ibid*, p. 169). Nevertheless, he fails to investigate systematically the distribution of rented land according to groups.

In order to bring out more clearly the mistake committed by the Narodnik economists we will cite the example of Mr. Maress (in his book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, Vol. I, p. 34). From the data covering the Melitopol Uyezd he draws the conclusion that "the distribution of rented land per head is approximately even." Why? Because if households are divided according to the number of male workers in them it will be found that households with no workers rent "on the average" 16 dessiatins per household, those with one worker rent 4.4 dessiatins, those with two workers, 8.3 dessiatins, those with three workers, 14.0 dessiatins per household. This is the very point—that the

"average" combines households of absolutely different states of prosperity, that among the households having one worker there are some which rent four dessiatins and cultivate five to ten dessiatins and have two to three head of draught animals, as well as some which rent 38 dessiatins, cultivate more than 50 dessiatins and have four and more head of draught animals. Consequently, the equality Mr Maress arrives at is *fictionous*. As a matter of fact, in the Melitopol Uyezd the richest households, representing 20 per cent of the total, notwithstanding the fact that they are best provided with allotment and purchased land, concentrate in their hands 66·3 per cent, *i.e.*, two thirds of the total rented land, leaving only 5·6 per cent to the share of the poorest households which represent *one half* of the total.

To proceed. Since we see, on the one hand, households which have no horses, or have only one horse, renting one dessiatin, and even part of a dessiatin of land, and, on the other hand, we see households having four or more horses, renting from seven to 16 dessiatins, it is clear that quantity is being transformed into quality. The first category is compelled to rent land by poverty, the position of those in this category is that of bondage. The "tenant" under such conditions cannot but become transformed into an object of exploitation by paying rent in labour, winter hiring, money loans, etc. On the other hand, households having from 12 to 16 dessiatins of land and *in addition* renting from seven to 16 dessiatins obviously do so not because they are poor, but because they are rich, not to provide themselves with "provisions,"¹ but to become richer, in order "to make money." Thus we have a striking example of how tenant farming is converted into capitalist farming, we see the rise of capitalist enterprise in agriculture, for, as we shall see further on, households like these cannot dispense with hired agricultural labourers.

The question now arises to what extent is this obvious capitalist renting of land a general phenomenon? Further on we shall quote data which show that the growth of capitalist farming

¹ *I.e.*, the renting of land in order to supplement the food supply which the peasant was unable to grow in sufficient quantities on his allotment.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

varies in the different commercial farming districts. For the moment we will quote a few more examples and draw our general conclusions regarding the renting of land.

In the Dneprovsk Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, households cultivating 25 dessiatins and over comprise 18.2 per cent of the total peasant households in the area. These have from 16 to 17 dessiatins of allotment land per household and rent from 17 to 44 dessiatins per household. In the Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, households having five and more head of draught animals represent 24.7 per cent of the total. They cultivate 25, 53, 149 dessiatins and rent 14, 54, 342 dessiatins of non allotment land per household (the first figure applies to the group having from five to ten head of draught animals representing 17.1 per cent of all the households, the second group owns from ten to 20 head of draught animals and represents 5.8 per cent of the households and the third owns 20 and over head of draught animals and represents 1.8 per cent of the total households). These households rent allotment land from other communities in areas of 12, 29 and 67 dessiatins per household and in their own communities they rent land in areas of 9, 21 and 74 dessiatins. In the Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, 10.1 per cent of the total households cultivate 20 and more dessiatins per household. These have 28 to 44 dessiatins of allotment land per household and rent from 14 to 40 dessiatins per household of arable land and from 118 to 261 dessiatins of grass land. In two uyezds in the Orel Gubernia (Eletz and Trubchevsk), households having four and more horses comprise 7.2 per cent of the total. Having 15.2 dessiatins per household of allotment land, by purchasing and renting land they enlarge their holdings to 28.4 dessiatins per household. In the Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia, the corresponding figures are: 3.2 per cent of the households have 17.1 dessiatins of allotment land per household, the total area per household amounting to 33.2 dessiatins. In three uyezds in the Nizhni Novgorod Gubernia (Knyagininsky, Makaryevsky and Vassilsky), 9.5 per cent of the households own three and more horses. These households have from 13 to 16 dessiatins of allotment land per household and a total of 21 to 34 dessiatins.

From this it is evident that *entrepreneur* renting is not an isolated or casual phenomenon among the peasantry but is general and widespread. Everywhere, in every village commune, there is a group of well to do households, which always represents an insignificant minority, and which always organises capitalist farming by means of *entrepreneur* renting of land. For that reason, general phrases about provisions and capitalist renting explain nothing in regard to the problem of peasant farming in Russia, the *concrete facts* of the development of the features of serfdom in the renting of land and the formation of capitalist relations *within this very system of renting* must be studied.

Above we quoted figures showing what proportion of the population and what share of the allotment land are concentrated in the hands of 20 per cent of the wealthiest peasant households. Now we may add that these concentrate in their hands from 50.8 per cent to 83.7 per cent of all the land rented by the peasantry and leave to 50 per cent of the total households, representing the poorer groups, from 5 to 10 per cent of the total rented land. The conclusion to be drawn from this is clear: if we are asked what kind of renting of land predominates in Russia, provision or capitalist renting, renting induced by poverty or renting by wealthy peasants, serf renting (rent paid in labour, bondage) or bourgeois renting, we can give only one answer. If we take the number of households which rent land, undoubtedly, the majority rent land because of poverty. For the overwhelming majority of the peasants the renting of land means bondage. If we take the amount of land rented, however, undoubtedly, not less than half of it is in the hands of the wealthy peasants, the rural bourgeoisie, who are organising capitalist agriculture.

Usually, statistics on the rents paid for rented land are given in "averages" covering the total number of tenants and the total amount of land rented. The extent to which these averages conceal the extreme poverty and oppression of the peasantry can be seen from the Zemstvo statistics of the Dneprovsk Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, in which, as a fortunate exception, figures are given for various groups of peasants, as follows:

	<i>Percentage Households Renting Land</i>	<i>Dess per Household</i>	<i>Rent per Dess Rubles</i>
Cultivating up to five dessiatins	25	2 4	15 25
Cultivating from five to 10 dessiatins	12	3 9	12 00
Cultivating from 10 to 25 dessiatins	69	8 5	4 75
Cultivating from 25 to 50 dessiatins	88	20 0	3 75
Cultivating over 50 dessiatins	91	48 6	3 55
Total	56 2	12 4	4 23

Thus, the "average" rent of 4 23 rubles per dessiatin actually distorts the state of affairs, it obscures the contradictions which are the very crux of this problem. The poor peasants are compelled to rent land at a ruinous rent more than three times higher than the average. The rich buy land "wholesale" at a favourable price, and, as occasion offers, turn it over to their poor neighbours at a profit of 275 per cent. There is renting and renting. There is serf bondage, there is Irish renting¹ and there is trading in land, capitalist farming.

The fact that the peasants let their allotment land reveals more strikingly than ever the capitalist relations existing within the village commune, the ruination of the poor and the enrichment of the minority at the expense of this ruined mass. The renting and letting of land is a phenomenon that has no connection whatever with the commune and commune equality. What real significance in real life will the equal distribution of allotment land have if the poor are forced to *rent* to the rich their equal share of allotment land? And what more striking refutation can one have of "communal" views than this fact that actual life *upsets* the official, inspectors', bureaucratic equality of allotments? The impotence of any kind of equality before developing capitalism is demonstrated by the fact that the poor peasants let their allotments and that rented land is being concentrated in the hands of the rich.

Is the practice of renting allotment land widespread? According to the now obsolete Zemstvo statistical investigations made

¹ Rack renting—rent for small plots of land screwed up to the highest point.—*Ed*

in the eighties of the last century, to which we have to limit our selves for the time being, the number of households letting land and the amount of allotment land thus let appear to be small. For example, in the Dneprovsk Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, 25.7 per cent of the households let allotment land, the amount of land thus let representing 14.9 per cent of the total allotment land. In the Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, 12 per cent of the households let land. In the Kamyshinsk Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, the amount of land rented out represents 16 per cent of the total. In the Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, 8,500 households let allotment land out of a total of 23,500, i.e., more than one-third. The allotment land thus rented out amounts to 50,500 dessiatins out of a total of 410,000 dessiatins, i.e., about 12 per cent. In the Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia, 6,500 dessiatins of allotment land is let out of a total of 136,500 dessiatins, i.e., less than 5 per cent. In three uyezds in the Nizhnii Novgorod Gubernia, 19,000 dessiatins out of a total of 433,000 dessiatins are let, i.e., also less than 5 per cent. But all these figures are only seemingly insignificant, for these percentages tacitly imply that the households in all groups rent out land more or less equally. But such a supposition would be quite contrary to the facts. What is more important than the absolute figures of renting and letting, than the average percentages of the amount of land rented, or of the households letting land—is the fact that it is the poor peasants who mostly let land, and that the largest amount of land is rented by the rich. The returns of the Zemstvo statistical investigation leave no doubts whatever on this score. Twenty per cent of the households, representing the more prosperous households, are responsible for letting from 0.3 to 12.5 per cent of the total amount of land let. On the other hand, 50 per cent of the households, representing the poorer group, are responsible for letting 63.3 per cent to 98.0 per cent of the total amount of land let. And, of course, it is the rich peasants who rent the land that is let by the poor peasants. Here, too, it is clear that the significance of land letting varies in the different groups of peasants: the poor peasant is obliged to let his land owing to his poverty, as he has not the means to cultivate his land, no seeds, no cattle,

no implements, and is very short of money. The rich peasants let little land, they either exchange one plot of land for another more convenient for their farm, or directly engage in trading in land.

The following are concrete figures applying to the Dneprovsk Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia

	<i>% Households Letting Allotment Land</i>	<i>% of Allotment Land Rented Out</i>
Cultivating no dessiatins	80	97.1
Cultivating five dessiatins	30	38.1
Cultivating five to 10 dessiatins	23	17.2
Cultivating 10 to 25 dessiatins	16	8.1
Cultivating 25 to 50 dessiatins	7	2.9
Cultivating more than 50 dessiatins	7	13.8
Average for Uyezd	25.7	14.9

Is it not clear from these figures that the abandonment of the land and widespread proletarianisation are combined here with the trading in land practised by a handful of rich? Is it not characteristic that the percentage of allotment land rented out rises precisely in the groups of big cultivators who have 17 dessiatins of allotment land per household, 30 dessiatins of purchased land and 44 dessiatins of rented land? Taken as a whole, the poor group in the Dneprovsk Uyezd, *i.e.*, 40 per cent of the total number of households, holding 56,000 dessiatins of allotment land, rents 8,000 and lets 21,500 dessiatins. While the wealthy group, which represents 18.4 per cent of the total number of households, holding 62,000 dessiatins of allotment land, lets 3,000 dessiatins of allotment land and rents 82,000 dessiatins. In three uyezds in the Taurida Gubernia, this wealthy group rents 150,000 dessiatins of allotment land, *i.e.*, three fifths of the total allotment land let in the area! In the Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, 47 per cent of the households possessing no horses and 13 per cent of those having one horse let allotment land, while the owners of ten and more head of draught animals, *i.e.*, only 7.6 per cent of the total households, rent 20, 30, 60 and 70 dessiatins of allotment land.

In regard to purchased land, almost the same thing has to be

said as in regard to the renting of land. The difference is that the renting of land bears features of serfdom, that, under certain circumstances, the renting of land is like the labour rent and bondage system, *i.e.*, is a manner of tying workers, impoverished neighbouring peasants, to the landlord's estate. On the other hand, the purchase of land as private property by allotment peasants represents a purely bourgeois phenomenon. In the West, the labourers and day workers are sometimes bound to the land by the sale of small plots to them. In Russia, this system was officially introduced long ago in the form of the "Great Reform" in 1861, and, at the present time, the purchase of land by peasants expresses only the fact that representatives of the rural bourgeoisie are emerging from the village commune. We have dealt above with the manner in which the purchase of land by peasants developed after 1861, when we examined the statistics of landownership. Here we must point to the enormous concentration of purchased land in the hands of a minority. The wealthy households, representing 20 per cent of the total, have concentrated in their hands from 59.7 per cent to 99 per cent of the total land purchased by peasants. Poor households, representing 50 per cent of the total, possess from 0.4 per cent to 15.4 per cent of the total amount of land purchased by peasants. We can boldly assert therefore that out of the 7,500,000 dessiatins of land which have been acquired by peasants as their private property in the period from 1877 to 1905 (see above), from two thirds to three fourths are in the hands of an insignificant minority of wealthy households. The same thing applies of course to the purchase of land by peasant societies and associations. In 1877, peasant societies owned purchased land amounting to 765,000 dessiatins, and in 1905 this had grown to 3,700,000 dessiatins, and in 1905, peasant associations owned 7,600,000 dessiatins of land as private property. It would be a mistake to think that land purchased or rented by societies is distributed differently from that purchased or rented individually. The facts prove the contrary. For example, in the three mainland uyezds in the Taurida Gubernia statistics were collected on the distribution of land rented from the state by peasant societies and these showed that 76 per cent

of the land thus rented was in the hands of the wealthy group (about 20 per cent of the households), while the poorest households, representing 40 per cent of the total, had only 4 per cent of the total amount of land rented. The peasants divide the land rented or purchased only according to the "money" each has

IV

The statistics quoted above concerning peasants' allotment land, rented land, purchased land and rented out land, taken together, lead to the conclusion that *the actual state of affairs in regard to peasant land holdings* every day corresponds less and less to the official peasant allotment. Of course, if we take total figures, or "averages," then the amount of land that is let will be balanced by the amount of land that is rented, the rest of the land rented and purchased could be distributed among all the peasant households equally, as it were, and the impression would thus be created that the actual state of affairs in regard to land holdings is not very much different from that of the official, *i.e.*, allotment distribution. But such an impression would be pure fiction, because the actual position in regard to peasant land holdings is far different from the original equal distribution of allotment land *precisely* in the *extreme groups*, so that in drawing "averages" the position is inevitably distorted.

As a matter of fact, all the land holdings of the peasants in the lower groups will be found to be relatively—and sometimes absolutely—less than the allotment distribution (letting land, an insignificant share of the amount of land rented) for the higher groups, however, all the land holdings will always be found to be relatively and absolutely larger than the allotment distribution owing to the concentration of purchased and rented land in their hands. We have seen that the poorest groups, representing 50 per cent of the total households, hold from 35 to 37 per cent of the total allotment land, but these groups hold only 18.6 to 31.9 per cent of the total amount of peasant holdings. In some cases the difference is as much as 50 per cent, for example, in the Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, the poor households hold

37.4 per cent of the total allotment land and 19.2 per cent of the total amount of peasant land holdings. The wealthy households, representing 20 per cent of the total, hold from 29 to 36 per cent of the allotment land, but from 34 to 49 per cent of the total amount of peasant holdings. Here are some concrete figures illustrating these relations. In the Dneprovsk Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, the poorest households, representing 40 per cent of the total, hold 56,000 dessiatins of allotment land, but the total amount of land they hold is 45,000 dessiatins, *i.e.*, 11,000 dessiatins less. The wealthy group (18 per cent of the households) hold 62,000 dessiatins of allotment land, but their total land holdings amount to 167,000 dessiatins, *i.e.*, 105,000 dessiatins more. The following table gives the figures for three uyezds in the Nizhn Novgorod Gubernia.

	<i>Dessiatins per Household</i>	
	<i>Allotment Land</i>	<i>Total Land Holdings</i>
Horseless peasants	5.1	4.4
Peasants with one horse	8.1	9.4
Peasants with two horses	10.5	13.8
Peasants with three horses	13.2	21.0
Peasants with four and more horses	16.4	34.6
Total	8.3	10.3

Here, too, as a result of renting and letting land, there is a diminution of the amount of land holdings in the lower group. And this lower group, *i.e.*, the horseless peasants, comprises 30 per cent of the households. Nearly one-third of the households suffer a net loss as a result of renting and letting land. The one horse households (37 per cent of the total) increased their holdings, but to a very small extent, proportionately less than the average increase in peasant land holdings (from 8.3 dessiatins to 10.3 dessiatins). Hence, the share of this group in the total land holdings has diminished: it had 36.6 per cent of the allotted lands in three uyezds, now it has only 34.1 per cent of the total land holdings. On the other hand, an insignificant minority representing the higher groups increased their holdings far above the average. Those owning three horses (7.3 per cent of the total) in

creased their holdings by more than half as much again from 13 dessiatins per household to 21 dessiatins, and those owning many horses (23 per cent) more than doubled their holdings from 16 dessiatins per household to 35 dessiatins

We see, therefore, that the general phenomenon in peasant economy is the *diminution of the role of allotment land*. This diminution is taking place at both ends of the social scale in the rural districts by different ways. The role of allotment land is declining among the poor peasants because their growing poverty and ruination *compel* them to let their land, to abandon it, to *reduce* their farms, (because they lack cattle, implements, seed, money) and either to seek some sort of work for hire, or enter the kingdom of heaven. The lower groups of peasants are dying out, famine, scurvy, typhus are doing their work. The importance of allotment land is diminishing in the higher groups because these farms are growing and require more land, and the peasant is compelled to acquire new land, not bonded, but free land, not ancient tribal land, but land bought in the market—purchased and rented land. The more land the peasantry possesses, the fainter the traces of serfdom, the more rapid is economic development, the stronger is the urge to be freed from allotment land, to bring the land into the sphere of commerce, to build up commercial farming on the basis of rented land. For example—Novorossia. We have just seen that the wealthy peasants in that district farm more purchased and rented land than allotment land. This may seem paradoxical, but it is a fact: in the district where more land is available than anywhere else in Russia, where there is more allotment land than anywhere else, the wealthy peasants (those having from 16 to 17 dessiatins per household) are transferring the centre of gravity of their farming from allotment land to *non allotment land*.

The fact that the role of allotment land is diminishing at both rapidly progressing ends of the social scale among the peasantry is, *inter alia*, of enormous importance in appraising the conditions of the agrarian revolution which the nineteenth century has bequeathed to the twentieth century and which has given rise to the class struggle in our revolution. It clearly demonstrates that the

break up of the old system of landownership, both landlord and peasant, has become *an absolute economic necessity*. This break up of the old system of landownership is absolutely inevitable and no power on earth can prevent it. The fight is centring around the form this is to take and the method by which it is to be brought about, *i.e.*, by the Stolypin method, with the retention of landlordism and the plunder of the village communes by the kulaks,¹ or by the peasant method, *i.e.*, the abolition of landlordism and all the mediæval hindrances on the land by means of the nationalisation of the land. We will deal with this question further on however. At this point it is necessary to point to the important fact that the diminution of the role of allotment land is leading to an extremely uneven distribution of taxes and imposts.

It is well known that the taxes and imposts on the Russian peasants bear very strong traces of mediævalism. We cannot go into this in detail, for it is a subject that concerns the fiscal history of Russia. It is sufficient to say that purchase payments are a direct continuation of feudal dues, tribute paid by the serf to the landlord, extracted with the aid of the police state. It is sufficient to recall how unequally the land of the peasantry was taxed compared with that of the nobility, the taxes in kind, etc. We will quote only total figures to illustrate the amount of taxes and imposts that had to be paid. These figures are taken from the statistics on *peasant budgets* in Voronezh. The average gross income of a peasant family (arrived at on the basis of 66 typical budgets) is given at 491.44 rubles, the gross expenditure, 443 rubles. Net income, 48.44 rubles. The taxes and imposts per "average" family amount to 34.35 rubles. Thus, taxes and imposts take 70 per cent of the *net income*. Of course, in form, these are only taxes, but as a matter of fact, this is the continuation of the previous feudal exploitation of the "*assessed estate*."² The net money income of the average family only amounts to 17.83 rubles, *i.e.*, the "taxes" imposed on the Russian peasant

¹ Capitalist farmers—*Ed Eng ed.*

² This estate for many centuries paid enormous sums in taxes to the state. It mainly comprised the peasantry—*Ed*

amount to *more than twice as much* as his net income—and this is according to the statistics of 1889 and not 1849!

But in this case, also, average figures conceal the poverty of the peasant and present the position of the peasant in a much better light than it really is. The statistics of the distribution of taxes and imposts among the various groups of peasants according to degree of prosperity show that the taxes and imposts paid by the peasants who own no horses or only one horse each (i.e., *three fifths* of the total peasant families in Russia) far exceed not only their net money income, but even *their gross income*. Here are the figures

BUDGET FIGURES (RUBLES PER FAMILY)

	Gross Income	Expend iture	Taxes and Imposts	Percentage Taxes and Imp to Exp
a) Horseless	118 10	109 03	15 47	11 19
b) Owning one horse	178 12	174.26	17 77	10 20
c) Owning two horses	429 72	379 17	32 02	8 44
d) Owning three horses	752 19	632 86	49 55	7 83
e) Owning four horses	978 66	937.30	67 90	7 23
f) Owning five and more	1 766 79	1 593 77	86 34	5 42
Average	491 44	443 00	34 35	7 75

The horseless and one horse peasants pay in the form of taxes *one seventh and one tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that the inevitable ruin of the mass of the peasants who belonged to him would not have been profitable for the landlord. The inequality of the taxes, as we see, is enormous. The proportion to their income, which the wealthy peasants pay, is only one half or one third of that paid by the poor peasants. What is the cause of this inequality? The cause is that the peasants distribute the payment of the bulk of the taxes according to the amount of communal land held. The peasant merges the share of the taxes and the share of the allotment land into the single concept, "soul"¹. But if, in the example we have given, we calculate the amount of taxes and

¹ *I.e.* per member of the family. The population of a village was counted as so many "souls."—*Ed. Ling. ed.*

imposts each group would have to pay per dessiatin of land we would get the following a) 26 rubles, b) 24 rubles, c) 25 rubles, d) 26 rubles, e) 29 rubles, f) 37 rubles. With the exception of the highest group, which owns large industrial enterprises that are assessed separately, we see an approximately even distribution of taxes. Here, too, the share of allotment land corresponds, as a whole, to the share of taxes paid. This is a direct survival of (and direct proof of) the feudal impost character of the village commune. Owing to the very conditions of the labour rent system of economy, it could not be otherwise: the landlords could not have been certain of obtaining bonded workers from among neighbouring peasants half a century after the "emancipation," had not these peasants been tied to a starvation allotment and had they not been obliged to pay three times the proper price for them. It must not be forgotten that *at the end of the nineteenth century* it was not unusual in Russia for the peasant to pay in order to release himself from his allotment, to pay "extra" for leaving his allotment, i.e., to pay a certain sum to the person who took over his allotment. For example, Mr Zhibanov, describing the life of the Kostroma peasants in his book, *Babya Storona*¹ (Kostroma, 1891), says that, of the Kostroma migratory workers, "the owners sometimes receive for their land a certain small part of the taxes, but usually they let their land on the sole condition that the tenant put a fence round it, and the owner himself pay all the taxes." In *A Review of Yaroslavsky Gubernia*, which appeared in 1896, similar references are to be found to the effect that the migratory workers have to pay to release themselves from their allotments.

Of course, we will not find such "power of land" in the purely agricultural districts. But even in regard to these districts the phenomenon that the role of allotment land at both ends of the social scale is declining is to be observed, although in another form. This fact is universal. That being the case, the distribution of taxes according to the amount of allotment land held inevitably

¹ Literally *Women's Land*, thus called because most of the males used to leave the villages on migratory occupations leaving the women to do the work of the farm.—Ed. Eng. ed.

gives rise to increasing inequality in the incidence of taxation. Economic development, from all sides, and in the most varied ways, leads to the breakdown of mediæval forms of landownership, the division of the land according to estates (allotment land, landlord land, etc.), is scrapped, new forms of economy arise indiscriminately out of the fragments of one or the other form of landownership. The nineteenth century is bequeathing to the twentieth century the imperative and obligatory task of completing the process of "cleaning out" the mediæval forms of landownership. The fight is revolving round the question as to whether this "cleaning" will be carried out in the form of the peasant nationalisation of the land, or in the form of the accelerated plunder of the village communes by the kulaks and the transformation of landlord economy into *Junker* economy.

Continuing our examination of the data concerning the contemporary system of peasant economy, we will pass from the question of land to the question of cattle breeding. Here, too, we must establish, as a general rule, that the distribution of cattle among peasant farms is *much more* unequal than the distribution of allotment land. For example, the figures below show the extent of cattle breeding among the peasants in the Dneprovsk Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia

	Per Household	
	Allotment Land (Dessiatins)	Total Cattle (Head)
Not cultivating land	64	11
Cultivating up to five dessiatins	55	24
Cultivating from five to 10 dessiatins	87	42
Cultivating from 10 to 25 dessiatins	125	73
Cultivating from 25 to 50 dessiatins	166	139
Cultivating more than 50 dessiatins	174	300
Average	112	76

The difference between the extreme groups in regard to the number of head of cattle owned is *ten times* greater than in regard to the amount of allotment land held. The data in regard to cattle breeding also show that the real dimensions of farms have little resemblance to what is usually believed to be the case when only averages are taken into consideration and when suppositions are

made in regard to the all determining role of allotments. No matter what uyezd we take, everywhere the distribution of cattle is found to be much more unequal than the distribution of allotment land. The wealthy households, representing 20 per cent of the total and having from 29 to 36 per cent of the allotment land, have concentrated in their hands from 37 to 57 per cent of the total quantity of cattle owned by the peasants in the given uyezd or group of uyezds. Fifty per cent of the households in the lower groups own only 14 to 30 per cent of the total quantity of cattle.

But these figures do not reveal the depths of the difference. Not less important, and sometimes more important than the question of the quantity of cattle, is the question of the *quality* of the cattle. It goes without saying that the half ruined peasant, with his poverty stricken farm, and involved on all sides in conditions of bondage, is not in the position to acquire and maintain cattle of any quality. If the master starves (master, indeed!), the cattle must starve, it cannot be otherwise. The returns of peasant budgets for the Voronezh Gubernia illustrate with extraordinary clarity the wretched state of cattle breeding of the horseless and one-horse peasants, *i.e.*, of *three fifths* of the total peasant farms in Russia. We quote below some extracts from these statistics in order to illustrate the state of peasant cattle breeding.

AVERAGE ANNUAL EXPENDITURE (In Rubles)			
	No Head of Cattle per Farm, All Kinds, in Terms of Large Cattle	For Acquiring Inventory and Repair of Purchasing Cattle	Cattle Feed
a) Horseless peasants	0.8	0.08	8.12
b) One-horse peasants	2.6	5.36	36.70
c) Two horse peasants	4.9	8.78	71.21
d) Three horse peasants	9.1	9.70	127.03
e) Four horse peasants	12.8	30.80	173.24
f) Five horse and more	19.3	75.80	510.07
Average	5.8	13.14	97.91

In the period from 1896 to 1900 there were in European Russia three and a quarter million peasant households which owned no

horses One can imagine the state of their "farms" if they spent eight *kopeks* per annum on livestock and inventory Households owning one horse each numbered three and one third millions With an expenditure of five rubles per annum for the purpose of acquiring livestock and inventory they can only linger on in a state of eternal, hopeless poverty Even in the case of two horse (2.5 million households) and three-horse (one million households) peasants, the expenditure on livestock and inventory amounts to only nine to ten rubles per annum Only in the two higher groups (in the whole of Russia there are only one million households of this type out of a total of eleven millions) does the expenditure on livestock and inventory approach anywhere near what is required for farming on proper lines

Quite naturally, under these conditions, the quality of the cattle cannot be the same in all the various groups of farms For example, the price of a working horse belonging to a one horse peasant is estimated at 27 rubles, that of a two horse peasant at 37 rubles, that of a three horse peasant at 61 rubles, that of a four horse peasant at 52 rubles and that of a peasant owning many horses at 69 rubles The difference between the extreme groups is more than 100 per cent And this phenomenon is general for all capitalist countries where there is small and large scale farming In my book, *The Agrarian Question*¹ (Part I, St Petersburg, 1908), I showed that the investigations made by Drexler into the conditions of agriculture and cattle breeding in Germany revealed the same state of affairs The average weight of the average animal on large estates was 619 kilogrammes (*ibid*, 1894, page 259), on peasant farms of 25 and more hectares, 427 kilogrammes, on farms of 7.5 to 25 hectares, 382 kilogrammes, on farms of 2.5 to 7.5 hectares, 352 kilogrammes, and finally on farms up to 2.5 hectares, 301 kilogrammes

The quantity and quality of cattle also determines the manner in which the land is cultivated and particularly the way it is manured We showed above that all the statistics for the whole of Russia proved that the landlords' land was better manured than

¹ *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Vol. XI—Ed,

peasant land Now we see that this division, although correct and legitimate for the times of serfdom, is now obsolete A deep chasm lies between the various categories of peasant farms, and all investigations, calculations, conclusions and theories based on the "average" peasant farm lead to absolutely wrong conclusions on this question Zemstvo statistics, unfortunately, very rarely study the various groups of households and are restricted to village commune statistics But as an exception to the rule, a house to house investigation was made in the Perm Gubernia (Krasnoufimsk Uyezd), which resulted in the collection of precise statistics in regard to the manuring of land by the various groups of peasant households These are as given below

	<i>Per Cent Farms Manuring Land</i>	<i>Number Cartloads per Household</i>
Cultivating up to five dessiatins	33.9	80
Cultivating from five to 10 dessiatins	66.2	116
Cultivating from 10 to 20 dessiatins	70.3	197
Cultivating from 20 to 50 dessiatins	76.9	358
Cultivating more than 50 dessiatins	84.3	732
Average	51.7	176

Here we see different agricultural types of farms according to dimensions of farms And investigators working in other districts, who devoted attention to this question, arrived at similar conclusions Statisticians working in the Orel Gubernia report that the amount of manure obtained from one head of cattle on the farm of a wealthy peasant is almost twice as much as that obtained on the farm of a poor peasant In the group having an average of 7.4 head of cattle a heap of 391 poods of manure is obtained and in groups having 2.8 head of cattle a heap of 208 poods is obtained The "normal" is estimated at 400 poods, so that only a small minority of wealthy peasants are able to reach the normal The poor peasants are obliged to use their straw and manure for fuel, sometimes they even have to sell their manure, etc

In this connection, we must examine the question of the increase in the number of horseless peasants In 1888-91 there

were in 48 gubernias in European Russia 2.8 million households, out of a total of 10.1 million households, which owned no horses, i.e., 27.3 per cent. After approximately nine or ten years, in 1896-1900, out of a total of 11.1 million households, 3.2 million, or 29.2 per cent, owned no horses. The increase in the expropriation of the peasantry is, therefore, obvious. But if we examine this process from the agricultural point of view we will arrive at what at first sight may seem a paradoxical conclusion. This is a conclusion arrived at by the well-known Narodnik writer, Mr V. V., as early as 1884 (*Vestnik Evropy*,¹ 1884, No. 7), who compared the number of dessiatins of land ploughed per horse in our peasant farming with that in the "normal" three field system of farming—normal from the point of view of agronomics. It turned out that the peasant employed *too many* horses, they plough only five to eight dessiatins per horse instead of seven to ten as required by the science of agronomics.

'Consequently' argues Mr V. V., 'we must to a certain degree, regard the fact that a section of the population in this region of Russia (the Central Black Earth Belt) has lost its horses as the restoration of the normal proportion between the number of draught animals employed and the area to be cultivated.'

As a matter of fact the paradox is explained by the fact that the loss of horses is accompanied by the concentration of land in the hands of the wealthy households who are able to maintain a "proper" proportion between the number of horses employed and the area of land cultivated. The "normal" proportion is not being "restored" (for it never existed in our peasant economy) but is reached only by the peasant bourgeoisie. The "abnormality" is really the fact that the means of production are broken up and divided in small peasant farming: the same amount of land which a million one horse peasants cultivate with the aid of a million horses is better and more carefully cultivated by the wealthy peasants with the aid of only one half or three quarters of a million horses.

In regard to inventory in peasant farming, a distinction must be drawn between ordinary peasant inventory and improved agri-

¹ *European Messenger*—Ed. Eng. ed.

cultural implements Taken as a whole, the distribution of the former corresponds to the distribution of draught animals, we will not find anything new in statistics of this kind to characterise the state of peasant farming Improved implements, which are much dearer to buy, can be employed profitably only on larger farms, are introduced only in successfully developing farms and are immeasurably more concentrated Statistics concerning this concentration are extremely important because they are the only statistics that enable us to judge in which direction and under what social conditions peasant farming is *progressing* There is not the slightest doubt that much progress has been made in this respect since 1861, but very often the capitalist character of this progress, not only in landlord farming, but also in peasant farming, is contested or subjected to doubt

The following figures, taken from Zemstvo statistics, show the distribution of improved implements among the peasantry

	IMPROVED IMPLEMENTS PER HUNDRED HOUSEHOLDS	
	<i>Two Uyezds</i> <i>Orel Gubernia</i>	<i>One Uyezd</i> <i>Voronezh Gubernia</i>
Horseless peasants.	0.1	—
One-horse peasants	0.2	0.06
Two to three horse peasants	3.5	1.6
Four and more horse peasants	35.0	23.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Average	2.2	1.2

In these districts, improved implements are comparatively little used by the peasants The percentage of households employing these is quite insignificant But the lower groups hardly employ them at all, whereas among the higher groups they are systematically employed In the Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, only 13 per cent of the peasants employ improved implements, but the percentage rises to 40 in the group owning five to 20 head of draught animals and to 62 in the group owning 20 and more head of cattle. In the Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia (three districts of this uyezd), there are 10 improved implements for every hundred households—this is the average, but for every hundred households cultivating from 20 to 50 dessiatins of land there are 50 improved implements and for every hundred house

holds cultivating 50 dessiatins of land there are even 180 implements. If we take the percentages we quoted above in comparing the returns of the different uyezds we will find that the wealthy households, representing 20 per cent of the total, own from 70 to 86 per cent of the total improved implements employed in those districts, while the poor households, representing 50 per cent of the total, have from 1.3 to 3.6 per cent of the improved implements. Therefore there cannot be the slightest doubt that the progress made in the use of improved implements among the peasantry (reference to this progress is made in the above mentioned work by Kaufman, 1907) is the progress of the wealthy peasantry. Three fifths of the total peasant households, the horseless and one horse peasants, are almost completely unable to employ these improved implements.

V

In examining peasant farming, we have up till now taken the peasants mainly as owners, at the same time we pointed to the fact that the lower groups were being continuously squeezed out of the category of owners. Where do they go? Evidently, into the ranks of the proletariat. We must now investigate in detail how this formation of the proletariat, and particularly the rural proletariat, takes place, and how the market for labour power in agriculture is formed. Under the labour rent system the typical classes are the feudal landlords and the allotment peasant tied in bondage. The typical classes under the capitalist system, however, are the farmers who hire labour and the labourers who hire themselves to the farmers. We have shown how the landlords and the wealthy peasants are transformed into employers of labour. We will now see how the peasant is transformed into a hired labourer.

Is the employment of hired labour by the wealthy peasants at all widespread? If we take the average percentage of households employing labourers in comparison to the total number of households (as is usually done), the percentage will not be very high in the Dneprovsk Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, 12.9 per cent, in the Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, 9 per cent, in the Kamy

shinsk Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, 12.7 per cent, in the Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, 10.6 per cent, two uyezds in the Orel Gubernia, 3.5 per cent, one uyezd in the Voronezh Gubernia, 3.8 per cent, three uyezds in the Nizhni Novgorod Gubernia, 2.6 per cent. But statistics of this kind are in fact fictitious, for they express the percentage of households employing labourers to the total number of households, including those which provide labourers. In every capitalist society, the bourgeoisie represents an insignificant minority of the population. The number of households employing labourers will always be "small." The question is: is a special type of farm arising, or is the employment of labourers casual? To this question we get a very definite reply in the Zemstvo statistics which in all cases show that the percentage of households employing labourers is immeasurably larger in the group of wealthy households than the percentage of total households in the uyezd employing labourers. We will quote the figures for the Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, which, as an exception to the rule, not only give information about the hiring of labourers, but also about the hiring of day labourers, i.e., the form of hiring that is more typical for agriculture.

	<i>No of Male Workers per Household</i>	<i>Per Cent of Households Hiring Labourers</i>			
		<i>Hired Definite Periods</i>	<i>Mow- ing</i>	<i>Reap- ing</i>	<i>Thresh- ing</i>
Not cultivating land	0.6	0.15	0.6	—	—
Cultivating up to five desya	1.0	0.7	5.1	4.7	9.2
Cultivating five to 10 desya	1.2	4.2	14.3	20.1	22.3
Cultivating 10 to 20 desya	1.5	17.7	27.2	43.9	25.9
Cultivating 20 to 50 desya	1.7	50.0	47.9	69.6	33.7
Cultivating more than 50 desya	2.0	83.1	64.5	87.2	44.7
Average	1.2	10.6	16.4	21.3	18.8

It will be seen that the wealthy households have a larger number of workers in the family than the poor households. Nevertheless, they employ an enormously larger number of hired labourers. "Family co-operation" serves as a basis for enlarging the farm and is thus transformed into capitalist co-operation. In the higher groups, the hiring of labourers is obviously becoming a

system, a condition of introducing large scale farming. Moreover, the hiring of day labourers appears to be very widespread even among the middle group of peasants in the two higher groups (representing 10.3 per cent of the households) the majority of the households hire labourers, while in the group cultivating from 10 to 20 desiatins (representing 22.4 per cent of the households), more than *two fifths* of the households hire labourers for reaping. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the wealthy peasants could not exist if they did not have a vast army of labourers and day labourers ready to serve them. And although, as we have seen, the average percentages of households hiring labourers vary considerably from uyezd to uyezd, the concentration of households hiring labourers in the higher groups of peasants, that is to say, the transformation of the wealthy households into capitalist enterprises, is undoubtedly general. The wealthy household group, which represents 20 per cent of the total peasant households, contains from 48 to 78 per cent of the total number of households hiring labourers.

In regard to the other end of the rural social scale, statistics do not usually show the number of households, the members of which hire themselves as labourers. In regard to a number of questions Zemstvo statistics show a great improvement as compared with the old, official statistics contained in gubernatorial reports and in the reports of various departments. But in one question, the old, official point of view has been retained even in Zemstvo statistics and that is in regard to the so called peasant "earnings." Agricultural employment on the peasant's own allotment is regarded as the real employment of the peasant, all other employments are put into the category of side "earnings" or "trades" and in doing so certain economic categories, which anyone with a knowledge of the ABC of political economy would be able to distinguish, are all thrown into one heap. For example, the category "agricultural occupations" includes the mass of hired labourers and also employers (for example, *bakhchevnik*¹), and by their side, also in the category "households with earnings,"

¹ From the word *bakhcha* which in the South of Russia means a field in which melons, cucumbers, etc., are cultivated.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

will be included beggars, traders, domestic servants, master artisans, etc. Clearly this utter confusion in political economy is a survival of serfdom. Indeed, it is a matter of indifference to the landlord what occupation his quit rent peasant follows on the side, whether that of a trader, a hired labourer or as a master in industry. All the serf peasants were equally bound to pay quit rent, all were regarded as being temporarily or conditionally absent from their real occupation.

After the abolition of serfdom, this point of view began more and more to come into increasingly sharp conflict with reality. The majority of the peasant households with earnings undoubtedly belong to the category of households which provide hired labourers, but we cannot obtain a true picture of the situation because the minority representing the *employers* are included in the general total and so make the position of the needy appear in a *better light* than it really is. We will quote an example to illustrate the point. The statistics for the Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, divide the category "trades" into a special category of "agricultural trades." Of course, this term is not exact, but the list of occupations at least enables us to learn that out of a total of 14,863 "traders" of this kind, 13,297 are labourers and day labourers. Thus, wage labourers predominate very largely. The distribution of agricultural trades is found to be the following:

PER CENT OF MALE WORKERS ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURAL TRADES

Peasants having no draught animals	71.4
Peasants with one head of draught animals	48.7
Peasants with two to three head of draught animals	20.4
Peasants with four head of draught animals	8.5
Peasants with five to 10 head of draught animals	5.0
Peasants with 10 to 20 head of draught animals	3.9
Peasants with 20 and more head of draught animals	2.0
In the Uyezd	25.0

Thus, seven-tenths of the horseless peasants and almost half the one-horse peasants hire themselves out as labourers. In the Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, the average per cent of households which engage in agricultural trades is 16.2, of those which do not cultivate land the percentage engaged in agricultural

trades is 52.3 and of those which cultivate up to five desiatins the percentage is 26.4. In other uyezds, where the agricultural trades are not put in a separate category, the position is not quite so clear, nevertheless, it remains the general rule that "trades" and "earnings" are the speciality of the lower groups. In the lower group, which represents 50 per cent of the total number of households, 60 to 93 per cent of the households have earnings.

We must conclude from this that the position of the lower groups of the peasantry, in the general system of national economy, particularly the one horse and horseless peasants, is that of *labourers and day labourers* (to put it more broadly—wage labourers) with *allotments*. This conclusion is confirmed by the statistics showing the increase in the employment of hired labour since 1861 over the whole of Russia, by the investigations made into the budgets of the lower groups to show the sources of their incomes and also by the statistics showing the standard of living of these groups. We will deal in somewhat greater detail with this threefold proof.

The only statistics available regarding the growth in the number of rural wage workers in the whole of Russia are those dealing with migratory workers, but these do not indicate whether they are engaged in agricultural or non agricultural occupations. The question as to whether the former or the latter predominated was decided in Narodnik literature in favour of the former, but further on we will give the reasons for an opposite point of view. The fact that the number of migratory workers among the peasantry rapidly increased after 1861 leaves no doubt whatever. All evidence goes to prove this. An approximate expression of this phenomenon is found in the returns of the revenue from the issue of passports and on the number of passports issued. In 1868, revenue from the issue of passports amounted to 2,100,000 rubles, in 1884, 3,300,000 rubles, in 1894, 4,500,000 rubles. Thus, the revenue from this source more than doubled. The number of passports and certificates issued in European Russia was 4,700,000 in 1884, 7,800,000 in 1897 and 9,300,000 in 1898. In thirteen years the number doubled. All these data correspond on the whole, with other data, for example, the calculations of

Mr Uvarov, who counted up the returns of the Zemstvo statistics—which for the most part are obsolete—for 126 uyezds in 20 gubernias and arrived at the approximate total of 5,000,000 migratory workers Mr S Korolenko, on the basis of the returns of the number of superfluous workers in the rural districts arrived at the figure of 6,000,000

In the opinion of Mr N—on, the “overwhelming majority” of these are engaged in agricultural trades In *The Development of Capitalism*¹ I showed in detail that the statistics and investigation of the ‘sixties, ‘eighties and ‘nineties completely prove that this conclusion is wrong The majority, although not the overwhelming majority, of the migratory workers are not engaged in agricultural occupations The following is the latest and fullest summary of the returns of the number of identity certificates issued in European Russia in 1898 according to gubernia

NO OF IDENTITY CERTIFICATES OF ALL KINDS ISSUED IN 1893

1 17 gubernias in which non agricultural migratory workers predominate	3,369,597
2 12 gubernias intermediate	1,674,231
3 21 gubernias in which agricultural migratory workers predominate	2,765,762
Total 50 gubernias	7,809,590

If we assume that in the intermediate gubernias half the migratory workers were agricultural, then the *approximate*, the most probable distribution will be as follows: about 4,200,000 non agricultural wage workers and *about 3,600,000 agricultural wage workers* Alongside these figures should be placed the figures of Mr Rudnev, who in 1894 summed up the returns of the Zemstvo statistics for 148 uyezds in 19 gubernias and arrived at the approximate figure of 3,500,000 agricultural wage workers This figure, based on the returns for the ‘eighties, includes both local and migratory agricultural workers In the ‘nineties, there were as many migratory agricultural workers alone

The growth of the number of agricultural wage workers is directly connected with the development of capitalist enterprises in

¹ *Collected Works*, Russian ed, Vol III.—Ed

agriculture, which we have traced in landlord and peasant farming. Take, for example, the employment of machinery in agriculture. We have quoted precise data proving that when the wealthy peasants employ this machinery it signifies the transition to capitalist enterprise. And in landlord farming the employment of machinery and improved implements generally means the inevitable squeezing out of the labour rent system by capitalism. The implements of the peasants are replaced by the implements of the landlord, the old three field system is supplanted by new technical methods called forth by the change in the implements employed, the bonded peasant is no longer suitable for work with improved implements and his place is taken by the permanent or day labourer.

In the region in European Russia where the employment of machinery developed most after the emancipation of the serfs, the employment of hired labourers from other districts is most widespread. That region comprises the southern and eastern districts of European Russia. The arrival of agricultural labourers in that region has given rise to extremely typical and strongly expressed capitalist relations. These relations deserve to be examined in greater detail in order to compare the old and hitherto predominant labour rent system with the new system that is coming to the front more and more. First of all, it must be noted that the southern district is distinguished by the higher rates of wages that are paid in agriculture. According to statistics covering a whole decade (1881-91), which eliminate casual fluctuations, the highest wages are paid in the Taurida, Bessarabia and Don Gubernias. In these gubernias the wages of a labourer hired by the year amount to 143.50 rubles per annum, including maintenance, and those of a seasonal labourer (for the summer), 55.67 rubles per season. The next highest wages are paid in the industrial districts—St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir and Yaroslavl Gubernias. Here the wages of a labourer hired by the year amount to 135.80 rubles and those of a seasonal worker, 53 rubles. The lowest wages are paid in the central agricultural districts—Kazan, Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Tula, Orel and Kursk Gubernias, *i.e.*, the principal districts where the labour rent system, bondage and

all sorts of survivals of serfdom prevail. Here the wages paid to a labourer hired by the year amount to only 92.95 rubles per annum, only two-thirds of the wages paid in the highest capitalist gubernias, and the wages of a seasonal worker amount to 35.64 rubles, about 20 rubles less for the season than is paid in the South. It is precisely from this central district that we see an enormous migration of workers. Every spring, more than one and a half million persons leave this district partly to seek agricultural employment (principally in the South, and partly, as we shall see later on, in the industrial gubernias) and also to seek non-agricultural employment in the capitals and in the industrial gubernias. Between this principal district from which workers migrate and the two principal districts to which workers migrate (the agricultural South and the capitals and the two industrial gubernias) there is a zone of gubernias in which average wages are paid. These gubernias attract workers from the "cheapest" and most hungry districts, while at the same time workers leave these gubernias to seek work in those districts where higher wages are paid. This migration and cross migration of workers is described in great detail in S. Korolenko's book, *Free Wage Labour*, in which the author quotes an abundance of material. In this way capitalism secures a more even (from the point of view of the requirements of capital, of course) distribution of the population, wages are levelled throughout the country, a real, single national labour market is created, gradually, the ground is cut from under the old method of production by the "temptation" the higher wages offer to the bonded muzhik. This explains the endless complaints of the landed gentry about the local workers becoming corrupted, about the drunkenness and debauchery which migratory occupations create and about the workers being "spoilt" by the towns, etc., etc.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century rather large capitalist agricultural enterprises were established in those districts to which workers most migrated. Capitalist co-operation arose in the employment, for example, of machines like threshing machines. Mr. Tezyakov, in describing the conditions of life and labour of the agricultural labourers in the Kherson Gubernia, points out

that a horse driven threshing machine requires the employment of from 14 to 23 and even more labourers, and a steam threshing machine, from 50 to 70. In several farms 500 to 1,000 workers were collected, an extremely high figure for agriculture. Capitalism rendered possible the substitution of cheap female and child labour for more costly male labour. For example, in the town of Kakhovka, one of the most important labour markets in the Taurida Gubernia, where formerly 40,000 workers were gathered and in the nineties of the last century, from 20,000 to 30,000—in 1890, 12.7 per cent were women, and in 1895, 25.6 per cent were women. In 1893, 0.7 per cent were children and in 1895 the percentage of children had increased to 1.69.

Having collected the workers from all parts of Russia, the capitalist farms sorted them out according to their requirements and created something in the nature of a hierarchy of factory workers. For example, the following categories are indicated: full workers, half workers—these are again subdivided into "great strength workers" (16 to 20 years of age) and "little strength" (children between the ages of 8 and 14). Not the slightest trace of the old, so called "patriarchal" attitude of the landlord to "his" peasant is to be observed here. Labour power becomes a commodity like every other commodity. Bondage of the "truly Russian" type disappears and gives way to weekly wages, fierce competition and strikes and lockouts. The accumulation of enormous masses of workers on the labour markets and the incredibly hard and insanitary conditions of labour gave rise to attempts to establish public control of large farms. These attempts are characteristic of "large scale industry" in agriculture, but of course they cannot be durable so long as political liberties and legal labour organisations are lacking. How hard the conditions of labour are may be judged by the fact that the working day ranges from 12½ to 15 hours. Traumatic injuries to workers engaged on machines have become a common occurrence. Occupational diseases have spread (for example, among workers engaged on threshing machines, etc.) All the "chains" of purely capitalist exploitation in the most developed American form are to be observed in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, side by side with the

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purely mediæval *otrabotochni* and *barshchina* systems, which have disappeared long ago in advanced countries. All the enormous variety of agrarian relations in Russia reduce themselves to the interweaving of seif and capitalist methods of exploitation.¹

In order to complete our investigation into the conditions of wage labour in Russian agriculture we will quote statistics on the budgets of peasant farms in the lower groups. Wage labour is included here under the euphemistic heading of "earnings" or "trades." What is the proportion between the income from these occupations and the income from the farm? The budgets of the horseless and one-horse peasants in Voronezh give a definite answer to this question. The gross income of a horseless peasant from all sources is given at 118 10 rubles, of which 57 11 rubles represents income from the farm and 59 04 rubles represents income from "trades." The latter sum is made up of 36 75 rubles income from "personal trade" and 22 29 rubles is miscellaneous income—included in the latter item is *income from letting land!* The gross income of a one-horse peasant is given at 178 12 rubles, of which 127 69 rubles is income from the farm and 49 22 rubles from side occupations (35 rubles, personal work, 6 rubles, carting, 2 rubles from "commercial and industrial establishments and enterprises" and 6 rubles, miscellaneous income). If we subtract the expenditure on the farm we will get 69 37 rubles income from the farm, as against 49 22 rubles income from side occupations. This is how three fifths of the peasant households in Russia obtain their livelihood. It goes without saying that the standard of living of these peasants is no higher, and sometimes even lower, than that of agricultural labourers. In this same Voronezh Gubernia the average wage of an agricultural labourer (during the decade 1881-91) is 57 rubles per annum in addition to maintenance, amounting to 42 rubles. The expenditure on maintaining a *whole family* of four persons of a horseless peasant amounts to 78 rubles per annum, and 98 rubles per annum for a family of five of a one-horse peasant. The Russian peasant has been reduced

¹ For further details on this subject see 'The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social Democracy,' Vol. III in this series.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

by labour rent, taxes and capitalist exploitation to such a miserable, starvation standard of life as would seem incredible in Europe. In Europe such social types are called *paupers*.

VI

In order to sum up what has been said above concerning the disintegration of the peasantry, we will first of all quote the only summarised statistics available in literature on European Russia as a whole that enable us to judge as to the various groups existing among the peasantry at various periods. These are the returns of the military horse census. In the second edition of my book, *The Development of Capitalism* I summed up these returns for 48 gubernias in European Russia for the periods 1888-91 and 1896-1900. The following is an abstract of the main results thus obtained.

NUMBER OF PEASANT HOUSEHOLDS (IN MILLIONS)

	1888-91		1896-1900	
	Total	%	Total	%
Horseless peasants	2.8	27.3	3.2	29.2
Peasants with one horse	2.9	28.5	3.4	30.3
Peasants with two horses	2.2	22.2	2.5	22.0
Peasants with three horses	1.1	10.6	1.0	9.4
Peasants with four and more	1.1	11.4	1.0	9.1
Total	10.1	100.0	11.1	100.0

As I have already pointed out in passing, above, these figures indicate the growing process of expropriation of the peasantry. The increase of one million peasant households in the period has been entirely an increase of the poor groups. The total number of horses has declined in this period from 16.91 millions to 16.87 millions, the peasants as a whole have become poorer in horses. The higher groups have also become poorer in horses, in 1888-91 they had 5.5 horses per household whereas in 1896-1900 they had 5.4.

It would be quite easy to draw the conclusion from these figures that no "differentiation" is taking place among the peasantry, the poorest group increased most, whereas the richest group diminished most (in number of households). This is not differentiation, but equalising poverty! And conclusions like

these based on methods like these can often be found in literature. But if we ask have the mutual relations between these groups of the peasantry changed?—we will see something different. In 1888-98 the lower groups, representing half the total households, owned 23.7 per cent of the total number of horses, and in 1896-1900 the percentage was exactly the same. The wealthy groups which represent one fifth of the total households owned 52.6 per cent of the total number of horses in the first period, and in the second period this had increased to 53.2 per cent. Clearly, the mutual relations between the groups have remained almost unchanged. The peasantry has become poorer, the wealthy groups have become poorer, the crisis of 1891 had a very serious effect, but the relations between the rural bourgeoisie and the peasantry who are being ruined have not changed as a result of that, nor could they really change.

This circumstance is usually lost sight of by those who undertake to judge the process of disintegration among the peasantry on the basis of fragmentary statistics. It would be ridiculous to imagine that separate statistics on the distribution of horses are able to explain anything at all in regard to the disintegration of the peasantry. This distribution shows nothing at all if it is not taken in conjunction with *all other statistics* on peasant farming. If, in examining these statistics, we have established what is common among the groups in regard to the distribution of renting and letting land, in regard to improved implements and manure, earnings and the purchasing of land, hired labourers and the number of cattle owned, if we have shown that all these various phenomena are inseparably connected with each other and reveal the actual formation of opposite economic types—a proletariat and a rural bourgeoisie—if we have established all this, and only to the extent that we have established this, we can then take separate figures showing the distribution of horses, say, to *illustrate* what has been said above. On the other hand, it would be ridiculous in the extreme to draw any conclusions whatever concerning the relation between the rural bourgeoisie among the peasantry and other groups of the peasantry, *exclusively* on the basis of this or that case of diminution in the number of horses,

say, owned by the wealthy group during a given period. Not in a single capitalist country, or in a single branch of economy, is there, nor can there be (in view of the predominance of the market) even development capitalism *cannot* develop in any other way except in leaps and zigzags, now rapidly advancing forward, now dropping temporarily below the previous level. And the essence of the question of the Russian agrarian crisis and of the forthcoming change is by no means the question of the stage of development reached by capitalism, or the rate of that development, but whether the crisis and the forthcoming change is a capitalist crisis and change, whether these are taking place amidst the transformation of the peasantry into a rural bourgeoisie and proletariat, whether the relations between the various households in the village communes are bourgeois relations or not. In other words the first task in all research on the agrarian question in Russia is to establish the principal facts which can characterise the class essence of agrarian relations. And only after the kind of classes and the trend of development we are dealing with become clear can we deal with separate questions like the rate of development, the various changes in the general trend of development, etc.

The foundation of the Marxist view of post Reform peasant farming in Russia is that this type of farming is regarded as petty bourgeois. And the controversy which the Marxian economists waged against the Narodnik economists revolved around the question (and could not but do so if the real nature of the differences between them was to be explained) as to whether this description was correct and applicable or not. Unless *this* question is definitely cleared up it will be impossible to make any progress whatever towards more concrete or practical questions. For example, it would have been an absolutely hopeless and confused task to examine the probable paths of solution of the agrarian question bequeathed by the nineteenth century to the twentieth century had not the general trend of our agrarian evolution, the classes that stand to gain by this or that progress of events, etc., first been made clear.

The detailed figures we quoted above showing the process of

disintegration among the peasantry explain precisely this foundation of all the other questions of the agrarian revolution, and unless this foundation is understood, it is impossible to proceed further. The sum of interrelations between the various groups of the peasantry, which we studied in detail, at opposite ends of Russia, reveal to us the very essence of the social economic relations existing within the village commune. These interrelations strikingly reveal the petty bourgeois character of peasant economy in the present historical situation. When the Marxists said that the small producer in agriculture (irrespective of whether he cultivates allotment or any other land) must, with the development of commodity production, inevitably become a petty bourgeois—this postulate caused astonishment, it was said that it could not be proved, that stereotyped examples from other countries were taken to apply to our peculiar conditions. But the data on the relations between the groups, on the rich members of the commune concentrating the land in their hands by renting it from the poor members, on the hiring of labourers by the former and the conversion of the latter into wage workers, etc., etc., etc.—all these data confirm the theoretical conclusions of the Marxists and prove that they are incontrovertible. The question of the significance of the village commune in directing the economic development of Russia is *irrevocably decided* by these data, because it is precisely this real trend of development of the village commune as it really is (and not as it is imagined) that our data indicate. Notwithstanding the equality of allotments and notwithstanding the redistribution, *it turns out* that the real trend of economic development of the peasant members of village communes is precisely in the direction of the creation of a rural bourgeoisie and of forcing the mass of the poorest farmers into the ranks of the proletariat. Both the Stolypin agrarian reforms,¹ as we shall see further on, and the nationalisation of the land demanded by the Trudoviki² are in

¹ For the Stolypin agrarian policy cf. Vol IV in this series, *Letter to Skvortsov-Stepanov*—Ed.

² Literally, labourites. Actually, representatives of the peasantry—Ed. Eng. ed.

line with this trend of development, although there is a big difference between these two "solutions" of the agrarian problem from the point of view of the rapidity of social development, the growth of productive forces and the maximum protection of the interests of the masses

We must now examine the question of the development of commercial farming in Russia. The foregoing included, as a premise, the well known fact that the whole of the post Reform epoch is distinguished by the growth of trade and exchange. We think it is quite unnecessary to quote figures to prove this. But we must show, first, to what extent present day peasant farming is already subordinated to the market and secondly, what *special* forms agriculture assumes in proportion as it becomes subordinated to the market.

The most precise statistics on the first question are contained in the budget statistics of the Voronezh Zemstvo. These statistics enable us to separate the money expenditure and income of a peasant family from the total expenditure and income (the gross income and expenditure were given above). Below is a table indicating the role of the market.

PERCENTAGE MONEY EXPENDITURE AND INCOME TO TOTAL
EXPENDITURE AND INCOME OF PEASANTS

	Expenditure	Income
Horseless peasants	57.1	54.6
Peasants with one horse	46.5	41.4
Peasants with two horses	43.6	45.7
Peasants with three horses	41.5	42.3
Peasants with four horses	45.4	40.8
Peasants with five and more horses	60.2	59.2
Average.	49.1	47.5

Thus, even the farms of the *middle peasant*—not to speak of the farms of the wealthy and of the poor and semi-proletarian peasants—are subordinated to the market to an extraordinary degree. Hence, all arguments about peasant farming which ignore the predominating and growing role of the market, of exchange, of commodity production are radically unsound. The abolition of the feudal latifundia and landlordism—a measure upon which all the thoughts and desires of the Russian

peasantry were concentrated at the end of the nineteenth century—will *increase* and not diminish the power of the market, for the growth of commerce and commodity production is *retarded* by the labour rent system and by bondage,

In regard to the second question, it must be pointed out that the penetration of capital into agriculture is a peculiar process which cannot be properly understood if we confine ourselves to general statistics covering the whole of Russia. Agriculture does not become commercialised suddenly and to an equal degree in all types of economy and in all parts of the country. On the contrary, the market usually subordinates to itself one phase of the complex economy of agriculture in one place and another phase in another, moreover, the remaining phases do not disappear, but adapt themselves to the “main,” *i.e.*, to the money, phase. For example, in one place, commercial grain farming mainly develops: the principal product produced for sale is grain. Cattle breeding plays a subordinate role in such farming, and later—in the extreme case of one-sided development of grain farming—almost disappears. The “wheat factories” in the far West of America, for instance, were sometimes organised, for one summer, almost without cattle. In other places commercial cattle breeding is the principal form that develops: the principal products produced for sale are meat or dairy products. Purely agricultural farming adapts itself to cattle breeding. Of course, the size of the farms and the methods of organisation will differ in each case. Sub-urban dairy farming cannot be judged by the amount of land sown. The same measure of large and small farming cannot be equally applied to the steppe¹ farmer, to the vegetable gardener, the tobacco planter and to the “dairy farmer” (to use an English term), *etc.*

The penetration of exchange and trade into agriculture gives rise to specialisation in farming, and this specialisation steadily increases. The same economic indices (the number of horses, for example) acquire different significance in different regions of commercial agriculture. Among the horseless peasants in the environs of the capitals there are, for example, big farmers who possess,

¹ *Preria*.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

say, dairy cattle, who have a big turnover and employ hired labourers. Of course, taken in the main, there are very few farmers of this type among the mass of the horseless and one horse peasants, but if we take gross figures covering the whole country we will not be able to appreciate the special form of capitalism in agriculture.

Special attention must be given to this point. If it is ignored, it will be impossible to obtain a correct picture of the development of capitalism in agriculture and it will be very easy to fall into the mistake of vulgarisation. The whole complexity of the process can be appreciated only if the actual special features of agriculture are taken into consideration. It is totally untrue to say that, owing to its special features, agriculture is not subject to the laws of capitalist development. It is true that the special features of agriculture hinder its subordination to the market, nevertheless, everywhere and in all countries the process of *growth of commercial agriculture* is unrestrained. The forms in which agriculture is becoming commercial agriculture are indeed peculiar and call for special methods of study.

In order to illustrate what has been said, we will take examples from various commercial agricultural districts in Russia. In the commercial grain farming district (Novorossia, the left bank of the Volga) we witness an extremely rapid increase in the harvest of cereals: in 1864-66 these gubernias lagged behind the Central Black Earth Belt and had a net harvest of only 2.1 quarters per head of the population, in 1883-87 these gubernias were ahead of the centre and had a net harvest of 3.4 quarters per head. The most characteristic feature of this district in the post-Reform epoch is—expansion of tillage. Very often the methods of tilling the land in this district are of the most primitive kind—all attention is exclusively concentrated on tilling the largest possible area of land. In the second half of the nineteenth century there developed in this district something similar to the American "wheat factories." The area of land tilled (which among the peasants in the higher groups reaches up to 271 dessiatins) enables us to judge fully of the size and type of a farm. In another district—in the industrial, and particularly in the environs of the capitals

—a similar expansion of tillage is out of the question. It is not commercial grain farming, but commercial cattle breeding that is the chief characteristic of this district. The number of desiatins tilled, or the number of horses employed, cannot serve here as the means for judging the type of farming carried on. The most convenient measure in this case would be the number of cows (dairy farming). Change in the rotation of crops, the sowing of grass and not the expansion of tillage, is here the characteristic symptom of progress in large scale farming. The number of households with many horses is smaller in this district, perhaps the diminution in the number of horses owned will sometimes indicate an improvement. On the other hand, the peasants in this district will have more cows than those in the rest of Russia. Mr Blagoveshchensky, in summing up the Zemstvo statistics, calculated on the average 1.2 cows per household, in 18 uyezds of the St Petersburg, Moscow, Tver and Smolensk Gubernias, the average is 1.6 and in the St Petersburg Gubernia alone, the average is 1.8 per household. Both merchant capital and capital invested in production operate in this district mainly in the products of cattle breeding. The size of incomes is determined to an increasing extent by the number of milch cows owned. "Dairy farms" are developing. The hiring of agricultural labourers by the rich peasants is developing, we have already remarked that workers migrate from the impoverished centre to the *industrial* districts for *agricultural* work. In a word, the very same social economic relations are manifesting themselves here in an altogether different form, under agronomic conditions that do not resemble purely agricultural conditions.

And if we take the cultivation of special crops like tobacco, or the combination of agriculture and the technical working up of the produce (distilling, beet sugar, oil pressing, potato starch, etc.), the forms in which capitalist relations manifest themselves will neither resemble those which exist in commercial grain farming nor those which develop in commercial cattle breeding. In this case we must take as our measure either the area under special crops or the size of the enterprise engaged in the technical working up of the produce cultivated by the given enterprise.

Gross statistics on agriculture, which deal only with the area of land or the number of cattle, do not by a long way take into consideration all this variety of forms, and therefore very often conclusions based only on statistics of this kind are wrong. Commercial agriculture is growing much more rapidly, the influence of exchange is wider and capital is changing rural economy much more profoundly than one is led to believe by gross figures and abstract averages.

VII

We will now sum up what has been said about the essence of the agrarian question and about the agrarian crisis in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century.

What is the essence of this crisis? M. Shanin, in his pamphlet, *Municipalisation or Distribution* (Vilna, 1907), insists that our agricultural crisis is an agronomic crisis and that its deepest roots lie in the necessity of raising the technical level of agriculture, which is incredibly low in Russia, in the necessity of adopting a higher system of farming, etc.

This opinion is wrong because it is too abstract. Undoubtedly, it is necessary to adopt a higher system of farming but, in the first place, this higher system was adopted in Russia after 1861. However slow progress may be, it cannot be denied that both landlord farmers and peasant farmers, as represented by the wealthy minority, have adopted grass sowing, are employing improved implements, are more systematically and carefully manuring their land, etc. And since this slow progress in agricultural technique has been a general process since 1861, it is obvious that this in itself does not explain the universally admitted intensification of the agricultural crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. Secondly, both "solutions" of the agrarian problem that have been proposed—the Stolypin proposal to solve it *from above*, by preserving landlordism and finally destroying the village commune by allowing it to be plundered by the kulaks, and the peasant (Trudovik) proposal to solve it *from below*, by abolishing landlordism and by nationalising all the land—both these solutions, each in its own way facilitate the adoption of the higher tech-

nique, both are in line with agronomic progress. The only difference between them is that one bases this progress on the acceleration of the process of squeezing the poor peasants out of agriculture and the other bases it on the acceleration of the process of abolishing the labour rent system by destroying the feudal latifundia. It is an undoubted fact that the poor peasants "manage" their land extremely badly. It is beyond doubt also that if their land is handed over to be plundered by a handful of rich peasants, agriculture will be raised to a higher level. But it is also an undoubted fact that landlord land, cultivated by means of the labour rent system and bondage, is also badly cultivated, *even worse than are the allotments* (the reader will recall the figures quoted above: 54 poods per dessiatin on allotment land, 66 poods per dessiatin on landlord farms, 50 poods per dessiatin under the share cropping system and 45 poods per dessiatin on land rented by the year by peasants). The labour rent system of landlord farming means the preservation of incredibly obsolete methods of land cultivation, it means the perpetuation of barbarism in agriculture and in social life. Undoubtedly, therefore, if the labour rent system is torn up by the roots, *i.e.*, if landlordism is completely abolished (without compensation), then agriculture will be raised to a higher level.

Consequently, the essence of the agrarian question and of the agrarian crisis is not the removal of the obstacles to raising agriculture to a higher level, but *how* these obstacles are to be removed, which class is to remove them and by what methods.

And it is absolutely necessary to remove these obstacles to the development of the productive forces of the country—necessity not only in the subjective sense of the word, but also in the objective sense, *i.e.*, this removal is inevitable, and no power on earth can prevent it.

The mistake M. Shanin makes, and which many writers on the agrarian question make, is that he took the correct postulate regarding the necessity of raising the level of the technique of agriculture in too abstract a manner and failed to take into consideration the peculiar form in which the feudal and capitalist features of agriculture in Russia are interwoven. The principal and fund-

amental obstacle to the development of the productive forces in Russian agriculture are the survivals of serfdom, *i.e.*, primarily the labour rent system and bondage, then come the serf dues, the state of inequality before the law of the peasantry, their degradation in relation to the higher orders, etc., etc. The abolition of these survivals of serfdom has long become an economic necessity and the crisis in agriculture at the end of the nineteenth century became so extraordinarily acute precisely because the liberation of Russia from mediævalism has been too long drawn out, because the labour rent system and bondage have "lived" too long. They began to die out after 1861 so slowly that the new organism must rid itself of them quickly by violent means.

What is this new organism of Russian agriculture? Above we tried to show in particular detail what this is, because the economists in the Liberal Narodnik camp have particularly wrong ideas on this subject. The new economic organism which is emerging from the shell of serfdom in Russia is commercial agriculture and capitalism. In so far as it is not conducted on the labour rent system, not on the system of holding the allotment peasant in bondage, the economics of landlord farming clearly reveal capitalist features. The economics of peasant farming—in so far as we are able to see what is going on in the village communes in spite of the official equality of allotment landownership—also reveal purely capitalist features everywhere. Commercial agriculture is steadily growing in Russia in spite of all obstacles, and this commercial agriculture is inevitably becoming transformed into capitalist agriculture, although the forms this transformation is taking vary very considerably in the various districts.

What is meant by the violent abolition of the mediæval shell that has become necessary for the further free development of the new economic organism? By that is meant the abolition of mediæval landownership. In Russia, right up to the present time, both landlordism and, to a considerable extent also, peasant landownership, is still mediæval. We have seen how the new economic conditions are breaking down the framework and obstacles of mediæval landownership, how it is compelling the poor peasant to

let his ancient allotment, how it is compelling the rich peasant to build up a relatively large farm out of the fragments of different lands allotments, purchased land and land rented from the land lord On landlord land also, the division of land into land worked by peasants in payment of rent, land rented to the peasants on annual leases and land farmed by the landlord himself indicates that the new economic system is being built up outside of the framework of the old mediæval system of landownership.

This system of landownership can be abolished at one stroke, by a determined rupture with the past The nationalisation of the land would be such a measure, which all the representatives of the peasantry¹ have indeed demanded, more or less consistently, in the period between 1905 and 1907 The abolition of private property in land does not by any means change the bourgeois foundations of commercial and capitalist agriculture There is nothing more erroneous than the opinion that the nationalisation of the land has something in common with socialism, or even with the equal right to the use of the land Socialism, as is well known, means the abolition of commodity production Nationalisation, however, means converting the land into the property of the state, and such a conversion does not in the least affect private enterprise on the land Whether the land is private property or whether it is in the "possession" of the whole country, of the whole nation, makes no difference in so far as the economic system on the land is concerned, nor does it make any difference whatever to the (capitalist) economic system of the rich muzhik whether he buys land "in perpetuity," rents land from the landlord or the state, or whether he "gathers up" allotment land abandoned by bankrupt peasants If exchange remains, it is ridiculous to talk of socialism And the exchange of agricultural products and means of production does not depend upon the form of landownership at all (I want to say in parenthesis that I am explaining here only the economic significance of nationalisation and not advocating it as a programme, I advocated this in the work I referred to above)

¹ Concerning the representatives of the peasantry in the period of the first revolution, cf Vol III in this series: *The Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution of 1905-07*, chap 2, part 6—Ed.

In regard to equality, we have already shown above how this is applied in practice in the distribution of allotment land. We have seen that within the village commune, allotment land is distributed fairly equally, and only slightly operates to the advantage of the rich. But very little trace is left of this equality in the long run, owing to the fact that the poor peasants are obliged to let their land and that the rented land is concentrated in the hands of the rich peasants. Clearly, equality of landownership is unable to remove the inequality in the actual use of the land as long as there is inequality in property among owners and a system of exchange which aggravates this inequality.

The economic significance of nationalisation does not by any means lie where it is very often sought for. It does not lie in the fight against bourgeois relationships (as Marx long ago pointed out, nationalisation is one of the most consistent bourgeois measures), but in the fight against feudal relationships. The multiplicity of forms of mediæval landownership hampers economic development: the system of dividing the population into estates hampers trade, the disharmony between the old system of landownership and the new system of economy gives rise to acute contradictions, owing to the retention of the *latifundia*, the landlords prolong the existence of the labour rent system, the peasants are confined to a ghetto, to allotment landownership, the framework of which life is breaking down at every step. Nationalisation will sweep away all mediæval relations in landownership entirely, will remove all artificial barriers on the land and make the land really free—for whom? For all citizens? Nothing of the kind. The horseless peasant (three and a quarter million households), as we have seen, is free to let his allotment. The land becomes free—for the *master*, for the one who really wants and is really able to cultivate it according to the requirements of modern economic conditions in general and the requirements of the world market in particular. Nationalisation would accelerate the death of serfdom and the development of purely capitalist farming on land that has been completely cleared of all mediæval lumber. This is the real historical significance of nationalisation in Russia as it developed at the end of the nineteenth century.

The other objectively not impossible way of clearing land ownership for capitalism is, as we have seen, to accelerate the plunder of the village commune by the rich and to consolidate private landownership among the wealthy peasants. This way leaves the principal source of labour rent and bondage untouched, the landlords' latifundia are left intact. Obviously, this way of clearing the ground for capitalism guarantees the free development of the productive forces to a much smaller degree than the first mentioned way. As long as the latifundia remain intact the preservation of the bonded peasant, the share cropper, the annual renting of small plots of land, the cultivation of the "squires' land with the implements of the peasants, i.e., the preservation of the most backward culture and of all that oriental barbarism that is called patriarchal rural life, are inevitable.

The two methods of "solving" the agrarian question in developing bourgeois Russia correspond to two paths of development of capitalism in agriculture. I call these two paths the Prussian path and the American path. The first is characterised by the fact that mediæval relationships in landownership are not liquidated at one stroke, they gradually adapt themselves to capitalism and for this reason capitalism for a long time retains semi-feudal features. Prussian landlordism was not crushed by the bourgeois revolution, it survived and became the basis of *Junker* economy, which is capitalist at bottom, but which still keeps the rural population in a certain degree of dependence, as for example the *Gesindeordnung*,¹ etc. As a consequence, the social and political domination of the *Junker* was strengthened for many decades after 1848 and the development of the productive forces of German agriculture proceeded very much more slowly than in America. On the contrary, in America, it was not the slave economy of the big landlords that served as the basis of capitalist agriculture (the Civil War crushed the slave estates), but the free economy of the free farmer working on free land, land free from all mediæval fetters, free from serfdom and feud.

¹ *Master and Servant Laws*—Ed. Eng. ed.,

alism, on the one hand, and free from the fetters of private property in land, on the other. Land was given away in America out of an enormous land fund, at a nominal price, and it is only on a new, completely capitalist base that private property in land has now developed there.

Both these paths of capitalist development became clearly marked in Russia after 1861. The progress of landlord economy cannot be doubted, but the slowness of this progress is not accidental: it is inevitable as long as the survivals of serfdom are preserved. There is no doubt also that the more free the peasantry are, the less they are oppressed by the survivals of serfdom (in the South, for example, all these favourable conditions exist), and finally, the better the peasants, taken as a whole, are provided with land, the greater will be the disintegration among the peasantry and the more rapid will be the process of the formation of a class of rural capitalist farmers. The whole question of the future development of the country can be reduced to this: which of the two paths of development will ultimately prevail, and, correspondingly, which class will carry through the necessary and inevitable change—the old landlord or the free peasant farmer?

Some people in Russia think that nationalisation of the land means that the land will be removed from the sphere of commerce. This, undoubtedly, is the point of view of the majority of the progressive peasants and of the ideologists of the peasantry. But this view is radically wrong. The very opposite is the case. Private property in land is an obstacle to the investment of capital in land. Therefore, when the free renting of land from the state becomes possible (and this is the essence of nationalisation in bourgeois society) the land will be drawn into the sphere of commerce to a *far greater extent* than was the case when private property in land prevailed. The possibilities of free investment of capital in land, free competition in agriculture, are much greater under the system of free renting than under the system of private property in land. Nationalisation of the land is, as it were, landlordism without the landlord. And what landlordism in the capitalist development of agriculture means

was explained by the profound observations of Marx in his *Theories of Surplus Value*. I have quoted these observations in my work on the agrarian programme referred to above, but in view of the importance of the question, I take the liberty of repeating them here.

In the paragraph on the historical conditions of the Ricardian theory of rent (*Theorie über den Mehrwert*, II Band, 2 Teil, Stuttgart, 1905, S. 67), Marx says that Ricardo and Anderson "start out from a viewpoint, which is regarded as very strange on the Continent, viz., that landed property, as an obstacle to all application of capital to the land, does not exist at all." At first sight, this would seem to be contradictory because it is precisely in England that feudal landed property is considered to have been completely preserved. But Marx explains that

"nowhere in the world has capitalist production dealt so ruthlessly with the traditional relations of agriculture and so adequately moulded its conditions and made them subject to itself. England is in this respect the most revolutionary country in the world. All historically inherited relations—not only the position of the villages but the very villages themselves, not only the habitations of the agricultural population but this population itself, not only the ancient economic centres but the very economy itself—have been ruthlessly swept away where they were in contradiction to the conditions of capitalist production in the countryside or did not correspond to those conditions. The German, for example, finds economic relations determined by the traditional relations of village fields" (*Feldmarken*), "the position of economic centres and particular conglomerations of the population. The Englishman finds that the historic conditions of agriculture have been progressively created by capital since the end of the fifteenth century. The technical expression customary in the United Kingdom the 'clearing of estates,' does not occur in any continental country. But what does this 'clearing of estates' mean? It means that, without regard for the local population—which is driven away for existing villages—which are levelled to the ground, for farm buildings—which are torn down, for the kind of agriculture—which is transformed at a stroke, being converted for example from tillage to pasture, all conditions of production instead of being accepted as they are handed down by tradition are historically fashioned in the form necessary under the circumstances for the most profitable investment of capital. To that extent therefore, no landed property exists. It allows capital—the farmer—to manage freely, since it is only concerned about the money income. A Pomeranian landowner (Marx refers to Rodbertus, whose theory of rent he examined in detail and brilliantly refuted in this work), "his mind full of his hereditary estates, economic centres and the agricultural collegium, is quite likely, therefore, to hold up

his hands in horror at Ricardo's 'unhistorical' views on the development of agricultural relations" As a matter of fact, "the English conditions are the only ones in which modern landed property, *i.e.*, landed property modified by capitalist production, has adequately developed. Here the English view' (Ricardo's theory of rent) 'is classical for the modern, *i.e.*, capitalist mode of production"

In England, the clearing of the land proceeded in revolutionary forms, accompanied by the violent breaking up of peasant landownership. The break up of the old and obsolete is absolutely inevitable also in Russia, but the nineteenth century (and also the first seven years of the twentieth) did not settle the question as to which class will do this necessary thing and in what form it will be done. We have shown above what the basis of the distribution of land is in Russia at the present time. We have seen that 10.5 million peasant households—having 75 million dessiatins of land—confront 30,000 owners of latifundia of a total area of 70 million dessiatins. One possible outcome of the struggle, which cannot help breaking out on this ground, is that the amount of land owned by tens of millions of households will be almost doubled and the landed properties of the upper 30,000 will disappear. Let us examine this possible outcome from the purely theoretical point of view, from the point of view of the manner in which the agrarian question arose in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century. What would the results of such a change be? From the point of view of agrarian relationships obviously, that mediæval allotment and mediæval land lordism would be reshuffled again. The old conditions would be swept away completely. Nothing traditional would be left in agrarian landowning relations. What force would determine agrarian relations? The "principle" of equality? That is what the progressive peasants who are affected by Narodnik ideology are inclined to believe. That is what the Narodnik thinks. But this is an illusion. The "principle" of equality, which in the village commune is recognised by law and hallowed by custom, leads, in fact, to landownership becoming adapted to differences in the amount of property owned. And on the basis of this *economic fact*, which has been confirmed a thousand times by Russian and West European data, we assert that all hopes

placed in equality will be shattered and that the *reshuffling of landownership will be the only durable result*. Would the significance of *such* a result be great? Very great, because no other measure, no other reform, no other change could give such complete guarantees for the rapid, wide and free progress of agricultural technique in Russia and for the elimination from our life of all traces of serfdom, social estates and oriental barbarism.

Progress of technique?—some will ask. But has it not been shown above by means of precise data that landlord farming is on a higher level than peasant farming in regard to the sowing of grass, in regard to the employment of machines, manuring the soil, quality of cattle, etc? Of course it has been proved, and this fact is beyond a doubt. But it must not be forgotten that all these differences in economic organisation, technique, etc., are summed up in the *yield*. And we have seen that the yield per desiatina on landlords' land cultivated by the peasants *on the share cropping and similar otrabotki systems* is lower than the yield on allotment land. This fact is nearly always forgotten when the agronomic level of landlord and peasant farming in Russia is discussed. Landlord farming is on a higher level *in so far as* it is conducted on capitalist lines. And the whole point is that this "in so far as," at the end of the nineteenth century, meant that the labour rent system was the predominant system of farming in the central districts. *To the extent* that, at the present time, landlords' land is cultivated by the bonded peasant with antiquated implements, methods, etc., *to that extent* landlordism is the principal cause of backwardness and stagnation. The change in the system of landownership that we are discussing would increase the yield of sharecropping and rented lands (at the present time the yield on such lands—*cf* figures above—is 50 and 45 poods as compared with 54 poods on allotment land and 66 poods on landlords' farms). Even if the yield was increased *only* to the level of that on allotment land, the progress would be enormous. It goes without saying, of course, that the yield on allotment land would also be increased as a result of the peasant being freed from the yoke of the feudal latifundia and also be

cause the allotment lands, like all the land in the state, would then become free land, equally accessible not to all citizens, but to citizens owning agricultural capital, *i.e.*, to the farmers

This conclusion does not by any means emerge from the data concerning the yield we have taken. On the contrary, these data merely serve to illustrate the conclusion that emerges from the *sum total* of data concerning the evolution of Russian land lord and peasant farming. To refute this conclusion it will be necessary to refute the fact that the history of Russian agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth century is the history of the substitution of bourgeois productive relations for feudal relations

If we keep to the figures of the number of peasant households at the present time, we may get the impression that the agrarian changes we are examining would lead to the land being divided up into extremely small fragments. Just think of it! Thirteen million households for 280 million dessiatins of land! Is not this dividing up the land in a monstrous fashion? To this our reply is the land is broken up in this extreme fashion *now* because at the *present time* thirteen million farms are working an area of *less than* 280 million dessiatins! Consequently, the change we are interested in would not by any means make things worse in this respect. More than that. We would ask further whether there are any grounds for thinking that in the event of this change taking place the number of households will remain unchanged? Usually, those influenced by Narodnik theories, and the peasants, whose thoughts and strivings are concentrated on land and who even dream of converting the industrial workers into small farmers, think it will remain unchanged. Undoubtedly, a certain number of Russian industrial workers at the end of the nineteenth century also adopted the peasant point of view. The question, however, is—*is this point of view correct?* Does it conform to the *objective* economic conditions and to the progress of economic development? It is sufficient to put this question clearly to enable one to see that the peasant point of view is determined by the obsolete and irrevocable past and not by the growing future. The peasant point of view is *wrong*. It repre

sents the ideology of yesterday, for economic development is, *in fact*, leading not to an increase but to a diminution of the agricultural population

The change in agrarian relations that we are examining will not and cannot stop this process of diminution of the agricultural population, a process which is common to all countries in which capitalism is developing. I may be asked: how can this change bring about a diminution of the agricultural population, seeing that the land will become freely accessible to all? I would reply to this question with a passage from a speech delivered in the Duma by the peasant deputy (Poltava Gubernia), Mr Chizhevsky. Speaking in the Duma on June 6 (May 24—old style), 1906, he said:

"The peasants where I come from, the voters who sent us here, calculate as follows: 'If we were a little richer and if every one of our families could afford to spend five or six rubles per annum on sugar—in every uyezd where it is possible to grow sugar beets several sugar refineries would arise in addition to those which already exist.' Naturally if these sugar refineries arose what a demand would arise for labourers if production were intensified! The output of the sugar refineries would increase, etc." (Stenographic Report, page 622)

This is a very characteristic admission by a local worker. If one were to ask his opinion on the significance of agrarian reform in general, he would probably give expression to Narodnik views. But since the question has been put not in regard to "opinions" but in regard to the *concrete consequences* of the change, *capitalist truth* would immediately prevail over *Narodnik utopias*. For what the peasants told their deputy, Mr Chizhevsky, is capitalist truth, the truth of capitalist reality. The increase in the number of sugar refineries and in their productivity would indeed be enormous if some little improvement were brought about in the conditions of life of the masses of small farmers, and it goes without saying that not only the beet sugar industry, but all the manufacturing industries—textile, iron, engineering, building industries, etc., etc.—would receive a powerful impetus and a great demand for "hands" would arise. And this economic necessity would prove to be more powerful than all the beautiful hopes and dreams about equality. Three and a quarter

million horseless households will not become "masters" as a result of any agrarian reform, not as a result of any change in landownership, not as a result of any "allotment of land." These millions of households (and no small number of one horse households), as we have seen, *pine away* on their small plots of land, *let their allotments*. An American development of industry would inevitably withdraw the majority of these owners, whose position is hopeless in capitalist society, from agriculture, and no "right to the land" would be powerful enough to prevent this. Thirteen million small owners, with the most miserable, wretched and obsolete implements, scratching their allotment and their land lords' land, this is the reality of today—this is *artificial* overpopulation in agriculture, artificial because of the hereditary retention of feudal relations which have long become obsolete and which could not be retained for a single day without executions, shootings, punitive expeditions, etc. Any real improvement in the conditions of the masses, a really serious blow to the survivals of serfdom would *inevitably* put an end to the overpopulation of the countryside and would, to an enormous degree, accelerate the process (which is taking place slowly even now) of withdrawing the population from agriculture into industry, would reduce the number of farms from 13 million to a much lower figure, and would lead Russia forward in the American manner and not in the Chinese manner, as is the case now.

The agrarian question in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century has imposed upon the social classes the task to put an end to antiquated serfdom and to purge landownership, to clear the whole path for capitalism, for the growth of productive forces, for the free and open class struggle. And this very class struggle will determine the manner in which this task will be fulfilled.

July 1908

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM
IN RUSSIA

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA*

THE PROCESS OF FORMATION OF THE HOME MARKET FOR LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION¹

In this work the author has set himself the aim of examining the question How is the home market for Russian capitalism being formed? It is well known that this question was raised long ago by the principal representatives of Narodnik views (headed by Messrs V V and N—on), and our task will be to subject these views to criticism. In our criticism we cannot limit ourselves to an examination of the errors and incorrectness of the views of opponents: it seemed to us that it would not be enough to quote facts proving the formation and growth of a home market in answer to the question that has been raised, for it might be argued that these facts were arbitrarily selected and that facts that proved the opposite had been omitted. We thought it necessary to examine and to try to describe the whole process of development of capitalism as a whole in Russia. It goes without saying that such a broad task would be beyond the strength of a single individual, if a number of limitations were not introduced into it. First, as the title already shows, we take the question of the development of capitalism in Russia exclusively from the point of view of the home market and leave aside the question of the foreign market and data concerning foreign trade. Secondly, we limit ourselves only to the post Reform period.² Thirdly, we take principally and almost exclusively data on the home, purely

¹ The following excerpts from *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* are given in this volume: Preface to first edition (without the postscript), conclusions to chap I, conclusions to chap II, chap III (without sec V and VI), sec IX of chap IV sec I (abridged), V, VII XI, XII of chap VII and the whole of chap VIII—*Ed*

² *I.e.* the period after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861—*Ed*
Eng ed

Russian gubernias. Fourthly, we limit ourselves exclusively to the economic aspect of the process. In spite of all these limitations, however, the topic remains an extremely broad one. The author does not conceal from himself the difficulties and even the dangers of taking up such a broad topic, but it seemed to him that in order to explain the question of the home market for Russian capitalism it would be absolutely necessary to show the interconnection and interdependence of the various aspects of this process which is going on in all spheres of social economy. We will limit ourselves, therefore, to an examination of the main features of the process and leave the study of its special features to a future work.

The plan of our work is as follows. In the first chapter we examine, in the briefest possible way, the principal theoretical postulates of abstract political economy on the question of the home market for capitalism. This will serve as an introduction, as it were, to the part of the work which deals with the facts and will relieve us of the necessity of having repeatedly to refer to theory in the further exposition of the subject. In the three subsequent chapters we will try to describe the capitalist evolution of agriculture in post Reform Russia, i.e., in chapter II we will examine the Zemstvo statistics showing the disintegration of the peasantry, in chapter III we will give data showing the transitional state of landlord farming, from the labour rent (*barshchina*) system to the capitalist system, and in chapter IV we will give data on the forms in which the formation of commercial and capitalist agriculture is taking place. The three next chapters will deal with the forms and stages of development of capitalism in our industry: in chapter V we will examine the first stage of capitalism in industry, namely, in *small peasant* (so called *kustar*¹) *industry*, in chapter VI we give data on capitalist manufacturing and on capitalist domestic industry, and in chapter VII we deal with the development of large scale machine industry. In the last chapter (chap. VIII) we will try to show the connection between the various aspects of the process explained above and to give a general picture of this process.

¹ Village handicraft industry.—Ed. F. N. G. ed.

IX CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER I

We will now sum up the theoretical postulates examined above which are directly related to the question of the home market

1 The fundamental process of the formation of a home market (*i.e.*, the development of commodity production and capitalism) is social division of labour. This means that, one after another, various forms of working up raw materials (and various operations in this process) become separated from agriculture and become independent branches of industry which exchange their products (now become *commodities*) for the products of agriculture. Thus, agriculture itself becomes an industry (*i.e.*, production of commodities) and the same process of specialisation takes place in it.

2 The direct deduction from the preceding postulate is the law of all developing commodity economy, and particularly capitalist economy, that the industrial (*i.e.* non agricultural) population grows faster than the agricultural population, that an increasing part of the population is withdrawn from agriculture and drawn into the manufacturing industries.

3 The divorcement of the direct producer from the means of production, *i.e.*, his expropriation which marks the transition from simple commodity production to capitalist production (and which is the necessary condition for this transition), *creates* the home market. This process of *creating* the home market proceeds in two directions: on the one hand, the *means of production* from which the small producer is "liberated" are converted into capital in the hands of the new owner, serve to produce commodities and, consequently, are themselves transformed into commodities. Thus, even the simple reproduction of these means of production now requires that they shall be purchased (formerly, in the

majority of cases, these means of production were reproduced in the natural form and sometimes they were made at home), *i.e.*, creates a market for means of production, and later, the products produced with the aid of these means of production are also transformed into commodities. On the other hand, the *means of existence* of this small producer become a material element of variable capital, *i.e.*, the sum of money which the employer (whether he is a landlord, a contractor, a lumber merchant, factory owner, etc, does not matter), spends on hiring workers. Thus, these means of existence are now also transformed into commodities, *i.e.*, create a home market for articles of consumption.

4 The realisation of the product in capitalist society (and, consequently, the realisation of surplus value) cannot be explained unless we understand that 1) the value of the social product, like that of the individual product, is divided into three parts and not into two (constant capital + variable capital + surplus value, and not only into variable capital + surplus value, as Adam Smith and the whole of subsequent political economy prior to Marx taught) and 2) that in its natural form it *should be divided into two main subdivisions means of production* (consumed productively) and articles of consumption (for personal consumption). Having laid down these main theoretical postulates Marx fully explained the process of realising the product in general and surplus value in particular in capitalist production, and revealed that it was utterly wrong to drag the foreign market into the question of realisation.

5 Marx's theory of realisation also shed light on the question of national consumption and income.

From what has been said above, it automatically follows that the question of the home market as a separate, independent question, independent of the question of the degree of development of capitalism, does not exist at all. That is precisely why the Marxian theory nowhere and never raises this question separately. The home market appears when commodity production appears: it is created by the development of commodity production, and the degree to which social division of labour has taken place deter-

mines the height of its development, it spreads with the transference of commodity production from the product to labour power, and only to the extent that the latter is transformed into a commodity does capitalism embrace the whole industry of the country, developing mainly in regard to means of production which, in capitalist society, occupy an increasingly important place. The "home market" for capitalism is created by developing capitalism itself, which increases the social division of labour and which divides the direct producers into capitalists and workers. The degree of the development of the home market is the degree of development of capitalism in the country. To discuss the question of the limits of the home market separately from the degree of development of capitalism (as the Narodnik economists do) is wrong.

That is why the question as to how the home market for Russian capitalism is being formed reduces itself to the following questions: in what manner and in what direction are the various aspects of Russian national economy developing? What are the interconnections and interdependence between these various aspects?

The next chapters will be devoted to the examination of the data which contain the reply to these questions.

XIII CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER II

We will sum up the main postulates which follow from the data examined above

1 The social economic environment in which the contemporary Russian peasantry find themselves is that of commodity production. Even in the central agricultural zone (which is the most backward in this respect as compared with the extreme south eastern regions or with the industrial gubernias), the peasant is completely subordinated to the market on which he depends as a consumer and as a producer, quite apart from his being a tax payer

2 The system of social economic relationships existing among the peasantry (agricultural and village commune) reveals all the contradictions which are a feature of all commodity production and all capitalism: competition, the struggle for economic independence, competition for land (purchased or hired), the concentration of production in the hands of a minority, the driving of the majority into the ranks of the proletariat, the exploitation of the latter by the minority by means of merchant capital and the hire of agricultural labourers. There is not a single economic phenomenon among the peasantry that does not bear this contradictory form, which is specifically peculiar to the capitalist system, i.e., which does not express the struggle and antagonism of interests, which is not an advantage for some and a loss for others. Such is the purchase and the renting of land, such are the diametrically opposite types of "trade," and such is the technical progress of economy.

We attach cardinal importance to this conclusion not only on the question of capitalism in Russia, but also on the question of the significance of the Narodnik doctrine in general. These very contradictions irrefutably demonstrate to us that the system

of economic relationships in the "communal" villages does not represent a special system ("people's production,"* etc), but the ordinary petty bourgeois system. In spite of the theories that have been prevalent in Russia during the past half century, the Russian commune peasantry are not the antagonists of capitalism, on the contrary, they are the deepest and most durable foundation of it. The deepest—because, precisely here, remote from all "artificial" influences, and in spite of institutions which restrict the development of capitalism, we see the constant formation of the elements of capitalism within the very "commune" itself.** The most durable—because it is in agriculture in general, and among the peasantry in particular, that ancient traditions, the traditions of patriarchal society, are strongest, and as a consequence the transforming effects of capitalism (the development of productive forces, the change in social relationships, etc) manifest themselves most slowly and gradually.¹

3 The sum total of all the economic contradictions among the peasantry comprises what we call the disintegration of the peasantry. The peasants themselves very aptly and strikingly characterise this process by the term "unpeasantise."² This process signifies the complete destruction of the old, patriarchal peasantry and the creation of *new types* of rural population.

Before we proceed to describe these types we will state the following. References to this process have been made in our literature long ago and very often. For example, Mr Vasilchikov, who studied the works of the Valuev Commission, established the formation of a "rural proletariat" in Russia and the "disintegration of the peasant estate" (*Landownership and Agriculture*, first edition, Vol I, chap IX). This fact was mentioned by V Orlov (*Statistical Abstract for the Moscow Gubernia*, Vol IV, part I, p 14) and by many others. But all these references remained fragmentary. No attempt was ever made to study this phenomenon systematically, and that is why, notwithstanding the wealth of data provided by the Zemstvo statistical household census, we have not to the present day sufficient information about

¹ Cf *Das Kapital*, Vol I² S 527

² *Agricultural Review of the Nizhni Novgorod Gubernia*, 1892

this phenomenon This is due also to the fact that the majority of the writers who write on this question regard the disintegration of the peasantry simply as the rise of property inequality, simply as "differentiation," to use a favourite term employed by the Narodniki in general and by Mr Karyshev in particular (Cf his book, *Rent*, and his articles in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* ¹) Undoubtedly, the rise of property inequality is the starting point of the whole process, but the process is not confined to "differentiation" The old peasantry are not only undergoing a process of "differentiation," they are being completely destroyed, they are ceasing to exist, they are being squeezed out by absolutely new types of rural population—types which serve as the basis of a society, in which commodity production and capitalist production predominate These types are the rural bourgeoisie (mainly petty bourgeoisie) and the rural proletariat, a class of commodity producers in agriculture and a class of agricultural wage workers

It is to a high degree instructive that the purely theoretical analysis of the process of the formation of agricultural capitalism points to the disintegration of the small producers as an important factor in this process We have in mind one of the most interesting chapters in Vol III of *Capital*, namely chapter XLVII, *The Genesis of Capitalist Ground Rent* As the starting point of this genesis Marx takes labour rent (*Arbeitsrente*),²

"which means that the direct producer cultivates during a part of the week, with instruments of labour (plough, cattle, etc.), actually or legally belonging to him, the soil owned by him in fact, and works

¹ *Russian Wealth*—Ed Eng ed

² In the Russian translation (page 651 *et sup*) this is translated as *trudovaya renta* (labour rent—Ed Eng ed) We think that our translation *otrabotchnaya renta* (as it is given in the Russian text of the above—Ed Eng ed) is more correct, for in the Russian language there is the specific term *otrabotki*, which means precisely the labour of a dependent tiller of the soil performed for a landlord

Note The term "labour rent" also applies to what in Russian is called *barshchina*, the system of labour rent prevailing before the emancipation of the serfs. Lenin's argument is that *otrabotki* hardly differs from *barshchina*, hence there is no contradiction in using the term 'labour rent' for both systems Where, however, Lenin uses the terms *barshchina* and *otrabotki* in juxtaposition, the Russian terms are given.—Ed Eng ed.

during the remaining days upon the estate of the feudal lord, without any compensation from the feudal lord' (*Das Kapital* III 2, 323)¹

The next form of rent is rent in kind (*Productenrente*), when the direct producer produces the whole product on land which he himself exploits and gives the landowner the whole of the surplus product in kind. The producer here becomes more independent and obtains the possibility of acquiring by his labour a certain quantity of products over and above his indispensable requirements.

'This form (of rent) will also give rise to greater differences in the economic situation of the individual direct producers. At least the possibility for such a differentiation exists and so does the possibility that the direct producer may have acquired the means to exploit other labourers for himself' (P 329²)

And so, even when natural self-sufficing society still prevails, with the very first step in the direction towards greater independence for the dependent peasant, the germs of this disintegration appear. But these germs can develop only under the next form of rent, under *money rent*, which is a mere change of form of rent in kind. Under money rent, the direct producer no longer turns over the product, but its price, to the landlord.³ The basis of this form of rent remains the same as that of rent in kind, the direct producer is still the traditional possessor of the land, "although (the basis of) money rent likewise approaches its dissolution" (P 330⁴). Money rent "requires a considerable development of commerce, of city industries, of the production of com-

¹ *Capital*, Vol. III, Charles H. Kerr, p. 917—Ed. Eng. ed.

² *Ibid.*, p. 924—Ed. Eng. ed.

³ A strict distinction must be drawn between money rent and capitalist ground rent; the latter presupposes the existence of capitalists and wage workers in agriculture, the former—dependent peasants. Capitalist rent is part of the surplus value which remains after *entrepreneur* profit is deducted, whereas money rent is the price of the whole of the surplus product paid by the peasant to the landowner. An example of money rent in Russia is the quit rent (*obrok*) which the peasant pays to the landlord. Undoubtedly, the taxes which the peasants now have to pay represent, in part, money rent. Sometimes, even peasant renting of land approximates to money rent, when the high rent the peasant has to pay leaves him no more than meagre wages.

⁴ *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 926—Ed. Eng. ed.

modities in general and also the circulation of money" (P 331¹) The traditional, customary relation between the dependent peasant and the landlord is transformed into a purely money relationship, based on a contract This, on the one hand, leads to the expropriation of the old peasant and, on the other hand, it leads to the peasant buying his land and his liberty

'The transformation of rent in kind into money rent is not only necessarily accompanied but even anticipated by the formation of a class of propertyless day labourers who hire themselves out for wages During the period of their rise when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom necessarily develops among the better situated tributary farmers (*Rentepflichtigen*) of exploiting agricultural labourers for their own account In this way they gradually acquire the ability to accumulate a certain amount of wealth and to transform themselves even into future capitalists The old self employing possessors of the land thus give rise among themselves to a nursery for capitalist tenants whose development is conditioned upon the general development of capitalist production outside of the rural districts' (*Das Kapital* III 2, 332²)

4 The disintegration of the peasantry, which, at the expense of the middle "peasantry," develops the extreme groups, creates two new types of rural population The common feature of both types—is the commodity, money character of economy The first new type is—the rural bourgeoisie, or wealthy peasantry These include the independent farmers who carry on commercial farming in all its varied forms (we will describe the main groups in chap IV), then come the owners of commercial and industrial enterprises, etc The combination of commercial farming and commercial and industrial enterprise is one of the forms of "combining agriculture with trade" that is specifically peculiar to *this* type of peasantry From among these wealthy peasants there arises the farmer class, for the renting of land for the sale of grain (in the agricultural belt) plays an enormous part in their economy, very often a more important part than their allotment. In the majority of cases the size of the farm among these peasants is larger than they are able to cultivate with the aid of the members of their families alone, and that is why the formation of a contingent of agricultural labourers, and still more, of day

¹ *Ibid*, p 926—Ed Eng ed

² *Ibid.*, p 928—Ed Eng ed

labourers, is the necessary condition for the existence of the wealthy peasant.¹ The spare cash which these peasants obtain in the form of net income is used either for commercial purposes or for usury, which is so excessively developed in our rural districts, or, in favourable circumstances, is invested in the purchase of land, improvements on the farm etc. In a word—these are small agrarians. Numerically, the peasant bourgeoisie represent a small minority of the peasantry, probably not more than one fifth of the total number of households (which, approximately, is equal to three tenths of the population), although the proportion fluctuates considerably according to district. But in regard to its importance in peasant economy as a whole, in regard to the share it has of the total means of production owned by the peasantry and to its share of the total produce produced by the peasantry—the peasant bourgeoisie is undoubtedly the predominant group. It is the master of the countryside at the present time.

5 The other new type is the rural proletariat, *the class of wage labourers possessing allotments*. This comprises the poor peasant, including the completely landless peasant, but the typical representative of the Russian rural proletariat is the agricultural labourer, the day labourer, the unskilled labourer, the building worker, or worker in other trades, possessing an allotment. The insignificant dimensions of the farm on a small patch of land, and, moreover, a farm in a state of ruin (this is particularly evidenced by the letting of land), the inability to exist without selling labour power (the “trades” of the poor peasant), an extremely low standard of living probably lower than that of the labourer without an allotment—these are the distinguishing features of this type.² Not less than one half of the total peasant

¹ We will observe here that the employment of hired labour is not an essential feature of the concept petty bourgeois. All independent production for the market, if the contradictions described in par. 2 exist in the social system of economy, and especially if the mass of producers are being transformed into wage labourers, comes within the meaning of this concept.

² In order to prove that it is correct to include the poor peasant in the category of wage labourers possessing an allotment, it must not only be shown how and which peasants sell labour power, but also how and which employers buy labour power. This will be shown in subsequent chapters.

households (which is approximately four tenths of the population) may be included in the category of representatives of the rural proletariat, *i.e.* all the horseless and a large part of the one-horse peasants (this, of course, is a mass, approximate calculation, which in various districts would be considerably modified in accordance with local conditions). The grounds which compel one to believe that such a large proportion of the peasantry belong to the rural proletariat have been given above.¹ It should be added that in our literature the postulate of the theory that capitalism requires a free, landless worker, is often understood in too stereotyped a manner. This postulate is quite correct as indicating the main trend, but capitalism penetrates into agriculture particularly slowly and in extremely varied forms. Very often, the rural labourer is allotted land in the interests of the rural employers, and for that reason the type of rural labourer with an allotment is a common type in all capitalist countries. The type assumes different forms in different countries: the English cottier (cottager) differs from the parcel land peasant in France or in the Rhine Provinces, and the latter differs again from the *Knecht* in Prussia. Each of these bears traces of the special agrarian system, of the special history of agrarian relations in those countries—but this, however, does not prevent the economist from generalising them under the single type of agricultural proletariat. The legal title to his plot of land does not

¹ Professor Conrad is of the opinion that the criterion for a real peasant in Germany is a pair of working animals (*Gespannbauerngueter*). (Cf. *Landownership and Agriculture* M., 1896, pp. 84-85.) For Russia the criterion ought rather to be put higher. In order to define the term "peasant," Conrad takes the percentage of persons or households engaged in "hired labour" or "auxiliary occupations" generally (*Ibid*). Professor Stebut, who, it cannot be denied, is an authority on questions of fact, in 1882, wrote: "After the fall of serfdom, the peasant with his small economic unit engaged exclusively in growing grain, that is to say, the peasant mainly in the Central Black Earth Belt of Russia, in the majority of cases, became an artisan, agricultural labourer, or day labourer, for whom agriculture became only a subsidiary occupation" (*Essays on Russian Agriculture, Its Weakness and the Measures to Be Taken for Its Improvement*, M., 1883, p. 11). Evidently the term artisan here includes the wage labourer in industry (building, etc.). However incorrectly this manner of employing terms may be, it is nevertheless very widespread in our literature, even in special economic literature.

affect the definition at all. Whether the land belongs to him as his own property (as in the case of the parcel land peasant), or whether the landlord or *Rittergutsbesitzer*¹ allows him the use of the land, or, finally, whether he owns it as a member of the village commune, as in Russia—makes no difference to the case at all.² In including the poor peasant in the category of rural proletariat we are not suggesting anything new. This term has already been employed by many writers, and only the Narodnik economists persist in speaking about the peasantry in general as if they were something anti capitalist, and close their eyes to the fact that the mass of "the peasantry" has already occupied a definite place in the general system of capitalist production, namely, the place of agricultural and industrial wage labourers. In Russia, people like to sing the praises of our agrarian system for having preserved the village commune and the peasantry, etc., and contrast this to the Baltic system with its capitalist system of agriculture. It will be of interest, therefore, to see what types of the agricultural population in the Baltic gubernias are included in the class of agricultural labourers and day labourers. Peasants in the Baltic gubernias are divided into peasants with a large amount of land (25 to 50 desyatins in a separate lot), poor

¹ The lord of the manor—*Ed*

² We will quote examples of the various forms of wage labour in agriculture from *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaft* [Statesman's Handbook—*Ed*] (*Landownership and Agriculture*, M., 1896). "The peasants holding," says Professor Conrad, "must be distinguished from the *parcel* land, from the 'poor peasants plot,' or 'vegetable plot,' the owner of which is obliged to seek occupation and earnings on the side" (p. 83-84). "In France, according to the census of 1881 18,249,209 persons, i.e. a little less than one half" (of the population) 'obtained their livelihood by agriculture about nine million owned their land five million were tenant farmers and share-croppers four million were day labourers and owners of small plots or tenants obtaining their livelihood mainly by wage labour'.

"It is assumed that at least 75 per cent of the agricultural labourers in France own land" (p. 233, Holtz). In Germany, the category of agricultural labourers includes owners of land 1) *Kätner, Häusler, Instleute* (cottars), 2) contract day labourers who own land and who hire themselves to farmers for a certain part of the year (something like our "three day labourers"). "Contract day labourers represent the bulk of agricultural labourers in those parts of Germany where large scale farming predominates" (p. 236), 3) agricultural labourers who till rented land (p. 237).

peasants (3 to 10 dessiatins—poor peasants' lots) and landless peasants. As S. Korolenko quite justly remarks, the poor peasant "most closely resembles the general type of Russian peasant of the central gubernias" (*Free Hired Labour*, p. 495), he is constantly compelled to divide his time between seeking for work on the side and cultivating his own plot of land. But what interests us most is the economic position of the *agricultural labourer*. The fact is that the landlords themselves find it profitable to *allot them land* in part payment for their work. Here are some examples of the landholdings of the Baltic labourers: 1) two dessiatins of land (we have converted *lofstelle* into dessiatins, 1 *lofstelle*=one third of a dessiatin), the husband works 275 days, and the wife, 50 days per year at a wage of 25 kopeks per day, 2) two and two thirds dessiatins, "the agricultural labourer owns one horse, three cows, three sheep and two pigs" (p. 518), the labourer works alternate weeks and the wife works 50 days in the year, 3) six dessiatins of land (Bausse Uyezd, Courland Gubernia), "the agricultural labourer owns one horse, three cows, three sheep and several pigs" (p. 518), he works three days in the week and the wife works 35 days in the year, 4) in the Hazenpot Uyezd, Courland Gubernia—eight dessiatins of land, "in all cases the agricultural labourer gets his flour milled free and free medical aid and medicine, and their children attend school" (p. 519), etc. We draw the reader's attention to the *size of the land and farms* owned by these agricultural labourers, i.e., to the very conditions which, in the opinion of the Narodniki, distinguish our peasants from the European agrarian system which corresponds to capitalist production. We will combine *all* the examples given in the publication we have quoted: 10 agricultural labourers own 35 dessiatins of land, that is, on the average, 3.5 dessiatins per labourer. The term *agricultural labourer* here includes peasants who work the *lesser part of the year* for the landlord (the husband works half the year and the wife 35 to 50 days); it includes also the one horse peasants who own two and even three cows. We are compelled to ask, therefore: where is this notorious difference between the "village commune" peasant and the Baltic labourer? In the Baltic, things are

called by their proper names, but in Russia the one horse agricultural labourer is combined with the wealthy peasant, an 'average' is struck and sentimental talk is indulged in about the "commune spirit," 'labour principles,' "people's industry" and "combining agriculture with industry"

6 The intermediary link between these post Reform types of the 'peasantry' is the *middle peasantry*. Their distinguishing feature is that commodity farming is *least* developed among them. Only in good years and under particularly favourable conditions is the independent husbandry of this type of peasant sufficient to maintain him and for that reason his position is a very unstable one. In the majority of cases the middle peasant cannot make ends meet without resorting to loans to be repaid by labour etc., without seeking "subsidiary" earnings on the side, which partly also consist of selling labour power, etc. Each time there is a failure of the harvest, masses of the middle peasants are thrown into the ranks of the proletariat. In its social relationships this group oscillates between the higher group, towards which it gravitates and into which only a fortunate minority succeeds in entering, and the lower group, into which the whole process of evolution is forcing it. We have seen that the peasant bourgeoisie not only *squeezes out* the lower group, but also the middle group of the peasantry. Thus, a process which is a specific feature of capitalist economy is going on—the process of "unpeasantising", the intermediary members are dying out, while the extremes are growing.

7 *The disintegration of the peasantry creates the home market for capitalism.* In the lower group, the formation of the market takes place in regard to articles of consumption (the personal consumption market). The rural proletarian *consumes less* in comparison with the middle peasant—and, moreover, consumes goods of an inferior quality (potatoes instead of bread, etc.), but he *buys more*. The rise and development of a rural bourgeoisie creates a market in a twofold manner: first and principally, in regard to means of production (the productive consumption market), for the well to do peasant tries to convert into capital the means of production he "collects" from the "impoverished" landlords as well as from the ruined peasant. Secondly, the

market for articles of consumption is created by the fact that the requirements of the wealthy peasants have grown¹

8 No precise statistical data to show whether the disintegration of the peasantry is progressing, and with what rapidity, are available which could be juxtaposed to the combined tables (secs I to VI) That is not surprising, for up till now (as we have already remarked), no attempt has been made to study systematically at least the statistics on the disintegration of the peasantry and to indicate the forms in which this process is taking place² But all the general data on the economics of our rural districts indicate an uninterrupted and rapid increase of disintegration on the one hand, the "peasants" abandon and let their land, the number of horseless peasants is growing, the "peasant" is fleeing to the towns, etc., on the other hand, the "progressive trend in peasant economy" is making headway, the "peasant" is buying land, improving his farm, introducing metal ploughs, is developing the sowing of grass, dairy farming, etc We now know which "peasants" are taking part in one or other of these diametrically opposed sides of this process

Furthermore, the development of the migratory movement gives an enormous impetus to the disintegration of the peasantry, and particularly of the agricultural peasantry It is well known that it is mainly the peasants from the agricultural gubernias who are migrating (migration from the industrial gubernias is quite insignificant), and precisely from the densely populated central gubernias where labour rent (*otraboiki*) (which retards the disintegration of the peasantry) is most developed That is

¹ The fact that the home market is formed by the disintegration of the peasantry is alone able to explain, for example, the enormous growth of the home market for cotton goods, the manufacture of which has increased so rapidly in the post Reform period simultaneously with the mass ruin of the peasantry Mr N—on, who illustrated his theory of the formation of the home market precisely with this example of the textile industry, was totally unable to explain, however, how this contradictory phenomenon arose

² The only exception to this is the excellent work by I Hurwitz, *Economics of the Russian Village*, New York, 1902 One can only express astonishment at the art with which Mr Hurwitz worked up the material in the volumes of *Zemstvo* statistics, which do not give any combined tables of the groups of the peasants according to economic status.

the first point The second point is that it is mainly the peasants in *medium circumstances* who are leaving the districts from which the peasants are migrating and that it is the extreme groups that are remaining at home Thus, migration is accelerating the disintegration of the peasantry in the districts from which the peasants are migrating and carries the germs of disintegration to the districts to which they are migrating (in the first period of their new life, the settlers in Siberia work as agricultural labourers) ¹ This connection between migration and disintegration is fully proved by I Hurwitz in his excellent piece of research, *The Peasant Migration to Siberia* (M., 1889) We strongly recommend this book to the reader which our Narodniki press has strenuously tried to hush up ²

9 As is known, merchant and usurer's capital plays a great part in our countryside We think it superfluous to quote numerous facts and sources to prove this phenomenon the facts are well known and are not directly related to our theme We are only interested in the questions in what relation does merchant and usurer's capital in our countryside stand to the disintegration of the peasantry? Is there any connection between the relations among the various groups of peasants described above, and the relations between the peasant creditors and the peasant debtors? Is usury a factor and driving force in the disintegration, or does it retard it?

We will first of all point out how theory presents this question In his analysis of capitalist production the author of *Capital* gave a very important place, as is known, to merchant and usurer's capital The main postulates in Marx's views on this question are as follows 1) Merchant and usurer's capital, on the one hand, and industrial capital (*i.e.*, capital invested in production, irrespective of whether in agriculture or in industry), on the other, represent one type of economic phenomenon which is covered by the formula the purchase of commodities for the purpose

¹ Restriction of migration, therefore, has a powerful retarding effect upon the disintegration of the peasantry

² Cf. also the work by Mr Primak *Statistical Material for the Study of Migration to Siberia* [Author's note to second edition]

of selling at a profit (*Das Kapital*, I, 2 Abschnitt, chap 4, especially pp 148 49, second German edition¹) 2) Merchant and usurer's capital always historically precede the formation of industrial capital and are logically the necessary premise of its formation (*Das Kapital*, III, I, pp 312 16²), but in themselves, neither merchant capital nor usurer's capital represent a sufficient premise for the rise of industrial capital (i.e., capitalist production), they do not always disintegrate the old mode of production and put in its place the capitalist mode of production, the formation of the latter "depends entirely upon the stage of historical development and the circumstances surrounding it" (*Ibid*, part II, p 133³) "To what extent it" (commercial and merchant capital) "brings about a dissolution of the old mode of production depends on its solidity and internal articulation And to what this process of dissolution will lead, in other words, what new mode of production will take the place of the old, does not depend on commerce, but on the character of the old mode of production itself" (*Ibid*, III, I, p 316⁴) 3) The independent development of merchant capital stands in an inverse ratio to the general economic development of society (*ibid*, p 312⁵), the more merchant and usurer's capital is developed the less is industrial capital (=capitalist production) developed and vice versa.

Consequently, in regard to Russia, we have to ask are merchant and usurer's capital being linked up with industrial capital? Are merchant and usurer's capital, in disintegrating the old mode of production, leading to its being substituted by the capitalist mode of production or by some other system?⁶ These are

¹ *Capital*, Vol I, chap IV pp 163 73, especially p 173—Ed Eng ed

² *Capital* Vol III, chap XX, pp 381 96—Ed Eng ed

³ *Capital*, Vol. III, p 698—Ed Eng ed

⁴ *Capital*, Vol. III, p 390—Ed Eng ed

⁵ *Capital*, Vol III, p 386—Ed Eng ed

⁶ Mr V V touched upon this question in the very first page of his *Destiny of Capitalism*, but neither in this nor in any other of his works did he attempt to examine the facts concerning the relations between merchant and industrial capital in Russia As for Mr N—on, although he claimed to

questions of fact, questions which must be answered in regard to all aspects of the national economy of Russia. In regard to peasant farming the data examined above contains the reply to this question, and the reply is in the affirmative. The usual Narodnik opinion, according to which the "kulak"¹ and the "prosperous" muzhik are not two forms of the same economic phenomenon, but opposite types of phenomena having no connection with each other, is totally unfounded. It is one of the Narodnik prejudices which no one has taken the trouble to prove by an exact analysis of precise economic data. The data prove the contrary. No matter whether the peasant hires labourers for the purpose of enlarging his farm, or whether he trades in land (recall the data quoted above on the extent of rented land among the rich), or in provisions, or whether he trades in hemp, or hay, or cattle, etc., or money (usury), he represents a single economic type, in the main, his operations reduce themselves to one and the same set of economic relations. Furthermore—that in the Russian communal village the role of capital is not confined to bondage and usury, and that capital is extending also into production, is apparent from the fact that the wealthy peasant invests his money not only in commercial establishments and enterprises (*cf.* above), but also in improvements on his farm, in the purchase and renting of land, in improved implements, in hiring labourers, etc. If capital in our countryside were incapable of creating anything but bondage and usury, it could not be argued, on the basis of the data on production, that the peasantry was disintegrating, that a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat were being formed, in that case, the whole of the peasantry would represent a fairly even type of farmer, oppressed by poverty, among whom might be discerned only usurers who are distinguished exclusively

be a faithful follower of the theory of Marx, instead of employing the precise and clear category "merchant capital," he preferred a vague and diffuse term of his own invention: 'capitalisation' or the 'capitalisation of income' and under cover of this hazy term successfully evaded, positively evaded, this question. According to him, the predecessor of capitalist production in Russia was not merchant capital, but 'people's industry'.

¹ Literally "first" or "highfirst," i.e., the rich peasant—Ed Eng ed

by the amount of money they own and not by the dimensions and method of organisation of agricultural production. Finally, the above quoted data logically lead to the important postulate that the independent development of merchant and usurer's capital in our countryside *retards* the disintegration of the peasantry. The more commerce develops and brings the country closer to the towns, squeezes out the primitive village fairs and undermines the monopoly of the village shopkeeper, the more proper European forms of credit develop and squeeze out the village usurer—the wider and deeper will the disintegration of the peasantry proceed. The capital of the wealthy peasants which is squeezed out of petty trade and usury will flow to a wider extent into production, into which it is already beginning to flow.

10 Another important phenomenon in the economy of our countryside which retards the disintegration of the peasantry is the survival of *barshchina*, i.e., *otraboiki*.¹ *Otraboiki* is based on payment of wages in kind, hence, on weakly developed commodity production. *Otraboiki* presupposes and requires precisely, a middle peasant who would not be entirely independent (otherwise he would not agree to the bondage of labour rent), but who would not be a proletarian (because to work for labour rent it is necessary to possess implements, one must be to some extent at least a master of "good standing").

When we said above that the peasant bourgeoisie were the masters of the countryside at the present time, we abstracted those factors which retarded disintegration—bondage, usury, labour rent, etc. As a matter of fact, often the real masters of the countryside today are not the representatives of the peasant bourgeoisie, but the village usurers and neighbouring landowners. It is quite legitimate, however, to abstract these factors in this way, because, otherwise, it would be impossible to study the internal structure of the economic relationships among the peasantry. It is interesting to note that the Narodniki also employ this method, only they stop half way, they do not follow up their reasoning to its logical conclusion. Speaking of the burden of taxation, etc., in his *Destiny of Capitalism*, Mr V. V. observes that because of

¹ See footnotes to pages 27 and 102.—Ed

these reasons "the conditions of natural" (*sic!*) "existence no longer exist" in the village commune, in the "*mir*" (p 287) Excellent! But the whole question is precisely what are the "natural conditions" that do not yet exist in our villages? In order to be able to reply to this question it is necessary to study the economic relationships prevailing in the village commune, to raise the veil, if one may so express it, that conceals the survivals of pre Reform antiquity which obscure the "natural conditions" of life in our villages Had Mr V V done this he would have seen that this system of real relationships reveals the complete disintegration of the peasantry, that the more completely bondage, usury, labour rent (*otraboiki*), etc, are removed, the more profound will be the process of disintegration among the peasantry¹ Above we showed, on the basis of the Zemstvo statistics, that this disintegration is already a fact, that the peasantry have split up into opposite groups

¹ In passing, we must say that Mr V V's *Destiny of Capitalism*, and particularly chap VI from which the above-quoted passage is taken, contains some very good and very just pages, namely, the pages in which the author does *not* speak about the destiny of capitalism, or about capitalism at all but about the manner in which the taxes are collected It is characteristic, however, that Mr V V fails to see the inseparable connection between this and the survivals of the labour rent (*barshchina*) system, which he (as we shall see further on) is *sapable of idealising!*

CHAPTER III

THE LANDOWNERS' TRANSITION FROM THE BARSHCHINA SYSTEM TO THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM OF FARMING

WE must now pass from our examination of peasant farming to the examination of landlord farming. Our task is to examine the main features of the present social economic system of landlord farming and describe the character of the evolution of this system in the post Reform epoch.

I THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE BARSHCHINA SYSTEM

In examining the present system of landlord farming we must take as our starting point the system of farming which prevailed in the epoch of serfdom. The essence of the economic system of that time was that the whole of the land in the given unit of land economy, *i.e.*, the given estate, was divided into two parts: the landlord's part and the peasants' part. The latter was distributed in allotments among the peasants, who (receiving in addition other means of production, for example, timber and sometimes cattle, etc.), with the aid of their own labour and implements, cultivated this land and obtained their livelihood from it. The product of this labour of the peasant represented the necessary product, to employ the term of theoretical political economy, necessary for the peasant in so far as it provided him with the means of existence, and necessary for the landlord in so far as it provided the latter with labourers, in exactly the same way as the product which replaces the variable part of the value of capital is a necessary product in capitalist society. The surplus labour of the peasant consisted of the work he performed in cultivating, *with his own implements*, the land of the landlord. The product of that labour went to the landlord. Hence, in this case surplus labour was separated in space from necessary labour: the peasant

worked for the landlord on the landlord's land and worked for himself on his own allotment, he worked for the landlord on certain days of the week and for himself on other days of the week. Thus, the peasant's "allotment" in this system of economy was, as it were, wages in kind (to express it in a modern way), or a means of providing the landlord with labourers. The peasant farming "on his own account," on his allotment, was a condition of landlord farming: its purpose was not to "provide" the peasant with the means of livelihood, but to provide the landlord with labourers.¹

It is this system of economy that we call the *barshchina* system. Obviously, in order that it might prevail, the following conditions were necessary: firstly the predominance of natural self-sufficing economy. The serfowner's estate had to represent a self-contained, isolated whole, having very weak contacts with the outside world. The production of grain for sale by the landlord, which developed particularly in the latter stages of the existence of serfdom, was the harbinger of the collapse of the old regime. Secondly, for such a system of economy it was necessary that the direct producer be provided with means of production in general and of land in particular, more than that—it was necessary that he be tied to the land, otherwise the landlord would not be assured of having labourers. Hence, the methods of obtaining the surplus product under the *barshchina* system and under the capitalist system are diametrically opposite to each other: the former is based on the condition that the producer is provided with land, the latter is based on the condition that the producer is divorced from the land.² The third condition for such a system is that the peasant must be personally dependent on the landlord. If the

¹ This system of economy is very graphically described by A. Engelhardt in his *Letters from the Country* (St. Petersburg 1885, pp. 556-57). He quite justly points out that the serf system of economy was a definite, harmonious and complete system in which the master was the landlord who allotted land to the peasants and appointed them to do certain work.

² In reply to Henry George, who said that the expropriation of the masses of the population is the great and universal cause of poverty and oppression, Engels wrote in 1887: "Historically speaking this is not quite true. In the Middle Ages it was not the expropriation of the people from the land but their appropriation to the land that was the source of feudal exploitation. The peasant retained his land, but was tied to it as a serf and

landlord did not exercise direct power over the person of the peasant he could not compel him, as possessor of land and a tiller on his own account, to work for him. Hence, "non economic compulsion," as Marx calls it in describing this economic regime, must be employed (As has already been pointed out above, Marx put this economic regime in the category of *labour rent* Cf *Das Kapital*, Vol III, 2, p 321¹) The form and degree of this compulsion may vary very considerably, from the state of serfdom to the system of estates in which the peasant occupies an inferior position. Fourthly, and finally, a condition and a result of the system of economy we are describing was the extremely low and routine state of technique, for the land was tilled by small peasants who were crushed by poverty and degraded by personal dependence and ignorance.

II THE COMBINATION OF THE BARSHCHINA SYSTEM WITH THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM OF FARMING

The *barshchina* system of farming was undermined by the abolition of serfdom. All the principal foundations of this system were undermined: natural self-sufficing economy, the isolated and self-contained character of the landlord's estate, the close contacts between its separate elements and the power of the landlord over the peasant. Peasant farming became separated from landlord farming, the peasant had to buy out his land and become the complete owner of it, the landlord had to adopt the capitalist system of farming, which, as has just been observed, rests on diametrically opposite foundations. But the adoption of an altogether different system could not, of course, be brought about at one stroke for two reasons: first, because the conditions which are necessary for capitalist production did not yet exist. A class of workers was

was compelled to pay the landlord either in labour or in produce (*The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, New York, 1887, Preface, p. iii).

¹*Capital*, Vol III, p. 918. In the English translation this passage reads as follows: "Under such conditions the surplus labour for the nominal owner of the land cannot be filched from them by any economic measures, but must be forced from them by other measures."—Ed. Eng. ed.

required that was accustomed to work for hire, it was necessary that the peasants' implements be substituted by landlords' implements, it was necessary that agriculture be conducted on the same lines as any other commercial and industrial enterprise and not as the domestic affair of the lord of the manor. These conditions could arise only gradually, and the attempts of certain landlords, immediately after the Reform, to import machinery and even labourers from abroad could not but end in complete fiasco. Another reason why it was impossible immediately to adopt the capitalist mode of farming was that although the old *barshchina* system of economy had been undermined, it was not yet completely destroyed. Peasant farming was not yet completely separated from landlord farming, for the landlords still remained in possession of very essential parts of the peasants' allotments: *otrezki* land, woods, meadows, watering places, pastures, etc. Without these lands (or servitudes) the peasants were totally unable to carry on independent farming and the landlords were thus able to continue the old system of farming in the form of *otrabotki*. The possibility of exercising "non economic compulsion" also remained: temporary bondage,¹ collective responsibility,² corporal punishment, forced labour on public works, etc.

Thus, the capitalist system could not arise all at once and the *barshchina* system could not disappear all at once. Hence, the only system that was possible was a transitional system which combined within itself the features of both the *barshchina* and capitalist systems. And as a matter of fact, the post Reform system of landlord farming bears precisely these features. In view of the endless variety of forms, which is characteristic of a transitional epoch, the economic organisation of contemporary landlord farming reduces itself to two main systems in a great variety of combinations, i.e., the *otrobotochna*³ system and capitalist system.

¹ I.e., until the purchase price of the land had been paid off by the peasant. The payments were extended over a period of thirty years.—*Ed Eng ed*.

² The whole village was held responsible for the payment of taxes and other imposts.—*Ed Eng ed*.

³ We substitute the term *otrabotki* for the term *barshchina* as the former corresponds more to post Reform relations and has been generally adopted in our literature.

The first is the system under which the landlords' land is cultivated by the surrounding peasants with their own implements, the form of payment does not alter the character of this system (whether in money, as in the case of *izdelni* hire [hired by the job], or payment in produce, as in the case of the share cropping system, or payment by granting the use of land pastures, woods, etc., as in the case of *otrabotki*, in the narrow sense of the term) This is a direct survival of the *barshchina* system,¹ and the economic description of the latter, given above, applies almost entirely to the *otrabotochni* system (the only exception being that, in one of the forms of the *otrabotochni* system, one of the conditions of the *barshchina* system disappears, namely, that in the case of *izdelni* hire, payment of labour is made in money instead of in kind) The capitalist system of farming implies the hiring of labourers (by the year, season, day, etc.) who till the land with the owners' implements In actual practice, the two systems mentioned are interwoven with one another in the most varied and curious manner, on a large number of landlord estates either one or the other system is applied to the various branches of the work on the estate² Naturally, the combination of so varied and even opposite systems of economy leads, in real life, to a number of profound and complicated conflicts and contradictions, and, as a result of these contradictions, a number

¹ Here is a very striking example "In the south of the Elets Uyezd (Orel Gubernia), writes a correspondent of the Department of Agriculture "on the big landlords estates, side by side with tilling with the aid of yearly labourers, a considerable part of the land is tilled by peasants in return for the use of land that has been let to them The ex-serfs continue to rent land from their former masters and in return till the latter's land Such villages continue to bear the name of *barshchina* of such and such a landlord" (S. A. Korolenko, *Freely Hired Labour etc.* p. 118) Or here is another example "On my estate" writes another landlord "all the work is done by my former peasants [serfs—*Ed Eng ed*] (eight villages with approximately 600 souls) in return for this they are allowed the use of pastures for their cattle (from 2,000 to 2,500 dessiatins) seasonal workers only do the first ploughing and sow with sowing machines" (*Ibid* p. 325 Kaluga Gubernia)

² "The majority of the farms are conducted in the following manner: part of the land, although only an insignificant part, is tilled by the owner with his own implements with the aid of yearly workers and other workers all the rest of the land is tilled by the peasants either on the share-cropping

of landlords go bankrupt, etc. All these phenomena are typical of all transitional epochs

If we were to ask ourselves to what extent the two systems are widespread in relation to each other, the answer would have to be, first of all, that no precise statistical data are available on this question, and it is hardly likely that they could be collected, for, to do so, it would be necessary to take a census not only of all the estates in the country, but also of all the economic operations performed on those estates. Only approximate data are available, in the form of general descriptions of separate localities in regard to the prevalence of one or the other system. Data of this kind are given in a compiled form for the whole of Russia in the above mentioned publication of the Department of Agriculture, *Freely Hired Labour, etc.* On the basis of these data, Mr Annensky has compiled a very striking diagram showing the extent to which both systems are widespread (*Influence of Harvests, etc.*, I, p. 170). We will compare these data in the form of a table and supplement it with the returns on the sown area of privately owned land in 1883-87 (*Statistics of the Russian Empire IV, The Average Harvest in European Russia in the Five Years, 1883-87*, St. Petersburg, 1888¹).

system or in return for land that has been let to them or for money" (*Ibid.*, p. 96). 'on the majority of estates almost all, or many forms of hiring labourers exist simultaneously (i.e., methods of "supplying the farm with labour power") (*Agriculture and Forestry in Russia* published by the Department of Agriculture for the Chicago Exhibition St. Petersburg 1893, p. 79).

¹ Of the 50 gubernias of European Russia the following have not been included: Archangel, Vologda, Olonets, Vyatka, Perm, Orenburg and Astrakhan. In 1883-87 these gubernias had a sown area of 562,000 dessiatins of privately owned land out of a total of 16,472,000 dessiatins for the whole of European Russia. Group I included the following gubernias: three Baltic provinces, four Western (Kovno, Vilna, Grodno and Minsk), three South-western (Kiev, Volynia, Podolsk), five Southern (Kherson, Taurida, Bessarabia, Ekaterinoslav, Don), one Southeastern (Saratov); then follow the St. Petersburg, Moscow and Yaroslavl Gubernias. Group II includes Vitebsk, Mogilev, Smolensk, Kaluga, Voronezh, Poltava and Kharkov. Group III includes all the rest of the gubernias. In order to be more exact it would be necessary to subtract from the total sown area of privately owned land the sown area belonging to tenant farmers, but no such statistics are available. We would add, however, that even if this modification were made it would hardly make any difference to the conclusion to be drawn in regard to the

Group of Gubernias According to System of Farming Prevalent in Them	Number of Gubernias			Sown Area of Grain and Potatoes on Privately Owned Land (thousand decs)
	Black Earth Belt	Non Black Earth Belt	Total	
I. Gubernias in Which Capitalist System is Predominant	9	10	19	7,407
II. Gubernias in Which Mixed Systems Prevail	3	4	7	2,222
III. Gubernias in Which <i>Otrabotochni</i> System is Predominant	12	5	17	6,281
Total	24	19	43	15,910

Thus, the *otrabotochni* system is predominant in the purely Russian gubernias, but if we take European Russia as a whole, we will have to admit that the capitalist system of landlord farming is the prevailing system at the present time. Moreover, our table does not by a long way express this prevalence to the full, for, among the gubernias in Group I, there are such in which the *otrabotochni* system is not applied at all (Baltic provinces, for example) whereas in Group III there is hardly a gubernia, and in all probability there is hardly a single estate which does its own farming, in which the capitalist system is not applied, at least to some extent. Below we give an illustration of this, based on the returns of the Zemstvo statistics (*Raspopin, Private Farming in Russia According to Zemstvo Statistical Returns, Yuridicheski Vestnik*, 1887, Nos 11-12, No 12, p. 634).

Uyezds in Kursk Gubernia	% Estates Hiring Labourers		% Estates Employing Regular Agricultural Labourers	
	Medium	Large	Medium	Large
Dmitrovskij	53.3	84.3	68.5	85.0
Fatezhskij	77.1	88.2	86.0	94.1
Lgovskij	58.7	78.8	73.1	96.9
Sudzhanaskij	53.0	81.1	66.9	90.5

Finally, it is necessary to observe that sometimes the *otrabotochni* system is transformed into the capitalist system and becomes merged with it to such an extent that it becomes impossible to distinguish the prevalence of the capitalist system, since in the Black Earth Belt a large part of the privately owned land is rented and in the gubernias of this belt the *otrabotochni* system predominates.

sible to separate them and to distinguish one from the other. For example, a peasant rents a plot of land and in payment for it undertakes to perform a certain number of days' work (this, as is known, is the most widespread practice, cf examples in the next chapter). Where can the line of distinction be drawn between the "peasant" in this case and the West European, or Baltic, "agricultural labourer" who receives a plot of land on undertaking to work a definite number of days? Life very gradually creates forms which combine systems of economy, the main features of which are the very opposites of each other. It becomes impossible to say where *otrabotki* ends and where *capitalism* begins.

Having established the main fact that all the varied forms of contemporary landlord farming reduce themselves to two systems, to the *otrabotochni* system and the *capitalist* system, we will now proceed to give an economic description of both systems and see which of them is squeezing out the other as a result of the whole process of economic evolution.

III DESCRIPTION OF THE OTRABOTOCHNI SYSTEM

As has already been observed above, there are numerous forms of the *otrabotochni* system. Sometimes the peasant, for a certain money payment, will undertake to till the landlord's land with his own implements—the so called *izdelni* system, "dessiatin system"¹ or "round" system² (i.e., one dessiatin of spring crop and one dessiatin of winter crop), etc. Sometimes the peasant will borrow grain or money, and will undertake to do a certain amount of work in repayment of the loan or in payment of the interest on the loan.³ This form strikingly reveals features peculiar to the *otrabotochni* system in general, namely, the bondage, usurious character of this form of hiring labour. In some cases the peasants work "for trespass" (i.e., they undertake to

¹ *Statistical Abstract of Ryazan Gubernia*

² Engelhardt 1c

³ *Abstract of Statistics of Moscow Gubernia*, Vol V, part 1, M., 1879, pp 186-89. We give the references only for purposes of illustration. The whole of our literature on peasant and landlord farming contains a mass of similar information.

do a certain amount of work in payment for a fine for trespassing), sometimes they will work "for honour" (cf Englarhardt, *loc. cit.* p 56), i.e. gratis, for a drink of vodka, or in order not to lose other "earnings" that they obtain from the landlord. Finally, other very widespread forms of *otrabotki* are the share cropping system and the system of performing a certain amount of work in return for the use of land, pastures, etc.

Very often the payment of rent for land assumes many varied forms which sometimes are combined so that, side by side with money rent, we find rent in kind and labour rent (*otrabotki*). Here are a couple of examples for every dessiatin till 15 dessiatins + 10 eggs + 1 chicken + one day's work of a female, for 43 dessiatins spring crop at 12 rubles and 51 dessiatins of winter crop at 16 rubles in money + thresh so many sheaves of oats, 7 sheaves of buckwheat and 20 sheaves of rye + manure not less than 5 dessiatins of rented land with *own* manure using 300 loads per dessiatin (Karyshev, *The Renting of Land* p 348). In this case even the peasant's manure is converted into a constituent part of private landlord farming! The very multiplicity of terms that are in use for the *otrabotochni* system is in itself indicative of its widespread and varied character. *otrabotki*, *otbutki*, *barshchina*, *basarinka*, *posobka*, *panshchina*, *postupok*, *vyyemka*, etc (*Ibid.* p 342). Sometimes the peasant pledges himself to perform "whatever work the master orders" (*ibid.* p 346), or in general pledges to "obey" or to "help out" the landowner. *Otrabotki* is applied to the "whole round of duties in rural life. All agricultural operations are carried out by means of *otrabotki* tilling the soil, harvesting the crops and hay, chopping firewood carting" (pp 346-47), repair of roofs and chimneys (pp 354, 348), the peasants undertake to provide chickens and eggs (*Ibid.*). An investigator in Gdovsk Uyezd, St Petersburg Gubernia, quite justly says that the forms of *otrabotki* that one meets with bear the "previous, pre Reform, *barshchina* character" (p 349) ¹

¹ It is a remarkable fact that the enormous variety of forms of *otrabotki* in Russia and the various forms of renting land with the various supplementary payments that are made, etc., are completely covered by the

A particularly interesting form of *otrabotki* is work in payment for land, the so called *otrabotochni* rent and rent in kind.¹ In the preceding chapter we saw how capitalist relationships appear in the peasant renting of land, here we see "the renting of land" which represents simply a survival of the *barshchina* system,² and which sometimes imperceptibly passes into the capitalist system in order to assure agricultural labourers for the estate by allotting them small plots of land. The data of Zemstvo statistics establish indisputable connection between this form of "renting land" and the enterprise conducted by the lessor of the land.

With the development of farming on own account on private landlord estates, the owners feel the need for *guaranteeing themselves the opportunity for obtaining workers at the time they want them*. Hence, there develops among them in many places a striving to distribute land among the peasants on the *otrabotki* system or on the share cropping plus the *otrabotki* systems.

This system of farming

is fairly widespread. The more frequently the lessors of land begin to farm on their own account the less the supply of land available for renting out becomes and the greater the demand for such land the more widely does this form of letting land develop. (*Ibid* p. 236, cf. also p. 367.)

Thus, here we see an altogether special form of rent which finds expression not in the landowner refraining from farming his

main forms of pre-capitalist agricultural relationships which Marx indicated in chap. 47 of the third volume of *Capital*. In the preceding chapter we pointed out that there are three main forms: labour rent, rent in kind and money rent. It is quite natural therefore that Marx should want to take Russian data to illustrate the part of his book dealing with ground rent.

¹ According to *A Summary of Zemstvo Statistics* (Vol. II) the peasant rents for money 76 per cent of all the land he rents, 3 to 7 per cent he rents on the labour rent system, 13 to 17 per cent—for rent in kind and finally, 2 to 3 per cent on a mixed system of rent.

² Cf. examples given in footnote¹ on page 120 regarding the South Elets Uyezd. Under the *barshchina* system the landlord gave the peasant land in return for which the peasant had to work for the landlord. Obviously, the same purpose is pursued when land is let on the *otrabotochni* system.

land, but in the *development of private landlord farming*, which indicates not the strengthening of peasant farming by the expansion of peasant landownership, but the *transformation of the peasant into an agricultural labourer*. In the preceding chapter we saw that in peasant farming the renting of land has a twofold significance, the one opposite to the other: for some it is a means of profitably enlarging their farms, others are forced to rent land owing to their poverty. Now we see that in landlord farming also, the letting of land has a twofold significance, the one opposite to the other: in some cases it takes the form of the owner giving out his land to others to be farmed at a certain rent, in other cases it is a means by which the owner carries on farming on his own account and a means for supplying his estate with labour power.

We come now to the question of payment for labour under the *otrabotochni* system. Data obtained from various sources unanimously testify to the fact that payment for labour under the *otrabotochni* and bondage system of hiring labour is always *lower* than under the capitalist system of "free" hire. In the first place, this is proved by the fact that rent in kind, *i.e.*, *otrabotochni* and share cropping systems (which, as we have just seen, express merely the *otrabotochni* and bondage system of hire), as a general rule, is everywhere *higher* than money rent, very much higher (*ibid.*, p. 350), sometimes twice as high (*Ibid.*, p. 356, Rzhev Uyezd, Tver Gubernia). Secondly, rent in kind is most developed among the poor groups of peasants. (*Ibid.*, p. 261 *et sup.*) This is—renting of land due to poverty, the "renting of land" by a peasant who is unable to resist his transformation by this means into an agricultural wage labourer. The wealthy peasant strives to rent land for money.

'The tenant takes advantage of every opportunity to pay his rent in money, and in this way to reduce the cost of utilising another's land.' (*Ibid.*, p. 265)

And we will add, not only to reduce the rent, but also to obtain release from bonded labour. In the Rostov on Don Uyezd a remarkable case was observed of money rent being abandoned in favour of share cropping in proportion as rents increased, *not*

withstanding the fact that the peasants' share of the harvest diminished (p 266) The significance of rent in kind, which utterly ruins the peasant and transforms him into an agricultural labourer, is strikingly illustrated by this fact¹ Thirdly, a direct comparison between the price of labour under the *otrabotochni* system and under capitalist "free" hire shows that the latter is the higher In the publication of the Department of Agriculture which we have quoted, *viz*, *Freely Hired Labour, etc*, it is

¹ The summary of the latest data on the renting of land (Mr Karyshev, *The Influence of Harvests, etc*) has fully confirmed the fact that only poverty compels the peasant to hire land on the share cropping or labour rent system and that the wealthy peasant prefers money rent (pp 317-80), as rent in kind is everywhere incomparably more costly for the peasant than money rent (Pp 312-46) All these facts, however have not prevented Mr Karyshev from presenting the situation as being that "the poor peasant is better able to satisfy his food requirements by increasing his tillage to a certain extent on another's land on the share cropping system" (P 321) These are the wild ideas that can enter the heads of those who have a prejudice in favour of "natural economy"! It is proved that rent in kind is higher than money rent, that the former is a sort of truck system [the system of compelling the factory workers to purchase provisions, etc, at the company store—Ed] in agriculture that it utterly ruins the peasant and transforms him into an agricultural labourer—and yet our economist talks about improving the supply of food! Share cropping if you please, "should help" the needy section of the rural population to rent land" (P 320) Getting land on the worst possible terms, terms which transform the peasant into an agricultural labourer is what our economist calls "help"! The question arises what is the difference between the Russian Narodniki and the Russian landlords who have always been ready and are always prepared to render the "needy section of the rural population" "help" of this kind? In passing, here is an interesting example In the Khotlnak Uyezd, Bessarabia Gubernia, the average daily earnings of a share cropper is estimated at 60 kopeks and those of a day labourer in the summer at 35 to 50 kopeks "It turns out, therefore, that the earnings of a share cropper is after all, higher than the wages of an agricultural labourer" (P 344, Mr Karyshev's italics.) The 'after all' is very characteristic But, unlike the agricultural labourer the share-cropper has expenses in connection with his farm has he not? Must he not have a horse and harness? Why were not these expenses taken into account? If the average daily wage in the summer in the Bessarabia Gubernia is 40 to 77 kopeks (1883-87 and 1888-92), the average daily wage of a labourer with a horse and harness is 124 to 180 kopeks (1883-87 and 1888-92), does it not "turn out" rather that 'after all' the agricultural labourer gets more than the share cropper? The average daily wage for the whole year for a labourer without a horse and harness in the Bessarabia Gubernia in 1882-91 was 67 kopeks, (*Ibid*, 178)

estimated that the average payment for the complete working of a dessiatin of land of winter grain with the peasant's own implements is six rubles (returns for the Central Black Earth Belt for the 8 years, 1883-91). If we calculate the same kind of work at free hire, the payment will be 6.19 rubles for the labour alone, not counting the work of the horse (the pay for the work of the horse cannot be calculated at less than 4.50 rubles, *l.c.*, p. 45). The compiler justly considers that such a phenomenon is "quite abnormal" (*Ibid.*). We will merely observe that the fact that payment for labour is higher under the purely capitalist system of hiring than in all forms of bondage and other pre-capitalist relationships has been established not only in agriculture, but also in industry, not only in Russia, but also in other countries. The following are more precise and more detailed Zemstvo statistics on this question (*Abstract of Statistical Information on the Saratov Uyezd*, Vol. I, part III, pp. 18-19. Quoted from Mr Karyshev's *Renting of Land*, p. 352).

SARATOV UYEZD—AVERAGE PAY FOR WORKING ONE DESSIATIN (in Rubles)

Category of Work	Winter Contract 80% to 100% ¹ / ₄ Paid in Advance	Otrabotki System		Free Hire Statement of	
		Written Contract	State- ment of Tenant	Em- ployers	Labourers
Complete Working and Harvesting Carting and Threshing	9.0	—	9.4	20.5	17.5
As Above Without Thresh- ing (Spring Crops)	6.6	—	6.4	15.3	13.5
As Above Without Thresh- ing (Winter Crops)	7.0	—	7.5	15.2	14.3
Tilling	2.8	2.8	—	4.9	3.7
Harvesting (Reaping and Carting)	3.6	3.7	3.8	10.1	8.5
Reaping (Without Carting)	3.2	2.6	3.3	8.0	8.1
Mowing (Without Carting)	2.1	2.0	1.8	3.5	4.0

¹Thus, under *otrabotka* (as under bondage hire combined with usury) the price of labour is usually less than half of that of

labour under the capitalist system¹ In view of the fact that under the labour rent system it is possible to employ only local workers, and these must necessarily be peasants who 'possess an allotment' the very fact that the payment for labour is so extraordinarily low indicates the significance of the allotment as a form of wages in kind In such cases, the allotment at the present time serves as a means of "assuring" the landowner cheap labourers But the difference between free labour and "semi-free" labour is not only a difference in the pay Of enormous importance in this respect is the fact that the latter form of labour always presupposes the personal dependence of the labourer upon his employer, it always presupposes the preservation, more or less, of "non-economic compulsion" Engelhardt very aptly says that the practice of lending money on the *otrabotochni* system² is explained by the fact that this form of security for debts is better than any other if distraint is made on the peasant's property, there is very little to take,

'but the authorities *compel* the peasant to fulfill the work he pledged himself to perform even if that means that he will be unable to gather in his own grain (*L c p 216*) Only long years of slavery of serf labour for the landlord could have given rise to the indifference (only apparent) with which the farmer leaves his own grain in the rain and goes to cart another's sheaves (*Ibid p 429*)

Without, in one form or another, binding the population to their place of residence, to the "commune," without a certain lack of equality of civic rights, *otrabotka*, as a system, would be impossible It goes without saying that an inevitable consequence of the above described features of the *otrabotka* system is low productivity

¹ After this how can one refrain from describing the kind of criticism of capitalism indulged in by the Narodnik Prince Vasilchikov as anything else than reactionary? The very phrase "free hire" he exclaims pathetically, is contradictory, for hire presupposes lack of independence, and lack of independence means lack of freedom Of course, this Narodnik landlord forgets that capitalism puts free non-independence in the place of bonded non-independence

² An expression employed by Mr Karyshev, *loc cit* It is a wonder that Mr Karyshev did not arrive at the conclusion that share cropping helps to make semi-free labour more tolerable¹

³ In which repayment of the principal or interest is made in labour—*Ed*

ity of labour methods of farming based on the labour rent system can only be the most routine methods, the labour of a bonded peasant cannot but approach that of the serf in quality

The combination of the labour rent and the capitalist system makes the contemporary structure of landlord farming similar in economic organisation to that which prevailed in our textile industry before the rise of large scale machine industry. In that industry the merchant got part of the operations performed with the aid of his own tools and hired workers (carding yarn, dyeing and finishing of the fabric, etc.), and part with the aid of the tools of the peasant handicraftsman who worked for the merchant with the merchant's materials. In contemporary landlord farming part of the operations are performed by wage workers, who use the employer's tools, and part are performed with the tools and the labour of peasants who work on another's land. In the textile industry above mentioned, merchant capital was combined with industrial capital and the handicraftsman was burdened, in addition to capital, with bondage, the merchant middleman, the truck system, etc. In the present instance, likewise, merchant and usurer capital, and all forms of reducing pay and increasing the personal dependence of the producer are combining with industrial capital. In the textile industry, the transitional system continued for centuries, being based on a primitive hand labour technique, and was broken in the course of three decades by large scale machine industry, in this instance, the labour rent system has existed almost from the beginning of ancient *Russ* (the land owners kept the serfs in bondage even at the time of *Russkaya Pravda*¹), perpetuating routine technique, and is beginning rapidly to give way to capitalism only in the post Reform epoch. In both cases, the old system implies merely stagnation in the form of production (and, consequently, in all social relations), and the domination of Oriental barbarism. In both cases, the new, capitalist forms of economy are indicative of enormous progress, notwithstanding the contradictions peculiar to them.

¹ Literally *Russian Truth*, The ancient code of laws of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries—Ed. Eng. ed.

IV THE FALL OF THE OTRABOTOCHNI SYSTEM

The question now arises in what relation does the *otrabotochni* system stand to post Reform economics in Russia?

First of all, commodity production cannot exist side by side with the labour rent system, as that system is based on natural self-sufficing economy, on an immobile technique and on inseparable ties between the landlord and the peasant. For that reason, that system is impracticable in its complete form, and every advance in the development of commodity production and commercial agriculture undermines the conditions of its existence.

Next we must take into consideration the following circumstances. From what has been said above, it follows that the labour rent system in contemporary landlord farming should be divided into two forms: 1) *otrabotka* that can be performed only by a peasant owner who owns draught animals and implements (for example, "all round," *dessiatin*, ploughing, etc., *otrabotka*), and 2) *otrabotka* that can be performed by a village proletarian who owns no implements whatever (for example, reaping, mowing, threshing, etc.). Obviously, both for peasant and landlord farming, *otrabotka*, of the first and the second form, have opposite significance and the latter form represents the direct transition to capitalism, merging with it in a number of quite imperceptible stages. Usually in our literature, reference is made to *otrabotka* in general, without making this distinction. And yet, in the process of capitalism squeezing out *otrabotka*, the transference of the emphasis from the first form of *otrabotka* to the second form is of utmost importance. Here is an example from the *Summary of Statistical Information on the Moscow Gubernia*:

"On the majority of estates the tilling of the fields and the sowing, i.e., work which has to be done with extreme care if the harvest is to be a good one is performed by permanent labourers, whereas the harvesting, i.e., work for which timeliness and speed is the greatest consideration, is given out to the surrounding peasantry, the labour being performed for money payment or in return for the use of pastures, woods, etc." (Vol. V, part 2, p. 140)

On such farms the majority of the labourers are recruited on the *otrabotka* system, but the capitalist system undoubtedly predomi-

nates and, as a matter of fact, the "surrounding peasantry" are transformed into village labourers similar to the "contract day labourers" in Germany, who also own land and also hire themselves for a definite part of the year (*Cf* footnote² on page 233) The enormous drop in the number of horses owned by the peasants and the increase in the number of horseless households as a result of the famine of the 'nineties,¹ could not but have the effect of greatly accelerating the process of the capitalist system squeezing out the *otrabotochni* system²

Finally, one of the most important reasons for the fall of the labour rent system is the disintegration of the peasantry The connection between *otrabotki* (*first form*) and precisely the middle group of the peasantry is clear *a priori*—as we have already observed above—and can be proved by the data of the Zemstvo statistics For example, the *Summary of Statistics on the Zadon Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia*, gives information on the number of households who took work by the job, according to the various groups of peasantry The following table gives this data in percentages

¹ The horse census of 1893-94 in 48 gubernias revealed a drop in the number of horses owned by all horseowners of 9.6 per cent and a drop in the number of horseowners of 28,321 In the gubernias Tambov Voronezh Kursk Ryazan Orel, Tula and Nizhni Novgorod the decline in the number of horses between 1888 and 1893 was 21.2 per cent In seven other gubernias in the Black Earth Belt the decline between 1891 and 1893 was 17 per cent In 38 gubernias in European Russia in 1888-91 there were 7,922,260 peasant households, of which 5,736,136 owned horses In 1893-94 in these gubernias there were 8,288,987 households, of which 5,647,233 owned horses Consequently, the number of households owning horses declined by 89,000 whereas the number of horseless households increased by 456,000 The percentage of horseless households increased from 27.6 per cent to 31.9 per cent (*Statistics of the Russian Empire*, XXXVII St Petersburg, 1896) Above we showed that in 48 gubernias in European Russia the number of horseless households increased from 2,800,000 in 1888-91 to 3,200,000 in 1896-1900, *i.e.*, from 27.8 per cent to 29.2 per cent In the four southern gubernias (Bessarabia, Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, Kherson), the number of horseless households increased from 305,800 in 1896 to 341,600 in 1904, *i.e.*, from 34.7 per cent to 36.4 per cent [Footnote to second edition]

² *Cf* also S. A. Korolenko *Freely Hired Labour etc* pp. 46-47, where on the basis of the horse census of 1882 and 1888, he gives examples of how the diminution in the number of horses owned by the peasants is accompanied by an increase in the number of horses owned by private owners.

<i>Group of Households</i>	<i>% of Peasants in Group Taking Work by the Job</i>	<i>% of Total Households</i>	<i>% of Total Households Taking Work by the Job</i>
Horseless	9.9	24.5	10.5
One horse	27.4	40.5	47.5
From two to three horses	29.0	31.8	39.6
Four and more horses	16.5	3.2	2.3
Total for Uyezd	23.3	100.0	100.0

From the above it is clearly to be seen that taking work by the job is diminishing in both extreme groups. The largest percentage of households taking work by the job is to be found in the middle group of peasants. In view of the fact that the Zemstvo statistics not infrequently include work by the job in the general category of "earnings," we see here an example of the typical "earnings" of the middle peasantry—in exactly the same way as in the preceding chapter we saw the typical "earnings" of the lower and higher groups of the peasantry. The forms of "earnings" we examined in that chapter express the development of capitalism (commercial and industrial enterprises and the sale of labour power) but the present form of "earnings," on the contrary, expresses the backwardness of capitalism and the predominance of labour rent (if we assume that in the sum total of "work by the job," the kind of work that we included in the first category of *otrabotki*, predominates).

The more the natural self-sufficing system of economy and the middle peasantry decline, the more effectively is the labour rent system squeezed out by capitalism. The wealthy peasants, of course, cannot serve as the basis for the labour rent system, for it is only extreme poverty that compels the peasant to take the worst paid form of work and such that is ruinous for his own farm. But neither is the rural proletariat fit for the labour rent system, although for quite another reason: not possessing a farm, or possessing an insignificant plot of land, the rural proletarian is not tied down to it to the same extent as a "middle" peasant, and, consequently, it is much easier for him to go away and hire himself on "free" conditions, *i.e.*, for higher pay and without any bondage. Hence the universal dissatisfaction of our ag

rarians with the drift of the peasants to the towns in quest of "earnings on the side" generally, hence their complaints about the peasant "not being sufficiently attached" (Cf chap IX) The development of purely capitalist wage labour undermines the very roots of the labour rent system¹

It is very important to note that this inseparable connection between the disintegration of the peasantry and the squeezing out of labour rent by capitalism—a connection which is clear in theory—was long ago observed by writers on agriculture who noted the various methods employed on the landlord estates In the preface to his symposium of articles on Russian agriculture, written in the period between 1857 and 1882, Professor Stebut points out that

¹ Here is a very striking example The Zemstvo statistics explain the extent to which money rent and rent in kind prevail in the various parts of the Bakhmut Uyezd, Ekaterinoslav Gubernia in the following way

'The localities where money rent is most widespread are in the coal and salt mining districts, and is least widespread in the steppe and purely agricultural districts Generally speaking the peasants are not eager to go out to work, and least of all are they eager to do the irksome and badly paid work on the private 'estates' Work in the coal mines and in mining generally is arduous toil and harmful to the health of the workers, but, generally speaking, it is better paid, and the worker is attracted by the prospect of receiving his monthly or weekly pay which he does not get when working on the 'estates for the reason that there he is either working to pay for land, or straw, or grain which he has borrowed or has taken his pay long beforehand in order to cover his constant needs etc

"All this causes the worker to avoid working on the 'estates' and he does avoid doing so when there is an opportunity to earn money in some place other than the 'estate' And this opportunity occurs precisely where there are many coal mines at which the workers are paid 'good money With the 'pence' the worker earns in the mines, he can rent land without having to pledge himself to work on the 'estate,' and in this way money rent becomes predominant' (Quoted from *Summary of Zemstvo Statistics*, Vol II, p 265) In the steppe and non-industrial districts in the uyezd the *shop shchina* (share-cropping) and labour rent system is established

Thus, the peasant is ready to flee even to the mines to escape from the labour rent system! The regular pay in cash, the impersonal form of hire and regular work "attracts" the worker to such an extent that he prefers working in underground mines to agriculture, the agriculture which our Narodniki wax idyllic about. The fact is that the peasant knows from hard experience the real value of the labour rent system which the agrarians and the Narodniki idealise and he knows how much better purely capitalist relations are than that system

"In contemporary communal peasant farming a differentiation is taking place between rural employers and agricultural labourers. The former, who are becoming big farmers, are beginning to employ labourers and usually cease to take work by the job unless they find it extremely necessary to add a little to their land or to obtain the use of pasture land, which in most cases cannot be obtained except by taking work by the job. The latter cannot take any work by the job because they have no horses. Hence the obvious necessity to adopt the hired labourer system, the more so that those peasants who still take work by the job, or by the desiatin, perform this work badly both in regard to quality and punctuality owing to the weakness of their horses and the amount of work they have taken" (P. 20)

References to the fact that the ruination of the peasantry is leading to the labour rent system being squeezed out by capitalism are made in current Zemstvo statistics. In the Orel Gubernia, for example, it has been observed that the drop in grain prices has ruined many tenant farmers, and the owners have been compelled to increase their own sowing

"Simultaneously with the expansion of farming on own account on big estates a striving is observed to substitute labourers for the job system and to abandon the system of utilising the peasants' implements a striving to improve the cultivation of the soil by employing improved implements to change the system of farming to introduce grass sowing, to expand and improve cattle breeding and to give it a productive character" (*Agricultural Review of the Orel Gubernia for 1887-88* pp. 125-26, quoted in *Critical Remarks* by P. Struve, pp. 242-44)

1 In the Poltava Gubernia in 1890, it was observed that with the low prices for grain

there has been a diminution in peasant renting of land through out the entire gubernia. Correspondingly, in many places, notwithstanding the severe drop in grain prices, landlord tilling on own account has increased." (*Influence of Harvests, etc.*, Vol. I, p. 304)

In the Tambov Gubernia, a considerable rise in the price of horsework has been observed in the three years 1892-94, these prices were from 25 per cent to 30 per cent higher than in the three years 1888-91 (*Novoye Slovo* [*New Word*] 1896, No. 3, p. 187). The rise in the price of horsework, which is the natural result of the decline in the number of peasant horses, cannot but affect the squeezing out of labour rent by the capitalist system.

Of course, we do not assert that these separate references prove the postulate that capitalism is squeezing out the labour

rent system no complete statistics on this subject are available. We merely quote them to illustrate the postulate that there is a *connection* between the disintegration of the peasantry and the squeezing out of labour rent by capitalism. General and mass data, which irrefutably prove that this process of squeezing out is actually taking place, is provided by the returns showing the employment of machinery in agriculture and the employment of free hired labour.

VII THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINERY IN AGRICULTURE

The post Reform epoch can be divided into four periods in regard to the development of the manufacture of agricultural machinery and the employment of machinery in agriculture.¹ The first period covers the last few years immediately preceding the Peasant Reform and the first few years immediately following it. The landlords rushed to purchase imported machines in order to dispense with the "unpaid" labour of the serfs and to remove difficulties in the way of employing hired labour. This effort, of course, ended in failure, the fever died down and from 1863 to 1864 the demand for machinery declined. The second period commenced from the end of the 'seventies and continued until 1885. This period is characterised by an extremely steady and rapid increase in imports of machines from abroad, home production also grows steadily, but more slowly than imports. From 1881 to 1884 the imports of agricultural machinery increased particularly rapidly, which is to be explained partly by the abolition, in 1881, of the free import of pig iron and cast iron for the

¹ Cf. *Historical Statistical Review of Industry in Russia*, Vol. I St. Petersburg (published for the 1882 Exhibition) article by V. Chernyaev, *The Agricultural Machine Industry*. Also *ibid.* Vol. II St. Petersburg 1886, in group IX *Agriculture and Forestry in Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1893, published for the Chicago Exhibition), article by V. Chernyaev, *Agricultural Implements and Machinery—The Productive Forces of Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1896, published for the 1896 Exhibition), article by Lenin [S. N. Lenin, an agronomist member of the Free Economists Society—Ed.] *'Agricultural Implements and Machinery* (part I), *Vestnik Finansov* [Financial News], 1896, No. 51, and 1897, No. 21, V. Raspopin, *op cit*. Only the last mentioned article puts the question on a political and economic basis, the rest are written by agronomic specialists.

needs of the factories manufacturing agricultural machinery. The third period is that between 1885 and the beginning of the 'nineties. In that year a duty was imposed (50 kopeks gold per po¹) on imported agricultural machinery, which hitherto had been imported duty free. The high duties caused an enormous drop in the imports of machinery, while home production developed slowly owing to the agricultural crisis which commenced in that very period. Finally, the fourth period evidently commences with the beginning of the 1890's when imports of agricultural machinery again increased and home production increases with particular rapidity.

We will quote statistics which illustrate the above. The average annual imports of agricultural machinery in the respective periods were as follows:

<i>Period</i>	<i>Thousand Poods</i>	<i>Thousand Rubles</i>
1869 1872	259.4	787.9
1873 1876	556.3	2,283.9
1877 1880	629.5	3,593.7
1881 1884	961.8	6,318
1885 1888	399.5	2,032
1889 1892	509.2	2,596
1893 1896	864.8	4,868

Unfortunately, equally complete and precise statistics on the production of agricultural machinery and implements in Russia are not available. The unsatisfactory state of our industrial statistics, the failure to distinguish between the manufacture of machinery generally and the manufacture of agricultural machinery in particular, the absence of any firmly established rule for distinguishing between "factory" production and "*kustarni*" (handicraft) production of agricultural machinery prevent a complete picture being obtained of the development of the production of agricultural machinery in Russia. If we combine all the data to be obtained in the above mentioned sources we will get the following picture of the development of the production of agricultural machinery in Russia.

¹ Pood=36 pounds.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

PRODUCTION, IMPORTS AND EMPLOYMENT OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY AND IMPLEMENTS

Year	Kingdom of Poland	Three Baltic Gubernias	Four South Steppe Gubernias Don, Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, Kherson	Remaining Gubernias, European Russia	Total 50 Gubernias European Russia and Kingdom of Poland	Imports Agricultural Machinery	Employment of Agricultural Machinery
(Thousands of Rubles)							
1876	646	415	280	988	2,329	1 628	8,957
1879	1 088	433	557	1 752	3 830	4 000	7,830
1890	498	217	2,360	1,971	5,046	2 519	7,565
1894	381	314	6,183	2,567	9,445	5 194	14 639

These figures show with what force the primitive agricultural implements are being squeezed out by improved implements (and, consequently, the force with which the primitive forms of farming are being squeezed out by capitalism) In the course of eighteen years the employment of agricultural machinery has increased by more than three and a half times and this has been mainly due to the increase in home production, which increased more than fourfold Another remarkable thing is the fact that the centre of the agricultural machinery industry has shifted from the Vistula and the Baltic gubernias to the South Russian steppe gubernias In the 'seventies, the chief centres of agricultural capitalism in Russia were the Western frontier gubernias, but in the 1890's still more important agricultural capitalist districts arose in the purely Russian gubernias¹

It is necessary to add, in regard to the figures just quoted, that although they are based on official (and as far as we know the only) returns on the questions we are discussing, they are by no means complete and not quite comparable for the respective

¹ In order to enable the reader to judge to what extent the situation has changed in recent times, we will quote statistics from the *Russian Annual* (published by the Central Statistical Committee [St. Petersburg, 1906] for 1900-03) According to these figures the production of agricultural machinery in the Empire amounted to 12,058,000 rubles, imports in 1902 amounted to 15,240,000 rubles and in 1903 they amounted to 20,615 000 rubles. [Footnote to second edition.]

years For the year 1876-79 there are statistics which were especially compiled for the 1882 Exhibition and are most complete, for they not only cover "factory" produced agricultural machinery and implements but also "kustarni", it was estimated that in 1876-79 there were, on the average, 340 establishments in European Russia, including the Kingdom of Poland, whereas according to the "factory" returns there were in 1879 not more than 66 factories in European Russia producing agricultural machinery (Calculated according to Orlov's *Directory of Factories and Works* for 1879) The enormous difference in these figures is explained by the fact that of the 340 establishments, less than one third (100) had steam power and more than one half (196) were handicraft establishments, 236 establishments out of the 340 did not have their own foundries and had their castings made outside (*Historical Statistical Review*, l c) The figures for 1890 and 1894, however, are taken from the *Summary of Returns on Factory Industry in Russia* (published by the Department of Trade and Manufacture)¹ These figures do not even fully cover the "factory" production of agricultural machinery and implements for example, in 1890 according to the *Summary*, there were in European Russia 149 factories engaged in this industry, whereas Orlov's *Directory* gives a list of more than 163 factories producing agricultural machinery and implements In 1894, according to the first mentioned returns, there were in European Russia 164 factories of this kind (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No 21, p 544), but according to the *Census of Factories and Works*, there were in 1894-95 more than 173 factories producing agricultural machinery and implements These figures do not at all include the small "kustarni" workshops producing agricultural machinery and implements² For these reasons there can be no doubt that the figures for 1890 and 1894 greatly underestimate the actual position, this is confirmed by the opinions of specialists

¹ In the *Vestnik Finansov* for 1897, No 21, comparative figures are given for 1888-94, but their source is not clearly indicated.

² It was estimated that the number of workshops engaged in the manufacture and repair of agricultural implements in 1864 was 64 in 1871, 112; in 1874, 208, in 1879, 340, in 1885, 435, in 1892, 400, in 1895 about 400 (*Agriculture and Forestry in Russia*, p 358 and *Vestnik Finansov*, 1896,

who calculated that in the beginning of the 1890's agricultural machinery and implements to the value of nearly 10,000,000 rubles were produced in Russia (*Agriculture and Forestry*, p 359), and in 1895 an amount to the value of nearly 20,000,000 rubles was produced (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No 51)

We will quote more detailed data concerning the forms and quantities of agricultural machinery and implements produced in Russia. It is calculated that in 1876, 25,835 farm implements were produced, in 1877, 29,590, in 1878, 35,226, in 1879, 47,892 agricultural machines and implements. The extent to which these figures have been exceeded at the present time may be gathered from the following data: in 1879 about 14,500 ploughs were produced, and in 1894, 75,500 were produced (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No 21)

'Five years ago the problem of taking measures to persuade the peasantry to adopt ploughs for tilling their land¹ was still a problem that awaited solution. At the present time, however, it has solved itself. Now it is no longer a rarity for a peasant to buy a plough; it has become a common practice and the number of ploughs now acquired by the peasants every year may be counted in thousands.'²

The mass of primitive agricultural implements employed in Russia still leaves a wide field for the manufacture and sale of steel ploughs.³ The progress achieved in the employment of ploughs has brought to the front the question of employing

No 51) On the other hand the *Summary* calculated that in 1888-94 there were only from 157 to 217 workshops of this kind (average for seven years, 193). The following example illustrates the relative positions of 'factory' production of agricultural machinery and *kustarni*.⁴ In the Perm Gubernia in 1894 it was calculated there were only four factories with a combined output of 28,000 rubles whereas according to the census of 1894-95 there were 94 '*kustarni*' workshops with a combined output of 50,000 rubles. But among these '*kustarni*' workshops were included those for example which employed six wage workers and had a total output of 8,000 rubles (*An Outline of the State of the Handicraft Industry in Perm Gubernia*, Perm 1896)

¹ The peasants at that time mostly employed the wooden plough, called in Russian "*sokha*."—Ed. Eng. ed.

² *Reports and Investigations into the Kustar Industry in Russia*. Published by the Ministry of State Property. Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1892, p. 202. The output of ploughs produced by peasants declined as a consequence of the competition of factory-made ploughs.

³ *Agriculture and Forestry in Russia*, p. 360.

electricity As reported in the *Commercial and Industrial Gazette* (1902, No 6), considerable interest was aroused at the Second Electro-Technical Congress by the paper read by V A Rievsky, *Electricity in Agriculture* The lecturer illustrated his paper with excellent drawings showing the tilling of fields in Germany with the aid of electric ploughs and quoted figures which he had himself compiled at the request of a landowner in one of the southern gubernias which showed how economical this method of tilling the land was According to the plan, 540 dessiatins of land were to be ploughed each year, part of which was to be ploughed twice a year The depth of furrow was to be from 9 to 10 inches, the soil was—pure black earth In addition to ploughs, the plan provided for the employment of machinery for other field work and also for a threshing machine and flour mill, the latter of 25 h p, calculated to work 2,000 hours per annum The cost of equipping the whole estate including six versts of overhead cables of 50 mm thickness was estimated at 41,000 rubles The cost of ploughing one dessiatin would be 7 40 rubles if the mill were put up, and 8 70 rubles if the mill were not put up It was found that, in comparison with the price of labour, draught animals, etc, prevailing in the district, electrical equipment would cause a saving of 1,013 rubles in the first case, and in the second case, when less power would be used without a mill, the saving would amount to 966 rubles

The change in the manufacture of threshing and winnowing machines is not so sharp because the production of these machines had become relatively well established long ago¹ In fact, a special centre for the production of these machines on “*kustarni*” lines had grown up in the town and the surrounding villages of Sapozhok, Ryazan Gubernia, and the local representatives of the peasant bourgeoisie made plenty of money at this “trade” (Cf *Reports and Investigations*, Vol I, p 208 10) A particularly rapid increase is observed in the production of reaping machines

¹ In 1879, about 4,500 threshing machines were produced, and in 1894-95, 8 500 were produced The latter figure, however, does not include the output of the “*kustarni*” industry,

In 1879, about 780 of these were produced per annum, in 1893 it was calculated that 7,000 to 8,000 were sold per annum and in 1894-95, about 27,000. In 1895, for example, the factory belonging to D. Greaves in Berdyansk, Taurida Gubernia, "the largest factory of its kind in Europe" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No 51, i.e., for the manufacture of reaping machines), produced 4,464 reaping machines. Among the peasants in the Taurida Gubernia reaping machines were so widespread that a special occupation arose, namely, harvesting other people's grain.¹

Similar data are available in regard to other, less widespread agricultural implements. Seed scattering machines, for example, are now being manufactured in scores of factories, and the more perfect furrow seeding machines, in the manufacture of which only two factories were engaged in 1893 (*Agriculture and Forestry*, p. 360), are now being manufactured in seven factories (*Produc*

¹ In 1893, for example, 700 peasants with their machines gathered on the Uspensky estate belonging to Falz Fein (who owned 200,000 desiatinas of land), to offer their services, but half their number went away empty handed, as only 350 were engaged (Shakhovsky *Agricultural Migratory Trades* M., 1896, p. 161). In the other steppe districts, however, especially in the trans-Volga districts, reaping machines are not widely used as yet. Nevertheless, in recent years even these gubernias have been trying very hard to overtake Novorossia. Thus, the Syzran Vyazma railway in 1890 carried 75,000 poods of agricultural machinery, steam engines and parts, in 1891, it carried 62,000 poods, in 1892 88,000 in 1893 12,000 poods and in 1894, 212,000 poods, that is to say, in a matter of five years the amount of machinery thus carried was almost tripled. In 1893, the Ukholovo railway depot despatched about 30,000 poods of agricultural machinery of local manufacture; in 1894 it despatched about 82,000 poods, whereas up to 1892 inclusive the total amount of agricultural machinery despatched from that depot did not amount to 10,000 poods per annum. "The Ukholovo depot mainly despatched threshing machines produced in the villages of Kanino and Smikovo and partly in the uyezd town of Sapozhok, Rvazan Gubernia. In the village of Kanino there are three foundries belonging to Ermakov, Karev and Golikov, which produce mainly parts for agricultural machinery. The finishing and assembly of machines is done at the two above mentioned villages (Kanino and Smikovo), and almost the whole population of these villages are engaged in this industry" (*A Brief Review of the Commercial Activity of the Syzran Vyazma Railway in 1894*, part IV, Kaluga, 1896, p. 62-63). The interesting features of this example are, first, the enormous increase in production precisely in recent years, i.e., when low grain prices have ruled, and, second, the connection that is revealed between "factory" and so called "kustarni" production. The latter is nothing more nor less than the "outside department" of the factory.

ive Forces, I p 51), the output of which has a particularly wide sale in the South of Russia Machinery is employed in all branches of agriculture and in all operations performed in the production of particular commodities in special reviews, reference is made to the widespread use of winnowing machines, seed selecting machines, seed cleaners (triers), seed drying machines, hay presses, flax retting machines, etc In the *Supplement to the Report on Agriculture* for 1898, published by the Zemstvo Administration of the Pskov Gubernia (*Severni Kurier*,¹ 1899, No 32), reference is made to the increase in the use of machinery, particularly of flax retting machines, owing to the transition from the production of flax for home use to production for the market. The number of ploughs in use is increasing Reference is made to the effect migratory trades have on the increase in the number of agricultural machines in use and on the increase in wages In the Stavropol Gubernia (*ibid*, No 33), there is a large increase in the employment of agricultural machinery as a consequence of the increase of migration to the gubernia In 1882, it was calculated that 908 machines were in use, in 1891-93, there were on the average 29,275, in 1894-96, there were on the average 54,874, in 1895, about 64,000 agricultural implements and machines

The increase in the employment of machinery naturally gives rise to an increased demand for mechanical driving power simultaneously with steam engines, "the use of kerosene engines has begun to grow rapidly on our farms recently" (*Productive Forces*, I, p 56) and notwithstanding the fact that the first engine of this type appeared abroad only seven years ago, there are already seven enterprises in Russia manufacturing them It is calculated that in the Kherson Gubernia there were in the 'seventies only 134 steam engines employed in agriculture (*Materials for Statistics on Steam Engines in the Russian Empire*, St Petersburg, 1882), in 1881 there were about 500 (*Historical Statistical Review*, Vol II, section dealing with agricultural implements) In 1884-86, in three uyezds in the gubernia (out of six), 435 steam threshing machines were found "At the present time" (1895) "there must be at least twice as many" (Tezyakov, *Agricultural Labourers*

¹ *Northern Courier*—Ed Eng ed

and the Organisation of Sanitary Inspection for Them in the Kher son Gubernia, Kherson, 1896, p. 71) *Vestnik Finansov* (1897, No. 21) says that in the Kherson Gubernia,

"there are about 1,150 steam threshers and in the Kuban Oblast the number of steam threshers is about the same, etc. In recent times the acquisition of steam threshers has assumed an industrial character. There have been cases when a threshing machine and steam engine costing five thousand rubles have paid for themselves in two or three good harvest years, and the owner immediately purchased a new one on the same terms. Thus on small farms in the Kuban Oblast five and even ten such machines may be found on a single farm. There they have become an essential accessory of every well kept farm'. Generally speaking in the South of Russia at the present time more than ten thousand steam engines for agricultural purposes are in use' (*Productive Forces*, IX, p. 151)¹

If we recall that in 1875-78 it was calculated that in the whole of European Russia only 1,351 steam engines were in use in agriculture, and, in 1901, according to incomplete returns (*Summary of Factory Inspectors' Reports for 1903*) there were 12,091, in 1902, 14,609, in 1903, 16,021, in 1904, 17,287 agricultural steam engines, the gigantic revolution capital has brought about in Russian agriculture in the last two or three decades will become clear. The Zemstvo played a great part in accelerating this process. At the beginning of 1897, Zemstvo agricultural machinery and implement stores "were already established by eleven gubernias and 203 uyezds. Zemstvos having a total working

¹ Cf. correspondence from the Perekop Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, in *Russkaya Vedomosti* [Russian News] of August 19, 1898 (No. 167). "Owing to the widespread use of reaping machines, and horse and steam threshing machines among our farmers, field work is making very rapid progress. The old-fashioned method of threshing with the aid of a roller "flail" has been abandoned. Every year the Crimean farmer increases his area of cultivation and is therefore compelled to resort to the aid of improved agricultural implements and machines. With the aid of the flail it is possible to thresh not more than from 150 to 200 poods of grain per day, a 10 h.p. steam thresher will do 2,000 to 2,500 per day and a horse-driven thresher will do 700 to 800 poods per day. That is why the demand for agricultural implements, reapers and threshers is increasing so rapidly from year to year that the stocks at the factories producing them become exhausted, as has happened this year, and they cannot satisfy the demands of the farmers." The drop in grain prices must be regarded as one of the most important reasons for the increase in the use of improved implements for the farmer is compelled to reduce cost of production.

capital of about one million rubles" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No 21) In the Poltava Gubernia, the turnover of the Zemstvo agricultural machinery stores increased from 22,600 rubles in 1890 to 94,900 rubles in 1892, and 210,100 rubles in 1895 In the six years 12,600 ploughs, 500 winnowing machines and seed sorters, 300 reaping machines, and 200 horse threshers were sold "The principal customers at the Zemstvo stores are the Cossacks and the peasants, they purchased 70 per cent of the total number of ploughs and horse threshers sold The purchasers of seeding and reaping machines were mainly landowners, and large landowners at that, those owning more than 100 dessiatins" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No 4)

According to the report of the Ekaterinoslav Gubernia Zemstvo Administration for 1895, the use of improved agricultural implements in the gubernia is spreading very rapidly For example, the following table gives the estimated totals for the Verkhnedneprovsk Uyezd

		1894	1895
Ploughs (Various Types for Deep and Shallow Ploughing)	{ Landowners	5 220	6 752
	{ Peasants	27 271	30 112
Horse Threshers	{ Landowners	131	290
	{ Peasants	671	893

(*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No 6)

According to the returns of the Moscow Gubernia Zemstvo Administration, the peasants in the Moscow Gubernia in 1895 owned 41,210 ploughs which were distributed among 20.2 per cent of the total households (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No 31) In the Tver Gubernia, according to the returns of a special census taken in 1896, there were 51,266 ploughs owned by 16.5 per cent of the total number of households In the Tver Uyezd there were in 1890 only 290 ploughs and in 1896 there were 5,581 ploughs (*Summary of Statistics on the Tver Gubernia*, Vol XIII, part 2, pp 91-94) It is possible to judge from this how rapidly the farms of the peasant bourgeoisie are becoming consolidated and improved

VIII THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MACHINERY IN AGRICULTURE

Having established the fact that the production and employment of agricultural machinery in post Reform agriculture in Russia is developing with extreme rapidity, we must now examine the question as to the social and economic significance of this phenomenon. From what has been said above in regard to the economics of peasant and landlord farming, the following postulates must be deduced: on the one hand, it is precisely capitalism which is the factor that gives rise to and spreads the employment of machinery in agriculture, on the other hand, the application of machinery in agriculture bears a capitalist character, i.e., it leads to the establishment of capitalist relationships and to the further development of these relationships.

We will deal with the first postulate. We have seen that the labour rent system and patriarchal peasant economy, which is inseparably connected with it, are by their very nature based on routine technique, on the preservation of ancient methods of production. Within the internal structure of this economic regime there is nothing to stimulate the change of technique, on the contrary, the exclusiveness and isolation of this system of economy, the poverty and degradation of the dependent peasant excludes the possibility of introducing improvements. In particular, we will point to the fact that payment for labour under the labour rent system is much lower (as we have seen) than under free hire, and it is well known that low wages is one of the most important obstacles to the introduction of machinery. And the facts do indeed show that the wide movement for the reform of agricultural technique commenced only in the post Reform period of the development of commodity production and capitalism. Competition, which was created by capitalism, and the fact that the farmer is dependent on the world market, made the reform of technique necessary and the drop in grain prices caused this necessity to become very urgent.¹

¹ "In the past two years, owing to the drop in grain prices and the necessity at all costs to reduce the cost of agricultural labour, reaping machines have also, begun to be so widely employed that the stores are not able to keep up with the demand." (Tezyakov, *op cit* p. 71.) The

In order to explain the second postulate, we must examine land lord and peasant farming separately. When a landlord introduces machines or improved implements, he substitutes his own implements for that of the peasants (who work for him), hence, he passes from the labour rent system to the capitalist system. The spread of the use of agricultural machinery implies the squeezing out of the labour rent system by capitalism. It is possible, of course, that a condition, for example in letting land, may be imposed that the tenant shall pay labour rent in the form of day work on a reaping machine, threshing machine, etc., but this will be labour rent of the second type, labour rent which transforms the peasant into a day labourer. Such "exceptions," therefore, merely go to prove the general rule that when the private landlord farmers acquire improved implements, the bonded ("independent," according to the Narodnik terminology) peasant is transformed into a wage labourer—in exactly the same way as when the merchant who gave work out to his workers to perform in their own homes acquires his own means of production, the bonded "*kustar*" is transformed into a wage worker. When the landlord farmer acquires implements of his own, it inevitably leads to the undermining of the middle peasantry which seeks to gain a livelihood by means of *otrabotka*. We have already seen that *otrabotka* is the specific "trade" of the middle peasantry, whose implements therefore, represent, not only a constituent part of peasant farming, but also of landlord farming.¹ Hence, the spread of the employment present agricultural crisis is a capitalist crisis. Like all capitalist crises, it ruins the farmers and owners in one locality, in one country, in one branch of agriculture, and at the same time it gives a powerful impetus to the development of capitalism in another locality, in another country in another branch of agriculture. It is the failure to understand this fundamental feature of the present crisis and its economic nature that marks the main error in the reasoning of N—on, Kshlukov and others, on this theme.

¹ Mr V V expresses this truism (that the existence of the middle peasant is conditioned to a considerable degree by the existence of the labour rent system of landlord farming) in the following original way: "The owner, so to speak, shares the cost of maintaining his (the peasant's) implements." "It logically follows, therefore," justly observes Mr Sanin in commenting on this, "that it is not the labourer who works for the landlord, but the landlord who works for the labourer" (A Sanin *A Few Remarks on the Theory of People's Production* in an appendix to the Russian translation of Hurwitz's *Economic Condition of the Russian Village*, M., 1896, p. 47.)

of agricultural machinery and improved implements and the expropriation of the peasantry—are two inseparably connected phenomena. It is hardly necessary to explain, after what has been said in the preceding chapter, that the spread in the employment of improved implements among the peasantry has the same significance. The systematic employment of machinery in agriculture squeezes out the patriarchal “middle” peasant as inexorably as the steam driven loom squeezes out the handloom, *kustar* weaver.

The results of the application of machinery in agriculture confirm what has been said and reveal all the typical features of capitalist progress with all the contradictions peculiar to it. Machines, to an enormous degree, increase the productivity of labour in agriculture, which, until the present epoch, has remained almost untouched by the process of social development. Hence, the mere fact that the employment of machinery in Russian agriculture is increasing is sufficient to reveal how unsound is Mr N—on’s assertion that there is “absolute stagnation” (*Outlines*, p. 32) in the production of grain in Russia, and even that there is a “diminution in the productivity” of agricultural labour. Later on we will return to this assertion which contradicts generally established facts and which Mr N—on made only for the purpose of idealising pre-capitalist conditions.

To proceed. Machines lead to the concentration of production and to the introduction of capitalist co-operation in agriculture. The introduction of machinery calls on the one hand, for the investment of large amounts of capital and, consequently, only big farmers are able to acquire it, on the other hand, the employment of machinery pays only when an enormous quantity of goods is turned out: the expansion of production becomes a necessity with the introduction of machinery. The spread of reaping machines, steam threshers, etc., therefore, indicates the concentration of agricultural production—and we shall indeed see later on that the district of Russian agriculture in which the employment of machinery is particularly widespread (Novorossia) is distinguished for the great size of its farms. Here we will merely observe that it would be a mistake to imagine that concentration in agriculture only takes place in the form of extensive expansion of sown area

(as Mr N—on does), as a matter of fact, concentration in agricultural production manifests itself in the most diverse forms, corresponding to the forms of merchant farming (Cf next chapter) The concentration of production is inseparably connected with wide co operation between the workers employed on the farm Above we saw an example of a large estate on which *hundreds* of reaping machines were employed simultaneously for the purpose of harvesting the grain

'Horse threshers require from four to eight horses and from 14 to 23 and even more workers half of whom are women and boys *i.e.* half labourers The eight to ten h.p. steam threshers which are employed on all large farms (Kherson Gubernia) require simultaneously from 50 to 70 workers of whom more than half are half labourers, boys and girls of 12 to 17 years of age' (Tezyakov *loc. cit.* p. 93)

"Large farms, on which 500 to 1,000 workers are gathered together, simultaneously may, without hesitation, be compared with an industrial establishment," the same author justly observes (P. 518)¹ Thus, while our Narodniki were arguing that the "village commune" "could easily" introduce co operation in agriculture, life proceeds in its own way, and capitalism, dividing the village commune into two groups whose interests are antagonistic to each other, created large farms based on the wide co operation of wage labourers

From the preceding it is clear that machines *create* a home market for capitalism first, a market for means of production (for the products of the engineering industry, mining industry, etc., etc.) and second, a market for labour power As we have seen already, the introduction of machines leads to the substitution of free hired labour for the labour rent system and to the creation of peasant farms employing agricultural labour The employment of agricultural machinery on a mass scale presupposes the existence of a mass of agricultural wage labourers In those districts where agricultural capitalism is developed most, this process of *introducing* wage labour, simultaneously with the introduction of machinery, cuts across another process, namely, the wage workers are squeezed out by the machines On the one

¹ Cf. also next chapter, section 2 in which more detailed data are given on dimensions of capitalist farms in this district of Russia

hand, the rise of a peasant bourgeoisie and the landlords' transition from the labour rent system to capitalism *creates* the demand for wage labourers, on the other hand, in those places where farming has been long conducted on the basis of wage labour, the machines squeeze out the wage labourers. There is no precise statistical data covering a wide field to indicate what the general results of both these processes for the whole of Russia are, i.e., whether the number of agricultural wage labourers is increasing or diminishing. There is no doubt that up till now the number has been increasing (Cf. next section). We assume that it is continuing to increase at the present time¹ in the first place, data on machinery squeezing out wage workers in agriculture is available only for Novorossia, and in other capitalist agricultural districts (Baltic and Western region, Eastern region, several of the industrial gubernias) the prevalence of this process on a large scale has not been established. There still remains the enormous region where the labour rent system predominates, and in that region the introduction of machinery gives rise to a demand for wage labour. Secondly, the increase in the intensiveness of agriculture (introduction of root crops, for example) increases the demand for wage labour to an enormous degree (Cf. chap IV). The absolute diminution in the number of agricultural wage labourers (unlike industrial) must take place, of course, at a certain stage of development of capitalism, namely, when agriculture throughout the whole country will have been organised on capitalist lines and when the employment of machinery will have become general.

In regard to Novorossia, local investigators have observed the usual consequences of highly developed capitalism. The machine is squeezing out the wage workers and is creating a capitalist reserve army of labour in agriculture.

'The times of fabulous prices for labourers in the Kherson Gubernia are past. Owing to the increased spread of agricultural implements " (and to other causes) "the price of labourers is systematically declining."

¹ It is hardly necessary to explain that in a country which has a mass of peasantry the absolute increase in the number of agricultural wage labourers is quite compatible, not only with a relative, but also with an absolute diminution of the rural population.

(Authors italics) " . . . The distribution of agricultural implements, which releases the large farms from dependence on labourers¹ at the same time reduces the demand for labourers and thus puts the labourers in an embarrassing position." (Tezyakov, *loc. cit.*, pp 66-71)

The same thing is stated by another Zemstvo Medical Officer for Health, Mr Kudryavtsev, in his work, *The Migratory Agricultural Labourers at the Nikolayev Fair in Kakhovka, Taurida Gubernia, and Sanitary Inspection Among Them in 1895* (Kher son, 1896)

The price of labourers continues to fall and a considerable number of the migratory workers fail to obtain employment and are unable to earn anything i.e., what in the language of economic science is called a reserve army of labour is created—an artificial surplus population' (P 61)

The drop in the price of labour caused by this reserve army of labour sometimes reaches such dimensions that "many employers preferred" (in 1895) "harvesting by hand labour to machine harvesting!" (*Ibid.*, p 66, taken from the *Report of the Kherson Zemstvo*, August, 1895) This fact reveals more strikingly and convincingly than any argument how profound are the contradictions peculiar to the capitalist employment of machinery!

Another consequence of the application of machinery is the increased employment of female and child labour. The development of capitalist agriculture in general has given rise to a certain hierarchy of labour, which very much recalls the hierarchy among factory workers. For example, in the big farms in South Russia the labourers are divided into the following categories: a) *full labourers*, adult males capable of performing all kinds of work, b) *half labourers*, women, and men up to the age of 20, half labourers are again divided into two sub categories: aa) 12-13 to 15-16 years of age—these are half labourers in the strict sense of

¹ Mr Ponamarev expresses himself on this point in the following way: "Machines, in regulating the price for harvesting in all probability, at the same time discipline the labourers. (Article in *Agriculture and Forestry*, quoted in *Vestnik Finansov*, 1896 No 14) You will remember how Andrew Ure, the "Pindar of the capitalist factory welcomed the machine which created "order" and 'discipline' among the workers (See Marx, *Capital*, Vol I, p 458—*Ed Eng ed*) Agricultural capitalism in Russia has not only managed to create an "agricultural factory," but also "Pindars" of such factories

the term, and bb) *labourers of strong power* "in the language of economics 'three quarters' labourers"¹ from 16 to 20 years of age, capable of performing all kinds of work except mowing. Finally, there is category c) half labourers of *weak power*, children not less than 8 and not more than 14 years of age, these act as swine herds, calfherds, weeders and ploughboys. Often they work merely for their food and clothes. The introduction of machinery "renders the full labourers worthless" and enables cheaper female and child labour to be employed in their stead. Statistics on migratory labour confirm the fact that female labour is taking the place of male labour. In 1890, in Kakhovka, and in the city of Kherson, the number of women labourers registered represented 12.7 per cent of the total number of labourers, in 1894, for the whole gubernia, 18.2 per cent (10,239 out of a total of 56,461), in 1895, 25.6 per cent (13,474 out of 48,753). Children in 1893 represented 0.7 per cent (from 10 to 14 years of age), in 1895, 1.69 per cent (from 7 to 14 years of age). Among the local farm labourers in the Elizavetgrad Uyezd in the Kherson Gubernia, children represented 10.6 per cent (*Ibid*).

Machinery increases the intensity of labour of the labourers. For example, the most widely employed type of reaping machine (which requires hand scattering) has acquired the characteristic name of "brow warmer" or "forelock warmer," as working with this machine calls for extraordinary exertion on the part of the labourer, the labourer takes the place of a scattering implement (*Cf Productive Forces*, I, p. 52). Intensity of labour also increases with the threshing machine. Here, too (as everywhere), the capitalist employment of machinery creates a powerful stimulus to increasing the working day. Night work is introduced in agriculture, a thing never observed before. "In good harvest years" work "in certain big landlord farms and on many peasant farms is carried on even at night" (Tezyakov, *loc. cit.* p. 126) by artificial light—torches (P. 92). Finally, the systematic employment of machinery results in traumatism among agricultural labourers, naturally, the employment of young women and children on machinery particularly leads to an abundance of accidents. During

¹ Tezyakov, *loc. cit.* p. 72

the agricultural season, the Zemstvo hospitals and dispensaries in the Kherson Gubernia, for example, are filled "almost exclusively with traumatic patients" and serve as "field hospitals, as it were, for the treatment of those in the enormous army of agricultural labourers who have been put out of action, the victims of the ruthless, destructive effect of the agricultural machinery and implements" (*Ibid*, p 126) A special medical literature is being created dealing with injuries caused by agricultural machinery. Proposals are put forth for the introduction of compulsory regulations governing the employment of agricultural machinery (*Ibid*) Large scale machine production in agriculture, as in industry, imperatively gives rise to the demand for the public supervision and regulation of production. We will deal below with the attempts that have been made to introduce such supervision.

In conclusion we will note the extreme inconsistency in the attitude of the Narodniki toward the question of the employment of machinery in agriculture. To admit the usefulness and progressive character of the employment of machinery, to defend all measures directed toward developing and facilitating it, and at the same time to ignore the fact that machinery in Russian agriculture is employed in a capitalist manner means to sink to the point of view of the small and big agrarians. And our Narodniki do ignore the capitalist character of the employment of agricultural machinery and improved implements and do not even attempt to analyse what type of peasant and landlord introduce machines on their farms. Mr VV angrily calls Mr V Chernayev "a representative of capitalist technique" (*Progressive Tendencies*, p 11) Perhaps Mr V Chernayev, or some other official in the Ministry for Agriculture is to blame for the fact that machinery in Russia is employed capitalistically! In spite of the grandiloquent promise "not to depart from the facts" (*Outlines*, chap XIV), Mr N—on preferred to ignore the fact that it is precisely capitalism that has developed the utilisation of machinery in our agriculture, and he invented the diverting theory according to which exchange reduces the productivity of labour in agriculture! (P 74) It is neither possible, nor is there any need to criticise this theory proclaimed without any analysis of the facts. We

will limit ourselves to giving a small sample of Mr N—on's reasoning

If the productivity of labour in Russia had doubled the price of a quarter of wheat would now be not twelve rubles, but six, and that is all there is to say about it." (P 234)

Not all, by any means, most worthy economist "In Russia" (as indeed in commodity society everywhere), only individual employers adopt a higher technique and only gradually is it adopted by the rest "In Russia," only the rural *entrepreneurs* are in a position to improve their technique "In Russia," this progress of the rural *entrepreneur*, small and big, is inseparably connected with the ruin of the peasantry and the creation of a rural proletariat Therefore, if the higher level of the technique of farming employed among rural *entrepreneurs* became socially necessary (and only under such circumstances would the price be reduced by half), this would mean that almost the whole of agriculture had passed into the hands of capitalists, it would mean the complete proletarianisation of millions of peasants, it would mean an enormous growth in the non agricultural population and an increase in the number of factories (in order that the productivity of labour in our agriculture may be doubled, an enormous development is required in the engineering industry, mining industry, steam transport, the construction of a mass of new types of farm buildings, granaries, warehouses, canals, etc , etc) Mr N—on here repeats the little error that he usually commits in his reasoning he skips the consecutive steps that are necessary in the development of capitalism he skips over the intricate complex of social-economic changes which inevitably accompany the development of capitalism, and then mourns and weeps over the danger of capitalist "drastic changes"

IX WAGE LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE

We now come to the principal manifestation of agricultural capitalism—to the employment of free wage labour This feature of post Reform economy has become most strongly revealed in the southern and eastern regions of European Russia and has

manifested itself in that mass migration of agricultural wage labourers which became known as the "agricultural migration." For that reason we will first quote facts concerning this main region of agricultural capitalism in Russia and then examine the data concerning the whole of Russia

The enormous migration of our peasants in search of work for wages was noted long ago in our literature. Reference was already made to it by Flerovsky (*Conditions of the Working Class in Russia*, St Petersburg, 1869), who tried to determine the extent to which this was spread in the various gubernias. In 1875, Chaslavsky gave a general review of "agricultural migratory trades" (*Compilation of Political Knowledge*, Vol II) and noted its real significance ("there was formed something in the nature of a semi vagrant population something in the nature of future agricultural labourers"). In 1887, Mr Raspopin summed up a number of Zemstvo statistics on this phenomenon and regarded it not as peasants seeking "earnings" in general, but as the process of formation of a class of wage labourers in agriculture. In the 'nineties, the works of S Korolenko, Rudnyev, Tezya kov, Kudryavtsev and Shakhovsky appeared, thanks to whom this phenomenon was studied incomparably more fully.

The regions to which the agricultural wage labourers mainly migrated were the Bessarabia, Kherson, Taurida, Ekaterinoslav, Don, Samara, Saratov (southern part) and Oienburg Gubernias. We are limiting ourselves to European Russia, but it must be observed that the movement is spreading ever wider (especially in recent times), and is reaching the North Caucasus and the Ural regions, etc. Statistics on capitalist agriculture in that region (of merchant grain farming) will be given in the next chapter, there, also, we will note other places to which agricultural labourers migrate. The principal regions from which agricultural labourers migrate are the midland Black Earth gubernias: the Kazan, Simbirsk, Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Tula, Orel, Kursk, Voronezh, Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev, Podolsk and Volynia Gubernias.¹ Thus the migration of workers proceeds from the most

¹ In chap VIII, in examining the process of migration of wage workers in Russia as a whole, we describe in greater detail migration to various localities.

densely populated regions to the least populated regions which are being colonised, from the places where serfdom was most developed to those places where it was least developed¹, from the places where the labour rent (*otraboiki*) system was most developed to the places where the labour rent system was least developed and capitalism is most developed. Hence, the labourers are fleeing from "semi free" labour to free labour. It would be a mistake to think that this flight reduces itself entirely to migration from the more densely populated regions to the sparsely populated regions. A study of the migration of workers (Mr S. Korolenko, *loc. cit.*) has revealed the peculiar and important fact that the migration of workers from many localities is so great that a shortage of labourers is created in those districts, which is made good by the immigration of labourers from other districts. Hence, the migration of labourers not only expresses a striving on the part of the population to spread itself more evenly over the given territory, but it also expresses a striving on the part of the labourers to go where better conditions prevail. We will fully appreciate this striving if we recall the fact that wages in the districts from which migration proceeds—the *otraboiki* districts—are particularly low, and that districts to which migration takes place, the capitalist districts, wages are incomparably higher².

As for the dimensions of "agricultural migration," general data is available only in the above mentioned work of S. Korolenko, who calculates the surplus of labourers (relative to the local demand) at 6,360,000 for the whole of Russia, of which 2,137,000 are in the above enumerated 15 gubernias from which migration takes place. On the other hand, in the eight gubernias to which migration takes place he calculates that there is a shortage of 2,173,000 labourers. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr S. Korolenko's methods of calculation are not always satisfactory, the general conclusions he draws (as we shall see below) must

¹ Chaslavsky has already pointed out that in those places to which migration takes place the serfs represented from 4 to 15 per cent and in those places from which migration takes place they represented from 40 to 60 per cent.

² See table of figures for ten years in chap. VIII, sec. 4, the formation of an internal market for labour power.

be regarded as approximately correct, and the number of migrant workers he gives is not only not exaggerated, but rather an under estimation of the facts. There can be no doubt that of these two million workers who migrate to the South, part are non agricultural workers. But Mr Shakhovsky (*l.c.*) quite arbitrarily, at random, calculates that half this number are industrial workers. First of all we know from all sources that it is *mainly* agricultural labourers who migrate to that region and, secondly, the agricultural labourers do not migrate from the above enumerated gubernias only. Mr Shakhovsky himself quotes a figure which confirms Mr S Korolenko's calculations. He states that in the eleven gubernias of the Black Earth Belt (which were included in the above list of gubernias from which migration takes place), 2,000,703 passports and identity certificates were issued in 1891 (*l.c.*, p 24), whereas, according to Mr S Korolenko's calculations only 1,745,913 labourers left those gubernias. Consequently, Mr S Korolenko's figures are not in the least exaggerated and apparently, the total number of migrant agricultural labourers in Russia must be more than two million.¹ The fact that such a vast number of "peasants" abandon their houses and allotments (that is, those who have houses and allotments) strikingly reveals the enormous process of transformation of the small farmers into rural proletarians, it reveals the enormous demand growing agricultural capitalism is creating for wage labour.

¹ There is another method of testing Mr S Korolenko's figures. We learn from the above mentioned works of Messrs. Tezyakov and Kudryavtsev that the agricultural labourers who in their travels in search of 'earnings' travel at least part of the way by railway represent one tenth of the total (combining the figures given by both authors we get the result that of a total of 72,635 labourers questioned only 7,827 travelled at least part of the way by railway). And yet the total number of labourers, who, in 1891, travelled by the three main railways in the direction we are concerned with, does not exceed 200,000 (170,000 to 189,000)—according to Mr Shakhovsky (*l.c.* p 71, according to railway returns.) Consequently the total number of labourers who migrated to the South in search of work should be about two million. Incidentally, the insignificant number of workers who travel by railway proves that Mr N—on is mistaken when he assumes that it is the agricultural labourers who provide the bulk of our railway passenger traffic. Mr N—on lost sight of the fact that the non agricultural labourer receives higher wages and can therefore better afford to travel by railway and, moreover these workers (for example, builders, navvies, dock workers), also go out to work in the spring and summer seasons.

The question now arises, what is the number of rural wage labourers in European Russia, both migrant and settled? The only attempt to reply to this question that we know of is that made in Mr Rudnyev's work, *Peasant Trades in European Russia* (*Journal of the Saratov Zemstvo*, 1894, Nos 6 and 11) This extremely valuable work gives a summary of the Zemstvo statistical returns for 148 uyezds in 19 gubernias of European Russia The total number of those engaged in "trades" is estimated at 2,798,122 out of 5,129,863 male workers (18 to 60 years of age), i.e., 55 per cent of the total number of peasant workers¹ The author placed in the category of "agricultural trades" only agricultural labourers working for hire (labourers, day labourers, shepherds, cow herds) In determining the percentage of agricultural labourers to the total number of males of working age in the various gubernias and districts of Russia, the author arrived at the conclusion that, in the Black Earth Belt, about 25 per cent of all the male workers are engaged in agricultural work for hire and in the non Black Earth districts, about 10 per cent are so engaged This gives the number of agricultural labourers in European Russia as 3,395,000, or, in round numbers, three and a half million (Rudnyev, *loc. cit.* p 448 This represents about 20 per cent of the total number of males of working age) It must be observed in this connection that, according to Mr Rudnyev,

'day labourers and those working on agricultural labour at piece rates were recorded in the statistics only in those cases when this occupation was the chief occupation of the given person or the given family' (Lc, p 446)

Mr Rudnyev's figure should be regarded as the minimum,

¹ As Mr Rudnyev points out, by "trades" is meant all peasant occupations except farm work on the peasant's own, purchased or rented land Undoubtedly, the majority of those engaged in 'trades' are wage labourers in agriculture or in industry We therefore call the reader's attention to the fact that these figures are very close to our estimate of the number of the rural proletariat in chap II we calculated that the latter represent 40 per cent of the peasantry Here we see the estimate of 55 per cent engaged in "trades," of which, in all probability, 40 per cent are engaged in various occupations for hire.

² This figure does not include, therefore, the mass of peasants for whom agricultural labour for hire represents, not the chief, but a no less important occupation than working on their own farms

firstly, because the returns of the Zemstvo census are more or less obsolete, as they refer to the 'eighties and even to the 'seventies and secondly, because in arriving at the percentage of agricultural labourers, no account was taken of the districts where capitalist agriculture is highly developed—the Baltic and Western gubernias. For lack of other figures, we are obliged to take this figure of three and a half million.

It appears, therefore, that about *one fifth* of the peasantry are already in the position in which their "chief occupation" is that of wage labourers working for rich peasants and landlords. We see here the first group of *entrepreneurs* who create a demand for the labour power of the rural proletariat. These are rural *entrepreneurs* who employ about *half* of the lower group of the peasantry. Thus, there is complete interdependence between the formation of a class of rural *entrepreneurs* and the growth of the lower group of the "peasantry," i.e., the growth in the number of rural proletarians. Among these rural *entrepreneurs* an important role is played by the peasant bourgeoisie, for example, in nine uyezds in the Voronezh Gubernia, 43.4 per cent of the total number of agricultural labourers are employed by peasants (Rudnyev, p. 434). If we take this percentage as the standard for all rural labourers and for the whole of Russia, we will find that the peasant bourgeoisie create a demand for a million and a half agricultural labourers. The very same "peasantry" throw on to the market millions of labourers seeking employment—and create an imposing demand for wage labourers.

X. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WAGE LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE

We will now try to depict the main features of the new social relationships that have sprung up in agriculture with the employment of free wage labour, and to define their significance.

The agricultural labourers who migrate to the South in such large numbers belong to the poorest strata of the peasantry. Of the labourers who migrate to the Kherson Gubernia, seven tenths go on foot, as they have not the means to pay their fare, "they tramp for hundreds and thousands of versts along the railway,

track and the banks of navigable rivers and admire the pleasing picture of rapidly moving trains and smoothly sailing ships" (Tezyakov, p. 35) On the average, the labourer takes with him about two rubles¹, not infrequently, they have not enough money to pay for the passport, and they pay ten kopeks for a monthly identity certificate. The journey takes from 10 to 12 days and after such a long tramp (sometimes barefooted in the cold spring mud), the feet of the pedestrians swell and become calloused and bruised. About one tenth of these labourers travel in *dubi* (large boats made from rough boards, holding from 50 to 80 persons, usually packed to the utmost). The reports of an official commission (The Zvegintsev Commission) note the danger of this form of travel.

"Not a year passes but that one two or even more of those overcrowded *dubi* go to the bottom with their passengers" (*Ibid.* p. 31). The overwhelming majority of the labourers own allotments, but of insignificant dimensions.

"As a matter of fact," observes Mr. Tezyakov quite justly, "these thousands of agricultural labourers are landless rural proletarians, for whom migratory trades are the only means of livelihood. Divorcement from the land is growing rapidly and at the same time is increasing the number of the agricultural proletariat" (P. 77).

Striking confirmation of the rapidity of this growth is the number of worker novices, i.e., those who are seeking labour for hire for the first time. These novices represent about thirty per cent. Incidentally, this figure enables us to judge the rapidity of the process of formation of cadres of *permanent* agricultural labourers.

The mass migration of labourers has given rise to special forms of hire which are peculiar to highly developed capitalism. In the South and Southeast, numerous labour markets have arisen where thousands of labourers gather and where employers come. These markets are usually held in towns, industrial centres, trading villages and fairs. The industrial character of the centre usually attracts the labourers who will accept employment even on non agricultural work. For example, in the Kiev Gubernia, labour

¹ Money for the journey is obtained by selling something, even household things by mortgaging the allotment by pawning things—clothes, etc. and even by borrowing money to be repaid in labour "from the poorest, the landlord and the local kulaks." (Shakhovsky, p. 55)

markets are held in Shipola and Smela (large centres of the beet sugar industry), and in the town of Belaya Tserkov. In the Kher son gubernia, labour markets are held in the trading villages (Novo Ukrainka, Birzula, Mostovoye, where on Sundays more than 9,000 workers gather, and many other villages), on railway stations (Znamenka, Dolinskaya, etc.), and in towns (Elizavet grad, Bobrinetz, Voznesensk, Odessa, etc.). In the summer, the citizens, labourers and "cadets" (the local name for tramps) of Odessa also come to be hired for agricultural work. In Odessa the agricultural labourers gather to be hired on the so called Serebinskaya Square (or "Kosarka"). "The labourers head for Odessa and avoid other markets in the hope that they will get a higher wage there" (Tezyakov, p. 58). The hamlet of Krivoy Rog is an important market where labourers are hired for agricultural and mining work. In the Taurida Gubernia, the principal labour market is held in Little Kakhovka where formerly 40,000 labourers gathered, in the 'nineties, twenty to thirty thousand gathered, but now, judging by certain statistics, the number is still less. In the Bessarabia Gubernia, the town of Akerman, in the Ekaterinoslav Gubernia, the town of Ekaterinoslav and Lozovaya Station, in the Don Gubernia, Rostov on Don—where every year up to 150,000 labourers gather, in the North Caucasus, the towns of Ekaterinodar and Novorossisk, Tikhoretsk Station and other places, in the Samara Gubernia, the village of Pokrovskaya (opposite Samara), Balakovo and other places, in the Saratov Gubernia, the towns of Khvalynsk and Volsk, in the Simbirsk Gubernia, the town of Syzran—serve as labour markets. Thus, capitalism has created in the outlying districts a new form of "combining agriculture with trades" namely, the combination of agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour. Such a combination is possible on a wide scale only in the epoch of the last and highest stage of capitalism—large scale machine industry which diminishes the significance of skill, of "handicraft," facilitates the transition from one occupation to another and levels the forms of hire.¹

¹ Mr. Shakhovsky mentions another form of the combination of agricultural with non-agricultural labour. Thousands of rafts float down the

Indeed, the forms of hire in this locality are very peculiar and very characteristic of capitalist agriculture. All the semi-patriarchal and semi-bondage forms of wage labour which one so frequently meets in the Central Black Earth Belt disappear here. The only relationship left is that between wage worker and employer, a commercial transaction for the sale and purchase of labour power. As is always the case in developed capitalist relationships, the workers prefer to work by the day, or by the week, which enables them to regulate the price of their labour more exactly according to the demand for labour.

'The price is fixed for the area of each bazaar (a radius of 40 versts) with mathematical precision, and it is very hard for the employer to beat the price down because the muzhik who has come to the market prefers to wait or to go on to another place rather than accept work at a lower price" (Shakhovsky, p. 104)

It goes without saying that extreme fluctuations in the price of labour cause frequent breaches of contract—only, this does not occur on one side alone, as the employers usually say, but on both sides ("strikes take place on both sides"), the labourers agree among themselves to demand more and the employers—to offer less¹ (*Ibid.*, p. 107). To what extent "callous cash payment" openly prevails here in the relations between classes may be seen for example from the following fact: "an experienced employer knows very well" that the workers will "give in" only when they have eaten all their bread.

'An employer related that he came to market one day to hire labourers. He walked between their ranks touching their bags in

river Dnieper to the towns lower down. On every raft there are 15 to 20 workers (craftsmen), mainly White Russians and Great Russians from Orel Gubernia. For the whole of the voyage they get literally only a few kopecks; their concern is to get to the place where they can get work on reaping or threshing. These hopes are rewarded only in "good" years.

¹ "At harvest time in a good year the labourer triumphs and it costs a great deal of effort to get him to yield. He is offered a price but he refuses to accept and keeps repeating: 'give me what I ask, otherwise I will not go.' And this is not because there is a shortage of workers, but as the workers say, 'this is our turn'" (Reported by a *volost* clerk, Shakhovsky, p. 125).

If the crop is a bad one and the price of labour has fallen the kulak employer takes advantage of this and discharges the labourer before the expiration of the contract and the labourer loses the season either in seeking for work in the same district or in wandering further afield, confesses a landlord correspondent (*Ibid.*, p. 132).

which they carried their food, with his stick (*sic!*) if they had bread in their bags he would not talk with them, he would leave the bazaar" and wait 'until empty food bags appeared at the bazaar' (From *Selski Vestnik*,¹ 1890, No 15, *ibid*, pp 107-08)

As under developed capitalism everywhere, so here, it is observed that small capital oppresses the worker particularly. Sheer commercial considerations² restrain the big employer from petty tyranny which brings little profit and which causes considerable loss if conflicts break out. For that reason, a big employer (for example, one who employs from 300 to 800 workers) strives to prevent his labourers from leaving at the end of the week and he himself fixes the price according to the demand on the market, some even adopt the system of increasing the price if the price in the area has risen—and all evidence goes to show that this extra outlay is more than compensated for by better work and the absence of conflicts (*Ibid*, pp 130-32, p 104). On the other hand, a small employer has no scruples.

"The muzhuk farmers and German colonists³ carefully select their labourers—pay them 15 to 20 per cent more than the price prevailing on the big landlord farms, but the amount of work they 'squeeze out of their labourers—is fifty per cent more' (*Ibid*, p 116).

The "girls" employed by such employers, as the girls put it, "do not know day from night." The colonists who hire mowers compel their sons to *take turns* to set the pace for the workers (*i.e.* to speed them up!), the sons change shift three times a day and so each comes fresh and rested to continue to drive the hired labourers "and that is why it is so easy to recognise a labourer employed by the German colonists by their exhausted appearance." Generally speaking, the muzhik farmers and German colonists avoid hiring labourers formerly employed on big landlord estates. "You will not be able to stand the pace," they say, quite frankly* (*Ibid*).

¹ *Rural Messenger—Ed Eng. ed.*

² Cf. Engels, *The Housing Question*, Preface—*Ed.*

³ On the Volga and certain other parts of Russia there were colonies of German farmers, most of them well to do, whose ancestors were given land by Katherine the Great.—*Ed Eng. ed.*

⁴ The same characteristics are displayed by the "Cossacks" in the Kuban Region. 'The Cossack resorts to every trick imaginable to reduce the price for labour, acting individually or as a whole commune' (*sic!*)

Large scale machine industry, concentrating large masses of workers together, transforming the methods of production, destroying all the traditional, patriarchal cloaks and screens which obscure the relationships between classes, always leads to the concentration of public attention upon these relationships and to attempts at public control and regulation. This phenomenon, which has found particularly striking expression in the system of factory inspection, is beginning to be observed in Russian capitalist agriculture, precisely in the district where it is most developed. The question of the sanitary conditions of the workers was raised in the Kherson Gubernia as early as 1875 at the Second Gubernia Medical Congress of the Kherson Zemstvo and it was brought up again in 1888, in 1889 a programme for studying the conditions of the workers was drawn up. The sanitary investigation that was carried out (far from completely) in 1889-90 lifted a corner of the veil which concealed the conditions of labour in the remote villages. It revealed, for example, that in the majority of cases the labourers are not provided with living quarters, where barracks are provided they are usually in a very insanitary condition, "not infrequently" one comes across *dugouts*, these are inhabited by shepherds who suffer very much from the dampness, overcrowding, cold, darkness and the stifling atmosphere. The food provided is very frequently unsatisfactory. The working day, as a rule, lasts from twelve and a half to fifteen hours, i.e., much longer than the usual working day in large scale industry (11 to 12 hours). The practice of stopping work during the hottest part of the day is met with only "as an exception"—and cases of affections of the brain are not rare. Work with machines creates division of labour into occupations, and occupational diseases. For example "drummers" are employed on threshing machines (they put the sheaves into the drum, the work is very dangerous

what a pity it is that we have not more detailed information about this new function of the commune!'), 'cutting down the food increasing the tasks, docking part of the pay when the labourer leaves, retaining the labourer's passport, passing public resolutions prohibiting employers from paying labourers more than a certain price under penalty of a fine etc.' (*Migratory Workers in the Kuban*, A Beloborodov in *Severni Vestnik*, February, 1896, p. 5.)

and most laborious, thick vegetable dust beats into the faces of the labourers), "pitchers" (they pitch the sheaves up to the threshers, the work is so laborious that the shifts have to be changed every hour or two) Women sweep up the straw which boys carry to the side while three to five labourers stack it in ricks The number employed on threshing in the whole gubernia must exceed 200,000¹ (Tezyakov, p. 94) In regard to the sanitary conditions of agricultural work, Mr Tezyakov says the following

Generally speaking at the present time, when the spirit of capitalism reigns in agriculture the opinion of the ancients who say that the labour of the husbandman is the pleasantest and healthiest occupation' is hardly sound With the introduction of machinery in agriculture the sanitary conditions of agricultural labour have not improved on the contrary they have become worse. Machinery has introduced into the field of agriculture specialisation of labour which was little known in this field before and this has had the effect of developing among the rural population occupational diseases and a mass of serious traumatic injuries' (P. 94)

The result of the sanitary investigation (after the famine year and the cholera) was an attempt to organise medical and feeding depots, at which the labourers were to be registered, placed under sanitary supervision and provided with cheap dinners However modest the dimensions and results of this organisation, and however precarious its existence may be,² it remains an important historical fact which reveals the tendency of capitalism in agriculture On the basis of the data collected by doctors, it was proposed at the Medical Congress of the Kherson Gubernia to recognise the importance of medical and feeding depots and the necessity for improving their sanitary conditions, to extend their activities so as to give them the character of labour exchanges which should give information on the price of labour and its

¹ We will observe, in passing, that this operation threshing, is most frequently performed by free hired labourers. One can judge from this how large must be the number employed on threshing over the whole of Russia'

² Of the six uyezd Zemstvo assemblies in the Kherson Gubernia, which as Mr Tezyakov informs us, discussed the question of organising supervision over the labourers, four voted in opposition to this system The local land lords accused the gubernia Zemstvo administration of 'mollycoddling the labourers,' etc

fluctuations, to introduce sanitary inspection in all more or less large farms employing a considerable number of labourers, "in the same way as is done in industrial enterprises" (p 155), to issue compulsory regulations governing the employment of agricultural machinery and making it compulsory to register accidents, to raise the questions of the right of labourers to receive compensation and of the improvement and cheapening of steam transport. The Fifth Russian Medical Congress passed a resolution calling the attention of the Zemstvo which are interested to the activity of the Kherson Zemstvo in organising medical and sanitary inspection

In conclusion, we will revert once again to the Narodnik economists. Above we saw that they idealised the labour rent system and closed their eyes to the progressive nature of capitalism in comparison with the former system. Now we must add that they are opposed to labourers "migrating" and favour local "earnings." This is how, for example, Mr N—on expresses this usual Narodnik point of view:

"The peasant goes off in quest of work. The question arises, what advantage is there in this from the economic point of view? Not from the point of view of the personal advantage of each individual peasant, but from the point of view of the national economic advantage of the peasantry as a whole? We wish to point to the purely economic disadvantage of the annual migration, God knows where to for the whole of the summer when it would seem that plenty of employment could be obtained at home." (Pp 23-24)

In spite of the Narodnik theory, we assert that the "migration" of the labourers is not only advantageous from the "purely economic" point of view to the labourer himself, but generally speaking, should be regarded as a progressive phenomenon. Public attention should be drawn, not towards substituting "employment at home" for migratory occupations, but, on the contrary, towards removing all the obstacles that stand in the way of migration, towards facilitating it in every possible way, towards cheapening and improving all the conditions of the labourers' travel, etc. The basis of our assertion is the following:

1) "Migration" brings "purely economic" benefits to the labourers because the latter go to places where higher wages are

paid, where their position as wage workers is better. Simple as this argument is, it is usually forgotten by those who love to rise to a higher, alleged, "national economic" point of view.

2) "Migration" destroys bondage forms of hire and the labour rent system.

We will recall the fact, for example, that formerly, when migration was weakly developed, the southern landowners (and other *entrepreneurs*) freely resorted to the following system of hiring labourers: they sent their agents to the northern gubernias and (through the medium of the rural authorities) hired labourers who had fallen into arrears with their taxes, on terms that were very disadvantageous to the latter.¹ The employer, therefore, enjoyed the advantages of free competition, but the labourer did not. We have already quoted examples of how the peasants are ready to flee from the labour rent system and bondage even into the mines.

It is not surprising, therefore, that on the question of "migration" our agrarians march hand in hand with the Narodniki. Take Mr S Korolenko, for example. In his book he quotes numerous expressions of opinion on the part of landlords in opposition to "migration," he quotes a mass of "arguments" against "migratory occupations", "dissipation," "turbulent morals," "drunkenness," "lack of conscientiousness," "striving to leave the family in order to get rid of the family and escape the supervision of parents," "desire for diversion and a life of greater pleasure," etc. But here is a particularly interesting argument: "Finally, as the proverb says 'even a stone at rest gathers moss,' and a man who stays in one place will certainly accumulate property and cherish it" (*Lc*, p. 84). The proverb does indeed strikingly indicate what happens to a man who is tied to one place.² Mr S Korolenko is particularly displeased with the phenomenon we referred to above, namely, that "too many" labourers leave certain gubernias and the shortage thus created is made good

¹ Shakhovsky, *l.c.*, p. 89 *et sup*. The author even quotes the "fees" paid to the clerks and village elders when advantageous contracts are made with the peasants. Tezyakov *l.c.* p. 65. Trirogov: *The Village Commune and Taxes*, article entitled *Bondage in National Economy*.

² *I.e.*, He becomes moss grown.—*Ed., Eng. ed.*

by labourers arriving from other gubernias. In noting this fact in connection with the Voronezh Gubernia, for example, Mr S Korolenko points to one of the reasons for this, namely, the large number of peasants who own "granted" allotments.

'Evidently such peasants who are in a relatively worse economic position and who are not worried about losing their tiny plot of land, frequently fail to carry out the obligations they have undertaken and, generally speaking, very light heartedly go to other gubernias when they could find plenty of employment at home.

Such peasants little attached (*sic*!) to their own inadequate allotment, and sometimes not even possessing implements lightly abandon their homes and go to seek their fortunes far from their native villages, not caring to seek employment in their native place and sometimes not even caring about the obligations they have undertaken, because in any case they own nothing and they cannot be made to pay' (*Ibid*).

'Little attached!' A perfect expression.

Those who talk about the disadvantages of "migration" and about preference for employment "at home" would do well to ponder over it!¹

3) "Migration" means mobility of the population. Migration is one of the most important factors which prevent the peasants from "gathering moss," of which history has gathered too much for them already. Unless the population becomes mobile it can not develop and it would be foolish to think that the village school can give the people what they can learn from their independent experience of various relationships and conditions, both in the South and the North, in agriculture and in industry, in the metropolis and in the remote provinces.

¹Here is another example of the pernicious influence of Narodnik prejudices. Mr Tezyakov whose excellent work we have frequently quoted, notes the fact that many labourers from the Kherson Gubernia migrate to the Taurida Gubernia, although there is a great shortage of labour in the former gubernia. He refers to this as 'an extremely queer phenomenon: "there is a loss to the employers and a loss to the labourers who abandon their work at home and take the risk of not finding employment in Taurida" (P. 33). We, on the contrary, think that Mr Tezyakov's statement is extremely queer. Does he think that the labourer does not understand what is good for him and has he not the right to seek for the best possible conditions of employment he can find? (In the Taurida Gubernia the wages of agricultural labourers are higher than in the Kherson Gubernia.) Must we really think that the muzhik must live and work in the place he is registered and "has an allotment"?

EXCERPT FROM CHAPTER IV

THE GROWTH OF COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE

IX CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE

IN chapters II-IV the question of capitalism in Russian agriculture was examined from two angles. First we examined the given system of social-economic relationships in peasant and landlord economy, the system which developed in the post-Reform epoch. We found that the peasantry was very rapidly being split up into a numerically small but economically powerful rural bourgeoisie on the one hand, and into a rural proletariat on the other. Inseparably connected with this process of "unpeasantising" is the transition of the landlords from the labour-rent system of economy to the capitalist system. Then we examined this very process from another angle: we took as our starting point the manner in which agriculture is being transformed into commodity production, and examined the social and economic relationships which are characteristic of every main form of commercial agriculture. We found that through all the variety of agricultural conditions the same processes run like a thread in both peasant and landlord economy.

We will now examine the conclusions that follow from all the data given above.

1. The main feature of the post-Reform evolution of agriculture is that it is more and more assuming a commercial, *entrepreneur* character. In regard to private landlord farming, this fact is so obvious that it does not require any special explanation. In regard to peasant farming, however, this fact is not so easily established, firstly, because the employment of wage labour is not an absolutely essential symptom of the small rural bourgeoisie. As we have already observed above, all small commodity pro-

ducers who cover their expenditure by their independent husbandry come under this category, provided the general system of economy is based on the capitalist contradictions that were examined in chapter II.¹ Secondly, the small, rural bourgeois (in Russia, as in other capitalist countries) combines—by a number of transitional stages—with the “peasant” who owns a tiny plot of land, and with the rural proletarian who owns a small allotment. This circumstance is one of the reasons why the theories which draw no distinctions between the rural bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat among the “peasantry” are so tenacious.

2 Owing to its very nature, the transformation of agriculture into commodity production takes place in a special manner which differs from that process in industry. Manufacturing industry is split up into a number of quite independent branches which are engaged exclusively in the manufacture of a single product or part of a product. The agricultural industry, however, is not split up into quite separate branches, but merely specialises in one market product in one case, or another market product in another case, and all the other sides of agriculture are adapted to the principal (*i.e.*, market) product. For that reason, the forms of commercial agriculture are distinguished for their great variety, which assume different forms not only in different districts, but also in different farms. That is why, in examining the question of the growth of commercial agriculture, we must not on any account restrict ourselves to general data covering agriculture as a whole.²

¹ Cf. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Vol. III, pp. 43-136.—Ed.

² Incidentally, the favourite postulate of the Narodnik economists that “Russian peasant economy is in the majority of cases purely natural self-sufficing economy,” is based on the ignoring of this circumstance (Cf. *Influence of Harvests on Grain Prices*, I, p. 52.) All one has to do is to take “average” figures which merge the rural bourgeoisie with the rural proletariat—and this postulate can be taken as proved!

³ This is precisely the kind of data the authors of the work referred to in the preceding footnote confine themselves to when they speak of the “peasantry.” They assume that every peasant sows *the very grain* that he consumes, that he sows *all* the kinds of grain that he consumes and that he sows them *exactly in the proportions* that he consumes them. It does not require very much effort to draw the “conclusion” from such “assumptions” (which contradict the facts and ignore the main feature of the post-*Reform* epoch) that natural self-sufficing economy predominates. In Narodnik

3 The growth of commercial agriculture creates a home market for capitalism. Firstly, specialisation in agriculture gives rise to exchange between the various agricultural districts, between the various types of agricultural economies and between the various kinds of agricultural produce. Secondly, the more agriculture is drawn into the sphere of commodity circulation the more rapid is the growth of the demand of the rural population for the products of the manufacturing industries which meet the requirements of personal use, thirdly, the more rapid is the growth in the demand for means of production, for neither the small nor the big rural *entrepreneur* can carry on the new, commercial agriculture with the aid of ancient "peasant" implements, buildings, etc., etc. Fourthly and finally, the demand is created for labour power, because the rise of a petty rural bourgeoisie, and the transition of the landlords to the capitalist mode of production presupposes the rise of a contingent of agricultural labourers and day labourers. The fact that the post Reform epoch is characterised by the expansion of the home market for capitalism (the development of capitalist agriculture, the development of factory industry generally, the development of the agricultural machine industry in particular, the development of so called peasant "agricultural" trades, i.e., working for hire, etc.) can only be explained by the growth of commercial farming.

4 Capitalism to an enormous degree expands and intensifies among the agricultural population the antagonisms without which that mode of production cannot exist at all. Notwithstanding this, however, agricultural capitalism in Russia, in its historical significance, is a powerful progressive factor. Firstly, capitalism has transformed the landowning "lord of the manor" as well as the patriarchal peasant into the same type of *trader* as are all masters in modern society. Before capitalism came on the scene, agriculture in Russia was a gentleman's occupation, an aristocratic hobby for

literature one may also come across the following ingenious method of argument: every separate form of commercial farming is an "exception" to agriculture as a whole. Therefore all commercial farming generally should be regarded as an exception, the general rule should be taken to be self-sufficing economy! In college textbooks on logic, one will find many similar examples of such reasoning in the part dealing with sophistry.

some—and a burdensome duty for others, hence, it could not be conducted in any other way except by methods of ancient routine, and it necessarily determined that complete isolation of agriculture from all that went on in the world outside of the confines of the village. The labour rent system—that living survival of antiquity in modern economy—strikingly confirms the correctness of this characterisation. Capitalism for the first time broke down the estate¹ system in land tenure and converted the land into a commodity. The farmer's product was put on sale and began to be subjected to social accounting—first on the local then on the national, and finally on the international market, and in this way the former isolation of the uncouth husbandman from the rest of the world was broken down completely. Willy nilly, the farmer was compelled by the threat of ruin to reckon with the whole complex of social relationships in his own country and in other countries connected with the world market. Even the labour rent system, which formerly guaranteed Oblomov an assured income without his taking any risk, without any expenditure of capital, without any changes in the ancient routine of production, proved incapable of saving him from the competition of the American farmer. That is why we can say in regard to post Reform Russia what was said half a century ago in regard to Western Europe, namely, that agricultural capitalism was “the driving force which dragged the idyll into historical motion”².

¹ Or orders—*Ed Eng ed*

² A character in one of Goncharov's novels. A typical idle, indolent landlord of that period—*Ed Eng ed*

³ *Misère de la Philosophie* [*Poverty of Philosophy*] (Paris 1896 p 223), the author [Karl Marx—*Ed Eng ed*] contemptuously described the longings of those who desired a return to the good old patriarchal life of simple morals, etc. who condemned the “subordination of the land to the same laws that governed all other industries,” as reactionary jeremiads.

We quite understand that to the Narodniki the whole of the argument given in the text may not only seem unconvincing but may even appear to be inexplicable. But it would be too ungrateful a task to analyse such opinions for example, as that the mobilisation of the land is—an abnormal phenomenon (Mr Chuprov, in the debate on grain prices, p 39, stenographic report) that the inalienability of the peasants' allotments is an institution that may be advocated, that the labour rent system is better or at all events is not worse than the capitalist system etc. All that which has been explained above refutes the political economic arguments brought forward by the Narodniki in defence of their opinion.

Secondly, agricultural capitalism for the first time put an end to the age long stagnation in our agriculture, gave a tremendous impetus to the transformation of its technique and to the development of the productive forces of social labour. A few decades of capitalist "change have done more than whole centuries of preceding history. Monotonous, routine natural, self-sufficing economy has given way to diversified forms of commercial agriculture. Primitive agricultural implements have begun to give way to perfected implements and machines, the immobility of ancient systems of husbandry was undermined by new methods of agriculture. The process of all these changes is inseparably linked up with the above mentioned phenomenon of specialisation in agriculture. By its very nature, capitalism in agriculture (as in industry) cannot develop evenly: it pushes to the front in one place (in one country, in one district, on a certain farm) one side of agriculture, in another place it pushes to the front another, etc. In one case it changes the technique of certain agricultural operations, in other cases it changes other operations, and breaks them away from patriarchal peasant economy and from the patriarchal labour rent system. In view of the fact that the whole of this process takes place under the guidance of the capricious demands of the market which are not always known to the producer, capitalist agriculture, in each separate case (not infrequently in each separate district, sometimes even in each separate country), becomes more and more one-sided compared with previous agriculture, but, taken as a whole, it becomes immeasurably more many-sided and rational than patriarchal agriculture. The rise of special forms of commercial agriculture makes capitalist crises possible and inevitable in agriculture in the event of capitalist overproduction, but these crises (like capitalist crises in general) give a still more powerful impetus to the development of world production and to the socialisation of labour.¹

Thirdly, capitalism for the first time created large scale agri-

¹ West European romanticists and Russian Narodniki lay strong emphasis on this process, on the one-sidedness of capitalist agriculture, on the metal-bility and crises created by capitalism—and on these grounds deny the progressive character of capitalist progress compared with pre-capitalist stagnation.

cultural production in Russia based on the employment of machinery and the wide co operation of workers Before capitalism, the production of agricultural produce was carried on in an invariable, miserable, petty form, when the peasant worked for himself as well as when he worked for the landlord—and the “commune” character of agriculture was totally unable to put an end to this enormous fragmentation of production Inseparably connected with the fragmentation of production was the isolation of the producers themselves¹ Tied to their allotment, to their tiny “commune,” they were sharply isolated even from the peasants in the neighbouring village commune by the various categories to which they respectively belonged (former owners, former state, etc.), by the different sizes of their land holdings—differences in the conditions under which they were emancipated (and these conditions were sometimes determined by the individual character of the landlords and their caprices) Capitalism for the first time broke down these purely mediæval obstacles—and did a very good thing in doing so Already, the differences between the various categories of peasants, the difference in their categories according to the size of their allotment holdings, are

¹ Hence in spite of the difference in the forms of landownership, the same thing can be applied to the Russian peasant as was said about the small French peasant by Marx “The peasants who farm their own small holdings form the majority of the French population Throughout the country, they live in almost identical conditions, but enter very little into relationships one with another Their mode of production isolates them, instead of bringing them into mutual contact. The isolation is intensified by the inadequacy of the means of communication in France, and by the poverty of the peasants Their farms are so small that there is practically no scope for a division of labour, no opportunity for scientific agriculture. Among the peasantry, therefore, there can be no multiplicity of development, no differentiation of talents no wealth of social relationships Each family is almost self sufficient, producing on its own plot of land the greater part of its requirements, and thus providing itself with the necessities of life through an interchange with nature rather than by means of intercourse with society Here is a small plot of land, with a peasant farmer and his family, there is another plot of land, another peasant with his wife and children A score or two of these atoms make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of like entities, much as a sack of potatoes consists of a lot of potatoes huddled in a sack” (*Dér achtzente Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte*, Hamburg, 1885, pp 98-99)

proving to be incomparably less important than the economic difference within each category and within each village commune. Capitalism destroys local isolation and insularity, and in place of the petty mediæval division among the farmers it introduces division on a large scale, embracing the whole nation dividing them into classes which occupy different positions in the general system of capitalist economy.¹ Formerly, the very conditions of production determined the fact that the masses of tillers of the soil were tied down to their place of residence, but the rise of various forms and various districts of commercial and capitalist agriculture could not but give rise to the migration of enormous masses of the population over the whole country and without the mobility of the population (as has already been observed above) the development of its intelligence and initiative is impossible.

Fourthly and finally, agricultural capitalism in Russia for the first time uprooted the labour rent system and the personal dependence of the farmer. The labour rent system had undivided sway in our agriculture from the time of *Russkaya Pravda* right down to the contemporary system of *otrabotki*, under which the peasant tills the landlord's fields with his own implements, an inevitable accompaniment of this system was the wretchedness and ignorance of the tiller of the soil who is degraded, if not by the serf, then at all events by the "semi free" character of his labour, without a certain lack of civil rights on the part of the tiller of the soil (for example, belonging to the lower estate, corporal punishment, assignment for public work, being tied to his allotment, etc.), the *otrabotchni* system would have been impossible. Hence, by substituting freely hired labour for the *otrabotchni* system, agricultural capitalism in Russia has rendered a great historical service.² Summing up what has been said

¹ The need for union and amalgamation in capitalist society has not diminished but, on the contrary, has enormously increased. But it is absolutely absurd to use the old measure to satisfy this need of the new society. This new society now demands, firstly that the union shall not be local, according to estate and category, and, secondly, that its starting point shall be the difference in position and interest that has been created by capitalism and the disintegration of the peasantry.

² Of the numerous sighs and regrets expressed by Mr N—on concerning the changes being brought about by capitalism in Russia, one deserves

above about the progressive historical role of Russian agricultural capitalism, it may be said that it is socialising agricultural production. Indeed, the fact that agriculture has been transformed from a privileged occupation of the higher estates and a burden for the lower estate into an ordinary commercial and industrial occupation, the fact that the product of the labour of the tiller of the soil has become subject to social accounting on the market, the fact that monotonous, routine agriculture is being converted into technically transformed commercial agriculture with a variety of forms, the fact that local isolation and the separation among small tillers of the soil is being broken down, the fact that the various forms of bondage and personal dependence are being squeezed out by impersonal transactions in the purchase and sale of labour power—all these are links in the single process, which is socialising agricultural labour and are more and more intensifying the contradictions between the anarchy of market fluctuations, between the individual character of the separate agricultural enterprises and the collective character of large scale capitalist agriculture.

Thus (we repeat once more), in emphasising the progressive historical role of capitalism in Russian agriculture, we do not for a moment forget the historical transitional character of this regime or the profound social contradictions which are peculiar to it. On the contrary, we showed above that it is precisely the *Narodniki*, who are only capable of deploring the "changes" brought about by capitalism, who very superficially appraise these contradictions and gloss over the disintegration of the peasantry, ignore the capitalist character of the employment of machinery in our agriculture and thus cover up by phrases like "agricultural trades" or "earnings," the rise of a class of wage labourers.

special attention; "Neither the confusion that reigned in the period of the appanaged princes nor the reign of the Tartars affected the forms of our economic life" (*Outlines* p 284); capitalism alone has displayed "contempt for its own historical past" (P 283). Sacred truth! Capitalism is progressive precisely because it has displayed "contempt" for the "ancient" forms, "sanctified by age," of *otrabotka* and bondage which indeed, no political storm—from the "confusion of the appanaged princes" to the "Tartars"—could overthrow.

EXCERPT FROM CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE SCALE MACHINE INDUSTRY

I THE SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION OF THE FACTORY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "FACTORY" STATISTICS¹

PROCEEDING to deal with large scale machine (factory) industry, we must first of all establish the fact that the scientific conception of this industry by no means corresponds to the ordinary usually accepted meaning of the term. In our official statistics and in literature generally, a factory is taken to mean any more or less large industrial establishment employing a more or less considerable number of wage workers. According to the theory of Marx, however, the term, large scale machine (factory) industry, applies only to a definite and precisely to a higher stage of capitalism in industry. The principal and most important symptom of this stage is the employment of a system of machines in production.² The transition from manufacture to the factory marks a complete technical revolution which eliminates the age long skill of the handicraftsman, and this technical revolution is followed by an extremely sharp change in the social relations in production, by a final rupture between the various groups taking part in production, a complete rupture with tradition, the intensification and expansion of all the gloomy sides of capitalism and at the same time the mass socialisation of labour by capitalism. Thus large scale machine industry is the last word of capitalism, the last word of its negative and "positive" aspects.³

¹ Part I is here given in slightly abbreviated form—*Ed*
(*Capital* Vol I chap 13)

² *Ibid.*, p 499

From this it clearly follows that the transition from manufacture to the factory is particularly important in the question of the development of capitalism. Anyone who confuses these two stages deprives himself of the ability to understand the transforming and progressive role of capitalism. This is exactly the mistake that is committed by our Narodnik economists, who, as we have already seen, naively identify capitalism generally with "factory" industry and who believe that the problem of the "mission of capitalism" and even of its "significance as a combining factor"¹ can be solved by simple references to factory statistics. Quite apart from the fact that these writers have betrayed astonishing ignorance in matters of factory statistics (as we will show in detail below), their still graver error lies in their astonishingly stereotyped and narrow conception of the Marxian theory. In the first place, it is ridiculous to reduce the question of the development of large scale machine industry to a mere matter of factory statistics. This is not merely a matter of statistics but a question of the forms and stages which the development of capitalism in industry assumes in the given country. Only after the substance of these forms and of their distinguishing features have been made clear is there any sense in illustrating the development of this or that form by properly prepared statistics. If, however, we restrict ourselves exclusively to Russian statistics it will lead to the most varied forms of capitalism becoming confused, it will not be possible to see the wood for the trees. Secondly, to reduce the mission of capitalism to increasing the number of "factory" workers means to betray as profound an understanding of theory as was displayed by Mr Mikhailovsky who expressed surprise that people should talk about capitalism socialising labour when all that socialisation means is that several hundred or a thousand workers "saw, chop, cut, plane, etc., in one building!"²

¹ Mr N—on in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No 6 pp. 103 and 119 cf also his *Outlines*, and *The Destiny of Capitalism* by Mr V V., *passim*.

² *Otechestvennye Zapiski* [Home Notes], 1883, No 7, Letter to the editor by Mr Postoronnul.

V DOES THE NUMBER OF WORKERS IN BIG CAPITALIST ENTERPRISES INCREASE?

Having examined the statistics of the factory and mining industries we can now make an attempt to reply to the question which has engaged the attention of the Narodnik economists so much and to which they replied in the negative (Messrs V V, N—on, Karyshev and Kablukov asserted that the number of factory workers in Russia is growing—if it is growing at all—more slowly than the population) We must first of all observe that the question must either be is the commercial and industrial population increasing while the agricultural population is declining (we will deal with this below), or is the number of workers employed in large scale machine industry increasing? It cannot be asserted that the number of workers employed in small industrial establishments, or in manufacture, must increase under developing capitalism, for the factory is constantly squeezing out the more primitive forms of industry Our factory statistics, as was pointed out in detail above, does not always use the term, *factory*, in the scientific sense of the term

In order to examine the question that interests us, we must take, first, the returns of all industries, second, returns covering a long period of time Only if we do that will we be sure that the statistics are more or less comparable. We take 1865 and 1890, a twenty five year period of the post Reform epoch We will sum up the available statistical returns The factory statistics give the most complete information for 1865 and estimate that in European Russia there were 380,638 factory workers in all industries except distilling, brewing, beet sugar and tobacco¹ In order to determine the number of workers employed in these industries, we are obliged to take the only available data, and that is the *Military Statistical Abstract*, moreover, as has been pointed out above, these statistics must be corrected By adding the 127,935 workers

¹ Compiled Information and Materials of the Ministry of Finance, 1867 No. 6 It was pointed out above that for comparison with contemporary statistics only these sources should be taken, i.e., those of the Ministry of Finance

employed in the above enumerated industries,¹ we will get the total number of factory workers in European Russia in 1865 (employed in industries subject and not subject to excise duty) as 508,573.² The corresponding figure for 1890 will be 839,730.³ The increase of 65 per cent is considerably larger than the increase in the population. We must bear in mind, however, that the increase was ever so much larger than these figures show above we showed in detail that the factory statistics for the 1860's are exaggerated, as they include the small *kustar*, artisan and agricultural establishments and also workers working in their own homes. Unfortunately, we are unable to correct these figures completely, owing to the lack of the necessary data, and we would prefer to refrain from correcting them only in part, the more so that further on we will quote more exact figures of the number of workers employed in large factories.

We will now examine the mining statistics. The statistics for 1865 only give the figures of the number of workers employed in copper and iron mining and also in the gold and platinum fields, the figure for European Russia is 133,176.⁴ In 1890, the number of workers employed in these industries was 274,748,⁵ i.e. more

¹ The number of workers employed in the brewing industry is given as 6,825 these too are exaggerated, but no material is available with which to correct them, beet sugar industry, 68,334 (*Ministry of Finance Annual*) tobacco industry, 6,116 (corrected), and in the distilling industry, 46,660 (corrected).

² Mr Tugan Baranovsky quotes for 1866 the figure given by Mr Veshnyakov, 493,371 (*Fabrika* [*Factory*], p. 339). We do not know how this was arrived at, but the difference between it and the one we quote is very small.

³ According to *Index* for 1890. From the total of 875,764 it is necessary to subtract the number of workers which is repeated in the statistics of the mining industry, i.e., 291 in the production of asphalt, 3,468 in salt making and 32,275 in the production of rails.

⁴ For the number of mine workers in the 'sixties see *Statuscheski Vremennik* [*Statistical Times*], I, 1886, *The Ministry of Finance Annual*, I, *Statistical Abstract of the Mining Industry*, 1846-67, St. Petersburg, published by the Mining Science Committee.

⁵ *Abstract of Statistical Information on the Mining Industry for 1890*, St. Petersburg 1892. According to this the total is 342,166 in European Russia and if we subtract the number of workers employed in kerosene works (deducted by *Index*) and correct certain minor mistakes, the total will be 340,912.

than twice as many The latter figure represents 80.6 per cent of the total number of mine workers in European Russia in 1890, if we assume that these industries in 1865 also employed 80.6 per cent of the total mine workers,¹ then the total number of mine workers in 1865 will be 165,203, and for 1890, 340,912, an increase of 107 per cent

Now the railway workers must also be included in the category of workers employed in big capitalist enterprises In 1890, in European Russia, together with Poland and the Caucasus, these numbered 252,415.² The number of railway workers in 1865 is unknown, but it can be fairly approximately determined because the number of railway workers employed per verst of railway fluctuates very slightly Counting nine workers per verst, the number of railway workers employed in 1865 will be 32,076.³

We will sum up our calculations in the following table

¹ Among the other branches of the mining industry there are some in which the number of workers employed has probably increased only to a small extent (salt mining), there are some in which the number of workers employed must have increased very considerably (coal stone quarrying) and there are some which did not exist at all in the sixties (quicksilver mining)

² *Statistical Review of Railways and Inland Waterways*, St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 22 published by the Ministry for Ways and Communications. Unfortunately we had no figures to enable us to separate European Russia. We include not only permanent but also temporary railwaymen (10,447) and also day labourers (74,504). The average annual pay of a temporary worker was 192 rubles and that of a day labourer, 235 rubles. The average daily pay is 78 kopeks. Consequently, both the temporary workers and the day labourers are engaged for the greater part of the year and it is quite wrong to delete these as Mr. N—on does in his *Ouidnes* (p. 124).

³ In 1886 the number of workers per verst employed on the railways was 9, in 1890, 9.5, in 1893, 10.2, 1894 10.6, in 1895 10.9 thus the number reveals an obvious tendency to grow. [In the first edition the passage continued as follows 'At the end of 1865 there were 3,568 versts of railways in Russia'—Ed.] Cf. *Compiled Information about Russia*, 1890 and 1896 *Vestnik Finansov* 1897, No. 39. We would point out that in this paragraph we are only making a comparison between the data for 1865 and 1890, hence, it does not matter in the least whether we take the number of workers for the whole of the Empire or only for European Russia or whether we take 9 workers per verst or less or whether we take all branches of the mining industry or only those for which data for 1865 is available.

NUMBER OF WORKERS IN LARGE CAPITALIST ENTERPRISES

(in thousands)

Year	Manufacturing Industries	Mining Industries	Railways	Total
1865	509	165	32	706
1890	840	340	253	1,433

Thus, in 25 years, the number of workers employed in large capitalist enterprises has more than doubled, i.e., it not only increased faster than the population as a whole, but it increased even faster than the urban population.¹ The attraction of an increasing number of workers from agriculture and from petty trades into big industrial enterprises, therefore, beyond a doubt exists.² This is what we glean from the very statistics which our *Národniki* so often quote and so often mishandle. But the culminating point in their mishandling of figures is the following truly phenomenal trick: they take the percentage of the number of *factory workers to the total population* (1) and on the basis of the figure thus obtained (about one per cent) declaim that this is an insignificant "handful" of workers.³ Mr. Kablukov, for example, after calculating the percentage of "factory workers in Russia" to the total population in the manner just described goes on to

¹ In 1868 the urban population of European Russia was 61 million, and in 1897 120 million.

² The latest data on the number of workers employed in large capitalist enterprises are as follows. For 1900 we have the figures of the number of factory workers employed in enterprises not subject to excise duty, for 1903, the figures for those subject to excise duty. We have data on the number of workers employed in the mining industry for 1902. The number of workers employed on the railways may be determined by calculating 11 persons per *vorst* (figures up to January 1, 1904). Cf. *Russian Annual*, 1906 and *Compiled Information on the Mining Industry* for 1902.

Summing up this data we get the following: in 50 gubernias in European Russia in 1900-03 there were 1,261,571 factory workers, 477,025 mine workers, 468,941 railwaymen. Total, 2,207,537. For the whole of the Russian Empire the figures are: factory workers, 1,509,516, mine workers, 626,929, railwaymen 685,929. Total, 2,792,374. These figures, too, fully confirm what has been said in the text. [Note to second edition.]

³ —on, i.e., p. 326 *et sup*.

⁴ *Lecture on the Economics of Agriculture*, M., 1897, p. 14.

say "In Western Europe, however" (11), "the number of workers engaged in the manufacturing industry " (is it not obvious to every college student that "factory workers" are not by any means the same as "workers engaged in the manufacturing industries"?) " represent an ever so much larger percentage of the population," namely, from 53 per cent in England to 23 per cent in France

It is not difficult to realise that the difference in the percentage of the class of factory workers" (11) "between that in Russia and that abroad is so great that it is totally impossible to identify our process of development with that of Western Europe.

And this is written by a professor and specialist in statistics! With extraordinary courage, he, in one breath, commits two subtleties 1) he substitutes workers engaged in manufacturing industries for factory workers, and 2) substitutes population engaged in manufacturing industries for workers engaged in manufacturing industries For the benefit of our learned statisticians we will explain the difference between these categories In France, according to the census of 1891, the workers engaged in the manufacturing industries numbered 3.3 million—less than one tenth of the population (36.8 million population divided according to occupation, 1.3 million not divided according to occupation) These include workers employed in all industrial establishments and enterprises and not only factory workers The number of the population engaged in the manufacturing industries was 9.5 million (about 26 per cent of the population), in this figure is included masters and others (one million), clerks, 0.2 million, *members of families*, 4.2 million and servants, 0.2 million¹ In order to illustrate corresponding percentages in Russia, we must take as our examples certain centres, for statistics showing the occupations of the whole population are not available We will take one urban and one rural centre According to the factory statistics the number of factory workers in St. Petersburg in 1890 was 51,760 (according to *Index*), and according to the census in St. Petersburg of Decem-

¹ *The Statesman's Yearbook*, 1897, p. 472. [The English publication. —Ed.]

ber 27 (15), 1890, the number of persons of both sexes engaged in the manufacturing industries was 341,991, distributed as follows ¹

NUMBER OF PERSONS OF BOTH SEXES

	<i>Independent i.e., Those Who Maintain Themselves</i>	<i>Members of Families and Servants</i>	<i>Total</i>
Masters	13,853	37,109	50,962
Management (clerks)	2,226	4,574	6 800
Workers	148 111	61 098	209 209
Working singly	51 514	23 506	75 020
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	215,704	126 287	341 991

Here is another example. In Bogorodskoye, Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni Novgorod Gubernia (which, as we have seen, is not engaged in agriculture, but represents "as it were, a single leather works"), there are, according to *Index* for 1890, 392 *factory workers*, whereas according to the Zemstvo census of 1889, the population engaged in occupations numbers about 8,000 (the total population equals 9,241, families engaged in occupations represent more than nine-tenths). Let Messrs N—on, Kablukov and Co ponder over these figures!

Addendum to second edition We now have the results of the general census of 1897 and statistics on the occupations of the entire population. The following are figures we have drawn up for the whole of the Russian Empire (in millions) ²

¹ *St Petersburg According to the Census of 1890, 1893* We have taken a summary of the groups II—XV occupations. The total number of persons engaged in various occupations is 551,700, of whom 200,748 are engaged in trade, carting and innkeeping occupations. By "working singly" is meant small producers who do not employ hired workers.

² *General Returns for the Empire of the Results of the First General Census of the Population, Feb. 9 (Jan. 27), 1897*, published by the Central Statistical Committee, Vol. II table XXI, p. 296. I have arranged the groups of occupations in the following manner: a) 1, 2 and 4; b) 3 and 5; c) 14 and 15; d) 16 and 63; e) 46; f) 41-45; g) 13; h) 17; i) 22-40.

Occupation	Independ ent	Members of Families Both Sexes	Total Population
a) Government Official., and Armed Forces	15	07	22
b) Clergy and Free Professions	07	09	16
c) Rentiers and Pensioners	13	00	22
d) Persons in Prisons, Prostitutes Indefinite, Unknown	06	09	09
Total Unproductive Population	41	28	69
e) Commerce	16	34	50
f) Railroads and Communications	07	12	19
g) Private Service Servants and Day Labourers	34	24	58
Total Semi Productive Population	57	70	127
h) Agriculture	182	755	937
i) Industry	02	71	123
Total Productive Population	234	826	1060
Grand Total	332	924	1266

Needless to say, these figures fully confirm what has been said above about the absurdity of the Narodnik trick of comparing the number of factory workers with that of the whole population

It would be interesting to group the figures quoted showing the division of the whole population of Russia according to occupation in order to illustrate the *division of social labour* as the basis of the whole system of commodity production and capitalism in Russia. From this point of view, the whole population should be divided into three main groups: 1 The agricultural population 2 The commercial and industrial population 3 Non productive population (to be more exact, not taking part in economic activity). Of the nine groups given (a to i), only one cannot be directly and entirely placed into any one of these three main groups. That is group g private service, servants and day labourers. This group should be divided *approximately* between the commercial and industrial and the agricultural population. We have placed into the former that section of this group which has been shown as living in towns (25 million), and that section which

lives in uyezds we have placed into the latter group (3.3 million). In this way we get the following picture of the division of the total population of Russia

Agricultural Population of Russia	97.0 million
Commercial and Industrial	21.7 million
Unproductive	6.9 million
Total	<hr/> 125.6 million

From this picture it is clearly seen that, on the one hand, commodity circulation and, consequently, commodity production is firmly implanted in Russia. Russia—as a capitalist country. On the other hand, it is clear that Russia is a very backward country compared with other capitalist countries in its economic development.

To proceed. After the analysis which we have made in the present work, the statistics of the occupations of the whole population of Russia can and should be utilised for the purpose of determining *approximately* the *main* categories into which the whole population of Russia is divided according to *class* position, *i.e.*, according to the position they occupy in the social system of production.

The possibility of doing this—only approximately, of course—is created by the fact that we know the main economic groups into which the peasantry are divided. And we may quite readily regard the whole mass of the agricultural population of Russia as peasants, for the number of landlords, taken on the whole, is quite insignificant. Moreover, a not inconsiderable section of the landlords has been included in the category of rentiers, government officials, high dignitaries, etc. The mass of the peasantry, numbering 97 million, must be divided into three main groups: the lower group, the proletarian and semi-proletarian strata of the population, the middle group, the poorer section of the small masters, and the higher group, the well-to-do section of the small masters. We have analysed above the main economic symptoms of these groups which distinguish them as different *class* elements. The lower group—is that section of the population which earns its livelihood mainly, or half, by the *sale of labour power*. The middle group—is the poorer section of the small masters, for the middle

peasant, only in good years perhaps, is able to make ends meet, but the *principal* means of livelihood of this group is—"independent" (alleged independent, of course) *small farming*. Finally, the higher group—the well to do small masters, who exploit more or less considerable numbers of agricultural labourers and day labourers with allotments and wage labourers in general.

Approximately, the percentage of each of these groups is as follows: 50, 30 and 20. Above we invariably took the share of the number of households or farms. Now we will take the share of the population. This results in an increase of the lower and a diminution of the higher group. But this is precisely the change that has taken place in Russia in the past decade as is incontrovertibly evidenced by the loss of horses and ruination of the peasantry, the growth of poverty and unemployment in the rural districts, etc.

Hence, among the agricultural population we have about 48.5 million proletarians and semi-proletarians, about 29.1 million poor small masters and their families, and about 19.4 million well to do small masters.

Now the question is how to divide the commercial and industrial and unproductive population. The latter group undoubtedly contains sections of the population who belong to the big bourgeoisie: all the rentiers ("who live on the income from capital and real estate"—the first sub-group in the fourteenth group of our statistics, 0.9 million), also a section of the bourgeois intelligentsia, high military and civil officials, etc. Altogether, these will number about 1,500,000. At the opposite pole of this unproductive group of the population there are the lower ranks of the army, navy, gendarmerie, police (about 1,300,000), servants, numerous persons in service (about 500,000), about 500,000 beggars, tramps, etc., etc. These can be only approximately divided into groups most closely approaching the main economic types: about 2,000,000 will go to the proletarian and semi-proletarian population (partly lumpen-proletarians), about 1,900,000 to the poor small masters and about 1,500,000 to the well to do small masters, including in that number a large section of office employees, managers, bourgeois intellectuals, etc.

Finally, among the commercial and industrial population the largest section is that of the proletariat, and here the gulf that separates the proletariat from the big bourgeoisie is widest of all. But the census gives no data whatever on the distribution of this section of the population according to the categories—inde pendent masters, working singly, workers, etc. We are, therefore, obliged to take as a sample the above quoted data on the industrial population of St. Petersburg, divided according to their position in production. On the basis of this data we can include approximately 7 per cent in the group of the big bourgeoisie, 10 per cent in that of the well to do small masters, 22 per cent in that of the poor small masters and 61 per cent in the proletarian group. Throughout Russia, small production in industry is much more tenacious than in St. Petersburg, of course, but, on the other hand, we do not include in the semi proletarian population the mass of those working singly, and *hustars* who work for masters in their own homes. Thus, taken as a whole, the percentages taken will in all probability not differ from the actual situation very much. We calculated the commercial and industrial population as follows: 1,500,000 belonging to the big bourgeoisie, about 2,200,000 to the well to do, about 4,800,000 to the poor small producers and about 13,200,000 to the proletarian and semi proletarian strata of the population.

By adding together the agricultural, commercial and industrial and unproductive sections of the population, the whole of the population of Russia will be divided according to class positions approximately as follows:

	<i>Total Population Both Sexes</i>
Big Bourgeoisie, Landlords, High Officials etc.	about 3.0 million
Well to-do Small Masters	about 2.1 million
Poor Small Masters	about 3.8 million
Proletarians ¹ and Semi Proletarians	about 6.3 million
Total	about 12.56 million

We have no doubt that among the Cadet² and pro Cadet economists and politicians, indignant voices will be raised against this

¹ These number not less than 22 million. See further on.

² Constitutional Democrats, i.e. bourgeois liberals—Ed Eng ed

"vulgar" presentation of the economics of Russia. It is so convenient and advantageous to gloss over the depth of economic antagonisms in a detailed analysis and at the same time complain about the "crudity" of socialist views on these contradictions as *one whole*. Such criticism of the conclusions we have arrived at lacks, of course, scientific significance.

Of course, there may be some difference of opinion as to *what extent* the figures *approximate* to the facts. From this point of view, it is of interest to note the work of Mr. Lositsky, *Studies on the Population of Russia According to the Census of 1897* (*Mir Bozhi*¹ 1905, No. 8). The author took the figures of the census relating to the number of workers and servants, and according to these he estimated the number of proletarians in Russia at 22 million, peasants and landowners at 80 million, masters and office employees in commerce and industry, about 12 million, and non-trading population about 12 million.

The number of proletarians given here approaches closely to that which we arrive at.² To deny that there is an enormous mass of semi-proletarians among the poor peasants dependent upon "earnings," among the *kustars*, etc., would be tantamount to throwing ridicule upon all the data on the economics of Russia. One need only recall the 3,250,000 horseless peasants in European Russia alone, the 3,400,000 one-horse households, the sum total of the data of the Zemstvo statistics on renting land, "earnings," domestic budgets, etc., to cast off all doubts about the numerousness of the semi-proletarian population. To calculate that the proletarian and semi-proletarian population taken together comprise one half of the peasantry is to underestimate and not to exaggerate their numbers. And outside of the agrarian population, the proletarian and semi-proletarian population undoubtedly represents a still higher percentage.

Furthermore, unless it is desired to break up the complete economic picture into fragments, the well-to-do small master group should include a considerable section of the commercial and in-

¹ *God's World*—Ed. Eng. ed.

² This is not the place to go into details concerning the statistics on workers and servants which Mr. Lositsky used. Apparently, these statistics considerably *underestimate* the number of workers.

dustrial management staffs, office employees, bourgeois intellectuals, public officials, etc. Here, perhaps, we were somewhat too cautious and fixed the number of this section of the population too high in all probability we should have put the poor small masters at a higher figure and the well to do at a lower. But these divisions do not of course claim to be absolutely precise statistically.

Statistics should illustrate social economic relations that have been revealed by an all sided analysis, and should not be converted into an end in itself, as is sometimes done. To gloss over the numerousness of the petty bourgeois strata of the population in Russia is tantamount to distorting the picture of our economic reality.

VII THE GROWTH OF LARGE FACTORIES¹

The unsatisfactory nature of the data in our factory statistics, which was shown above,² compelled us to resort to more complicated calculations in order to determine the manner in which large scale machine industry developed in Russia after the Reform. We made a selection of the data for 1866, 1879, 1890 and 1894-95 on the largest factories, namely, those employing 100 and more workers.³ Outdoor workers are accounted for separately only

¹ In the preceding chapters Lenin described the development of industry from its earliest stages (domestic industry, handicraft and manufacture). These have been omitted here owing to exigencies of space. This part, part VII, is given in an abridged form—Ed.

² See preceding, part V—Ed.

³ Sources: *Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I data given only for 71 in dustries, *Index*, first and third editions, data given for all industries as in *Census* but in order to compare the data in *Census* with that given in *Index* the manufacture of rails must be subtracted from the list of industries given in the latter. Those establishments, which included home workers in the number of factory workers given, have been subtracted. In some cases the fact that home workers have been included is clearly stated in foot notes in the publications mentioned. Sometimes the fact emerges from a comparison of the data for different years: cf. for example, the data on the cotton weaving industry in the Saratov Gubernia for 1879-1890, and 1894-95 (Cf. chapter VI, part II, par. 1.) Sinzheimer (*Über die Grenzen der Weiterbildung des fabrikmässigen Grossbetriebs in Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1893 [*The Limits of Expansion of Large Factory Enterprises in Germany*]) puts in the category of large factory enterprises, those employing 50 and more workers. We do not regard this standard as being low, but owing to the difficulty of counting up Russian data we have limited ourselves to the large factories.

in the data given in *Census* for 1894-95, it is quite possible, therefore, that the returns for previous years (particularly 1866 and 1879) are still slightly exaggerated, notwithstanding the corrections, to which reference is made in a footnote. Data on these large factories are given in the accompanying table (See next page.)

We will commence our analysis of this table with the data for the years 1866, 1879 and 1890. The changes in the number of large factories during these years were 644, 852, 951, or in index numbers 100, 132, 147 respectively. Thus in the course of 24 years the number of large factories increased nearly fifty per cent. Moreover, if we take the data for separate categories of large factories, we will see that the larger the factories, the faster does their number grow (A 512, 641, 712, B 90, 130, 140, C 42, 81, 99). This indicates the growing concentration of production.

The establishments employing mechanical power increase in number faster than the total number of factories, the index numbers are as follows 100, 179, 226. An increasing number of large factories are introducing steam power. The larger the factories are, the larger is the number among them which employ mechanical power. If we calculate the percentage of those employing mechanical power to the total number of factories in the given category, we will get the following figures: A) 39%, 53%, 63%, B) 75%, 91%, 100%, C) 83%, 94%, 100%. The employment of steam power is closely connected with the increase in the volume of output and with the growth of co-operation in production.

The changes in the number of workers employed in all large factories were as follows, in index numbers 100, 168, 200. During the 24 years the number of workers employed doubled, i.e., the increase exceeded the growth of the total number of "factory" workers. The average number of workers employed per large factory in the given years was as follows: 359, 458, 488, and according to category it was as follows: A) 213, 221, 220, B) 665, 706, 673, C) 1,495, 1,935, 2,154. Thus, the largest factories concentrate within their walls an increasing percentage of workers. In 1866 the factories employing 1,000 and more workers employed 27 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large factories, in 1879 the percentage was 40, and in 1890, 46.

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PREREQUISITES

LARGE FACTORIES IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA IN THE YEARS

Group of Factories According to No Workers Employed	1860				1879				1890				1894-95			
	Total	Number of Factories	Which Employ Steam Power	Number of Workers Employed	Volume of Output in Thousands of Rubles	Total	Number of Factories	Which Employ Steam Power	Number of Workers Employed	Volume of Output in Thousands of Rubles	Total	Number of Factories	Which Employ Steam Power	Number of Workers Employed	Volume of Output in Thousands of Rubles	
A) 100 to 499 Workers	512		304	102 061	99 830	641		754	141 727	201 542	712		455	156 692	186 289	
B) 500 to 999 Workers	93		63	28 857	48 359	130		119	91 897	117 830	140		140	34 305	146 546	
C) 1 000 and over	42		35	62 801	52 877	81		76	136 700	170 533	92		99	213 353	253 130	
Total	644		307	231 755	201 066	852		549	339 374	489 905	931		694	464 337	587 965	
A) 100 to 499 Workers	931		534	219 735	289 006	1 133		769	252 656	353 258	1 136		935	252 676	374 444	
B) 500 to 999 Workers	166		144	115 265	142 648	183		123	127 533	190 283	215		212	143 439	229 364	
C) 1 000 and over	91		83	174 322	198 272	115		78	218 037	313 065	117		117	252 241	350 628	
Total	1 228		762	509 643	629 926	1 431		1 067	623 146	856 586	1 468		1 264	653 670	955 235	
A) 100 to 499 Workers	979		532	219 136	288 759	1 131		767	252 085	352 525	1 136		935	252 676	374 444	
B) 500 to 999 Workers	164		144	113 036	140 791	182		123	120 506	186 115	215		212	143 439	229 364	
C) 1 000 and over	86		78	163 644	177 537	108		108	226 267	276 212	117		117	252 241	350 628	
Total	1,229		754	498 416	607 037	1 431		1 057	599 206	815 153	1 468		1,264	653 670	955 235	

- 1 Data for 1866, 1879-1890 for 71 industries for which data is available for 1886
- 2 Data for 1879 and 1890 for all industries sub set and not subject to excise duty
- 3 Data for 1879, 1890 1891-95 for all industries except steel mills.

The index numbers of the changes in the volume of output of all large factories were as follows 100, 243, 292, and according to category, the index numbers of the changes were as follows A) 100, 201, 187, B) 100, 244, 308, C) 100, 320, 479 Thus the volume of output of all large factories increased almost threefold, but the larger the factory, the more rapid is the increase in the volume of output If, however, we examine the volume of the output per worker in each year in the respective categories, we will find the position somewhat different The average volume of output per worker in all large factories for the respective years will be 868 rubles, 1,255 rubles, 1 266 rubles, and according to category, it will be as follows A) 915, 1,422, 1,189, B) 808, 1,282, 1,575, C) 842, 1,088, 1,187 Thus, an increase in the volume of output per worker in each separate year from the lower category to the higher is not observed This is due to the fact that the various categories contain an uneven proportion of factories engaged in various industries in which the cost of raw materials varies and, consequently, there is a difference in the volume of output per worker per annum¹

We think it superfluous to examine in as great detail the data for the years 1879 90 and for the years 1879 90 94 95, for this would mean repeating all that has been said above in a slightly different percentage

Recently, the *Compiled Factory Inspectors' Reports* gave figures showing the distribution of factories in groups according to the number of workers employed The following are the figures for 1903 (See top page 320)

These figures are comparable with those previously quoted only if a certain inexactitude, very slight, it is true, is permitted At all events, these figures show that the number of large factories (employing more than 99 or more than 100 workers) and the number of workers employed in them are rapidly growing The concentration of workers and, consequently, the concentration of production in the largest of these large factories are increasing also

¹For example in 1866 category A included 17 sugar refineries the average output per worker of which was about 6,000 rubles per annum whereas in textile mills (which were included in a higher category) the average output per worker ranged from 500 to 1 500 rubles per annum,

<i>Groups of Factories</i>	In 64 Gubernias of Russia		In 50 Gubernias of European Russia	
	<i>No Estab- lishments</i>	<i>No Workers</i>	<i>No Estab- lishments</i>	<i>No Workers</i>
Less than 20 workers	5 719	63,652	4,533	51,728
21 to 50 workers	5,064	158,602	4 253	134 194
51 to 100 workers	2 271	156,789	1 897	130 642
101 to 500 workers	2 095	463,366	1,755	383 000
501 to 1000 workers	404	276 486	319	240 440
More than 1000 workers	238	521,511	210	457 534
Total	15,821	1,640 406	12 997	1,397,538

In comparing the data on the large factories with that on all "factories and works" given in our official statistics, we see that in 1879 the large factories represented 4.4 per cent of all "factories and works," and that they concentrated within their walls 66.8 per cent of the total factory workers and 54.8 per cent of the total volume of output. In 1890, the large factories represented 6.7 per cent of the total "factories and works," concentrated 71.1 per cent of the total number of workers and 57.2 per cent of the total volume of output. In 1894-95 the large factories represented 10.1 per cent of the total "factories and works." In these, 74 per cent of the total number of factory workers and 70.8 per cent of total production were concentrated. In 1903, the factories employing more than 100 workers represented in European Russia 17 per cent of the total number of factories and works and concentrated 76.6 per cent of the total number of workers.¹ Thus, notwithstanding their relative smallness in numbers, the large factories, mainly those employing steam power, concentrate the overwhelming and continuously growing share of workers and volume of output of all "factories and works." We have already seen the tremendous rapidity with which these large factories have been growing in the post Reform epoch. We will now quote data showing similarly large enterprises in the mining industry.²

¹ The data on our factory industry given by *Index* and *Census* was summed up above in part II (*C/ Studies*) [*Collected Works*, Vol II, p 353—*Ed*]. We would point out that the rise in the percentage of large factories to the total number of "factories and works" indicates first of all that the meaning of this term is gradually becoming more restricted in our statistics.

² These data are taken from *Compiled Statistical Data on the Mining Industry for 1890*, but the enterprises enumerated in *Index* have been ex-

LARGE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA IN 1890

Groups of Factories Works Mines etc According to No Workers Employed	Mining Industry			Manufacturing and Mining		
	No of Enter- prises		No of Workers Employed	No of Enter- prises		No of Workers Employed
	Total	Em- ploying Steam Power		Total	Em- ploying Steam Power	
A) 100 to 499 Workers	236	89	58 249	1,369	858	310,960
B) 500 to 999 Workers	73	38	50 607	256	221	172,160
C) 1,000 and over	71	49	149 098	186	164	398 036
Total	380	176	257,954	1 811	1,243	881,101

In the mining industry the concentration of workers in large enterprises is still more marked (although the percentage of enterprises employing steam power is smaller), 258,000 workers, out of a total of 305,000 employed in the mining industry, i.e., 84.5 per cent, are concentrated in enterprises employing 100 and more workers, almost half the total number of mine workers (145,000 out of 305,000) are employed in a few large works employing 1,000 and more workers. Of the total factory and mine workers in European Russia (1,180,000 in 1890), *three fourths* (74.6 per cent) are concentrated in enterprises employing 100 and more workers, almost half (570,000 out of 1,180,000) are concentrated in enterprises employing 500 and more workers¹.

X. APPENDAGES TO THE FACTORY

By appendages to the factory we mean those forms of wage labour and small industry, the existence of which is directly con-

cluded. As a result the number of mine workers employed in European Russia was reduced by 35,000 (340—35 equals 305).

¹The industrial census in Germany in 1895, which covered the *whole* of industry, including mining construction, which is not registered in Russia, revealed 248 enterprises employing 1,000 and more workers the total number of workers employed in these enterprises being 430,286. Hence, Russian large factories are larger than the German.

nected with the factory. These include, first of all, lumber and building workers (a certain part of them), to whom we have already referred,¹ and who sometimes form part of the industrial population of industrial centres and sometimes form part of the population of the surrounding villages.² These also include workers employed on peat bogs, which are sometimes worked by the factory owners,³ carters, loaders, stackers and unskilled labourers generally, who always make up a not inconsiderable part of the population of industrial centres. In St Petersburg for example, the census of December 27 (15), 1890, registered 44,814 persons (of both sexes) in the group of "day labourers, unskilled labourers", 51,000 persons (of both sexes) engaged in the transport industry, of whom 9,500 are specially engaged in carting and stacking heavy loads. Then again, certain auxiliary work is done for the factory by small "independent" tradesmen, in the factory district or in its environs trades spring up such as barrel making for the seed crushing mills and distilleries,⁴ basket making for packing glassware,⁵ box making for packing small metal goods, the making of wooden handles for joiners' and fitters' tools,⁶ the making of wooden tacks for boot factories, "tannin" for leather works, etc.,⁷ the weaving of reed-matting for packing factory goods (in the Kostroma and other gubernias), the making of "sticks"

¹ In a preceding chapter. See *Collected Works*, Vol III pp 410 17—Ed.

² For example, in the Ryazan Gubernia 'at the Khludov factory alone' (1894-95 4849 workers output 6,000,000 rubles), 'in the winter, 7000 horses are engaged in carting firewood the great majority of these horses belong to the peasants of the Egoryev Uyezd' (*Works of the Kustar Commission*, VII pp 1109 10).

³ Complete chaos reigns also in the statistics on the peat industry. Usually it is included in the 'factory and works group' (cf Kobelyatsky *Hand book* p 16) and sometimes it is not. For example *Census* registers 12 peat fields employing 2,201 workers in the Vladimir Gubernia but only in that gubernia although peat is extracted in other gubernias as well. According to Svirsky (*Factories and Works in the Vladimir Gubernia*), in 1890 6038 persons were employed in extracting peat in the Vladimir Gubernia. The number of workers employed in the extraction of peat throughout the whole of Russia must be ever so much larger.

⁴ *Works of the Kustar Commission* Vol VI.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol VIII, in Novgorod Gubernia.

⁶ *Ibid.* Vol IX in the suburban volosts of Tula Uyezd.

⁷ In the Perm Gubernia around the town of Kungur and in Tver Gubernia in the village of Klimra and others.

for matches (in the Ryazan, Kaluga and other gubernias), cardboard box making for tobacco factories (in the environs of St Petersburg)¹ the making of sawdust for white vinegar factories,² the spinning in small spinning mills of waste yarn (in Lodz), which has developed as a result of the demand created by the big mills³ etc., etc. All these small manufacturers, like the wage workers referred to above, belong either to the industrial population of factory centres, or to the semi agricultural population of the surrounding villages. Furthermore, when the factory is engaged in the production of some semi manufacture, it sometimes gives rise to small trades engaged in the further working up of this material, for example, the production of yarn by machinery gave an impetus to handicraft weaving, "kustar" producers of metal goods gather around mines, etc. Finally, capitalist domestic industry is not infrequently an appendage of the factory.⁴ In all countries, the epoch of large scale machine industry is characterised by the wide development of capitalist domestic industry in such branches as, for example, dressmaking. We have already referred above to the widespread character of this kind of work in Russia, to its distinguishing features and to the reason why it seems to us to be more correct to deal with it in the chapter devoted to manufacture.

In order to describe the appendage to the factory at all fully,

¹ Cf. *Report of the Zemstvo Administration of the St Petersburg Uyezd for 1889* report by Mr Volnov on Medical District No 5.

² *Reports and Investigations*, I, p. 360.

³ *Report on the Investigation into Factory Industry in the Kingdom of Poland* St. Petersburg, 1888 p. 24.

⁴ In *Census* we counted 16 factories, employing 1,000 and more workers on their premises, which in addition employed a total of 7,857 outdoor workers. Fourteen factories, employing from 500 to 999 workers, employed 1,352 outdoor workers. *Census* registered outdoor workers in a very casual manner and therefore is extremely imperfect in this respect. *The Summary of Factory Inspectors' Reports for 1903* estimates that there were 632 offices distributing work to outdoor workers employing a total of 65,115 workers. These figures are very incomplete, of course, nevertheless, it is characteristic that the overwhelming majority of these offices and the workers they employ are concentrated in the centres of the factory industry (Moscow area 503 offices, 49,345 workers; Saratov Gubernia cotton gauze, 93 offices, 10,000 workers) (Footnote to second edition.) [The first part of this footnote up to the words, *Summary of Factory Inspectors' Reports*, was contained in the first edition. Lenin's note "Footnote to the second edition" applies only to the latter part of his footnote.—Ed.]

it is necessary to have complete statistics on the occupations of the population, or monographic descriptions of the whole of the economic life of the factory centres and their environs. But even the fragmentary data that was available to us proves how in correct is the opinion so widespread among us that factory industry is isolated from other forms of industry, that the factory population is isolated from the population not employed within factory walls. The development of forms of industry, like that of all social relationships in general, cannot but be very gradual, and betrays a large number of interlocking, transitional forms, which sometimes seem to be a return to the past. For example, the growth of small trades may (as we have seen) express the progress of capitalist manufacture, now we see that even the factory can sometimes stimulate the development of small trades. Working for the merchant may also be an appendage of both manufacture and the factory. In order to be able to appraise the significance of such phenomena properly, they must be compared with the whole structure of industry at the given stage of its development and with the main trend of this development.

XI THE COMPLETE SEPARATION OF INDUSTRY FROM AGRICULTURE

Large scale machine industry alone brings about the complete separation of industry from agriculture. Russian statistics fully confirm this postulate, which was laid down by the author of *Capital* for other countries,¹ but which is usually ignored by the Narodnik economists. Mr N—on, in season and out of season, talks in his *Outlines* about "the separation of industry from agriculture," but he does not take the trouble to examine the precise data in order to determine how this process is taking place and to note the various forms it assumes. Mr V. V. mentions the contacts our industrial worker has with the land (*in manufacture*, our author does not think it necessary to distinguish between the various stages of capitalism, although he pretends to adhere to the theory of the author of *Capital*¹) and declaims against the

¹ *Das Kapital*, I, pp. 779-80 [*Capital*, English edition, Vol. I, chap. XXV, section 5, p. 711 et sup.—Ed. Eng. ed.]

"shameful" (*sic*!) "dependence" "of our" (his italics) "capitalist industry" upon the worker farmer, etc (*The Destiny of Capitalism*, p 114 *et sup*) Apparently Mr V V has not heard, or if he has heard he has forgotten, that not only "our," but even western capitalism could not break the workers' connection with the land until it reached the stage of large scale machine industry And, finally, Mr Kablukov only very recently presented students with the following astonishing distortion of the facts "Whereas in the West, work in the factory represents the sole means of livelihood for the worker, here (in Russia), *with relatively few exceptions*" (*sic*!) "the worker regards working in the factory as an auxiliary occupation, *he is mostly drawn to the land*"¹

A practical analysis of this question will be found in the Moscow Sanitary Statistics, compiled by Mr Dementyev, on the "factory workers' connection with agriculture"² Systematically collected statistics covering about 20,000 workers have shown that only 14.1 per cent of the factory workers go off for agricultural work But what is still more important is the fact, so comprehensively revealed in the above mentioned work, that *it is precisely mechanised production that separates the workers from the land* Of a number of figures quoted in proof of this, we select the following most striking³

Factories and Works	Per Cent Leaving for Field Work	
Hand Cotton Weavers and Dyers	72.5	Hand labour
Silk Weavers	63.1	
Pottery	31.0	
Calico Finishers and Offices for Distributing to Outdoor Workers	30.7	Machine Produce tion
Cloth (All Processes)	20.4	
Cotton Spinning and Power Loom Weaving	13.8	
Power Loom Weaving Including Finishing	6.2	
Engineering Works	2.7	
Calico Finishing by Machine	2.3	

¹ *Lectures on the Economics of Agriculture* (*sic*!), published for students Moscow, 1897 p 13 Perhaps our learned statistician thinks that 85 per cent of the total may be regarded as 'relatively few exceptions'? See further on in text

² *Compiled Statistics on the Moscow Gubernia*, Department of Sanitary Statistics, Vol IV, part II, Moscow 1893 Quoted in Mr Dementyev's well known work *The Factory* etc

³ *Compiled Statistical Data*, etc p 292 *The Factory*, second edition, p 36

Of the industries enumerated in the author's table, we have divided eight of them according to the method of production employed, either hand labour or machine production. In regard to the ninth branch, cloth, we will note that its manufacture is carried on partly by hand and partly by machinery. Thus, in the hand weaving factories about 63 per cent of the weavers leave for field work, but *not a single weaver* working on power looms leaves, and of the workers employed in those departments of cloth mills which use mechanical power, 33 per cent leave.

"Thus, the most important reason that causes the factory workers to give up all connections with the land is the transition from hand labour to machine production. Notwithstanding the fact that a relatively large number of factories are still carried on with hand labour, the number of workers employed in them, compared with the number employed in factories where machine production is carried on, is quite insignificant, and that is why the percentage of those who leave for field work is as small as 14.1 of the total adult workers and 15.4 of the adult workers belonging exclusively to the peasant estate."¹

We would recall the fact that the returns of the sanitary inspection of factories in the Moscow Gubernia gave the following figures: mechanical power, 22.6 per cent of total factories (including 18.4 per cent with steam power), in these are concentrated 80.7 per cent of the total number of workers. Hand labour factories, 69.2 per cent, which employ only 16.2 per cent of the total number of workers. In 244 factories using mechanised power 92,302 workers are employed (378 workers per factory) while 747 hand labour factories employ 18,520 workers (25 workers per factory).² We have shown above how considerable is the concentration of all Russian factory workers in large enterprises, mostly power driven, employing on the average 488 and more workers per enterprise. Mr. Dementyev studied in detail the influence of the place of birth, the difference between those who are native to the locality and those who have come from other districts, difference in estate (citizen or peasant), etc., upon the divorcement of the workers from the land and he found that all

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 280. *The Factory*, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, part I, pp. 167, 170, 177.

these influences are eclipsed by the main factor the transition from hand production to machine production¹

"Whatever the causes for the transformation of the former tiller of the soil into a factory worker may be, the fact is that these special workers exist. They are merely registered as peasants connected with the village only by the fact that they have to pay taxes there which they pay when they have to renew their passports for as a matter of fact, they have no farm in the village and in a large number of cases not even a house, which usually they have sold. Even their right to land they preserve only juridically so to speak and the industrial dis- orders of 1885-86 showed, in many factories, that these workers regard themselves as being totally alien to the village in the same way as the peasants in their turn regard them the offspring of their own fellow villagers, as foreign incomers. Thus we have already a crystallised class of workers who do not own their own homes who in fact own no property, a class bound by no ties and living from hand to mouth. And this class did not come into being only yesterday. It already has its factory genealogy and a not inconsiderable section has its third generation."²

Finally, interesting material on the separation of the factory from agriculture is given in the latest factory statistics. The *Census of Factory and Works* (for 1894-95) gives information on the number of days in the year in which each factory is in operation. Mr Kasperov hastened to use this data in support of the Narodnik theories and calculated that "on the average, the Russian factory works 165 days in the year," that "in Russia, 35 per cent of the factories work less than 200 days in the year."³ It goes without saying that in view of the vagueness of the term "factory," these

¹ Mr Zhibankov, in *Sanitary Inspection of Factories and Works in Smolensk Gubernia* (Smolensk, 1894-96) estimates the number of workers who leave for field work at only 10 to 15 per cent of the Yartsev Textile Mill alone (Vol II pp 307-445; in 1893-94 the Yartsev Textile Mill employed 8,106 workers out of a total of 8,810 factory workers in the Smolensk Gubernia). The temporary workers in this factory represented 28 per cent of the males (in all factories, 29 per cent) and 18.6 per cent of the females (in all factories, 21 per cent. Cf Vol II, p 469). It should be noted that the temporary workers include 1) those who have been employed at the factory for less than twelve months 2) those who leave for summer work in the fields 3) those "who ceased work at the factory for various reasons for several years" (Vol II p 445).

² *Compiled Statistical Information* p 296. *The Factory* pp 45-46.

³ *Statistical Summary of the Industrial Development of Russia*. A paper read by M I Tugan-Baranovsky, member of the Imperial Free Economic Society and the debate on this paper at the session of the Third Department, St Petersburg, 1898, p 41.

figures, taken without discrimination, have hardly any significance, since they do not indicate how many days in the year the various categories of workers work. We have counted up the figures given in the *Census* for the large factories (employing 100 and more workers) which as we have seen above (section VII), employ about three fourths of the total number of factory workers. And we found that, according to the various categories, the average number of working days in the year was as follows: A) 242, B) 235, C) 273,¹ and the average for all large factories was 214. If we calculate the average number of working days per worker, we will get 253 working days per year—the average number of working days per worker employed in large factories. Of the twelve sections into which the various branches of industry are divided in the *Census*, only in one is the average number of working days, in the lower categories, lower than 200, namely section XI (food products): A) 189, B) 148, C) 280. Factories in category A and B in this section employ a total of 110,588 workers, which equals 16.2 per cent of the total number of workers employed in large factories (655,670). We would point out that this section includes the most varied branches of industry: beet sugar, tobacco, distilling, flour milling, etc. For the remaining sections, the average number of work days per factory is as follows: A) 259, B) 271, C) 272. Thus, the larger the factory, the larger is the number of days they are in operation in the course of the year. The total returns for all large factories in European Russia, therefore, confirm the conclusion arrived at by the Moscow Sanitary statisticians and prove that the factory is creating a class of permanent factory workers.

Thus, the data on the Russian factory workers fully confirm the theory enunciated in *Capital* that it is precisely large scale machine industry that brings about a complete and decisive change in the conditions of life of the industrial population and separates it completely from agriculture and from the century old traditions of patriarchal life connected with the latter. But, in destroying patriarchal and petty bourgeois relationships, large scale machine

¹ We will remind the reader that category A includes factories employing from 100 to 499 workers; B, from 500 to 999 workers and C, 1,000 and more workers.

industry creates, on the other hand, conditions which bring together the wage workers in agriculture with those in industry first, it, in general, carries into the rural districts the commercial and industrial conditions of life which first arise in the non agricultural centres, second, it creates mobility among the population and large markets for hiring agricultural as well as industrial labourers, third, by introducing machinery into agriculture, large scale machine industry introduces into the rural districts skilled industrial workers who enjoy a higher standard of living

XII THREE STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY

We will now sum up the main conclusions to which the data on the development of capitalism in our industry lead us ¹

There are three main stages in this development small commodity production (petty, mainly peasant trades), capitalist manufacture, and the factory (large scale machine industry) The facts utterly refute the opinion that is widespread among us that "factory" and "*kustar*" industry are isolated from each other On the contrary, their division is purely artificial The connection and continuity between these two forms of industry are most direct and intimate The facts very clearly prove that the main trend of small commodity production is towards the development of capitalism in particular towards the rise of manufacture, and before our very eyes, manufacture is very rapidly growing into large scale machine industry Perhaps one of the most striking manifestations of the close and immediate connection between the consecutive forms of industry is the fact that a number of big and very big manufacturers were, at one time, the smallest of small tradesmen and passed through all the stages from "people's industry" to "capitalism" Savva Morozov was first a serf peasant (he purchased his freedom in 1820), then a shepherd, carter, weaver in a mill, then a "*kustar*" weaver, walking to Moscow to sell his cloth to merchants, then he became the owner of

¹ As we stated in the preface we limit ourselves to the post Reform epoch and do not deal with the forms of industry which were based on the labour of serfs.

a small establishment for giving out work to outdoor workers, and finally a factory owner. At the time of his death in 1862, he and his numerous sons owned two large cotton mills. In 1890 the four factories which belonged to his descendants employed 39,000 workers and produced goods to the value of 35,000,000 rubles.¹ In the silk industry in the Vladimir Gubernia, a number of big manufacturers were formerly weavers in mills, or "kustar" weavers.² The biggest manufacturers in Ivanovo Voznesensk (Kuvayevs, Fokins, Zubkovs, Kokushkins, Bobrovs and many others) were formerly "kustars".³ The brocade factories in the Moscow Gubernia all grew up from small "kustar" workshops.⁴ The manufacturer Zavyalov, of the Pavlovsk district, in 1864 still had "a vivid recollection of the time when he was a simple worker employed by master craftsman Khabarov".⁵ The manufacturer Varypayev was a small "kustar".⁶ Kondratov was a small "kustar" who walked to Pavlovo carrying a bag with goods he had made.⁷ The manufacturer Asmolov was a horse driver employed by itinerant dealers, later became a small trader, the owner of a small tobacco workshop, and subsequently owned a factory with a turnover of millions,⁸ etc. It would be interesting to know where, in these and similar cases, the Narodnik economists would define the beginning of "artificial" capitalism and the end of "people's" industry.

The three main forms of industry enumerated above are distinguished from each other by the different technical methods employed. The characteristic feature of small commodity production is its very primitive, hand technique that remained unchanged from time immemorial. The craftsman remains a peasant who adopts the methods handed down by tradition of working up

¹ *Industry in the Vladimir Gubernia*, VI, pp. 5-7. *Index*, 1890. Shishmarev. *A Brief Review of the Industries in the Region of Nizhni Novgorod and Shuisk Ivanovsk Railways*. St. Petersburg, 1892, pp. 28-32.

² *Industry in the Vladimir Gubernia* III, p. 7 et sup.

³ Shishmarev, pp. 56-62.

⁴ *Compiled Statistics of Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, part III, Moscow, 1883, pp. 27-28.

⁵ Labzin, *l.c.* p. 105.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁷ Grigor'ev, *l.c.* p. 36.

⁸ *Historical Statistical Review*, Vol. II, p. 27.

raw material Manufacture introduces division of labour, which fundamentally changes the form of technique and transforms the peasant into a "detail worker" But hand labour remains, and, on this basis, progress in methods of production is inevitably very slow Division of labour springs up spontaneously and is adopted by tradition just as in peasant labour Large scale machine industry alone introduces a radical change, throws hand labour overboard, transforms production on new rational principles and systematically applies the knowledge of science to industry Until capitalism organised large scale machine industry in Russia, we observed—and still observe in those industries in which it has not yet organised large scale production—almost complete stagnation in technique, we see the employment of the same kind of hand loom, the same kind of water mill or wind mill that was employed in production a century ago On the other hand, in those industries which the factory has conquered we see a complete technical revolution and extremely rapid progress in the methods of machine production

Owing to the difference in the technical methods employed we see different stages of development in capitalism The characteristic feature of small commodity production and manufacture is the prevalence of small enterprises from among which only a few large ones stand out Large scale machine industry completely squeezes out the small enterprises Capitalist relationships arise also in the small trades (in the form of small workshops employing wage workers, and merchant capitalists), but these are only slightly developed and are not marked by a sharp line of antagonism between the groups of persons taking part in production Neither big capitalists nor broad strata of proletarians have yet arisen In manufacture we see the rise of both the one and the other The gulf that divides the owner of the means of production from the worker has already become fairly wide "Wealthy" industrial centres spring up, the mass of the inhabitants of which represent entirely propertyless workers A small number of merchants who do an enormous business in the purchase of raw materials and the sale of finished goods and a mass of detail workers living from hand to mouth, such is the general

picture which manufacture presents. But the multitude of small establishments, the preservation of contacts with the land, the preservation of tradition in production and in the whole system of life, all this creates a mass of intermediary elements between the extremes of manufacture and retards the development of these extremes. Large scale machine industry sweeps away all these retarding factors, the extremes of social antagonism reach their highest development. All the gloomy sides of capitalism, as it were, concentrate together, the machine, as is well known, gives a powerful impetus to the undue lengthening of the working day, women and children are drawn into industry, a reserve army of unemployed is formed (and must be formed to suit the conditions of factory production), etc. However, the socialisation of labour, which the factory brings about to an enormous degree, and the change it brings about in the sentiments and understanding of the people it employs (particularly the destruction of patriarchal and petty bourgeois traditions) gives rise to a reaction unlike preceding stages, large-scale machine production imperatively calls for the planned regulation and public control of production (a manifestation of the latter tendency is factory legislation).¹

The very character of the development of production changes at various stages of capitalism. In small trades this development follows in the wake of the development of peasant economy, the market is extremely restricted, the distance between the producer and the consumer is small, the insignificant dimensions of production easily adapt themselves to barely fluctuating local demands. That is why the characteristic feature of industry at that stage is its stability, but that stability is tantamount to stagnation in technique and the preservation of patriarchal social relationships enmeshed in all sorts of survivals of mediæval traditions. Manufacture works for a wide market—sometimes for the whole nation and, in conformity with this, production acquires the character of instability that is peculiar to capitalism and which

¹ On the connection between factory legislation and the conditions and relationships to which large scale machine industry gives rise, see chapter II part 2 of Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's book, *The Russian Factory*, and especially the article in *Novoye Slovo*, July, 1897.

reaches its greatest dimensions under factory production. The development of large scale machine production cannot proceed except in spurts, periods of crisis alternate with periods of prosperity. This sporadic growth of the factory accelerates to an enormous degree the ruination of the small producers, and the workers are drawn into the factory in masses at one moment, in busy seasons, and thrown out at another. The formation of a vast reserve army of unemployed, who are prepared to take any kind of work, becomes a condition for the existence and development of large scale machine industry. In chapter II we showed the strata of the peasantry from which this army is recruited and in subsequent chapters the main occupations for which capital keeps this army in reserve were indicated. The "instability" of large scale machine industry has always given rise, and now gives rise, to reactionary complaints among those who continue to look at things through the spectacles of the small producer and who forget that it is this "instability" alone that put an end to the stagnation of the past and stimulated the rapid change in methods of production and in all social relationships.

One of the manifestations of this change is the separation of industry from agriculture, the release of the social relationships in industry from the traditions of serfdom and the patriarchal system that hover over agriculture. In small commodity production the tradesman has not yet completely emerged from the peasant shell, in the majority of cases he remains a tiller of the soil, and this connection between small industry and small agriculture is so strong that we observe an interesting law of the parallel disintegration of the small producer in industry and in agriculture. The rise of a petty bourgeoisie and of wage workers is proceeding simultaneously in both spheres of national economy, and by that is preparing, at both poles of disintegration, the divorcement from farming of those engaged in industry. Under manufacture this divorcement assumes considerable dimensions. A number of industrial centres arise which do not engage in agriculture. The chief representative of industry is no longer the peasant, but the merchant manufacturer on the one hand and the "artisan" on the other. Industry and the relative development of

commercial intercourse with the rest of the world raise the standard of living and the culture of the population, the worker working for the merchant manufacturer begins to look down upon the peasant farmer. Large scale machine industry completes this change, finally separates industry from agriculture, creates, as we have seen, a special class of the population which is totally alien to the old type of peasantry and which differs from the latter in its manner of living, its family relationships, in its higher standard of material and spiritual requirements.¹ In small industry and in manufacture we always see survivals of patriarchal relations and a variety of forms of personal dependence which, in the general conditions of capitalist economy, extremely worsen the position of the toilers, degrade and corrupt them. Large scale machine industry, by concentrating together masses of workers who frequently come from various parts of the country, cannot possibly tolerate survivals of patriarchalism and personal dependence, and is marked by its "contempt for the past." And it is precisely this rupture with obsolete tradition that served as one of the important conditions which made possible and created the necessity for the regulation and the public control of production. Particularly, in speaking of the changes the factory has brought about in the conditions of life of the population, it is necessary to observe that the drawing of women and adolescents into the factory² is, in the main, a progressive phenomenon. Unquestionably, capitalism extremely worsens the conditions of these categories of workers and it becomes particularly necessary to regulate and shorten their working day, to guarantee hygienic conditions of labour, etc., but to strive to completely prohibit women and adolescents from going into industry, or to preserve the patriarchal

¹ For types of the "factory" worker, see Chapter VI section II § 5 [Vol. III, *Collected Works*—Ed.] See also *Compiled Statistical Information of Moscow Gubernia* Vol VII, part III, Moscow, 1883, p. 58 (the factory worker—moralist, 'wise one'), *Nizhni Novgorod Zbornik* I pp 42-43 Vol IV p 335 *Industry in Vladimir Gubernia*, III, pp 113-14 et sup *Novoye Slovo*, Oct., 1897, p. 63. See also above mentioned work by Mr Zhibankov in which are described the workers who go to the towns to seek commercial and industrial occupations.

² According to *Index* the factories and works in European Russia in 1890 employed 875,164 persons of whom 210,207 (27 per cent) were women, 17,793 (2 per cent) were boys and 8,216 (1 per cent) were girls.

system which prevented them from doing so, would be reactionary and utopian. By destroying the patriarchal isolation of these categories of the population who formerly never emerged from the narrow circle of domestic, family relationships, by drawing them into direct participation in social production, large scale machine industry stimulates their development and increases their independence, i.e., creates conditions of life that are incomparably superior to the patriarchal immobility of pre-capitalist relationships.¹

The characteristic feature of the first two stages of development of industry is that the population is settled. The small tradesman, remaining a peasant, is bound to his village by his farm. The worker under manufacture is usually restricted to the small industrial district which is created by manufacture. There is nothing inherent in the system of industry in the first and sec-

¹ The poor woman weaver goes to the factory together with her father and husband and works like them and independently of them. She helps to maintain the family no less than the man. 'In the factory the woman is a producer completely independent of her husband.' The woman factory worker learns to read and write with remarkable rapidity (*Industry in Vladimir Gubernia*, III, pp. 112, 113, 118 et sup.) The following conclusion arrived at by Mr. Kharisomenov is perfectly just: industry destroys the economic dependence of the woman on the family and on the husband. 'At another's factory the woman is equal to the man, this is proletarian equality. The capitalisation of industry is an important factor in woman's struggle for independence in the family.' Industry creates a new position for the woman completely independent of the family and of the husband" (*Yuridicheski Vestnik* 1883, No. 12, pp. 582, 596.) In the *Compiled Statistical Information on Moscow Gubernia* (Vol. VII, part II, Moscow, 1882, pp. 152, 138-39), the investigators compared the position of women engaged in making stockings by hand with those working by machine. The handworkers earned about 8 kopeks per day; machine workers, 14 to 30 kopeks per day. The conditions of the woman worker working by machine are described as follows: "Before us is a free young woman, not restricted by any obstacles, emancipated from the family and from all that which represents the conditions of life of the peasant woman, a young woman who at any moment may wander from place to place, from employer to employer, and may at any moment find herself without employment without a crust of bread." "The hand knitter earns a very meagre wage which is not sufficient to maintain her; she is able to maintain herself only because she is a member of a family that has an allotment and receives some of the product of that land under machine production; the working woman, in addition to victuals and tea, earns a wage which enables her to live apart from the family and to dispense with the income from the land. Moreover, the wages of women workers working at the machine, under present conditions, is more secure."

and stages of development that disturbs the settled character and isolation of the producer. Intercourse between the various industrial districts is rare. The transfer of industry from one place to another takes place only in the form of the migration of individual small producers who establish small trades in the outlying parts of the state. Large-scale machine industry, however, necessarily creates mobility among the population, commercial intercourse between various districts grows enormously, railways greatly facilitate travel. On the whole, the demand for labour increases, now rising in the period of boom, now falling in the period of crisis, so that it becomes necessary for the worker to go from one factory to another and from one part of the country to another. Large-scale machine industry creates new industrial centres which, with unprecedented rapidity, arise sometimes in unpopulated places—which would be impossible without the mass migration of workers. Further on we will show the dimensions and significance of the so-called migratory non-agricultural trades. At the moment, we will limit ourselves to a brief presentation of the data of the Zemstvo Sanitary Statistics of the Moscow Gubernia. Investigation among 103,175 factory workers showed that only 53,238, or 51.6 per cent were born in the particular uyezd in which they worked. Hence, nearly half the total number of workers migrated from one uyezd to another. The number of workers who were born in the Moscow Gubernia was 66,038, or 64 per cent of the total.¹ More than one third of the total came in from other gubernias (chiefly from gubernias in the central industrial zone adjacent to the Moscow Gubernia). Investigation of the various uyezds showed that the more industrially developed uyezds had a small per cent of workers native to the particular uyezd working there: for example in the uyezds of Moshaisk and Volokolamsk, which are not highly developed industrially, from 92 to 93 per cent of the factory workers are natives of the place they work in. In the highly industrial Moscow, Kolomna and Bogorodsk Uyezds the per cent of native workers

¹In the less industrially developed Smolensk Gubernia, an investigation among 5,000 factory workers showed that 80 per cent were natives. (Zhbankov, *loc. cit.*, II, p. 442.)

drops to 24, 40 and 50. The investigators draw the conclusion from this that "the considerable development of factory production in the uyezd encourages the influx of elements from outside that uyezd."¹ These facts show also (we will add) that mobility among the industrial workers bears the same features that we observed in the mobility of the agricultural workers, *viz*, that the industrial workers, also, not only migrate from those districts where there is a surplus of labour, but also from those districts where there is a shortage of labour. For example, the Bronnitsa Uyezd attracts 1,123 workers from other uyezds in the Moscow Gubernia and from other gubernias, and at the same time 1,246 workers leave that uyezd to go to more industrially developed uyezds, *i.e.*, Moscow and Bogorodsk. Hence, the workers leave, not only because they cannot find "local occupations," but also because they strive to go to those places where conditions are better. Elementary as this fact is, it is worth while reminding the Narodnik economists of it again, for they idealise local occupations, condemn migratory trades and ignore the progressive significance of the mobility among the population which capitalism creates.

The characteristic features described above, which distinguish large scale machine industry from preceding forms of industry, may be summed up in the words—socialisation of labour. Indeed, production for an enormous national and international market, the development of close commercial contacts with various parts of the country and with various countries in the purchase of raw materials and auxiliary materials, the enormous technical progress, the concentration of production and the population by enormous enterprises, the destruction of the outworn traditions of patriarchal life, the creation of mobility among the population and the raising of the standard of requirements and the development of the worker—all these are elements of the capitalist process which more and more socialise the production of the country and at the same time socialise those who participate in production.²

¹ Compiled Stat. Inf. on Moscow Gub., sanitary statistics section Vol. IV, part 1 (Moscow, 1890), p. 240.

² The data given in the three last chapters prove, in our opinion, that the classification of the capitalist forms and stages of industry given by

In regard to the question of the relation of large scale machine industry in Russia to the home market for capitalism, the data given above lead to the following conclusion. The rapid development of factory industry in Russia creates an enormous and continuously increasing market for means of production (building material, fuel, metals, etc.), it increases with particular rapidity the proportion of the population engaged in producing articles to be used in production and not for personal consumption. But the market for articles for personal use also grows rapidly owing to the growth of large-scale machine industry, which draws a growing proportion of the population away from agriculture into commercial and industrial occupations.

Marx is more correct and sound than that classification which has gained currency at the present time and which confuses manufacture with the factory and regards working for the merchant as a special form of industry (Hölld and Bücher). To confuse manufacture with the factory implies taking the purely superficial symptoms as the basis for the classification and ignoring the essential features of technique, economics and social life which distinguish manufacture from the machine period of capitalism. Undoubtedly capitalist domestic industry plays a great role in the mechanism of capitalist industry. There is no doubt also that working for the merchant is a special feature of pre-machine capitalism but it is to be met with (and in by no means small dimensions) in the most varied stages of the development of capitalism. It will be impossible to understand the significance of working for the merchant, unless it is studied in connection with the whole structure of industry in the given period, or in the given stage of the development of capitalism. The peasant who weaves baskets for the order of the village shopkeeper, the Pavlov wooden handle maker making handles in his own home for the knives manufactured by Zayyalov, the working woman who makes clothes, shoes, gloves or boxes for the order of big manufacturers or merchants—all work for the merchant, but all these instances of capitalist domestic industry bear a different character and have different significance. We do not in the least deny the merits of Bücher, for example, who has studied the pre-capitalist forms of industry, but we think that his classification of capitalist forms of industry is wrong. We cannot agree with the views expressed by Mr. Struve (*Cf. Mir Bozhi*, 1898, No. 4) in so far as he adopts Bücher's theory (the part referred to) and applies it to Russian '*kustar* industry' (Since these lines were written 1899 Mr. Struve has managed to complete the cycle of his scientific and political development. Wavering between Bücher and Marx, between liberal and socialist economics, he has finally become a pure liberal bourgeois. The writer of these lines is proud of the fact that as far as he was able he has helped to purge Social Democracy of such elements.) [Footnote to second edition.]

CHAPTER VIII

THE FORMATION OF THE HOME MARKET

WE have now to sum up the data that was examined in preceding chapters and try to depict the mutual relationships that exist between the various spheres of national economy in their capitalist development

I THE GROWTH OF COMMODITY CIRCULATION

As is well known, commodity circulation precedes commodity production and represents one of the conditions (but not the sole condition) of the rise of the latter. In the present work we will limit ourselves to the task of examining the data on commodity and capitalist production and for that reason we will not deal in detail with the important question of the growth of commodity circulation in post Reform Russia. In order to present a general picture of the rapidity of the growth of the home market the following brief data will suffice.

The Russian railways increased from 3,819 kilometres in 1865 to 29,063 kilometres in 1890,¹ i.e., increased more than sevenfold. A similar increase was achieved in England in a longer period (1845, 4,082 kilometres, 1875, 26,819 kilometres, a six fold increase), in Germany in a shorter period (1845, 2,143 kilometres, 1875, 27,981 kilometres, a twelvefold increase). The length of new railways opened each year fluctuated very considerably as between different periods, for example in the five years 1868-72, 8,806 versts of new railway were opened and in the

¹ *Übersichten der Weltwirtschaft* [Review of World Economy] I.c. In 1904, 54,878 kilometres in European Russia (including the Kingdom of Poland, the Caucasus and Finland) and 8,851 in Asiatic Russia. [Footnote to second edition.]

five year period 1878-82, only 2,221 versts were opened.¹ The extent of this fluctuation enables us to judge what an enormous reserve army of labour is required by capitalism, which at one moment increases and at another moment reduces the demand for labour. There have been two periods of boom in railway development in Russia: the end of the 'sixties (and beginning of the 'seventies) and in the latter half of the 'nineties. From 1865 to 1875, the average annual increase in the length of railways in Russia was about 1,500 kilometres and from 1893 to 1897, 2,500 kilometres.

The amount of railway freight carried was as follows: 1868, 439,000,000 poods, 1873, 1,117,000,000 poods, 1881, 2,532,000,000 poods, 1893, 4,846,000,000 poods, 1896, 6,145,000,000 poods, 1904, 11,072,000,000 poods. Not less rapid has been the growth of passenger traffic: 1868, 10,400,000 passengers, 1873, 22,700,000, 1881, 34,400,000, 1893, 49,400,000, 1896, 65,500,000, 1904, 123,600,000.²

The development of water transport is indicated by the figures in the following table (for the whole of Russia).³

Year	Steamers		Number of Non-Steamers	Cargo Capacity of Ships in Mill. Poods			Value of Ships in Mill. Rubles			Total Employed on Ships		
	Number	Power		Steamers	Non-Steamers	Total	Steamers	Non-Steamers	Total	Steamers	Non-Steamers	Total
1868	846	47,313	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1884	1,246	72,105	20,083	61	362	368.1	48.9	32.1	81.0	18,766	94,089	112,855
1890	1,824	103,206	20,125	92	401	410.2	75.6	38.3	113.9	23,814	90,340	116,170
1893	2,539	129,759	20,580	123	526.9	539.2	97.9	46.0	143.9	32,680	85,608	128,287

¹ V. Mikhailovsky, *The Development of Russian Railways, Works of the Imperial Free Economic Society*, 1898, No. 2.

² *Military Statistical Abstract*, p. 511. Mr. N—on, *Outlines*, appendix *Productive Forces*, XVII, p. 67. *Vestnik Finansov* 1898, No. 43. *Russian Annual* 1905, St. Petersburg, 1906.

³ *Military Statistical Abstract*, p. 445. *Productive Forces*, XVII, p. 42. *Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 44.

The amount of freight carried on inland waterways in European Russia was as follows 1881, 899,700,000 poods, 1893, 1,181,500,000 poods, 1895, 1,553,000,000 poods The value of the freight carried was 186,500,000 rubles, 257,200,000 rubles and 290,000,000 rubles respectively

In 1868, the mercantile fleet of Russia consisted of 51 steamers with a cargo capacity of 14,300 lasts¹ and of 700 sailing ships with a cargo capacity of 41,800 lasts, in 1896 the mercantile fleet consisted of 522 steamers with a cargo capacity of 161,600 lasts²

The development of mercantile shipping at all ports on the outer seas was as follows during the five years 1856 60 the number of vessels entering and leaving was on the average 18,900 per annum with a total cargo capacity of 3,783,000 tons, the average for the period 1886 90 was 23,201 vessels per annum (+23 per cent) with a total cargo capacity of 13,845,000 tons (+266 per cent) Hence, cargo capacity increased three and two thirds times During 39 years (from 1856 to 1894) cargo capacity increased 55 times and if we subtract Russian vessels from foreign vessels, we will find that the number of the former increased during the 39 years 34 times (from 823 to 2,789) while their cargo capacity increased 121 times (from 112,800 tons to 1,368,000 tons) whereas the number of the latter increased by 16 per cent (from 18,284 to 21,160) and their cargo capacity increased 53 times (from 3,448,000 tons to 18,267,000 tons)³ It should be noted that the cargo capacity of vessels entering and leaving also fluctuates very considerably from year to year (for example, 1878, 13,000,000 tons, 1881, 8,600,000 tons) and these fluctuations should enable us to judge to some extent the fluctuation in the demand for unskilled labourers, dock workers, etc Here, too, capitalism demands the existence of a mass of people, always seeking work and prepared at the first call to accept work however casual it may be.

¹ One last equals two tons—*Ed Eng ed*

² *Military Statistical Abstract*, p 785 and *Ministry of Finance Annual*, I, p 363 *Productive Forces* XVII, p 90

³ *Productive Forces*, Russia's Foreign Trade p 56 *et sup*

The development of foreign trade may be seen from the following figures ¹

Year	Population Russia without Finland (millions)	Total Exports and Imports (millions credit rubles)	Total Foreign Trade per Head Population (in rubles)
1856 1860	69 0	314 0	4 55
1861 1865	73 8	347 0	4 70
1866-1870	79 4	554 2	7 00
1871 1875	86 0	831 1	9 66
1876 1880	93 4	1 054 8	11 29
1881 1885	100 6	1 107 1	11 00
1886 1890	108 9	1 090 3	10 02
1897 1901	130 6	1,322 4	10 11

The following figures give a general idea of the volume of bank turnover and accumulation of capital. The total withdrawals from the State Bank rose from 113,000,000 rubles in 1860-63 (170,000,000 rubles in 1864-68) to 620,000,000 rubles in 1884-88 and the total deposits on current account rose from 335,000,000 rubles in 1864-68 to 1,495,000,000 rubles in 1884-88.² The turnover of loan and savings societies and banks (agricultural and industrial) increased from 2 750,000 rubles in 1872 (21 800 000 rubles in 1875) to 82,600,000 rubles in 1892 and 189,600,000 rubles in 1903.³ Debts on real estate in the period from 1889 to 1894 increased as follows: the value of land mortgaged rose from 1,395,000,000 rubles to 1,827,000,000 rubles and the amounts advanced on this property increased from 791,000,000 rubles to 1,044,000,000 rubles.⁴ The operations of savings banks particularly increased in the 'eighties and 'nineties. In 1880 it was estimated that there were 75 savings banks, in 1897, 4,315 (of which 3,454 were post office savings banks). In 1880, deposits in these banks amounted to 4,400,000 rubles, in 1897, 276,600 000 rubles. The balance at the end of the year amounted to 9,000,000 rubles in 1880, and 494,300,000 in 1897. The annual increase in capital is particularly striking in the *famine*

¹ *Ibid.* p. 17. *Russian Annual for 1904*, St. Petersburg 1905.

² *Compiled Information on Russia, 1890*, CIX.

³ *Compiled Information on Russia, 1896*, table CXXVII.

⁴ *Ibid.*

years 1891 and 1892 (52,900,000 and 50,500,000 rubles respectively), and the last two years (1896, 51,600,000 rubles, and 1897, 65,500,000 rubles) ¹

The latest statistics show an even greater development of the savings banks. In 1904, over the whole of Russia there were 6,557 savings banks with 5,100,000 depositors and total deposits amounting to 1,105,500,000 rubles. Incidentally, we would like to say that the old Narodniks and the new opportunists in the socialist movement have more than once talked very naively (to put it mildly) about the increase in the number of savings banks being a symptom of the growing prosperity of the "people." Perhaps it will not be superfluous, for that reason, to compare the distribution of savings bank deposits in Russia (1904) with that in France (1900) (*Bulletin de l'Office du Travail*, 1901, No 10) ²

RUSSIA

<i>Deposits</i>	<i>No Depositors (thousands)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Total Deposits (million rubs)</i>	<i>%</i>
Up to 25 rubs.	1,870.4	38.7	11.2	1.2
25 to 100 rubs	967.7	20.0	52.8	5.4
100 to 500 rubs	1,380.7	28.6	308.0	31.5
Over 500 rubs	615.5	12.7	605.4	61.9
Total	4,834.3	100.0	977.4	100.0

FRANCE

<i>Deposits</i>	<i>No Depositors (thousands)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Total Deposits (mill. francs)</i>	<i>%</i>
Up to 100 fr	5,273.5	50.1	143.6	3.3
100 to 500 fr	2,197.4	20.8	493.8	11.4
500 to 1,000 fr	1,113.8	10.6	720.4	16.6
Over 1,000 fr	1,948.3	18.5	2,979.3	68.7
Total	10,533.0	100.0	4,337.1	100.0

What an amount of material is provided here for Narodnik Revisionist Cadet apologists! It is interesting to note, in passing, that in Russia also, depositors are divided into 12 occupations and professions and it appears that the largest amount of deposits is owned by those engaged in agricultural and rural occupations,

¹ *Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No 26

² *Bulletin of the Ministry of Labour*—Ed

viz, 228,500,000 rubles, and their deposits grow particularly rapidly. The village is becoming civilised and trading on the misery of the muzhiks is becoming very profitable.

But we will return to our immediate theme. As we see, the data indicates an enormous growth of commodity circulation and accumulation of capital. The manner in which the field for the investment of capital in all branches of national economy was created and the manner in which merchant capital was transformed into industrial capital, i.e., was invested in production and created capitalist relationships between those taking part in production, have been shown above.

II THE GROWTH OF THE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL POPULATION

We have already referred above to the fact that the growth of the industrial population at the expense of the agricultural population is an essential phenomenon in capitalist society in general. We have also examined the manner in which industry steadily becomes separated from agriculture. Now we have to sum up the main points of this question.

1 Growth of the Towns

The most striking expression of the process we are examining is the growth of the towns. The following table shows this growth in European Russia (50 gubernias) in the post Reform epoch.¹

¹ Figures for 1863 taken from *Statistical Times* (I, 1866) and *Military Statistical Abstract*. The figures of the urban population in the Orenburg and Ufa Gubernias have been corrected according to the tables of towns. The total urban population thus obtained is 6105,100 and not 6087,100 as given in the *Military Statistical Abstract*. The figures for 1885 are taken from *Compiled Information on Russia, 1884-85*. The figures for 1897 are those of the census taken on Feb. 9 (Jan. 28) 1897 (*First General Census of the Population of the Russian Empire, 1897*, Central Statistical Committee, St. Petersburg, 1897, parts 1 and 2). According to the census, the permanent urban population in 1897 was 11,830,500 i.e., 12.55 per cent of the total population. We have taken the available figures of the population of the towns. We would observe that we cannot be certain that the figures for 1863, 1885 and 1897 are quite comparable. For that reason we limit ourselves to comparing those relationships that are most common and deal separately with the data concerning the large towns.

Year	Population of European Russia (In Thousands)			% Urban Population	No of Towns with population				Population in Large Towns (In Thousands)				Population of 14 Towns That Were the Largest in 1863 (Thousands)
	Total	Urban	Rural		Over 200 000	100 000 to 200 000	50,000 to 100 000	Total Large Towns	Over 200 000	100 000 to 200 000	50,000 to 100 000	Total	
1863	61 420 5	6 105 1	55 315 4	9 94	2	7	10	13	891 1	119 0	883 4	1 693 5	1 741 9
1885	81 725 2	9 064 6	71 760 4	12 19	3	7	21	31	1 854 8	998 0	1 302 7	4 155 5	3 103 7
1897	94 215 4	12 127 1	81 088 3	12 76	5	9	30	44	3 238 1	1 177 0	1 982 4	6 397 5	4 266 3

Thus, the percentage of the urban population is constantly growing, the population is being withdrawn from agricultural occupations into commercial and industrial occupations¹ The population of the towns is growing twice as fast as the rest of the population, from 1863 to 1897, the total population increased 53 3 per cent, the rural population increased 48 5 per cent while the urban population increased 97 per cent Mr V Mikhailovsky estimated that during the eleven years (1885-97) "at least" 2,500,000 persons "migrated from the country into the towns,"² i.e., more than 200,000 per annum

The population of towns which are important industrial and commercial centres grows much more rapidly than the urban population generally The number of towns with a population of 50,000 and over more than trebled from 1863 to 1897 (13 and 44) In 1863, only 27 per cent of the total urban population (1,700,000 out of 6,100,000) were concentrated in such large centres, in 1885, however, it was 41 per cent (4,100,000 out of 9,900,000)³

¹ 'The number of urban centres of an agricultural character is very small and the number of inhabitants of such centres is quite insignificant compared with the total urban population' (G Grigoryev, *The Influence of Harvest and Grain Prices*, Vol II, p 126)

² *Novaya Slovo* [New Word] June, 1897, p 113

³ G Grigoryev quotes a table (*loc. cit.*, p 140) which shows that in 1885, 85 6 per cent of the towns had populations of less than 20,000, the population of these towns represented 38 per cent of the total urban population 12 4 per cent of towns (82 out of 660) had populations of less than 2 000 and these together represented 1 1 per cent of the total urban population (110,000 out of 9,962,000),

and in 1897 it was already more than half, about 53 per cent (6,400,000 out of 12,000,000) Thus, while in the 'sixties the urban population was mainly a population of not very large towns, in the 'nineties the large towns became predominant. The population of the 14 towns that were the largest in 1863 increased from 1,700,000 to 4,300,000, *i.e.*, an increase of 144 per cent, whereas the total urban population increased by only 97 per cent. Hence, the enormous growth of large industrial centres and the rise of a number of new centres is one of the characteristic features of the post Reform epoch

2 *The Significance of Internal Colonisation*

As we have already pointed out above (chap 1, par 2, p 17 18¹), theory arrives at the law of the growth of the industrial population at the expense of the agricultural population from the fact that in industry variable capital increases absolutely (the increase of variable capital implies an increase in the number of industrial workers and an increase in the total commercial and industrial population), whereas in agriculture the "variable capital required for the exploitation of a certain piece of land decreases absolutely" "Consequently," adds Marx, it "cannot increase unless new land is taken into cultivation, which implies a still greater previous growth of the non agricultural population"² Hence it is clear that the phenomenon of the growth of the industrial population may be observed in its pure form only in an already inhabited territory in which all the land is already occupied. The inhabitants of such a territory, who are forced out of agriculture by capitalism, have no other alternative but to migrate to industrial centres or to other countries. But the situation is entirely different in a territory in which not all the land is occupied and which has not been entirely populated. The inhabitants of such a territory, who are forced out of agriculture in a populated district, may migrate to an uninhabited part of that territory and "take new land into cultivation" The result will

¹ *Collected Works*, Vol. III, Russian edition—Ed

² Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, p 747—Ed

be an increase in the agricultural population, and this increase may be (for a certain time) not less, if not more, rapid than the increase in the industrial population. In that case, we will have two different processes: 1) the development of capitalism in the old, populated country or part of the country, 2) the development of capitalism in the "new land." The first process will express the further development of capitalist relationships that have already arisen, the second will express the rise of new capitalist relationships on new territory. The first process implies the development of capitalism in depth, the second implies the development of capitalism in breadth. Obviously, if these two processes are confused it must inevitably lead to a wrong conception of the process which withdraws the population from agriculture into commercial and industrial occupations.

Post Reform Russia gives us an example of both these processes taking place simultaneously. In the beginning of the post Reform epoch, in the 'sixties, the southern and eastern outlying territories of European Russia were largely unpopulated, and there was an enormous stream of emigration to these places from the central agricultural districts of Russia. This formation of a new agricultural population on new territory obscured to a certain degree the process of withdrawing the population from agriculture into industry that was taking place at the same time. In order to demonstrate this special feature of Russia by means of the statistics on the urban population, the 50 gubernias of Russia must be divided into separate groups. We will quote the figures of the urban population in 9 districts in European Russia in 1863 and in 1897 (See table on page 349).

For the question we are interested in, the data for three regions are the most important, *viz*, 1) the non agricultural industrial (11 gubernias in the first two groups, including the two capital gubernias¹). This is the region from which there is the least

¹That we are right in grouping the capital gubernias with the non agricultural gubernias we have taken, is proven by the fact that the population of the capitals is augmented chiefly by migrants from the gubernias mentioned. According to the St. Petersburg census of Dec. 27 (15) 1890, there were in that city 726,000 peasants and urban dwellers of these, 544,000, *i.e.*, three fourths, were peasants and urban dwellers who came from the 11 gubernias which we put in group 1.

migration to other regions, 2) the central agricultural (13 gubernias in group 3) This is the region from which migration was very considerable, partly to the region just mentioned, but particularly to the following group, 3) the outlying agricultural districts (nine gubernias in group 4), which have been colonised in the post Reform epoch. As will be seen from the table, the percentage of the urban population in all these 33 gubernias differs very little from that of the urban population in the whole of European Russia.

In the first region, the non agricultural or industrial, we observe a particularly rapid rise in the percentage of the urban population from 14 per cent to 21.1 per cent. The increase in the rural population is very small, almost half of that for the whole of Russia. On the other hand, the growth of the urban population is considerably above the average (105 per cent as against 97 per cent). If comparison is made with West European industrial countries (as is sometimes done in Russia), then comparison should be made with these regions alone, for they alone are in approximately similar conditions to those of the industrial capitalist countries.

In the second region, the central agricultural, we see an entirely different situation. The percentage of the urban population is very low and grows more slowly than the average. The increase in the population, both urban and rural from 1863 to 1897 is much below the average for Russia. This is to be explained by the fact that there has been an enormous stream of migration from this region to the outlying regions. According to the calculations made by Mr V. Mikhailovsky, from 1885 to 1897 about 3,000,000 persons left this region, i.e., more than one tenth of the population.¹

In the third region, the outlying districts, we see that the increase in the percentage of the urban population is slightly below the average (from 11.2 per cent to 13.3 per cent, i.e., in the proportion of 100:118, whereas the average is 99.4:127.6 i.e., a proportion of 100:128). Nevertheless, not only was the growth of the urban population in this region not below the average, but

¹ *L.c.*, p. 109. "This movement has no parallel in the modern history of Western Europe." (Pp. 110-11.)

DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA

223

Groups of Gubernias in European Russia	Groups of Gubernias in European Russia	Population in Thousands				Per Cent Urban Population		Per Cent Increase Population 1863 to 1897	
		1863		1897		1863	1897	Total	Rural
		Total	Rural	Urban	Total				
I. The Capital Gubernias	I. The Capital Gubernias	2,738.4	1,680.0	1,058.4	4,541.0	38.2	56.2	65	18
II. Industrial and Non-Agricultural	II. Industrial and Non-Agricultural	9,890.7	9,165.6	725.1	12,701.8	7.3	8.6	29	26
III. The Capital Gubernias, Non-Agricultural and Industrial	III. The Capital Gubernias, Non-Agricultural and Industrial	11,126.29	11,084.56	1,783.5	17,292.8	14.1	21.1	36	25
IV. Little Russia and Middle Volga	IV. Little Russia and Middle Volga	13,204,91.9	18,792.5	1,699.4	28,251.4	8.3	9.8	38	30
V. Novorossia, Lower Volga and Eastern	V. Novorossia, Lower Volga and Eastern	9,540.3	8,472.6	1,067.7	18,386.4	11.2	13.3	92	87
Total first four groups	Total first four groups	33,42,661.3	38,110.7	4,550.6	63,930.6	10.5	13.9	49	44
V. Baltic Gubernias	V. Baltic Gubernias	3,181.23	1,602.6	209.7	2,387.0	11.5	20.3	31	11
VI. Western Gub	VI. Western Gub	6,548.5	4,940.3	608.2	10,126.3	9.1	11.8	82	88
VII. South-West. Gub	VII. South-West. Gub	3,548.7	4,982.8	500.9	9,605.5	9.1	9.2	75	74
VIII. Urals	VIII. Urals	2,435.9	2,216.5	142.7	6,086.0	3.2	4.7	39	37
IX. Far Northern	IX. Far Northern	3,155.0	1,462.5	93.0	2,080.0	5.9	5.8	33	34
Grand Total	Grand Total	50,61,420.5	50,315.4	6,105.1	94,215.4	9.94	12.75	53.3	48.5
Gubernias in above-mentioned groups: I) St. Petersburg and Moscow II) Vladimir, Kaluga, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Yaroslavl III) Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Penza, Poltava, Ryazan, Saratov, Simbirsk, Tambov, Tula, Kharkov, Chernigov IV) Astrakhan, Bessarabia, Don, Ekaterinodar, Oranienburg, Samara, Taurida, Kherson, Ufa V) Courland, Latvia, Esthonia VI) Vilna, Vitebsk, Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, Mogilev VII) Volhynia, Podolsk, Kiev VIII) Viatka, Perm IX) Archangel, Vologda, Olonets									

considerably above (+134 per cent as against +97 per cent) Hence, there has been a very considerable withdrawal of the population from agriculture into industry, but this has been obscured by the enormous increase in the agricultural population as a result of migration, in this region the rural population increased by 87 per cent as compared with the average of 48.5 per cent for the whole of Russia. In certain gubernias the obscuring of the process of industrialisation of the population is still more striking. For example, in the Taurida Gubernia the percentage of the urban population in 1897 was the same as that in 1863 (19.6 per cent) and in the Kherson Gubernia, the percentage actually declined (from 25.9 per cent to 25.4 per cent), in spite of the fact that the growth of the towns in both these gubernias only slightly lagged behind the growth of the capitals (+131 per cent and +135 per cent as compared with +141 per cent in the two capital gubernias). Hence, the rise of a new agricultural population on new territory leads, in turn, to a considerable increase in the non agricultural population.

3 *The Growth of Factory, Commercial and Industrial Towns and Villages*

In addition to the towns, importance as industrial centres also attaches firstly to suburban districts, which are not always counted as towns and which spread to an increasing area around the big towns, secondly, to factory settlements and villages. Such industrial centres¹ are particularly numerous in the industrial gubernias in which the percentage of the urban population is extremely low.² The district figures given in the preceding table of the urban population show that in nine industrial gubernias this percentage in 1863 was 7.3 and in 1897, 8.6. This is explained by the fact that the commercial and industrial population of these gubernias is concentrated mainly, not in the towns, but in the in

¹ Cf. chap. VII, section VIII, and supplement III to chap. VII [*Collected Works*, Vol. III—Ed.]

² On the significance of this circumstance, which has already been pointed out by Korsack cf. the very just remarks of Mr. Volgin (*L.c.*, pp. 215-16.)

dustrial villages Among the "towns" in the Vladimir, Kostroma, Nizhni Novgorod and other gubernias, there are not a few which have three or two or only one thousand inhabitants, whereas there are "villages" in which factory workers alone number two, three and even five thousand In the post Reform epoch, justly observes the compiler of the *Review of the Yaroslav Gubernia* (part II, p 191), "the towns began to grow much faster, and they were joined by the growth of settlements of a new type, a type midway between a town and a village—factory centres" We have already quoted data showing the enormous growth of these centres and the number of factory workers concentrated in them We have seen that there are not a few centres of this kind in all parts of Russia, not only in the industrial gubernias, but also in the South In the Urals the percentage of the urban population is the very lowest in the Vyatka and Perm Gubernias, 3·2 per cent in 1863 and 4·7 per cent in 1897 But here is an example of the relative size of the "town" and industrial population in the Krasnoufmsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, the urban population numbers 6,400 (1897), whereas, according to the Zemstvo census (1888-91), the population of the factory section of the uyezd numbers 84,700, of whom 56,000 are not at all engaged in agriculture and only 5,600 obtain their livelihood mainly from the land In the Ekaterinburg Uyezd according to the Zemstvo census, 65,000 of the population are landless and 81,000 have only grass land Hence, the industrial non urban population in *two* uyezds alone is larger than the urban population of the whole gubernia (in 1897, 195,600!)

Finally, in addition to factory settlements, significance as industrial centres attaches to commercial and industrial villages, which are either at the head of large "*kustar*" districts, or have rapidly developed in the post Reform epoch owing to their situation on the banks of rivers, near railway stations, etc Several examples of these were given in chap VI, section II, and we noted the fact that such villages, like the towns, attracted the rural population and that they are distinguished by the great amount of literacy among the population¹

¹ How numerous in Russia are the villages which represent important centres of population may be judged from the following (if obsolete) data

We will quote as a further example data for the Voronezh Gubernia in order to show the relative importance of urban and non urban industrial and commercial centres of population. The *Svodni Zbornik*¹ for the Voronezh Gubernia gives a combined table showing groups of *villages* in eight uyezds in the gubernia. In these eight uyezds there are eight towns with a total population of 56,149 (in 1897). Of the villages four have a total of 9,367 households with a total population of 53,732, i.e., they are much larger than the towns. In these villages there are 240 commercial and 404 industrial establishments. Of the total number of households, 60 per cent do not cultivate land at all, 21 per cent work the land with hired labour or let it on a share-cropping basis. 71 per cent own no draught animals or farm implements, 63 per cent buy bread all the year round, 86 per cent are engaged in various trades. In placing the whole of the population in these places in the commercial and industrial category, not only do we not exaggerate, but, on the contrary, we minimise the magni-

given in the *Military Statistical Abstract* in the 'sixties it was estimated that in 25 gubernias in European Russia there were 1,334 villages having more than 2,000 inhabitants. Of these 108 had populations ranging from 5,000 to 10,000, 6 had from 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants, one from 15,000 to 20,000 and one had over 20,000 (P. 169). In all countries, and not only in Russia, the development of capitalism has led to the rise of new industrial centres which are not officially included in the category of towns. "The distinction between town and village is becoming obliterated near growing industrial towns this takes place because industrial enterprises and workers' houses move out to the suburbs of the town, near declining small towns this takes place because the latter merge with the surrounding villages and also because of the development of large industrial villages."

The distinction between the urban and rural districts is becoming obliterated because of the rise of numerous intermediary types that are formed. Statisticians have long ago recognised this and have abandoned the historical-juridical concept of the town and adopted instead the statistical concept which divides centres of population solely according to the number of inhabitants" (Bücher, *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft* [*The Rise of National Economy*] Tübingen, 1893, pp. 296-97 and 303-04.) Russian statistics lag behind European statistics in this respect. In Germany and in France (cf. *Statesman's Yearbook*, pp. 536-474) towns having more than 2,000 inhabitants are regarded as populated centres and in England they come under the category of "net urban sanitary districts," i.e. factory villages, etc. Hence, Russian data on the "urban" population are quite incomparable with European.

¹ *Handbook*—Ed. Eng., ed.

tude of the latter, for in these eight uyezds, 21,956 households do not cultivate land at all. Nevertheless, in the agricultural gubernia that we have taken, the commercial and industrial population outside of the towns is found to be not less than that of the towns.

4 *Non Agricultural Migratory Trades*

But even by adding to the towns the commercial and industrial villages and settlements, we do not account for the total industrial population of Russia. The lack of freedom to move from place to place, and the isolation imposed on the village commune by the estate system fully explains the remarkable feature of Russia that to the industrial population must be added a fairly considerable section of the rural population which obtains its livelihood by working in industrial centres and which spends part of the year in these centres. We refer to the so called non agricultural migratory trades. From the official point of view, these "traders" are peasant tillers of the soil merely seeking "subsidiary occupations," and the majority of the Narodnik economists, without troubling to think the matter over, adopted this point of view. After what has been said above, there is no need to prove in detail how unsound this point of view is. At all events, however much opinions may differ on this point, there cannot be the slightest doubt that it expresses *the attraction of the population from agriculture into commercial and industrial occupations*.¹ The extent to which this fact alters our conception of the size of the urban industrial population may be seen from the following example. In the Kaluga Gubernia the percentage of the urban population is lower than the average for the whole of Russia (8.3 per cent as against 12.8

¹ Mr N—on has completely failed to observe the process of industrialisation of the population in Russia! Mr V V noticed it and admitted that the growth of migratory trades expresses the attraction of the population away from agriculture (*The Destiny of Capitalism* p 149) however he not only failed to include this process in his conceptions of the 'destiny of capitalism' but tried to obscure it by lamenting the fact that 'there are people who think that all this is quite natural' (for capitalist society? Can Mr V V imagine capitalism without this phenomenon?) "and almost desirable" (*Ibid*) It is desirable without the 'almost', Mr V V!

per cent) The *Statistical Review* for that gubernia for 1896 calculates the number of months migratory workers are absent from their homes according to the number of passports issued. From this calculation it appears that the total number of months is equal to 1,491,600, divided by twelve this will give a total of 124,300 persons absent, i.e., 'about 11 per cent of the total population' (Lc, p. 46). Add this population to the urban population (1897 97,900), and the percentage of the industrial population will be very considerable.

Of course a certain part of the non agricultural migratory workers are registered as permanent town dwellers and are also included in the population of the non urban industrial centres to which we have already referred. But only a part, because owing to the migratory character of this section of the population, it is difficult to include them in the census of separate centres. Moreover, the registration of the population usually takes place in the winter, whereas most of these migratory workers leave their homes in the spring.

The following are the figures for some of the principal gubernias from which migration takes place for non agricultural occupations.¹

DISTRIBUTION OF IDENTITY CERTIFICATES ISSUED
(Gubernias—Per Cent)

Season	Moscow (1885)		Tver (1897)		Smolensk (1893)		Pskov (1893 Passports)		Kostroma (1883)		
	Males	Females	Males and Females		Males	Females	Males	Females	Males		Passports and Identity Cert.
									Passports	Identity Certificates	
Winter	19.3	18.6	22.3	22.4	20.4	19.3	16.2	16.2	17.3		
Spring	32.4	32.7	38.0	34.8	30.3	27.8	43.8	40.0	39.4		
Summer	20.0	21.2	19.1	19.3	22.0	23.2	15.4	20.4	20.4		
Autumn	27.8	27.4	20.0	23.5	26.7	29.7	24.6	22.8	17.0		
Total	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

¹ Identity Certificates Issued to the Peasant Population of the Moscow Gubernia in 1880 and 1885. *Statistical Yearbook of the Tver Gubernia*,

Everywhere, the largest number of passports are issued in the spring. Hence, a large section of workers who are temporarily absent are not included in the census of the towns.¹ But it would be far more correct to include even these temporary town dwellers in the urban population than in the rural population.

'A family which obtains its livelihood in the course of the year or for the greater part of the year in the town has far more reason to regard the town which secures its existence as its place of domicile than the village with which it has only family and fiscal ties.'²

The enormous significance these fiscal ties have to this very day can be seen from the fact, for example, that among the migratory workers of Kostroma

"there are very few who get for it (their land) "any part of the tax they have to pay usually they let it and the only terms they get are that the tenant undertakes to put a fence around it the owner pays all the taxes himself" (D Zhbenkov *Babya Storona*, Kostroma 1891, p. 21)

In the *Review of the Yaroslav Gubernia* also (Vol II, Yaroslavl, 1896) we find repeated references to the fact that the migratory workers have to ransom themselves from the village and their allotment.³ (Pp. 28, 48, 149, 150, 166 *et sup.*)

1897 Zhbankov *Migratory Occupations in the Smolensk Gubernia*, 1896 *Ibid The Influence of Migratory Occupations etc Kostroma* 1897 *Occupations of the Peasant Population in the Pskov Gubernia* Pskov, 1898. The mistake in the percentages in the Moscow Gubernia could not be corrected because the absolute figures were not given. In regard to the Kostroma Gubernia only uyezd figures were available and then only in percentages. We had, therefore, to take the average of the uyezd figures and that is why we give the figures for Kostroma separately. In regard to the Yaroslav Gubernia it is calculated that 68.7 per cent of the migratory workers are absent the whole year round, 12.6 per cent are absent in the autumn and winter and 18.7 per cent in the spring and summer. We will observe that the figures for the Yaroslav Gubernia (*Review of the Yaroslav Gubernia*, Vol II Yaroslavl 1896) are not comparable with the preceding figures because they are based on the reports of the priests and not on the number of passports issued.

¹ It is known, for example, that in the summer the suburban population of St. Petersburg increases very considerably.

² *Statistical Review of the Kaluga Gubernia*, 1896 Kaluga 1897, p. 10, section II.

³ "Migratory occupation is a form which conceals the uninterrupted process of growth of the towns. Communal land tenure and the various

How large is the number of non agricultural migratory workers? The number of workers engaged in all kinds of migratory occupations is not less than 5 to 6 millions. In fact, in 1884, in European Russia, about 4,670,000 passports and identity certificates were issued,¹ and revenues from passports increased from 1884 to 1894 by more than one third (from 3,300,000 to 4,500,000 rubles). In 1897 the total number of passports and identity certificates issued in Russia was 9,495,700 (of which 9,333,200 were issued in the 50 gubernias in European Russia). In 1898 the number issued was 8,259,900 (European Russia, 7,809,600).²

special features of financial and administrative life in Russia do not enable the peasant to become a town dweller as easily as in the West. Juridical threads maintain his (the migratory worker's) ties with his village but, as a matter of fact, by his occupation, habits and tastes he has become completely assimilated with the town and, not infrequently he regards his ties with his village as a burden" (*Russkaya Mysl* [*Russian Thought*], 1896, No 11, p. 228). This is very true, but it is not enough for a publicist. Why did not the author speak out openly for complete freedom to move from place to place for the freedom of the peasant to leave the village commune? Our liberals are still afraid of our Narodniki but there is no need to fear them at all.

We will quote for the purpose of comparison the argument of Mr Zhibankov, who sympathises with the Narodniki. "Migratory occupations in the towns are, as it were a lightning conductor (sic!) 'that guards against the too rapid increase of the capitals and big cities and the increase in the urban and landless proletariat. Both from the sanitary as well as from the social and economic point of view, migratory occupations should be regarded as useful as long as masses of the people are not divorced from the land, which provides the migratory workers with some security of existence' (from which "security" they pay money to release themselves!), "these workers will never become the blind instruments of capitalist production, and at the same time the hope is retained of organising agricultural-economic communes. (*Yuridicheski Vestnik* 1890 No 9, p. 145). Is not the retention of petty bourgeois hopes very useful, indeed? As for the "blind instruments," the experience of Europe and all the facts observed in Russia show that this qualification applies infinitely much more to the worker who maintains contact with the land and with patriarchal relationships than to the worker who has broken these ties. The figures and facts quoted by Mr Zhibankov himself show that the "Petersburg" migratory worker is more literate cultured and developed than the settled Kosromian in some "forest" uyezd.

¹ L. Vesin *The Significance of Migratory Occupations, etc.*, *Dyelo*, 1886, No 7, and 1887, No 2.

² *Statistics of Industries Subject to Excise Duty, etc.*, 1897-98. St. Petersburg, 1900. Published by the Chief Administration of Non Assessed Taxes.

Mr S Korolenko calculated that the superfluous workers (compared with local demand) in European Russia numbered 6,300,000. Above (chap III, sec IX), we saw that for the 11 agricultural gubernias the number of passports issued exceeded Mr Korolenko's calculations (2,000,000 as against 1,700,000). Now we can add the figures for 6 non agricultural gubernias, Mr Korolenko gives the number of superfluous workers in these at 1,287,800, but the number of passports issued is 1,298,600¹. Thus in 17 gubernias of European Russia (11 in the Black Earth Region and 6 in the non Black Earth region) there are, according to Mr Korolenko, 3,000,000 superfluous workers (compared with the local demand). In the 'nineties, however, the number of passports and identity certificates issued in these 17 gubernias was 3,300,000. In 1891, these gubernias provided 52.2 per cent of the total revenue obtained from the issue of passports. Hence, in all probability the number of migratory workers is in excess of 6,000,000. Finally, the Zemstvo statistics (most of which are obsolete) led Mr Uvarov to the conclusion that Mr Korolenko's figures were approximate to the truth and that the figure of 5,000,000 "was highly probable"².

The question now arises: what is the number of the non agricultural and agricultural migratory workers? Mr N—on very boldly, but very mistakenly, asserts that "the overwhelming majority of peasant migratory occupations are agricultural" (*Outlines*, p. 16). Chaslavsky, to whom Mr N—on refers, expresses himself much more cautiously, he quotes no figures and limits himself to general remarks about the size of the districts from which the various types of workers migrate. The figures Mr N—on quotes on railway passenger traffic prove absolutely nothing, for the non agricultural workers also leave their homes mainly in the spring and, moreover, they travel by railway to a

¹ Gubernias: Moscow (1885 obsolete figures), Tver (1896), Kostroma (1892), Smolensk (1895), Kaluga (1895), Pakov (1896). Sources given above. Figures refer to all absences male and female.

² *The Journal of Public Hygiene and Juridical and Practical Medicine*, July, 1896. Mr Uvarov: *The Influence of Migratory Occupations on the Sanitary Conditions of Russia*. Mr Uvarov calculated the statistics for 126 uyezds in 20 gubernias.

much larger extent than do the agricultural workers.¹ We, on the contrary, are of the opinion that the majority (although not the "overwhelming" majority) of the migratory workers are probably non agricultural. This opinion is based on 1) the returns showing the distribution of revenue from the issue of passports, and, 2) Mr Vesin's figures. Flerovsky on the basis of the returns for 1862-63 on the distribution of the revenues from "miscellaneous duties" (more than one third of these were obtained from the issue of passports), had already come to the conclusion that the greatest migration of peasants in search of work was from the capital gubernias and non agricultural gubernias.² If we take the 11 non agricultural gubernias which we grouped together above (point 2) into one region, from which the overwhelming majority of those who leave are non agricultural workers, we will see that in 1885 these gubernias contained only 18.7 per cent of the population of all of European Russia (in 1897, 18.3 per cent), whereas, in the same year they produced 42.9 per cent of the revenues from the issue of passports (in 1891, 40.7 per cent).³ There are many other gubernias from which non agricultural workers migrate, and we must therefore come to the conclusion that agricultural workers represent less than half of the total migratory workers. Mr Vesin distributes 38 gubernias in European Russia (in which 90 per cent of migration permits were issued) into groups according to the particular form of migration that predominates in them, and gets the following results.⁴ [See table on next page.]

¹ This has been dealt with in greater detail in a preceding footnote at the beginning of part IX, "Wage Labour in Agriculture."—Ed.

² *The Conditions of the Working Class in Russia*. St. Petersburg, 1869, p. 400 et sup.

³ Figures of revenue from the issue of passports taken from *Compiled Information on Russia* for 1884-85 and 1896. In 1885 the revenue from the issue of passports in European Russia amounted to 37 rubles per thousand inhabitants, in the 11 non agricultural gubernias, 86 rubles per thousand inhabitants.

⁴ We have ourselves added the two last columns in the table. Group I includes Archangel, Vladimir, Vologda, Vyatka, Kaluga, Kostroma, Moscow, Novgorod, Perm, St. Petersburg, Tver, Yaroslavl; Group II includes Kazan, Nizhni Novgorod, Ryazan, Tula, Smolensk. Group III includes Bessarabia, Volynia, Voronezh, Ekaterinoslav, Don, Kiev, Kursk, Orenburg, Orel, Penza, Podolsk, Poltava, Samara, Saratov, Simbirsk, Taurida, Tambov,

Groups of Gubernias	No Migration Permits Issued in 1884 (in thousands)			Population in 1885 (in thous)	Permits per Thous Pop
	Passports	Ident Cert	Total		
I 12 Gub in Which Non Agric Migration Predominates	967 8	794 5	1 762 3	18 643 8	94
II 5 Gub Intermed iary	423 9	209 5	723 4	8,007 2	90
III 21 Gub In Which Agric Migration Pre dominates	700 4	1 046 1	1 746 5	42,518 5	41
38 Gubernias	2 092 1	2 140 1	4 232 2	69 169 5	61

These figures show that migratory occupations are more developed in the first group than in the last. They also show that the variation in the duration of absence from home on migratory occupations corresponds to the variations in the groups. In the group in which non agricultural occupations predominate the periods of absence are very much longer (*Dyelo* 1886 No 7 p 134)

Finally, the statistics of industries subject to excise duty, etc, mentioned above, enable us to distribute the number of identity certificates issued among the whole of the 50 gubernias of European Russia. Making the above mentioned corrections to Mr Vesin's grouping, and dividing the 12 gubernias, for which figures are not available for 1884, among these groups (group I, Olonets and Pskov Gubernias, group II, the Baltic and Northwest nine gubernias, group III, Astrakhan Gubernia), we get the following

Ufa Kharkov Kherson Chernigov We would observe that this grouping is not quite correct since it exaggerates the importance of agricultural migration. Smolensk, Nizhni Novgorod and Tula Gubernias should go in group I (*Cf Agricultural Review of Nizhni Novgorod Gubernia for 1896*, chap XI, *Handbook of Tula Gubernia for 1895* section VI p 10. In the latter the number of those leaving on migratory occupations is given as 188 000, whereas Mr Korolenko calculated that there were only 50 000 superfluous workers! Moreover, from the six northern non Black Earth uyezds 107 000 migratory workers leave.) Kursk Gubernia should go into group II (S Korolenko loc from seven uyezds the majority who leave are artisans and from the remaining eight all leave for agricultural work). Unfortunately, Mr Vesin does not give figures of the number of permits to leave according to gubernia

<i>Groups of Gubernias</i>	<i>Total Ident 1897</i>	<i>Cert Issued 1898¹</i>
I 17 Gubernias in Which Non Agricultural Migratory Occupations Predominate	4 437 392	3 369 597
II 12 Intermediary Gubernias	1 886,733	1 674 231
III 21 Gubernias in Which Agricultural Occupations Predominate	3 009,070	2,765 762
Total 50 Gubernias	9 333,195	7 809 590

According to these figures migratory occupations are much more considerable in the first group than in the third

Thus, there is not the slightest doubt that the mobility of the population is incomparably greater in the non agricultural part of Russia than in the agricultural part. The number of non agricultural migratory workers must be greater than that of the agricultural migratory workers *and cannot be less than three million*

The enormous and increasing growth of migratory occupations is confirmed from all sources. Revenue from the issue of passports increased from 2,100,000 rubles in 1868 (1,750,000 rubles in 1866) to 4,500,000 rubles in 1893-94, i.e. more than doubled. The number of passports and identity certificates increased as follows: Moscow Gubernia, from 1877 to 1885 by 20 per cent (males) and 53 per cent (females), Tver Gubernia, from 1893 to 1896 by 5.6 per cent, Kaluga Gubernia, from 1885 to 1895 by 23 per cent (and the number of months of absence, by 26 per cent), Smolensk Gubernia, from 100,000 in 1875 to 117,000 in 1885 and to 140,000 in 1895, Pskov Gubernia, from 11,716 in 1865-75 to 14,944 in 1876 and to 43,765 in 1896 (males). In the Kostroma, 23.8 passports per hundred males were issued in 1868 and 0.85 per hundred females. In 1880 the respective figures were 33.1 and 2.2, etc., etc.

Like the attraction of the population away from agriculture into the towns, non agricultural migratory occupations represent

¹ Incidentally, the author of the review of these statistics (*loc. cit.* chap. VI p. 639) ascribes the diminution in the number of passports issued in 1898 to the diminution in the number of workers who migrated in the summer to the southern gubernias, owing to the bad harvest and to the spread of the use of machines in agriculture. This explanation is absurd because the diminution in the number of passports issued was least in Group III and most in Group I. Are the methods of registration in 1897 comparable with those in 1898? [Footnote to second edition.]

a *progressive phenomenon*. It tears the population out of the remote and backward places which history appears to have forgotten and draws them into the whirlpool of modern social life. It increases literacy among the population¹ and also its intelligence,² it cultivates cultured habits and requirements among them.³ The peasant is induced to seek migratory occupations by "motives of a higher order," i.e., the more developed and smarter appearance of the St. Petersburgers, they seek for places where "things are better."

'Life and work in St. Petersburg are considered to be easier than in the country.'⁴ 'All country folk are called *raw*, and the strange thing is that they do not appear to be offended at this but on the contrary, they refer to themselves as such and scold their parents for not sending them to St. Petersburg to learn a trade. It should be stated however, that these *raw* country people are not so raw as those in the purely agricultural districts, they unconsciously assume the airs and cultivate the habits of the St. Petersburgers, the light of the capital is refracted on them.'⁵

In the Yaroslavl Gubernia

"there is still another cause (in addition to the cases of people having become rich) which induces everyone to leave home, and that is—public opinion for a man who has not been to St. Petersburg, or to some other place, and who is engaged in agriculture or some hand!

¹ Zhbankov, *The Influence of Migratory Occupations etc.*, p. 36 et sup. The percentage of literacy among males in the uyezds in Kostroma Gubernia from which workers migrate is 55.9 in the factory uyezds, 34.9 in the settled (forest) uyezds, 25.8, females, 3.5 per cent, 2.0 per cent, 1.3 per cent children of school age, 1.44 per cent 1.43 per cent, 1.07 per cent respectively. In the migratory uyezds the children also go to school in St. Petersburg.

² The literate St. Petersburgers take greater care of their health so that infectious diseases do not have such a fatal effect among them as in the *less cultured volosts* (author's italics) (*Ibid.* p. 34).

³ "The migratory uyezds are superior to the agricultural and forest districts in regard to their mode of life. The clothes of the St. Petersburgers are much cleaner, smarter and more hygienic. The children are kept cleaner and for that reason the itch and other skin diseases are not so frequent among them" (*Ibid.*, p. 89 Cf. *Migratory Occupations in the Smolensk Gubernia*, p. 8). 'The migratory villages differ very much from the settled villages: houses, clothes, habits, entertainments remind one more of town life than of village life' (*Migratory Occupations in the Smolensk Gubernia*, p. 3). In the migratory volosts in the Kostroma Gubernia "one finds paper, ink, pencils and pens in half the houses." (*Babya Storona*, p. 68).

⁴ *Babya Storona*, pp. 26-27, 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

craft is dubbed a shepherd and this name sticks to him all his life such a man finds it difficult to obtain a wife" (*Review of Yaroslav Gubernia* II p 118)

Migration to the town raises the civic personality of the peasant, it liberates him from the abyss of patriarchal and personal relations of dependence and subjection which are so rife in the rural districts¹

A most important fact that fosters migration is the growth of consciousness of *per onality* among the people. Liberation from serf dependence, the fact that the more vigorous section of the rural population has long become assimilated to town life long ago roused the 'ego' in the Yaroslav peasant roused in him the desire to extricate himself from his condition of poverty and dependence to which life in the country dooms him and to aspire to a life of sufficiency independence and respect. The peasant who has earnings on the side feels more free in respect to equality with those belonging to other estates, and in many other respects and that is why the young people in the rural districts strive more and more to go into the town (*Review of Yaroslav Gubernia* II, pp 189 90)

Migration to the towns weakens the ties of the old patriarchal family, puts the woman in a more independent position, equal with that of the man

Compared with settled localities *families in the Soligalich and Chukhloma Uyezds* (the uyezds in which migration is greatest in the Kostroma Gubernia) *are much less closely knit* not only in regard to the patriarchal authority of the elder but also in regard to the relations between parents and children wife and husband. One cannot of course expect strong love for parents and attachment to the parental roof from sons who have been in St Petersburg from the age of twelve unconsciously they become *cosmopolitans* 'where things are good there is my fatherland'."²

'Accustomed to dispense with the authority and assistance of her husband, the Soligalich woman does not in the least resemble the wretched peasant woman in the agricultural districts. She is independent. Wife beating is a rare exception here. Generally speaking equality between man and woman is observed almost everywhere and in all things.'"³

¹ For example, among other things, the Kostroma peasant strives to be come registered in the *meshchyan* [or burger—*Ed Eng ed*] estate because of his liability to 'corporal punishment in his village which shocks the smartened St. Petersburg even more than the raw country dweller' (*Ibid* p 58)

² *Ibid*, p 88

³ *Yuridicheski Vestnik*, 1890, No 9, p 142

Finally, last but not least,¹ non agricultural migratory occupations raise the wages not only of those who migrate but also of those who *stay at home*

This is most strikingly reflected in the fact that, as wages in the non agricultural gubernias are higher than in the agricultural gubernias, the former attract rural workers from the latter.² Here are some interesting figures for the Kaluga Gubernia

Group of Uyezds According to Degree of Migration	% Migratory Males to Total Male Population	Wages per month in rubles	
		Industrial Mig Wrkr	Agr Lab on Yearly Contract
I	38.7	90	59
II	36.3	88	53
III	32.7	84	49

"These figures fully reveal the fact that 1) migratory occupations help to raise wages in agricultural occupations, 2) that they attract the best forces of the population."³

Not only are money wages increased but also real wages. In the group of uyezds from which no less than 60 out of every 100 workers are migratory workers, the average wage for a labourer working on yearly contract is 69 rubles or 123 poods of rye; in the uyezds in which from 40 to 60 per cent are migratory workers, the average wage is 64 rubles, or 125 poods of rye, in the uyezds in which less than 40 per cent are migratory workers, the average wage is 59 rubles or 116 poods of rye.⁴ In these groups of uyezds the number of complaints about the shortage of labour steadily diminishes in the following proportions: 58 per cent, 42 per cent and 35 per cent. In the manufacturing industries wages are higher than in agriculture, and "migratory occupations, according to the statements of numerous correspondents, stimulate the development of new requirements among the peasant population, tea, calico, boots, clocks, etc.), raise the general standard of living and in this way cause a rise in wages."⁵ Here is a typical statement by a correspondent

¹ "Last but not least" in English, in the Russian text.—Ed

² Cf chap IV, sec. IV, pp 202-08 Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol. III.—Ed

³ *Statistical Review of the Kaluga Gubernia*, 1896, part II, p 48

⁴ *Ibid.*, part I, p 27

⁵ *Ibid.*, p 41

'The shortage (of labour) is always complete and the reason for this is the fact that the suburban population is spoilt they work in the railway workshops and serve on the railways. The proximity of Kaluga and the bazars cause the surrounding inhabitants to gather there constantly to sell eggs milk etc followed by orgies of drunkenness at the inn the reason for this is that the whole population strives to get jobs at high salaries with little to do. To live as an agricultural labourer is regarded as a *disgrace* all strive to get to the town where they represent the proletariat and hooligan elements meanwhile the country side suffers from a shortage of capable and healthy labourers.¹

We are quite justified in describing this appreciation of migratory occupations as a *Narodnik* appreciation. Mr Zhbakov, for example, after pointing out that it is not the superfluous but the "necessary" workers who leave and whose places are taken by agricultural labourers from other districts, thinks that it is "obvious" that "such mutual replacement is very disadvantageous" ² [or whom, Mr Zhbakov?

'Life in the capitals cultivates many *cultural habits of a tawdry kind* and an inclination to luxury and finery which results in a useless (sic!) 'waste of money',³ expenditure on this finery is largely 'unproductive' (11)

Mr Hertzenstein positively weeps over the "ostentatious culture," the "riot of revelry," "carousing," "orgies of drunkenness and cheap debauchery," etc.⁴ Moscow statisticians use the fact that

¹ *Ibid*, p. 40. Authors italics.

² *Babya Storona*, pp. 89 and 8. "Will these real tillers of the soil' (from other districts), "by their well-to-do standard of living have a sobering influence upon the native population who regard as their source of livelihood not the land, but migratory occupations?" (Page 40) 'Incidentally' the author remarks sadly above we quoted an example of the very opposite taking place. This is the example. The inhabitants of Velogda bought land and lived "very prosperously" 'In reply to the question I put to a peasant from Gryaznovetsk as to why, although he was well to do, he allowed his son to go to St Petersburg, he said 'It's quite true that we are not poor, but life is very drab at our place and my son, seeing others go, wanted to educate himself even at home he was the learned one.' (P. 25) Poor Narodnik! How can they help deploring this example of well to do peasants muzhiks able to buy land, but unable to 'sober' the youth who desiring to educate themselves, flee from the 'allotment that secures them their livelihood'!

³ *The Influence of Migratory Occupations etc*, p. 33, Authors italics

⁴ *Yuridicheski Vestnik*, 1890, No. 9, p. 138.

⁵ *Russkaya Mysl*, 1887, No. 9, p. 163

there is mass migration as an argument to prove the necessity for "measures that would diminish the need for migratory occupations"¹ Mr Karyshev talks about migratory occupations in the following way

Only an increase in the land holdings of the peasants to a size sufficient to provide the main (!) requirements of their families can solve this very serious problem of our national economy.²

And it never occurred to any one of these magnanimous gentlemen that before talking about "solving very serious problems," it is necessary to secure complete liberty to move from place to place for the peasants, liberty to give up their land and to leave the village commune, liberty to settle (without having to pay "ransom") in any urban or rural community in the state they please!

* * *

Thus the attraction of the population away from agriculture is reflected in Russia in the growth of the towns (which is partly obscured by internal colonisation), suburbs, factory and commercial and industrial villages and settlements, and also in non agricultural migratory occupations. All these processes, which have rapidly developed and which are rapidly developing in the post Reform epoch, are necessary constituent parts of capitalist development and are of profoundly progressive significance compared with the old forms of life.

III INCREASE IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE LABOUR

Perhaps the most important point to consider in the question of the process of development of capitalism is the spread of wage labour. Capitalism is the stage in the development of commodity production in which labour becomes a commodity. The main tendency of capitalism is for the whole of the labour power of national economy to be applied in production only after it has

¹ *Identity Certificates etc.*, p. 7

² *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1896, No. 7, p. 18. Thus the "main" requirements are to be met by means of the allotment and the rest, apparently, by means of "local occupations" to be obtained in the countryside which "suffers from a shortage of capable and healthy labourers."

been purchased by *entrepreneurs*. We tried above to examine, in detail, the manner in which this tendency manifested itself in post Reform Russia, and now we must sum up the question. First of all, we will count up the figures of the number of sellers of labour power we quoted in preceding chapters and then (in the next section) we will deal with the purchasers of labour power.

The sellers of labour power comprise the working population of the country who are engaged in the production of material values. It is estimated that this section of the population numbers about 15,500,000 adult male workers.¹ In chapter II we showed that the lower group of the peasantry represents nothing more nor less than the rural proletariat, and we there observed (in a foot note) that the forms in which this proletariat sells its labour power would be examined later. We will now sum up the categories of wage labourers previously enumerated: 1) Agricultural wage workers. These number about 3,500,000 (in European Russia). 2) Factory, mine and railway workers, 1,500,000. Total, 5,000,000 professional wage workers. Then come 3) Building workers, about 1,000,000. 4) Lumber workers (tree fellers, log rollers, etc.), workers engaged on navvying, building railways, loading and unloading goods and all kinds of "unskilled" labour in industrial centres. These number about 2,000,000.² 5) Workers employed by capitalists in their own homes and also working for wages in the manufacturing industries that are not included in the "factory industries." These number about 2,000,000.

Total—about ten million wage workers. Of this number we

¹ The figures given in the *Abstract of Statistical Materials, etc.* (published by the Office of the Committee of Ministers, 1894) is 15 546 618. This figure is arrived at in the following way: the urban population is taken to be equal in number to the population not participating in the production of material values. The adult male peasant population is reduced by 7 per cent (4.5 per cent in military service and 2.5 per cent in the service of the *mir*).

² We saw above that lumber workers alone are estimated at 2 000 000. The total number of workers employed in the last two forms of occupation we have enumerated must be larger than the total number of non agricultural migratory workers, for a part of the building workers, unskilled labourers and particularly the lumber workers, are local and not migratory workers. And we have seen that the number of non agricultural migratory workers is not less than 3 000,000.

will deduct, say, one fourth women and children,¹ which leaves *seven and a half million adult male wage workers, i.e., about half of the total adult male population engaged in the production of material values.*² A part of this enormous number of wage workers has completely abandoned the land, and obtains its livelihood entirely by selling its labour power. This includes the overwhelming majority of the factory workers (and undoubtedly also of mine workers and railwaymen), a certain section of building workers, sailors and unskilled labourers, and finally, not an inconsiderable section of workers engaged in capitalist manufacture and those inhabitants of the non agricultural districts who work in their own homes for capitalists. The other section, which is the larger section, has not yet abandoned the land, but covers part of its needs with the produce of its farms, which it conducts on tiny plots of land and, consequently, it represents the type of wage worker with an allotment which we tried to describe in detail in chap II. We have already shown that this enormous mass of wage workers has sprung up mainly in the post Reform epoch and that it is continuing to grow rapidly.

It is important to note the significance of our conclusion in the question of relative over population (or of the reserve army of unemployed) created by capitalism. The figures of the total number of wage workers in all branches of national economy very strikingly reveal the fundamental error the Narodnik economists commit in this question. As we have already had occasion to observe in another place (*Studies*, pp 38-42),³ this mistake lies in the fact that the Narodnik economists (Messrs V V, N—on, and others), who talk a great deal about capitalism “freeing” the

¹ As we have seen, in the factory industries women and children represent a little over one fourth of the total number of workers employed. In the mining, building, lumber industries, etc. few women and children are employed. On the other hand they are probably more numerous than men in capitalist domestic industry.

² In order to avoid any misunderstanding we will observe that we do not claim that these figures are exact and that they can be proved by statistics. We merely desire to show approximately the great variety of forms of wage labour and how numerous are its representatives.

³ Cf. *Collected Works*, Vol II—Ed

workers, never thought of investigating the concrete forms of capitalist overpopulation in Russia, it lies also in the fact that they totally failed to understand that the very existence and development of capitalism in our country demand an enormous reserve army of labour. By means of pitiful words and curious calculations of the number of "factory" workers,¹ they transformed one of the fundamental conditions for the development of capitalism into an argument to prove that capitalism was impossible, a mistake, groundless, etc. As a matter of fact, however, Russian capitalism could never have developed to its present level, could not have survived a single year had not the expropriation of the small producers created a vast army of wage workers ready at the first call to satisfy the maximum demand of the employers in agriculture, forestry, building, commerce, in the manufacturing, mining, transport, etc., industries. We say the maximum demand advisedly, because capitalism can develop only in leaps and consequently the number of producers desiring to sell their labour power must always exceed capitalism's average demand for labour power. Although we have just counted up the various categories of wage workers, we did not intend to imply that capitalism can employ them constantly. There is not and there cannot be constant employment in capitalist society for any category of wage workers. Of the millions of wandering and settled workers, a certain section is always in the reserve army of unemployed, and this reserve army swells to enormous dimensions in years of crisis, or, as the result of the decline of an industry in any particular district, or if there is a particularly rapid expansion in the employment of ma-

¹ We will recall Mr N—on's argument about the "handful" of workers, and also Mr V V's truly classical calculations, as follows (*Outlines of Theoretical Economics* p. 131). In 50 gubernias in European Russia there are 15,547,000 adult male workers belonging to the peasant estate, of these, "united by capital," 1,020,000 (860,000 in factory industries and 160,000 railway workers); the rest comprise the "agricultural population." With the "complete capitalisation of the manufacturing industries" 'capitalist factory industry' will employ twice as many workers (133 per cent in place of 76 per cent, while the remaining 86.7 per cent of the population 'will remain on the land and be idle during half the year'). "Comment would only spoil the impression created by this remarkable sample of economic science and economic statistics."

clunery which dispenses with workers, or it contracts to a minimum at other times, which even gives rise to the "shortage" of labour about which employers in certain branches of industry, in certain years, in certain parts of the country, sometimes complain. It is impossible to calculate even the approximate number of unemployed in an average year owing to the complete absence of statistics that are at all reliable, but there can be no doubt that the number must be very large. This is evidenced by the extreme fluctuations in capitalist industry, trade and agriculture, to which repeated reference has been made above, and by the usual deficits in the domestic budgets of the peasants in the lower groups revealed by the Zemstvo statistics. The increase in the number of peasants who are driven into the ranks of the industrial and agricultural proletariat and the increase in the demand for wage labourers are two sides of the same medal. The forms of wage labour vary very greatly in capitalist society, which is still entangled on all sides by survivals and institutions of the pre capitalist regime. It would be a profound mistake to ignore this variety of forms, and this is the very mistake that is made by those who, like Mr V V, argue that capitalism has "carved out for itself a corner with a million or a million and a half of workers and never emerges from it."¹ They have in mind, not capitalism, but large scale machine industry alone. But how arbitrarily and artificially this million and a half of workers have been fenced off into a special "corner" which, it is alleged, is in no way connected with any other branch of wage labour! As a matter of fact, this connection is a very close one, and to characterise it it is sufficient to mention the two main features of the present economic system. 1) the fact that the basis of this system is the money system. The "power of money" manifests itself with full force in industry, in agriculture, in the towns and in the country, but only in large scale machine industry does it reach its full development, does it squeeze out completely the remnants of patriarchal economy, it becomes concentrated in a few, gigantic institutions (banks) and becomes directly linked up with large

¹ *Novoye Slovo*, 1896, No. 6, p. 21

scale social production 2) The present economic system is based on the purchase and sale of labour power Take even the smallest producers in agriculture, or in industry, and you will see that those who do not hire themselves out, or do not hire others, are the exception But here again, these relationships reach full development and become completely separated from previous forms of economy only in large scale machine industry Hence, the "corner," which seems to the Narodniki to be so very small, really embodies the quintessence of modern social relationships, and the population of this "corner," i.e., the proletariat, is only, in the literal sense of the word, the vanguard of the whole mass of the toilers and exploited¹ Therefore, only by examining the whole of the present economic system from the point of view of the relationships that have arisen in this "corner" is it possible to understand the main interrelationships between the various groups of persons taking part in it and to trace the main trend of development of this system On the other hand, those who turn their backs on this "corner" and examine economic phenomena from the point of view of petty patriarchal production are converted by the progress of history either into innocent dreamers or into ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie and the agrarians.

IV THE FORMATION OF THE HOME MARKET FOR LABOUR POWER

To sum up the data quoted above on this question, we will confine ourselves to describing the manner in which the workers move across European Russia We are able to obtain this descrip-

¹ *Mutatis mutandis* the same thing may be said in regard to the relation between wage workers in large scale machine industry and the rest of the wage workers, as was said by the Webbs in regard to the relations between trade unionists and non-trade unionists 'the trade unionists numbered at this date (1891) about 20 per cent of the adult male manual working class.' But the trade unionists include, as a general rule, the picked men in each trade The moral and intellectual influence which they exercise on the rest of their class is, therefore, out of all proportion to their numbers. Sidney and Beatrice Webb *The History of Trade Unionism*

[Lenin quotes these passages in German from the German edition they will be found in the original on pp. 424 and 443, 1920 edition.—Ed. Eng. ed.]

tion from the data published by the Department of Agriculture,¹ which is based on the evidence of employers. A description of the movements of the workers will give us a general idea of the manner in which the home market for labour power is formed. In utilising the data mentioned, our aim was only to draw a distinction between the movements of agricultural and non agricultural workers, although in the chart which is appended to this volume of data and which illustrates the movements of the workers, this distinction is not made.

The main streams of migration of agricultural workers are as follows: 1) From the central agricultural gubernias to the southern and eastern regions; 2) From the northern Black Earth gubernias to the southern Black Earth gubernias, while from the latter there is a stream of migration to the outlying regions (Cf chap III, sec IX, p 104 and sec X, p 108); 3) From the central agricultural gubernias to the industrial gubernias. (Cf chap IV, sec IV, pp 202-08.) 4) From the central and southwestern agricultural gubernias to the sugar beet plantations (even workers from Galicia migrate to this district).

The main streams of migration of non agricultural workers are: 1) To the capitals and the large towns, mainly from the non agricultural gubernias but to a considerable degree also from the agricultural gubernias; 2) To the industrial districts to the factories in the Vladimir, Yaroslav and other gubernias, from the same districts mentioned above; 3) Migration to the new centres of industry or to new branches of industry, to non factory industrial centres, etc. These include: a) the beet sugar refineries in the southwestern gubernias, b) the southern mining districts, c) dock labouring (Odessa, Rostov on Don, Riga, etc.), d) the peat beds in the Vladimir and other gubernias, e) the mining districts in the Urals, f) fisheries (Astrakhan, the Black Sea,

¹ *Agricultural and Statistical Information Based on Material Obtained from Employers*, Vol V, *Free Wage Labour on Privately Owned Farms and the Migration of Workers in Connection with the Agricultural and Industrial Statistical Economic Review of European Russia*, compiled by S. A. Korolenko, published by the Department of Agriculture, St Petersburg, 1892.

² Cf *Collected Works*, Vol III.—Ed

Azov Sea, etc), g) shipping, lumbering, etc , h) work on the railways, etc

These are the main streams of migration mentioned by employers as exercising more or less material influence upon the conditions of hiring labour in the various localities. In order to appreciate the significance of these movements better, we will compare them with the data on wages in the various districts from which and to which the workers migrate. We will confine ourselves to 28 gubernias in European Russia which we will divide into six groups according to the character of the migrations and we will get the following (see table on next page)¹

This table clearly reveals the basis of the process that creates the home market for labour power and, consequently, the home market for capitalism. Two districts, those capitalistically most developed, attract the main mass of the workers: the district of agricultural capitalism (the southern and eastern regions), and the district of industrial capitalism (the capitals and the industrial gubernias). Wages are lowest in the districts from which migration takes place, in the central agricultural gubernias, which are distinguished for the fact that capitalism, both in agriculture and in industry, is least developed there.² In the districts to which

¹ The other gubernias have been left out in order not to complicate the matter by including data which do not contribute anything new to the subject. Moreover, these gubernias are either situated off the main routes of mass migration (Urals, the North) or bear special ethnographical and administrative and juridical features (the Baltic gubernias, the gubernias in the Jewish pale of settlement, White Russia, etc). The figures are taken from the publication mentioned above. The wages quoted are the average according to gubernia: the summer wages for day labourers represent the average for three seasons: sowing, hay making and grain harvest. Districts 1 to 6 include the following gubernias: 1) Taurida, Bessarabia and Don; 2) Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Samara, Saratov, Orenburg; 3) Simbirsk, Voronezh, Kharkov; 4) Kazan, Penza, Sambov, Ryazan, Tula, Orel, Kursk; 5) Pskov, Novgorod, Kaluga, Kostroma, Tver, Nizhni Novgorod; 6) St. Petersburg, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Vladimir.

² Thus, the peasants flee in masses from those districts where patriarchal economic relationships are most in evidence where *otrabotki* and primitive forms of industry are most preserved to those districts in which the "pillars" of the old society have completely decayed. They flee from "peoples' industry" and refuse to listen to the chorus of voices from "Society" calling after them to return. In this chorus two voices can be distinguished from the rest: "Not tied down enough!" is the threatening voice of the Black Hundred Sobakevich; "Their allotment is not big enough!"

Regions According to Character of Migration	Average Wages 10 Years (1881-1891)					Extent of Migration		
	Yearly Contract		% of Money Wages of Total	Seasonal Workers (Summer)	Day Labourers' (kop)	Agricultural		Non-Agricultural
	Not Including Board	Including Board				Migration to	Migration from	Migration to
		1 rubles						
1. To Which Agricultural Migration is Very Great	93.00	143.50	64.3	55.67	32	About 1 Million Workers	-	Considerable Number to Mining Districts
2. To Which Agricultural Migration is Very Great from Which, Small	69.80	114.40	62.6	47.30	63	About 1 Million Workers	Inconsiderable Number	-
3. From Which Agricultural Migration is Considerable, to Which, Small	58.67	100.67	53.2	41.50	43	Inconsiderable Number	More than 300 000 Workers	Inconsiderable Number
4. From Which Very Great Migration, Mostly Agric. but Also Non Agric.	51.50	92.95	55.4	35.61	47	-	More than One and a half Million Workers	-
5. From Which Very Great Non-Agric. Mig., to Which Agric. Mig. Small	62.13	112.43	56.4	41.00	53	Inconsiderable Number	Very Small Number	About One and a Quarter Million
6. To Which Non-Agric. Migration is Very Great, Agric. Mig. Fairly Considerable	79.40	135.80	58.7	53.00	64	Fairly Considerable Number	-	Very Great Number (in the Capitals)

1. Out of which they have to provide their own food.

migration takes place, however, wages rise in all branches of work, the percentage of money wage to the total, *i.e.*, the replacement of natural economy by money economy, increases. The intermediary districts which are situated between the districts to which migration is greatest (and wages are highest) and the districts from which migration takes place (and where wages are lowest) reveal the mutual replacement of workers to which reference was made above, the workers leave the district in such large numbers that a shortage of labour is created, and this attracts workers from "cheaper" gubernias.

In essence, the two-sided process of attracting the population away from agriculture into industry (the industrialisation of the population) and of the development of commercial industrial capitalist agriculture (industrialisation of agriculture), demonstrated in the preceding table, sums up, as it were, all that has been said above on the question of the formation of a home market for capitalist society. The home market for capitalism is created by the parallel development of capitalism in agriculture and industry,¹ the formation of a class of rural and industrial *entrepreneurs*, on the one hand, and of a class of rural and industrial wage workers, on the other. The main streams of migration of workers show the main forms of this process, but they do not show all the forms. Above we have shown that the forms of this process differ in peasant and landlord economy, differ in the different districts of commercial agriculture, differ in the different stages of the capitalist development of industry, etc.

is the polite echo of the Cadet Manilov [The two names mentioned are those of characters in Gogol's *Dead Souls*; Sobakovich is the type of brutal, cunning and grasping landlord. Manilov is the type of sentimental landlord whose mind is filled with phantastic projects which he never tries to carry out. The words "Black Hundred" and "Cadet" were added to the footnote to the second edition.—Ed.]

¹ Theoretical political economy established this truth long ago. Apart from Marx who pointed directly to the development of capitalism in agriculture as a process which creates the 'home market for industrial capital' (*Capital*, Vol. I, chap. XXIV, part 5), we will refer to Adam Smith. In chap. XI of Book I and chap. IV of Book III of his *Wealth of Nations* he pointed to the most characteristic features of the development of capitalist agriculture and noted that this process ran parallel with the process of growth of the towns and the development of industry.

To what extent the picture of this process is distorted and confused by the representatives of Narodnik political economy is seen particularly clearly in sec VI, part II, of Mr N—on's *Outlines*, which bears the remarkable heading "The Influence of the Redistribution of the Social Productive Forces Upon the Economic Position of the Agricultural Population" This is how Mr N—on pictures this "redistribution" to himself

" In capitalist society an increase in the productive power of labour results in the liberation of a corresponding number of workers who are compelled to seek other employment as this takes place in all branches of production and this liberation takes place over the whole surface of capitalist society the only thing left open for these workers is to resort to the instrument of labour of which they have not yet been deprived, viz the land " (P 126.) Our peasants possess land, and for this reason it is to the land that they turn their efforts Having lost their employment in the factory or being obliged to abandon their auxiliary domestic occupations, they see no other way out except to resort to the more intensified exploitation of the soil All the compiled Zemstvo statistics reveal the fact that the area under cultivation is increasing " (P 128)

Apparently, Mr N—on knows of a special type of capitalism which has never existed anywhere and of which not a single political economist ever could conceive Mr N—on's capitalism does not attract the workers away from agriculture into industry, it does not divide the agricultural population into two opposite classes Quite the contrary Capitalism "liberates" the workers from industry and there is nothing else left for "them" to do but to turn to the land, for "our peasants possess land"!! At the bottom of this "theory" which, with poetic abandon, "redistributes" all the processes of capitalist development in this original way, there lie the simple tricks common to all Narodniki, which we have already dealt with in detail previously they confuse the peasant bourgeoisie with the rural proletariat, they ignore the growth of commercial farming, they hatch stories about the "people's," "*kustar* industries" being isolated from "capitalist," "factory" industry, instead of analysing the consecutive forms and the variety of manifestations of capitalism in industry

V THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OUTLYING REGIONS HOME OF FOREIGN MARKETS?

In chapter I we showed how erroneous was the theory that links up the question of the foreign market for capitalism with the question of the realisation of the product (P 38 *et sup*¹) The fact that capitalism stands in need of a foreign market is explained, not by the impossibility of realising the product on the home market, but by the fact that capitalism is unable to repeat one and the same process of production in the same magnitude in unchanged conditions (as was the case under the pre-capitalist system), and that it inevitably leads to the unlimited growth of production which overflows the old, narrow limits of previous economic units. In view of the unevenness of development which is a feature of capitalism one branch of production surpasses the others and strives to extend beyond the boundaries of the old radius of economic relations. Take, for example, the textile industry at the beginning of the post-Reform epoch. Being fairly well developed capitalistically (manufacture, which was beginning to pass to the factory), it was in complete command of the market in Central Russia. But the big factories, which sprang up so rapidly, could not be satisfied with the previous dimensions of the market, they began to seek farther afield, among the new population that colonised Novorossia, the Southeast Volga region, North Caucasus, Siberia, etc. The effort on the part of the big factories to stretch out beyond the boundaries of the old markets cannot be doubted. But does that mean that the districts that served as these old markets could not absorb a larger quantity of textile goods? Does it mean that the industrial and central agricultural gubernias, for example, cannot absorb a larger quantity of manufactured goods? It does not. We know that the disintegration of the peasantry, the growth of commercial agriculture and the increase in the industrial population continued, and still continue, to enlarge the home market even in this old region. But the expansion of the home market is retarded by many circumstances (chiefly by the preservation of obsolete institutions which

¹ *Collected Works*, Russian Edition, Vol. III—Ed.

retard the development of agricultural capitalism) and the manufacturers will not, of course, wait until the other branches of national economy catch up to the textile industry in their capitalist development. The manufacturers must have a market at once, and if the backwardness of the other branches of industry restricts the market in the old district, they will seek for markets in another district, or in other countries, or in the colonies of the old country.

But what is a colony in the political economic sense? We have already stated above that, according to Marx, the main features of this concept are the following: 1) the existence of unoccupied, free land, easily accessible to settlers, 2) the existence of developed world division of labour, a world market thanks to which the colonies can specialise on the mass production of agricultural produce and receive in exchange finished manufactured goods "which, under other circumstances, they would have to manufacture themselves" (Cf p 195, chap IV, sec II¹). We have already pointed out in another place² that the southern and eastern outlying regions of European Russia which were colonised in the post Reform epoch bear these distinctive features and that they represent, in the economic sense, the colonies of Central European Russia. The term colony is still more applicable to the other outlying regions, for example, the Caucasus. The economic "conquest" of the Caucasus by Russia took place much later than its political conquest, and its complete economic subjugation has not been accomplished to this day. In the post Reform epoch there took place, on the one hand, the intensive colonisation of the Caucasus,³ the extensive ploughing up of the land by colonists

¹ *Collected Works* Vol III—Ed

² It was exclusively due to them due to these peoples forms of production, and on the basis of these forms that the whole of South Russia was colonised and became inhabited' (Mr N—on, *Outlines* p 284). How wonderfully broad and profound is the term: peoples forms of production! It covers everything and anything patriarchal peasant farming, *otrabotki*, primitive handicrafts: petty commodity production as well as those typically capitalist relations within the peasant commune which we have noted above from the data concerning the Taurida and Samara Gubernias (chap II), etc., etc

³ Cf article by Mr Semenov in *Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No 21, and the article by V Mikhailovsky in *Novoye Slovo*, 1897,

(particularly in the North Caucasus) who produced wheat, to tobacco, etc. for sale, and who attracted masses of rural wage workers from Russia. On the other hand, the ancient, native "kustar" industries were squeezed out by the competition of the manufactured goods brought from Moscow. The ancient gunsmith's craft declined as a result of the competition of Tula and Belgian weapons, the ancient smith's craft declined as a result of the competition of ironware brought from Russia and so also did the crafts of the coppersmith, goldsmith, silversmith, potter, soap boiler, tanner, etc.,¹ the kind of goods produced by all these craftsmen were produced more cheaply in the Russian factories, which sent their goods to the Caucasus. The manufacture of drinking horns and beakers declined as a consequence of the decline of the feudal system in Georgia and with it its historical feasts, the sheepskin hat industry declined as a result of the introduction of European clothing in place of Asiatic clothing, the manufacture of wineskins and wine jugs declined because for the first time the wine of this district began to be sold and in its turn to capture the Russian market, and thus gave rise to the barrel making industry. In this way, Russian capitalism drew the Caucasus into the sphere of world commodity circulation, obliterated its local peculiarities—the remnants of ancient patriarchal isolation—and *created for itself* a market for its goods. A country which was thinly populated at the beginning of the post-Reform epoch or populated by mountaineers who lived out of the course of world economy and even out of the course of history, was transformed into a land of oil traders, wine merchants, wheat growers and tobacco growers, and Monsieur Coupon ruthlessly divested the proud mountaineer of his picturesque national costume and dressed him in the livery of the European lackey (Gleb Uspensky). Simultaneously with the growth of the colonisation of the Caucasus and the accelerated growth of its agricultural population there was also a process (concealed by the

¹ Cf. article by K. Khattsov in Vol. II of *Reports and Investigations into the Kustar Industry*, and also an article by P. Ostyakov in Vol. V of *The Works of the Kustar Commission*.

latter growth) of attraction of the agricultural population into industry. From 1861 to 1897, the urban population of the Caucasus increased from 350,000 to 900,000 (the total population increased by 95 per cent from 1851 to 1897). There is no need for us to add that the same thing has taken place, and is taking place, in Central Asia, Siberia, etc.

Thus, the question naturally arises, where is the border line between the home and the foreign market? To take the political border line of a state would be too mechanical a solution, and would it be a solution? If Central Asia is a home market and Persia is a foreign market, then to which category do Khiva and Bokhara belong? If Siberia is a home market and China a foreign market, then to which category does Manchuria belong? Such questions are not of great importance, however. What is important is that the capitalist system cannot exist and develop without constantly extending its sphere of domination, without colonising new countries and without drawing ancient, non-capitalist countries into the whirlpool of world economy. And this feature of capitalism has strongly manifested itself and continues to manifest itself in post Reform Russia.

Hence, the process of the formation of a market for capital has two phases, viz, the development of capitalism in depth, as it were, i.e., the further growth of capitalism in agriculture and in industry in the given, definite and exclusive territory, and the development of capitalism in breadth, i.e., the extension of the sphere of domination of capitalism to new territory. In accordance with the plan of the present work, we have confined ourselves almost exclusively to the first phase of the process, and that is why we think it necessary to lay special emphasis at this point on the fact that the other phase is of extreme importance. Any thing like a complete study of the process of colonisation of the outlying regions and the expansion of Russian territory from the point of view of capitalist development would require a whole volume in itself. It is sufficient for us to observe here that Russia is in a particularly favourable position compared with other capitalist countries owing to the abundance of free and accessible

land for colonisation in its outlying regions¹ Apart from Asiatic Russia, we have in European Russia regions which, owing to their enormous distances and bad means of communication, are economically still weakly connected with Central Russia Take, for example, the "Far North"—the Archangel Gubernia This boundless territory and unlimited natural wealth is still exploited in a most insignificant degree One of the principal products of the region, timber, was until recently exported mainly to England In this respect therefore, this region of European Russia served as a foreign market for England without being a home market for Russia The Russian *entrepreneurs*, of course, envied the English *entrepreneurs*, and now, since the railway is being extended to Archangel, they are rejoicing in anticipation of the "rise in spirits and enterprising activity in various branches of industry in the region"²

VI THE "MISSION" OF CAPITALISM

We must now, in conclusion, sum up the question which in literature has come to be known as the "mission" of capitalism, i.e., of its historical role in the economic development of Russia To admit that this role is a progressive one is quite compatible

¹ The circumstance described in the text has another aspect The development of capitalism in depth in old long inhabited territories is retarded by the colonisation of the outlying regions The solution of the contradictions, which are a feature of capitalism and which capitalism gives rise to is temporarily postponed by the fact that capitalism can very easily develop in breadth For example, the simultaneous existence of the most advanced forms of industry and semi-medieval forms of agriculture undoubtedly is a contradiction If Russian capitalism were unable to expand beyond the limits of the territory it has occupied since the beginning of the post-Reform period this contradiction between capitalist large-scale industry and the archaic institutions in rural life (the tying down of the peasant to the land, etc.) would very soon have led to the abolition of these institutions and to the complete clearing of the path of agricultural capitalism in Russia But the possibility of seeking and finding a market in the outlying regions which are being colonised (for the manufacturer) the possibility of moving to new territories (for the peasants) softens this contradiction and retards its solution It goes without saying that such a retardation of the growth of capitalism is tantamount to preparing for an even greater and more extensive growth in the near future.

² *Productive Forces*, p. 12

(as we have tried to show in detail at every stage in our exposition of the facts) with the fullest admission of the negative and gloomy sides of capitalism, with the fullest admission of the inevitable, profound and all-sided social antagonisms which are a feature of capitalism and which reveal the historically transitional character of this economic system. It is the Narodniki who try with all their might to make it appear that if one admits that capitalism is historically progressive, one thereby becomes an apologist of capitalism, and it is precisely the Narodniki who underestimate (and sometimes ignore) the most profound contradictions of Russian capitalism, gloss over the disintegration of the peasantry, the capitalist character of the evolution of our agriculture, the rise of a class of rural and industrial wage workers with allotments, and gloss over the complete predominance of the lowest and worst forms of capitalism in the notorious 'kustar' industries.

The progressive, historical role of capitalism may be summed up in two brief postulates: increase in the productive forces of social labour and the socialisation of labour. But both these facts manifest themselves in very diversified processes in various branches of national economy.

The development of the productive forces of social labour is observed in complete relief only in the epoch of large scale machine industry. Until that high stage of capitalism was reached, handicraft and primitive technique was preserved and developed quite spontaneously and at a very slow pace. The post Reform epoch differs sharply from previous epochs in Russian history in this respect. The Russia of the wooden plough and the flail, of the water mill and hand loom, rapidly began to be transformed into the Russia of the steel plough and the threshing machine, of steam driven mills and looms. There is not a single branch of national economy that is subordinated to the capitalist mode of production in which a similarly complete transformation of technique has not been observed. Owing to the very nature of capitalism, this process of transformation cannot take place except through a series of unevennesses and disproportionalities: periods of prosperity alternate with periods of crisis, the development

of one branch of industry leads to the decline of another, the progress of agriculture affects one branch in one district and another branch in another, the growth of trade and industry is faster than that of agriculture, etc. A number of errors the Narodniki commit are due to their effort to prove that this disproportionate, sporadic, feverish development is not development.¹

Another feature of the development of the social productive forces by capitalism is that the growth of means of production (productive consumption) is much faster than the growth of individual consumption we have pointed out more than once how this manifests itself in agriculture and in industry. This feature is the result of the operation of the general laws of the realisation of the product in capitalist society, and is in complete harmony with the antagonistic nature of this system of society.²

¹ "Let us see what the further development of capitalism can bring us even if we could sink England to the bottom of the sea and take her place (Mr N—on *Outlines*, p. 210). The textile industry in England and America which supplies two-thirds of the world's requirements employs only a little over 600,000 persons. So that even if we succeeded in winning a considerable part of the world market capitalism would still be unable to exploit the whole mass of labour power which it is now continuously depriving of employment. What are 600,000 English and American workers compared with the millions of peasants who are idle for months?" (P. 211)

"History has existed up till now but it no longer exists." Up till now every step in the development of capitalism in the textile industry has been accompanied by the disintegration of the peasantry, by the growth of commercial agriculture and agricultural capitalism, by the attraction of the population from agriculture into industry by 'millions of peasants' turning to building, lumbering and many other kinds of non-agricultural occupations for hire, by the migration of masses of people to the outlying regions and the conversion of these regions into a market for capitalism. But all this took place up till now; now nothing like it takes place any more!

² Ignoring the significance of means of production and the lack of an analytical attitude toward "statistics" caused Mr N—on to give utterance to the following remarks which do not bear criticism: "all (!) capitalist production in the sphere of the manufacturing industries at best produce new values to an amount not exceeding 400 500 000 000 rubles" (*Outlines*, p. 328). Mr N—on bases this calculation on the returns of the three per cent and assessment tax without stopping to think whether such returns can cover 'the whole of capitalist production in the sphere of the manufacturing industries.' Moreover, he takes returns which (on his own admission) do not cover the mining industry, and yet he includes in "new values" only surplus value and variable capital. Our theoretician forgot that, in those branches of industry which produce goods for personal consump-

The socialisation of labour by capitalism manifests itself in the following processes. Firstly, the very growth of commodity production destroys the fragmental character of small economic units that is the feature of natural self-sufficing economy and unites the small local markets into an enormous national (and then into a world) market. Working for oneself is transformed into working for the whole of society, and the more capitalism is developed the greater is the contradiction between the collective character of production and the individualist character of the appropriation of the results of production. Secondly, in place of the formerly scattered production, capitalism creates production, both in agriculture and in industry, that is concentrated to a degree never witnessed before. This is the most striking and outstanding manifestation of the feature of capitalism that we are examining but it is not the only one. Thirdly, capitalism squeezes out the forms of personal dependence that were an inseparable part of preceding systems of economy. In Russia, the progressive character of capitalism in this respect is particularly marked, for in Russia the personal dependence of the producer existed (and partly continues to exist to the present day) not only in agriculture but also in the manufacturing industries ("factories" employing serf labour), in the mining industry, in the fishing industry, etc.¹ Compared with the labour of a dependent worker, constant capital also represents new values *for society* and is exchanged for the variable capital and surplus value of those branches of industry which produce means of production (mining industry, building, lumber, laying of railways, etc.). Had not Mr N—on confused the number of "factory" workers with the total number of workers capitalistically employed in the manufacturing industries, he would easily have observed the error of his calculations.

¹ For example, in one of the principal centres of the Russian fishing industry the Murmansk coast, the "ancient" and "time honoured" form of economic relationships was what was known as *pokrut* which was already established in the seventeenth century and continued almost without change right up to recent times. "The relations between the *pokruts* and their masters are not limited to the time they are employed on the contrary, they affect the whole life of the *pokruts* who are in a constant state of economic dependence on their masters" (*Compiled Material on Artels in Russia*, Vol II, St. Petersburg, 1874, p. 33). Fortunately, in this branch of industry also capitalism apparently "is contemptuous of its own historical past." "Monopoly is giving way to the capitalist organisation of fishing with free labourers" (*Productive Forces*, V, pp. 24.)

ent or bonded peasant, the labour of a free labourer is a progressive phenomenon in all branches of national economy. Fourthly, capitalism necessarily creates mobility among the population which was not required in previous systems of social economy and was impossible on any large scale under those systems. Fifthly, capitalism constantly diminishes the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture (in which the most backward forms of social and economic relationships usually predominate), and increases the number of large industrial centres. Sixthly, capitalism increases among the population the need for union, for association, and gives these associations a special character compared with associations in previous times. While breaking down the narrow, local estate associations of mediæval society and creating fierce competition, capitalism at the same time divides society into large groups of persons who occupy different positions in production, and gives a tremendous impetus to the organisation of the persons within each of these groups.¹ Seventhly, all the changes referred to, which capitalism brings about in the old economic system, inevitably lead also to a change in the spiritual make up of the population. The sporadic character of economic development, the rapid change in the methods of production and the enormous concentration of production, the disappearance of all forms of personal dependence and patriarchal relations, the mobility of the population, the influence of the big industrial centres, etc.—all this cannot but bring about a profound change in the very character of the producers, and we have already had occasion to note the observations of Russian investigators on this score.

Turning now to the Narodnik economists, with whose representatives we have constantly had to enter into controversy, we may sum up our differences with them in the following manner. First, we cannot but regard the Narodniks' conception of the process of development of capitalism in Russia and their conception of the system of economic relationships that existed in Russia before the rise of capitalism as being absolutely wrong. More-

¹ Cf. *Studies*, p. 91 footnote 85; p. 198 (Cf. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 95-96 and 276, Russian edition.—Ed.)

over, from our point of view, the fact that they ignore the capitalist contradictions in the peasant economic system (both in agriculture and in other peasant occupations) is particularly important. Furthermore, the question as to whether the development of capitalism in Russia is slow or rapid depends entirely upon what this development is compared with. If we compare the pre-capitalist epoch in Russia with the capitalist epoch (and this is precisely the comparison that should be made if a correct solution to the problem is to be found), then we will have to admit that the development of social economy under capitalism is extremely rapid. If, however, we compare the present rate of development with the rate that would have been possible at the modern level of technique and culture generally, then we would have to admit that the present rate of development of capitalism in Russia is really slow. Nor could it be anything else but slow, for there is not a single capitalist country in the world in which ancient institutions, which are incompatible with capitalism, which retard its development, which immeasurably worsen the conditions of the producers who "suffer from capitalism as well as from the insufficient development of capitalism," have survived in such abundance as they have survived in Russia. Finally, perhaps one of the greatest causes of difference between the Narodniki and ourselves is the difference in our fundamental views on social and economic processes. In studying the latter, the Narodniki usually try to draw some moral, they do not regard the various groups of persons taking part in production as the creators of certain forms of life, they do not try to picture to themselves the sum total of social and economic relationships as the result of the mutual relations between these groups, which have different interests and different historical roles. If the writer of these lines has succeeded in providing material that will assist in clearing up these questions, he will regard his labours as not having been in vain.

PART II

THE FIGHT FOR THE HEGEMONY OF THE PROLETARIAT

WHAT THE "FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE" ARE AND HOW THEY FIGHT AGAINST THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS*

(A REPLY TO ARTICLES IN *RUSSKOYE BOGATSTVO*¹
IN OPPOSITION TO THE MARXISTS²)

EXCERPT FROM PART I

"*RUSSKOYE BOGATSTVO*" has opened a campaign against the Social Democrats. As early as last year in issue No. 10, one of the chiefs of this journal, Mr N Mikhailovsky, announced the forthcoming "polemics" against "our so called Marxists, or Social Democrats." Then followed an article by Mr S Krivenko entitled *Our Cultural Freelances* (in No. 12), and one by Mr N Mikhailovsky entitled *Literature and Life* (in Nos. 1 and 2, *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894). The views of the journal itself on the economic situation in our country have been most fully expounded by Mr S Yuzhakov in an article entitled *Problems of the Economic Development of Russia* (In Nos. 10 and 12). While claiming to represent in their journal the ideas and tactics of true "friends of the people,"³ these gentlemen are bitter enemies of the Social Democrats. Let us examine these "friends of the people," their criticism of Marxism, their ideas and their tactics.

EXCERPT FROM PART III

We will now take up the political programme of the "friends of the people," to whose theoretical views we have, we think, devoted too much time already. By what means do they propose

¹ *Russian Wealth*—Ed. Eng. ed.

² Only the first paragraph of part I is given here in order to introduce the reader to the subject with which this pamphlet deals.—Ed.

³ This is what the Narodniki sometimes called themselves in the legal literature of the nineties of the last century.—Ed.

to "extinguish the conflagration"? What do they suggest as the way out, and why in their opinion is the solution proposed by the Social Democrats wrong?

"The reorganisation of the Peasants' Bank," says Mr Yuzhakov in an article entitled *The Ministry of Agriculture* (No 10, *Russkoye Bogatstvo*) "the establishment of a colonisation department, introducing order in the letting of state lands in the interest of national economy the study and straightening out of the problem of letting land—such is the programme for restoring national economy and for protecting it against the economic violence (*sic!*) of the rising plutocracy"

And in the article, *Problems of Economic Development*, this programme for "restoring national economy" is supplemented by the following "primary, but necessary measures"

the removal of all hindrances that now encumber the village commune the release of the village commune from tutelage, the adoption of communal tillage (the socialisation of agriculture) and the development of the communal working up of the raw materials obtained from the soil'

And Messrs Krivenko and Karyshev add

'cheap credit, the *artel*¹ form of farming, a guaranteed market, the opportunity to dispense with *entrepreneurs'* profit (this is dealt with separately below) the invention of cheaper engines and other technical improvements," and finally, exhibitions, warehouses, commission agencies'

Examine this programme and you will find that these gentle men wholly and entirely adopt the position of modern society (*i.e.*, the position of the capitalist system, which they do not realise) and want to make shift with darning and patching the system while failing to understand that all their progressive measures cheap credit, improved technique, banks, etc., can only serve to strengthen and develop the bourgeoisie.

N—on is quite right, of course, when he said—and this is one of his most valuable postulates, against which the "friends of the people" could not refrain from protesting—that no reforms on the basis of the present system are of any use, and that credit, colonisation, tax reform, the transference of all the land to the peasants, will not bring about any material change, but on the contrary, they can only serve to strengthen and develop capitalist

¹ Co-operative.—*Ed Eng ed.*

economy which at the present time is retarded by excessive "tutelage," the survivals of serf dues the attachment of the peasantry to the land, etc. Economists, he says, who, like Prince Vasilchukov (who, in his ideas, is undoubtedly a "friend of the people"), want the extensive development of credit, want the same thing as the "liberal," i.e., bourgeois economists, and "strive for the development and consolidation of capitalist relationships." They do not understand the antagonism within our relationships of production (among the "peasantry" as among the other estates) and instead of striving to bring these antagonisms to the light of day, instead of frankly taking their places beside those who are enslaved as a result of these antagonisms and helping them to rise to the struggle, they dream of putting an end to the struggle by measures which would satisfy all classes, measures calculated to conciliate and unite. The results of these measures are a foregone conclusion—it is sufficient to recall the examples of disintegration given above¹ to become convinced that these proposals for credit,² improvements, banks and similar "progressive" measures can only be of benefit to those who having well managed and well established farms, have "savings," i.e., the representatives of the insignificant minority, of the petty bourgeoisie. And however much you reorganise the Peasants' Bank and similar institutions, you will not in the least affect the fundamental and root fact that the mass of the population has been expropriated and continues to be expropriated for they have not the wherewithal to maintain an existence, let alone to run well managed farms.

¹ The examples referred to are quoted in the parts of this pamphlet not given in this volume. Cf. *Collected Works* Russian ed. Vol. I for disintegration among the peasantry see article *The Agrarian Problem in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* the first of Lenin's articles in this volume—Ld.

² The idea—of utilising credit as a means of fostering "national economy," i.e. the economy of small producers, while maintaining capitalist relationships (and the 'friends of the people,' as we have already seen can no longer deny the existence of these relationships)—is absurd, reveals a complete failure to understand the elementary truths of theoretical political economy and exposes the banality of the theories advanced by these gentlemen who try to sit between two stools.

The same thing may be said about "*artels*," "communal tillage" Mr Yuzhakov calls the latter "the socialisation of agriculture" Of course, this is merely funny because, in order to socialise, it is necessary to have organised production on a wider scale than is possible within the limits of a single village, because for this purpose it is necessary to expropriate the "bloodsuckers" who monopolise the means of production and who now rule Russian public economy And in order to expropriate the "bloodsuckers," it is necessary to fight, to fight and to fight and not to indulge in empty, philistine moralising

And for that reason such measures, when they advocate them, are transformed into mild, liberal half measures, nourished upon the generosity of the philanthropic bourgeois, and the harm they do by diverting the exploited from the struggle outweighs the good that might accrue from possible improvements for single individuals, which cannot but be paltry and precarious on the general basis of capitalist relationships The outrageous extent to which these gentlemen gloss over the antagonisms in Russian life—done, of course, with the best intentions in the world in order to put an end to the present struggle, *i.e.*, the very same intentions with which the road to hell is paved—is shown by the following argument advanced by Mr Krivenko "Intellectuals manage the manufacturers' enterprises and they can manage the people's industry"

The whole of their philosophy reduces itself to whining about the conflict and exploitation, but these "might" not be if there were no exploiters Whatever did the author want to say in the absurd sentence quoted above? Can it really be denied that the Russian universities and other educational establishments turn out year after year "intellectuals" (??) whose only concern is to find someone to feed them? Can it really be denied that the means whereby this "intelligentsia" can be maintained are owned at the present time in Russia only by the bourgeois minority? Will the bourgeois intelligentsia in Russia disappear because the "friends of the people" will say that they "might" serve other than the bourgeoisie? They "might" if they were not a bourgeois intelligentsia The intelligentsia "might" not have been a bourgeois

intelligentsia had there not been a bourgeoisie and capitalism in Russia! And there are people who spend their whole lives speculating as to what would be "if" this and "if" the other would be. Incidentally, these gentlemen not only refuse to attach decisive importance to capitalism, but in general refuse to see anything bad in capitalism. If certain "defects" were removed, they, perhaps, would not fare so badly under this system. How do you like the following statement made by Mr Krivenko

"Capitalist production and the capitalisation of trades by no means represent gates through which the manufacturing industry can only depart from the people. Of course it can depart, but it can also enter the life of the people and come closer to agriculture and the extractive industries. Various combinations are possible for this and these very gates, as well as others, can serve this purpose. (P. 161.)

Mr Krivenko has a number of very good qualities—compared with Mr Mikhailovsky, for example, frankness and straightforwardness. Where Mr Mikhailovsky would write whole pages of smooth and plausible phrases, wriggling round the subject without touching it, businesslike and practical Mr Krivenko hits straight from the shoulder and without any prickings of conscience spreads before the reader the complete absurdity of his views. "Capitalism may enter the life of the people"—if you please, *i.e.*, capitalism is possible without divorcing the toilers from the means of production! This is positively delightful! Now, at any rate, we can clearly picture to ourselves what the "friends of the people" want. They want commodity production without capitalism—capitalism without expropriation and exploitation, only with phillistinism peacefully vegetating under the roof of the humane landlords and liberal administrators. And they, with the serious men of a department official who intends to confer bounties on Russia, undertake to invent a system of society in which the wolves will never go hungry and the sheep remain whole. In order to get an idea of the character of these inventions we must turn to the article written by the same author in *Our Cultural Freelances*, No. 12.

"The *artel* and state form of industry," argues Mr Krivenko apparently under the impression that he has already been "called to solve practical economic problems," are not by any means all that one can think of in the present instance. For example, the following combination is possible."

And then he goes on to relate how a technician visited the editorial offices of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* and presented a scheme for the technical exploitation of the Don Oblast by a limited liability company, which was to issue shares in small denominations (not more than 100 rubles per share) It was suggested to the author that he 'modify his scheme approximately in the following way

"That the shares shall not belong to individual shareholders but to the village communes, that part of the population of the village communes that was to be employed in the enterprises of the company receive ordinary wages and the village communes guarantee that its connection with the land would be maintained

What administrative genius! With what wonderful simplicity and ease capitalism is introduced into the life of the people and all its pernicious attributes removed! All that is required is that the rural rich buy shares¹ through the village commune and receive dividends from the enterprises in which a "part of the population" will be employed and that the latter's "connection" with the land be guaranteed—a "connection" which does not secure a livelihood from the land (if it did, who would go to work for "ordinary wages"?), but is sufficient to tie a man to his locality, to enslave him to the local capitalist enterprise and deprive him of the opportunity of changing masters I am quite justified in saying master, capitalist, because whoever pays the toiler wages cannot be called anything else but a master

¹I say the rich are to buy the shares in spite of the author's proposal that the shares are to be owned by the village communes, because he does propose that the shares be purchased for money, and it is only the rich that have money Hence irrespective of whether the business will be conducted through the agency of the village commune or not only the rich will be able to pay in the same way as the purchase or renting of land by the commune does not prevent the rich from monopolising this land Besides, the dividends are to go to those who paid—otherwise the shares will not be shares, I take it that the author proposes that a certain share of the profits shall be earmarked for the purpose of guaranteeing the workers connection with the land' If the author has not this in mind (although this is what inevitably follows from what he says) but proposes that the rich pay the money for the shares but shall not take the dividends then all his scheme amounts to is that the rich shall share with the poor This puts one in mind of the proverbial device for killing flies first catch the fly, put it into a saucer containing fly killer, and the fly will die

Perhaps the reader will complain that I am dealing at such length with nonsense of this kind that, apparently, does not deserve having any attention paid to it at all. But excuse me. Although this is nonsense it is a type of nonsense that is useful and necessary to study because it reflects the actual social and economic relationships prevailing in Russia and, consequently, belongs to the very widespread public ideas prevalent among us and with which Social Democrats will have to contend for a long time to come. The point is that the transition from the self, feudal mode of production to the capitalist mode of production in Russia gave rise, and to some extent continues to give rise now, to a situation for the toilers in which the peasant, being unable to obtain a livelihood from the land and pay *the dues to the landlord (and he has to pay them to this very day)*, is compelled to seek "earnings on the side" which, at first, in the good old times, took the form either of some independent occupation (for example, carting), or some non-independent occupation, but which, owing to its extremely undeveloped state, was paid at a relatively tolerable rate. Compared with the present condition of the peasantry, this guaranteed the relative prosperity of the serf who peacefully vegetated under the care of one hundred thousand police officers and the rising unifiers of the land of Russia—the bourgeoisie.

And the "friends of the people" idealise this system, simply close their eyes to its dark sides, dream about it—"dream," because it has long ceased to exist, it has long ago been destroyed by capitalism which gave rise to the mass expropriation of the peasant tiller of the soil and transformed the former "earnings" into the unbridled exploitation of "hands" which are now being offered in abundance.

Our knights of philistinism want to preserve the peasant's "connection" with the land, but they do not want serfdom, which alone was able to guarantee this connection and which was broken only by the commodity system and capitalism, which made this connection impossible. They want earnings on the side that would not take the peasant away from the land, which—while working for the market—would not give rise to competition, which would

not create *capital* and would not enslave the masses of the population to this capital True to the subjective method in sociology, they want to "take" what is best from the one and the other, but, of course, this childish desire can only lead in fact to reactionary dreams which ignore realities, lead to a failure to understand and to utilise the really progressive, revolutionary sides of the new system it can only create sympathy for measures which perpetuate the good old system of semi serf, semi free labour—a system which contains all the horrors of exploitation and oppression, but which holds forth no possibility of escape from them

In order to prove that we are right in including the "friends of the people" among the reactionaries, we will quote two examples

The Moscow Zemstvo Statistics give a description of the farm owned by a certain Madame K (in Podolsk Uyezd) which (the farm, not the description) roused the admiration of the statisticians as well as of Mr V V, if my memory does not betray me (I remember that he wrote about it in a magazine article)

This much lauded farm owned by Madame K was regarded by Mr Orlov as a "thing which convincingly confirmed in practice" his favourite thesis that "where peasant agriculture is kept in good condition, there the landlords' farms are also conducted better" From what Mr Orlov says about this lady's estate, it appears that she runs her farm with the aid of the labour of the local peasants who till her land in return for the flour, etc., which she loans them in the winter Moreover, the lady treats these peasants with extraordinary kindness, helps them in their need, so that now these peasants are the most prosperous in the volost and they have bread now "to last them almost until the new harvest (formerly, they did not have enough to last them until St Nicholas day in the winter) "

The question arises, does "such a system exclude the antagonism of interests between the peasant and the landowner" as Messrs N Kablukov (Vol V, p 715) and V Orlov (Vol II, pp 55 59 *et sup*) think? Obviously not, because Madame K lives on the labour of her peasants Hence, exploitation is not abolished at all Madame K can be forgiven for failing to see the exploi

tation behind the kindness shown towards the exploited, but not so an economist and statistician who, in expressing admiration for the case we are discussing, take exactly the position taken by those *Menschenfreunde*¹ in Western Europe who admire the kindness shown by the capitalist toward the worker and go into raptures over cases of employers showing interest in the welfare of their workers by opening provision shops for them, providing dwellings, etc. To draw the conclusion from such "facts" (and therefore from such "possibilities") that no antagonism of interests exists means to fail to see the wood for the trees. That is the first point.

The second point is that we see, from what Mr Orlov relates, that Madame K's peasants, "thanks to excellent harvests (the landlady gave them good seeds), were able to acquire cattle" and their farms are "solvent." Let us assume that these solvent farmers have become not "almost," but completely solvent, that they have enough bread, not "almost" until the new harvest and not only the "majority," but that all of them have quite enough bread. Let us assume that these peasants now have enough land, that they have "meadows and pastures," which in fact they have not got at the present time (solvent, indeed!), for they have to rent these from Madame K in return for their labour. Does Mr Orlov really believe that then—*i.e.*, if peasant farming were really solvent—these peasants would agree to "perform all the work on Madame K's estate, thoroughly, punctually and quickly" as they do now? Perhaps the sense of gratitude towards the kind mistress who sweats the life out of solvent peasants with such maternal care will be a no less potent incentive than the present hopeless position of the peasants who cannot dispense with meadows and pastures?

Evidently, this is exactly what the "friends of the people" do think like the true ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie that they are, they do not want to abolish exploitation, but to assuage it, they want, not conflict, but conciliation. Their broad ideals, from the point of view of which they so zealously belabour the narrow minded Social Democrats, do not go beyond a "solvent" peasantry

¹ Friends of humanity—Ed

who perform their "duties" towards the landlords and capitalists if only the landlords and capitalists act justly towards them

Take the other example Mr Yuzhakov, in his rather well known article, *Norms of Popular Landownership in Russia* (*Russkaya Mysl*,¹ 1885, No 9), expounded his views on what the dimensions of "popular" landownership should be, i.e., to employ the terminology of our liberals, dimensions that will exclude capitalism and exploitation. Now, after the excellent explanation given by Mr Krivenko, we know that he too regarded things from the point of view of "introducing capitalism into the life of the people." As the minimum for "popular" landownership he took such allotments as would cover "requirements in grain and payments,"² while the rest could be obtained by "earnings." In other words, he deliberately reconciled himself to a state of affairs in which the peasant, while maintaining connection with the land, is subjected to a double exploitation—partly by the landlord on the "allotment," and partly by the capitalist when working for his "earnings." This state of the small producer who is subjected to double exploitation and whose conditions of life are such as to breed wretchedness and depression, which kill all hope, not only of victory for the oppressed class, but even the hope that they will fight—this semi mediæval state is the *non plus ultra* of the intellectual horizon and of the ideals of the "friends of the people." And when capitalism, which developed with tremendous rapidity throughout the whole of the post Reform history of Russia began to uproot this pillar of old Russia—the patriarchal, semi serf peasantry—to drag them out of these mediæval and semi feudal conditions and to put them into modern, purely capitalist conditions, to compel them to abandon their ancient habitations and to wander over the whole of Russia in search of

¹ *Russian Thought*—Ed Eng ed

² In order to show the relation between these outlays and the remaining part of the peasants' budget, I will quote the 24 budgets examined in the Ostogorsk Uyezd. The average expenditure of the family is 495.39 rubles (in kind and in money). Of this 109.10 rubles goes to maintain the cattle, 135.80 rubles is spent on vegetable food and taxes and the remaining 250.49 rubles on other expenses—non vegetable food, clothes implements, rent etc. Mr Yuzhakov puts the expenditure on the maintenance of the cattle to the account of the hay crop and auxiliary pastures.

employment, thereby breaking the chains of slavery to the local "employer," and showing what was the basis of exploitation in general, of class exploitation as opposed to depredations of a particular viper—when capitalism began to draw the rest of the peasant population, which had been reduced to the wretched and depressed condition of cattle, into the whirlpool of social and political life with all its growing complexities, our knights began to lament and moan about the decline and collapse of the old pillar of society. And even now they continue to lament and moan for the good old times, although one would think that only the blind would fail to see the revolutionary side of these new conditions of life, fail to see how capitalism is creating a new social force, which is in no way connected with the old regime of exploitation and which has the opportunity of fighting against it.

The "friends of the people," however, do not reveal a trace of desire for a radical change in contemporary conditions. They are entirely satisfied with liberal measures, to be applied on the present basis of affairs, and in the field of invention of such measures Mr Krivenko displays the genuine administrative capacities of a native pompadour.¹

'Generally speaking' he says, in urging the necessity for 'a detailed study and radical transformation of "our people's industry" ' 'this question calls for special study and industries must be divided into groups such as those which can be applied to the life of the people (*sic*!') and those that would encounter serious obstacles in their application to the life of the people.'

Mr Krivenko himself gives an example of how this division could be made, by dividing the various trades into those which are not being capitalised, those which have already been capitalised and those which can "contend with large scale industry for their existence."

"In the first case," this administrator decides, "small production can exist freely"—and be free of the market, the fluctuations of which disintegrate the small producers into a bourgeoisie and

¹ An unflattering reference made by the Russian author Saltikov Shchedrin, to petty minded tyrannical bureaucrats—*Ed Eng ed*

proletariat?—be free of the expansion of the local markets and their merging with the big market?—be free from the progress of technique? Perhaps this progress of technique—under commodity production—need not be capitalist? In the latter case, the author demands the “organisation of production also on a large scale

‘Clearly’ he says what is required here is the organisation of large scale production, basic and working capital machines, etc. or something else that will equal these conditions cheap credit, the removal of superfluous middlemen, the *artel* form of production and the opportunity of dispensing with *entrepreneurs* profits assured markets, the invention of cheaper engines and other technical improvements or finally a slight reduction in wages if this will be compensated by other benefits.”

This sort of reasoning is most highly characteristic of the “friends of the people” with their broad ideals in words and their stereotyped liberalism in deeds. As you see, our philosopher starts out from nothing more nor less than the opportunity to dispense with *entrepreneurs*’ profits and with the organisation of large scale production. Excellent this is *exactly* what the Social Democrats want. But how do the “friends of the people” want to achieve this? In order to organise large scale production without *entrepreneurs*, it is necessary, first, to abolish the commodity system of social economy and to replace it by the communal, communist system under which production will be regulated, not by the market, as it is at present, but by the producers themselves, by the society of workers, under which the means of production are owned, not by private individuals, but by the whole of society. Obviously, such a transition from the private form of appropriating the fruits of production to the communal form requires that *first of all, the forms of production* must be changed, that the scattered, small, isolated production of small producers be merged into a *single, social, productive process*, requires, in a word, the very material conditions which capitalism creates. But the “friends of the people” do not in the least intend to rely on capitalism. How then do they propose to act? They do not say. They do not even mention the abolition of the commodity system. evidently, their broad ideals cannot possibly extend beyond the limits of this system of social production. Moreover, in order to abolish *entre*

preneurs' profits, it will be necessary to expropriate the *entrepreneurs* who obtain their "profits" by having monopolised the means of production. And in order to expropriate these pillars of our fatherland, we must have a popular revolutionary movement against the bourgeois regime, a movement which only the proletariat, which is in no way connected with this regime, is capable of organising. But the "friends of the people" have no kind of struggle in mind and do not even suspect that other kinds of social workers are possible and necessary besides the administrative organ of the *entrepreneurs* themselves. Clearly, they have not the slightest intention of taking any serious measures against "*entrepreneurs' profits*." Mr Krivenko just blunted this out. And he immediately corrected himself: why, it is possible to "balance" such a thing as "the opportunity of dispensing with *entrepreneurs' profits*"—"with something else," namely, credit, organising a market, improved technique. Thus, everything is arranged in perfect order: instead of the abolition of the sacred right to take "profits," which would be highly displeasing to Messieurs the *entrepreneurs*, he proposed mild, liberal measures which can only serve to place better weapons for the struggle in the hands of the capitalist, which will only serve to strengthen, consolidate and develop our petty, "people's" bourgeoisie. And in order not to leave the slightest doubt that it is the interests of this petty bourgeoisie alone that the "friends of the people" champion, Mr Krivenko adds the following remarkable statement. It appears that the abolition of *entrepreneurs' profits* may be "balanced" "by a reduction in wages"!!! At first sight this would appear to be a slip of the pen, but it is not. It is the result of the logical reasoning of a petty bourgeois. The author observed a fact like the struggle between big capital and small capital, and as a true "friend of the people," he took the side of small capital. Moreover, he had heard that one of the most powerful weapons the small capitalist can use is to reduce wages—a fact which has been observed and confirmed in a large number of trades in Russia, in addition to lengthening the working day. And so, desiring at all cost to save the small capitalist, he proposes "a slight reduction in wages if this will be compensated by other benefits"!

Messieurs the *entrepreneurs*, about whose "profits" some queer things seem to have been said at first, can rest at ease. In fact, I think that they would be quite willing to appoint this brilliant administrator, who proposes to reduce wages as a measure *against* the *entrepreneurs*, as Minister of Finance.

Many more examples could be quoted to show that from behind the backs of the humane and liberal administrators of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* there peeps the pure blooded bourgeois, as soon as practical questions are raised. In the *Chronicle of Home Affairs* in No. 12 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, reference is made to monopoly.

"Monopoly and syndicate," says the author, "such are the ideals of developed industry." And then he expresses surprise that these institutions are appearing in Russia, although there is "no keen competition among the capitalists" here.

Neither the sugar nor the oil industries have by any means developed to any great extent yet. The consumption of sugar and the use of kerosene oil here are still in the embryonic stage to judge by the insignificant quantity of these goods consumed per head of the population compared with other countries. The field for the development of these branches of industry is still very large and can still absorb a large amount of capital.

It is characteristic that precisely on this, a practical question, the author forgot the favourite idea of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* about the contraction of the home market. He is compelled to admit that this market has the prospect of tremendous development before it and not of contraction. He arrives at this conclusion by a comparison with the West, where consumption is greater. Why? Because there is a higher level of culture there. But what is the material basis of this culture if it is not the development of capitalist technique, the growth of commodity production and exchange which bring people into more frequent intercourse with each other and which break down the mediæval isolation of separate localities? Was not the level of culture in France, for example, before the great revolution, before the semi mediæval peasantry had been split up into a rural bourgeoisie and proletariat, no higher than ours? Had the author examined Russian life more closely he would have observed, for example, that, in those localities where

capitalism is developed, the requirements of the peasant population are much higher than in the purely agricultural districts. This has been noted by all investigators of our "*kustar*" industry in all cases where this industry has developed so far as to put an industrial impress upon the whole life of the population.¹

The "friends of the people" pay no attention to "trifles" of this kind because they explain the thing "simply" by the level of culture or by the growing complexity of life generally, and they do not even take the trouble to inquire about the material bases of this culture and of this growing complexity of life. If they would at least examine the economics of our rural districts they would have to admit that it is precisely the disintegration of the peasantry into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat that creates the home market.

They must think that the growth of the market does not imply the growth of the bourgeoisie. "In view of the low development of production generally," continues the above mentioned chronicler of home affairs, "and the lack of enterprise and initiative, monopoly will still further retard the development of the *forces of the country*." Speaking of the tobacco monopoly, the author calculates that it "takes 154 million rubles out of *national circulation*." The author positively loses sight of the fact that the basis of our economic system is commodity production, the leaders of which, here as everywhere else, are the bourgeoisie. And instead of saying that monopoly badly affects the bourgeoisie, he says it badly affects the "country," instead of bourgeois commodity circulation, he says, "national" circulation.² A bourgeois is incapable of seeing the difference between these two terms, however great it may be. To show how obvious this difference is, I will quote from a magazine which enjoys great authority in the eyes of the "friends of the people," namely, *Otechestveniya Zapiski*.³

¹As an example I will quote the Pavlov '*kustars*' in comparison with the peasants in the surrounding villages. Cf. the works of Grigoryev and Annensky. I again deliberately give the example of the rural districts in which a special "people's system" is alleged to exist.

²We must particularly blame the author for employing these terms because *Russkoye Bogatstvo* loves to use the term '*narodni*' [people's or national—*Ed. Eng. ed.*] in contradistinction to bourgeoisie.

³*Home Notes*—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

In No 2 of that magazine for 1872, in an article entitled *The Plutocracy and its Bases* we read the following

'According to Marlow the most important characteristic of the plutocrat is a love for a liberal form of government or at all events a love for the principle of freedom of appropriation. If we take this characteristic and recall what the position was, say 8 or 10 years ago we will realise that as far as liberalism is concerned we have made enormous strides. No matter what newspaper or magazine one takes up one will observe that all of them apparently represent more or less democratic principles all of them fight for the interests of the people. But simultaneously with these democratic views, and some times under the cloak of these views (*note this*), "now and again, deliberately or unintentionally plutocratic strivings are expressed

The author quotes as an example the address presented by the St Petersburg and Moscow merchants to the Minister of Finance, expressing the gratitude of this most honourable estate of the Russian bourgeoisie for the fact that he "had based the financial position of Russia on the widest possible expansion of private enterprise which alone was fruitful." And the author concludes

Plutocratic elements and strivings undoubtedly exist in our society in plenty"

As you see, your predecessors in the distant past, when the impressions of the Great Reform (which, as Mr Yuzhakov has discovered, should have opened up a peaceful and correct path of development for "people's production," and which, in fact, only opened a path for the development of a plutocracy) were still vivid and fresh, could not but admit the plutocratic, i.e., the bourgeois character of private enterprise in Russia

Why have you forgotten this? Why, when you talk about "national" circulation and the development of the "forces of the country" thanks to "enterprise and initiative," do you not mention the inherent antagonism in this development, the exploiting character of this enterprise and initiative? Opposition can, and should, of course, be expressed to monopolies and similar institutions, for undoubtedly they make the conditions of the toilers worse, but it must not be forgotten that in addition to all these mediæval fetters, the toiler is bound by still stronger, modern, bourgeois fetters. Undoubtedly, the abolition of monopoly will be beneficial for the whole of the "people," because since the

bourgeois system became the basis of the economics of the country, these survivals of the mediæval system only serve to add still more bitter mediæval misfortunes to capitalist misfortunes. Undoubtedly, these must be abolished, and the quicker and more radically this is done, the better, in order, by freeing bourgeois society of the semi serf fetters it has inherited, to free the hands of the working class, to facilitate its struggle against the bourgeoisie.

Therefore, one should call a spade a spade and say that monopoly, and all other mediæval restrictions (and their name in Russia is legion) must be abolished in the interest of the working class in order to facilitate its struggle against the bourgeois system. That is all. Only a bourgeois can fail to see the profound and irreconcilable antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat among the "people" that lies behind the solidarity of interests of the whole "people" in opposition to the mediæval, serf institutions.

Incidentally, it would be absurd to believe that the "friends of the people" can be put to shame when, in regard to what the rural districts require, they can say things like the following:

"When a few years ago," says Mr Korolenko, "certain newspapers discussed the question as to what professions and what type of intellectual people the rural districts required the list proved to be a very long and varied one and embraced almost the whole of life: doctors and women doctors were followed by doctors' assistants, then followed lawyers, teachers, librarians and booksellers, agronomists, forestry experts and agricultural experts generally, technicians of the most varied branches of industry (a very extensive sphere and almost untouched as yet), organisers and managers of credit institutions, warehouses, etc."

We will deal at least with those "intellectuals" (??) whose activities are related to the sphere of economics, the agronomists, forestry experts, technicians, etc. The rural districts certainly do need the services of these people! But who, in the rural districts? The landlords and the farmers, prosperous muzhiks, of course, who have "savings," and who can afford to pay for the service of the artisans whom Mr Krivenko is pleased to call "intellectuals." These have indeed long been thirsting for technicians, for credit and warehouses, the whole of our economic literature testifies to this. But there are others in the rural districts, much more numer-

ous than the former, and it would do no harm if the "friends of the people" had these others in mind more often, *viz*, the peasants who are ruined and in rags and not only have no "savings" with which to pay for the services of "intellectuals" but have not enough bread to prevent them from dying of starvation. And it is these rural districts that you want to assist by *setting up ware houses*! What will our one horse and horseless peasants store in these warehouses? Their clothes? They pawned these as far back as 1891 to the rural and city kulaks¹ who, at that time, in accordance with your humane liberal prescription set up actual "ware houses" in their houses, inns and shops. All that these peasants have left is their "hands" to work with, but even Russian *chunovniks* have so far failed to invent "warehouses" in which to store this commodity.

It is difficult to imagine more striking proof of the banality of these "democrats" than their sentimental adoration of technical progress among the "peasantry" while closing their eyes to the mass expropriation of this very "peasantry." For example, in No 2 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Sketches*, sec XII), Mr Karyshev, with the fervour of a liberal *cretin*, tells of cases of "perfections and improvements" in peasant farming—of the "spread of improved sorts of seeds on the peasant farms"—American oats, Vaza rye, Clydesdale oats, etc. "In some places the peasants set apart a special plot of land for seed on which, after very careful tilling, they plant by hand selected samples of grain." "Many and very varied innovations" are observed "in the sphere of improved implements and machines"—hoes, light ploughs, threshing machines, winnowing machines, seed sorters. He states that there is an "increase in the use of different kinds of fertilizer"—phosphorite, fish manure, pigeon droppings, etc. "Correspondents urge the necessity for setting up local stores for the sale of phosphorite" in the vil-

¹ Usurers.—*Ed Eng ed*

² Government officials, bureaucrats.—*Ed Eng ed*

³ We would remind the reader that these improved implements are distributed in the Novouzensk Uyezd as follows: 37 per cent (poor) peasants, i.e., 10,000 out of 28,000 households, have 7 implements out of 5,724, that is to say, one eighth of one per cent! Four fifths of the implements are monopolised by the rich, who represent only one-fourth of the total households.

lages—and Mr Karyshev, quoting from V V's book, *Progressive Tendencies in Peasant Farming* (Mr Krivenko also quotes this book), is so affected by all this progress that he positively drops into pathos. He says

"This information, which we are able to give here only in brief, makes both a cheerful and a sad impression. cheerful because these people impoverished in debt, a great number without horses, do not drop their arms to their sides, do not give way to despair, do not change their occupation, but remain true to the soil, for they understand that it is in the soil, if it is properly treated that their future then strength, their riches lie. (Of course it is just the impoverished and horseless muzhik that buys phosphorite, seed sorters, threshing machines and Clydesdale oats for seed! *O sancta simplicitas!* But this is not written by a high school girl, but by a professor, a doctor of political economy!! No, say what you like mere holy simplicity does not explain everything here.) "They search feverishly for new ways methods of cultivation seed, implements fertilizers, for everything that will fertilize the soil that feeds them and that will compensate them a hundredfold for the labour they put into it." ¹ This information creates a sad impression because" (perhaps you will think that this friend of the people' has at least remembered the mass expropriation of the peasantry, that accompanies and is called forth by the concentration of the land in the hands of the prosperous muzhiks and its conversion into capital as a basis of unimproved farming—the very expropriation that throws on to the market free and 'cheap' 'hands' which make for the success of native 'enterprise' with the aid of these threshing machines seed sorters winnowing machines?—No thing of the kind) 'because we ourselves must be roused. What is the aid that we should be giving to the muzhik who is striving to raise the level of his farming? We have at our disposal science, literature exhibitions warehouses commission agents (That is exactly how he puts them, gentlemen, side by side science and 'commission agents. The friends of the people must be studied, not when they are fighting the Social Democrats, because at such times they don a uniform made of the rags of the ideals of their fathers" but in their every day clothes, when they are discussing in detail the

¹ You are quite right, Mr Professor when you say that the unimproved methods of farming will compensate a hundredfold the 'people who do not "fall into despair and who remain true to the soil.' But have you not observed O mighty doctor of political economy, that in order to acquire phosphorite etc, the 'muzhik' must distinguish himself from the mass of the starving poor by having available money, and that money is the product of social labour which has passed into private hands, that the appropriation of the "reward" for improved farming will be the appropriation of other people's labour, that only the most contemptible hangers on of the bourgeoisie can think that the source of this abundant reward is the personal effort of the master who 'diligently fertilizes the soil that feeds him'?

affairs of every day life. At such times one is able to observe these petty bourgeois ideologists in their true colours and odours.) Has the muzhik anything like that? Of course he has the rudiments of them, but for some reason or other these develop very slowly. The muzhik wants an example—where are our experimental fields, our model farms? The muzhik is seeking for the printed word—where is our popular literature on agronomics? The muzhik is seeking for fertilizer, implements, seed—where are our Zemstvo stores for the sale of these things, wholesale supplies, convenience of purchasing, distribution? Where are you workers, private and Zemstvo workers? Go and work, the time has long arrived and

"The Russian people will express to you
Their heartfelt gratitude!"¹

N Karyshev, (*Russkoye Bogatstvo* No 2, p. 19)

Here you have the picture of these friends of the petty "people's" bourgeois delighting in their philistine progress!

One would imagine that, apart from an analysis of the economics of our countryside, it would be sufficient to note this striking fact of our modern economic history, *viz.*, the generally admitted progress in peasant economy which has gone on simultaneously with the enormous expropriation of the "peasantry"—in order to become convinced of the absurdity of picturing the "peasantry" as an inherently united and homogeneous whole, in order to become convinced of the bourgeois character of all this progress! But the "friends of the people" remain deaf to all this. Having discarded the good sides of the old Russian social revolutionary Narodism they cling tightly to one of its most serious mistakes, *viz.* the failure to understand the class antagonisms among the peasantry.

"The Narodnik of the 'seventies," aptly observed Hurwitz, "had not the faintest idea of the class antagonisms among the peasantry itself, and saw only the antagonism between the 'exploiter,' the kulak or shark, and his victim, the peasant who is imbued with the communist spirit." Gleb Uspensky was alone in his scepticism and responded to the general state of illusion with an ironical smile. Knowing the peasant so well and possessing enormous artistic talent which penetrated to the heart of things, he could not help seeing that individualism had become the fundamental economic relationship, not only

¹ From Nekrasova's poem *The Sower*—Ed. Eng. ed.

² "Within the village commune antagonistic social classes arose," says Hurwitz in another place (P. 104.) I quote Hurwitz only to supplement the facts enumerated above.

between the usurer and the debtor, but among the peasantry generally. Cf. article entitled *All on an Equal Level* in *Russkaya Mysl*, 1882 No 1 (p. 106 of the article)

But it was permissible and even natural to fall into this error in the 'sixties and 'seventies, when exact information about the economics of the countryside was relatively scarce, when the disintegration of the rural districts had not yet become so marked, but at the present time one must deliberately close one's eyes not to see this disintegration. It is extremely characteristic that it is precisely at the present time, when the ruination of the peasantry seems to have reached its climax, that one hears so much on all sides about the progress of peasant economy. Mr. V. V. (who is an undubitable "friend of the people") has written a whole book on this subject and he cannot be reproached with being wrong as regards the facts. On the contrary, the facts cannot be doubted in the least: the facts about the technical, agricultural progress of the peasantry, but neither can there be any doubt about the fact of the mass expropriation of the peasantry. And so, the "friends of the people" concentrate all their attention on the fact that the "muzhik" is feverishly seeking new methods of cultivating the soil which would help him to fertilize the soil that feeds him—and fail to see the reverse side of the medal, *viz*, the feverish separation of the very same "muzhik" from the land. Like os triches, they bury their heads in the sand in order to avoid looking facts in the face, in order not to witness the process of transformation of the very land from which the peasant is being divorced, into capital, in order not to witness the process of formation of the internal market.¹ Try to refute the fact that these two polarized processes are taking place among our commune peasants, try to prove that they are due to anything *else* than the bourgeois character of our society. You will fail! The *alpha* and *omega* of their "science" and of their political "activity" is to sing hallelujas and to pour out humane and well meaning phrases.

¹ The quest for "new methods of cultivating the soil" becomes "feverish" precisely because the well to do muzhik has to carry on farming on a large scale and he would not be able to do this with the old methods, precisely because competition compels him to seek for new methods, for agriculture is more and more acquiring a commodity and bourgeois character.

And they even elevate this mildly liberal patching of the present system into a complete philosophy "Small vital deeds," says Mr Krivenko, with an air of profundity, "are much better than superb inactivity" Something new and wise Moreover, he goes on to say, "small deeds are by no means synonymous with small aims" And as an example of such "wide activity," when small deeds become "proper and good," he quotes the activity of a certain lady who organised schools, and then the activities of a lawyer in the country who squeezes out the legal quacks, the proposal of the lawyers to go into the provinces to the circuit sessions of the assize courts in order to defend accused persons, and finally, the proposal of which we have already heard, to open stores for "*kustars*" in this case, the extension of activity (to the dimensions of a great aim) is to consist of opening stores "with the combined efforts of the *Zemstvos* in the busiest centres"

All this is very lofty, humane and liberal, of course, "liberal," because it will release the bourgeois system of economy of all its mediæval fetters and by that will make it easier for the workers to fight this very system, which, of course, is not injured, but on the contrary is strengthened by these measures We have read all about this long ago in Russian liberal publications It would not have been worth while arguing against this had we not been compelled to do so by the gentlemen of *Russkoye Bugatstvo* who began to advance these "modest beginnings of liberalism" as arguments *against* the Social Democrats, to set them an example and to reproach them with having renounced the "ideals of the fathers" * That being the case, we cannot but say that it is, to say the least, diverting to oppose the Social Democrats with proposals and suggestions for such moderate and punctilious *liberal* (in other words, serving the bourgeoisie) activity As for the fathers and their ideals, it must be said that however erroneous and utopian the old theories of the Russian *Narodniki* may have been, they, at all events, were *absolutely* opposed to such "modest beginnings of liberalism" I have borrowed the latter expression from Mr N K Mikhailovsky's review of the Russian edition of Marx's book (*Otechestvennye Zapiski*, 1872, No 4) This review is written in a very lively, spirited and fresh style (compared with his pre-

ent writings), and in it he strongly protests against the proposal to refrain from offending our young liberals

But that was written a long time ago, so long ago that the "friends of the people" have managed to forget all this completely, and by their tactics they have strikingly demonstrated that when materialist criticism of political institutions is lacking and when the class character of the modern state is not understood, it is only one step from political radicalism to political opportunism

Here are a few examples of this opportunism

The transformation of the Ministry of State Property into the Ministry of Agriculture,' declares Mr. Yuzhakov, 'may have profound influence on the progress of our economic development, but it may also turn out to be nothing more than a reshuffling of officials' (No 10, *Russkoye Bogatstvo*)

That is to say, it all depends upon who will be "called"—the friends of the people or the representatives of the interests of the landlords and capitalists. The interests themselves need not be touched

"The protection of the economically weak from the economically strong is the first natural task of state interference,' continues this very same Mr. Yuzhakov in the very same place and this is repeated after him in the very same terms by the chronicler of internal affairs in No 2 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. And in order that there may be no doubt that he interprets this philanthropic nonsense¹ in the same way as it is interpreted by his fellow liberal and radical petty bourgeois ideologists in Western Europe, he adds, after what has been quoted above, the following

"Gladstone's Land Bill,* Bismarck's insurance for workers** factory inspection, the idea of our Peasants Bank the organisation of migration measures against the kulak—all these are attempts to apply this very principle of state interference for the purpose of protecting the economically weak"

The merit of this lies in its frankness. The author openly declares that he wants to stand on the basis of present social rela

¹ It is nonsense because the 'economically strong' is strong because, among other things, he possesses political power. Without political power he would not be able to maintain the economic rule,

tionships as do Messrs Gladstone and Bismarck, that he, like them, wants to patch and darn present day society (bourgeois society—and this is what he, like the West European adherents of Gladstone and Bismarck, does not understand), and not to fight against it. The fact that they regard the state, the organ which has arisen on the soil of present day society and which protects the interests of the ruling classes in this society, as an instrument of reform, is in complete harmony with this, their fundamental theoretical view. They regard the state as being omnipotent and standing above classes, and expect that it will not only “assist” the toilers, but introduce real and proper order (as Mr Krivenko informed us). Of course, nothing else could be expected from these purest of philistine ideologists, for one of the most characteristic features of the petty bourgeoisie, and which, incidentally, makes them a reactionary class, is that as a small producer dissociated and isolated by the very conditions of his work, tied down to a definite place and to a definite exploiter, the petty bourgeois is unable to understand the class character of the exploitation and oppression from which he suffers, sometimes not less than the proletarian, he is unable to understand that even the state in bourgeois society cannot but be a class state.¹

But why is it, most worthy Messieurs “friends of the people,” that up till now—and with particular energy since the passing of the Emancipation Reform—our government has “supported, protected and created” only the bourgeoisie and capitalism? Why is it that this bad behaviour on the part of the autocratic and alleged above class government has coincided with the historical period during which the internal life of the country is characterised by

¹ That is why the “friends of the people” are the most out and out reactionaries when they say that the natural task of the state is to protect the economically weak (that is what it *should* do according to their banal old wives’ morality), when the whole history and internal politics of Russia prove that the task of our state is to protect only the feudal landlords and the big bourgeoisie and to punish ruthlessly every attempt on the part of the *economically weak* to stand up for their own interests. That, of course, is its *natural* task, because absolutism and bureaucracy are thoroughly saturated with the feudal bourgeois spirit and because in the economic sphere the bourgeoisie has undivided power and compels the worker to “lie low.”

the development of commodity production, commerce and industry? Why do you think that these last mentioned changes in internal life came subsequently and that the policy of the government came first when, as a matter of fact, these changes took place so deep down in society that the government did not observe that they were taking place and put innumerable obstacles in their way, when as a matter of fact this very "absolute" government under other conditions of internal life, "supported," "protected" and "created" another class?

Oh, the "friends of the people" never stop to ask themselves questions like this! All this is materialism, dialectics "Hegelianism," "mysticism and metaphysics" They think that if they plead with this government nicely enough and humbly enough it can put everything right And as far as humility is concerned, one must do *Russkoye Bogatstvo* justice why, even among the Russian liberal press it is distinguished for its failure to display the slightest independence Judge for yourselves "The abolition of the salt tax, the abolition of the poll tax and the reduction of the land purchase payments" are described by Mr Yuzhakov as "a considerable relief for national economy" Of course! But was not the abolition of the salt tax accompanied by the imposition of a host of new indirect taxes and by an increase in old taxes? Was not the abolition of the poll tax accompanied by an increase in the payments made by the former serfs on state lands in the guise of transforming these payments into land purchase payments? And even after the notorious reduction in the land purchase payments (by which the government did not even return to the peasants the profits it made of land purchase operations), did not the discrepancy between the amount of the payments and the income from the land, i.e., the direct survival of feudal quit rent, remain? Oh, that's nothing What is important to them is "the first step," the "principle" As for the rest Oh, the rest we can plead for later on!

But these are only the blossoms Now for the fruit

"The 'eighties eased the burden of the people' (this refers to the above mentioned measures) "and by that saved the people from utter ruin,"

This too is a classical example of shameless, cringing phrase mongering which can only be compared with the above quoted remark of Mr Mikhailovsky that we have still to create the proletariat. One cannot help recalling, in this connection, Shchedrin's apt description of the history of the evolution of the Russian liberal. This liberal starts out by pleading with the authorities to grant reforms "as far as possible," then he begins to beg "Give us at least something," and finally takes up a permanent and unshakable position that can only be "described as despicable." Now how can one refrain from saying that the "friends of the people" have taken up this permanent and unshakable position when, fresh with the impressions of the famine raging among millions of the people, towards which the attitude of the government was first that of the huckster's stinginess and then of the huckster's cowardice, they declare in the press that the government saved the people from utter ruin!! Several years more will pass, during which the peasantry will be expropriated still more rapidly, the government, in addition to establishing the Ministry of Agriculture will abolish one or two direct taxes and introduce several new indirect taxes, the famine will spread to 40 million of the population—and these gentlemen will write just the same—see, 40 million are starving and not 50 million, that is because the government has eased the burden of the people and saved it from utter ruin, that is because the government heeded the advice of the "friends of the people" and established a Ministry of Agriculture!

Another example

In No. 2 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* the chronicler of internal affairs argues that Russia, being "fortunately" (*sic*!) a backward country "which has preserved elements that enable her to base her economic system on the principle of solidarity,"¹ is therefore able to "enter into international relationships as the channel for economic solidarity" and that the chances for this are increased by Russia's unchallenged "political power"!!

¹ Solidarity between whom? Between the landlord and the peasant, the prosperous muzhik and the tramp, the manufacturer and the worker? In order to understand what this classical "principle of solidarity" means, we must recall that solidarity between the employer and the workman is achieved by "reducing wages."

This is said of the gendarme of Europe, the constant and most reliable bulwark of all reaction, which has reduced the Russian people to the shameful position of being oppressed in their native country and of serving as instruments to oppress the people in western countries—this gendarme is described as the channel for economic solidarity!

This is too much! Messieurs the "friends of the people" outshine all the liberals put together. They not only plead with the government, they not only eulogise it, but they actually pray to it, pray and bow their heads to the ground to it, pray to it with such zeal that one's heart is wrung with pity to hear the thumping of their loyal foreheads on the ground.

Do you remember the German definition of a philistine?

Was ist der Philister?
Ein hohler Darm,
Voll Furcht und Hoffnung,
Dass Gott erbarm!¹

This definition does not quite fit this case. God is quite in the background. The authorities—that's an altogether different matter. And if, in this definition, we put "authorities" in place of the word "God" we will get an exact description of the intellectual stock in trade, the moral level and the civic courage of the Russian humane, liberal "friends of the people."

To their absolutely absurd views about the government, the "friends of the people" add a corresponding attitude toward the so-called "intelligentsia." Mr. Krivenko writes:

"Literature" should 'appraise phenomena according to their social meaning and encourage every active effort to do good. It has called attention, and continues to call attention to the shortage of teachers, doctors, technicians to the fact that the people are sick, are becoming impoverished' (owing to the shortage of technicians!) "that they are illiterate, etc. and when people come forward who have wearied of sitting at green baize tables, of taking part in private theatricals and eating *vyaziga* pie at banquets of the marshals of the nobility who go out to work with rare self-sacrifice (think of it: they sacrifice green

¹ What is a philistine?
A hollow gut,
Full of fear and hope,
May God have pity on him! (Helne Ed.)

baize tables, theatricals and pie!) "and in spite of all obstacles it must welcome them."

Two pages later, he, with the serious air of a bureaucrat who has grown wise by experience, reproves those who

'wavered when confronted with the question of whether or not to accept service as rural prefect¹ as mayor of a town, as chairman or member of Zemstvo administrations under the new regulations. In a society in which the consciousness of civic requirements and duties is developed' (really, gentlemen, this is as bad as the speeches of famous Russian pompadors, like the Baranovs and Koslohes!) such wavering and such an attitude would be inconceivable because it would assimilate every reform, if it had a vital side to it at all, in its own way *i.e.* it would take advantage of and help to develop exactly that side of the reform that it thought expedient, the undesired sides it would convert into a dead letter, and if there were no vitality in the reform at all it would remain entirely an alien body."

What the devil does this mean? Miserable twopenny ha'penny opportunism, and yet he talks with all this bombast! Literature's task is to collect all the drawing room gossip about the wicked Marxists, to bow in gratitude to the government for having saved the people from utter ruin, to welcome people who have wearied of sitting at green baize tables, to teach people not to hesitate to take positions even as rural prefects. What am I reading? *Nedelya* or *Novoye Vremya*?² No, it is *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, the organ of the advanced Russian democrats.

And it is these gentlemen who talk about the "ideals of the fathers," who claim that they are the guardians of the traditions of the times when France spread the ideas of socialism throughout Europe and the assimilation of these ideas in Russia gave rise to the theories and teachings of Herzen and Chernyshevsky. This is really scandalous and would be outrageous and offensive if *Russkoye Bogatstvo* were not so diverting, if such statements in the pages of such a magazine did not rouse only Homeric laughter. Yes, you besmirch these ideals! Indeed, what were the ideals

¹ In Russian, *Zemski Nachalnik*. Officials first appointed in 1889 whose functions were to keep the peasants in subjection to the landlords. The *Zemski Nachalnik* was a member of the nobility in his county or uyezd, and was appointed on the recommendation of the Marshal of the Nobility or the governor of the province. He exercised administrative and judicial authority over the local peasant population.—Ed. Eng. ed.

² *Week and New Times*, reactionary journals.—Ed. Eng. ed.

of the first Russian Socialists, of the Socialists of the epoch which Kautsky so aptly described when he said

"when every socialist was a poet and every poet—a socialist"

Faith in a special social system, in the communal structure of Russian life, hence—faith in the possibility of a peasant socialist revolution—that is what inspired them and roused scores and hundreds of people to the heroic struggle against the government. And you cannot reproach the Social Democrats with not being able to appreciate the enormous historical service these excellent people rendered in their day and with not being able to respect their memory profoundly. But I ask you, where is that faith now? It no longer exists, so much so that, when last year Mr. V. V. tried to argue that the village commune trains the people for co-operative effort and serves as the hearth of altruistic sentiments, etc., even Mr. Mikhailovsky's conscience was pricked and he began shamefacedly to lecture Mr. V. V. and to point out that "*no investigation* has shown the connection between our village commune and altruism." And indeed no investigation has shown this. But still, there was a time when people did believe, and faithfully believed without investigations.

How? Why? On what grounds? Because

"Every socialist was a poet and every poet—a socialist"

Moreover, adds Mr. Mikhailovsky, all conscientious investigators are agreed that the rural population is being split up: on the one hand, a mass of proletarians is arising and, on the other, a handful of "kulaks" who keep the rest of the population under their heel. Again he is right: the rural population is indeed being split up. Moreover, the rural population was split up long ago. And simultaneously, the old Russian peasant socialism was split up and made way, on the one hand, for workers' socialism and, on the other, for—a degenerate and banal philistine radicalism. This change cannot be described otherwise than as degeneration. Out of the doctrine of a special social system of peasant life, of a peculiarly native path of development of our country, there has emerged a sort of diluted eclecticism, which can no longer deny that commodity production has become the basis of eco-

nomic development and that it has grown into capitalism, but which refuses to see the bourgeois character of all relationships of production, refuses to see the inevitability of the class struggle under such a social system. Out of a political programme that was calculated to *rouse the peasantry for the socialist revolution against the foundations of modern society*¹—there has emerged a programme for patching, “improving” the conditions of the peasantry while *preserving the foundations of present society*.

Strictly speaking, all that has gone before is sufficient to enable one to judge the kind of “criticism” that is to be expected from the gentlemen of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* when they undertake to “rout” the Social Democrats. They do not make the slightest attempt to explain in a straightforward and conscientious manner their conception of conditions in Russia (the censorship would not have prevented them from doing this had they laid most stress on the economic side and expressed themselves in the general and partly *Æsopian*, terms in which the whole of their “polemic” was conducted) and to bring forward arguments against this conception, to prove that it is wrong and to prove that the practical conclusions drawn from this conception are wrong. Instead of that, we get vapid phrases about abstract schemes and belief in them, about the conviction that every country has to pass through the phase and similar stuff, the like of which Mr Mikhailovsky has provided us in plenty. Often we get utter distortions. For instance, Mr Krivenko declares that Marx

‘admitted that if we desired it (?! according to Marx, therefore, the evolution of social and economic relationships is determined by human will and consciousness?? Is this boundless ignorance or unexampled effrontery?!) “and if we acted accordingly, we could avoid the vicissitudes of capitalism and proceed by another and more expedient path (*sic!*)’

Our knight was able to give utterance to this absurdity by deliberately misquoting what Marx said. Quoting the passage from

¹ This, in fact, was the substance of all our old revolutionary programmes from the Bakuninists and the rebels, to the Narodniki and finally the *Narodnaya Volya*ists who were firmly convinced that the peasants would send an overwhelming majority of Socialists to the future Zemsky Sobor *

Marx's well known letter * (*Yuridicheski Vestnik*, 1888, No 10), in which Marx expresses his great respect for Chernyshevsky, who thought that Russia would be able to avoid "the tortures of the capitalist system," Mr Krivenko, closing the quotation marks, i.e., ending the quotation of what Marx actually said (the last words of which were "he [Chernyshevsky] pronounces in favour of the latter solution"), adds "'And I,' says Marx, '*share* (Krivenko's italics) these views'" (P 186, No 12)

What Marx actually did say was the following

'And my honourable critic would have had at least as much reason for inferring from my consideration for this 'great Russian critic and man of learning that I shared his views on the question as for concluding from my polemic against the 'literary man and Pan Slavist' that I rejected them" (*Yuridicheski Vestnik*, 1888, No 10, p 271)

And so Marx said that Mr Mikhailovsky had no right to regard him as opposed to the idea that Russia would develop along special lines because he respected those who advocated this idea and Mr Krivenko interpreted this to mean that Marx "admitted" this special line of development. Thus is a complete distortion. Marx's statement clearly shows that he evaded the question as such "Mr Mikhailovsky might have taken as his grounds either of the two contradictory remarks, i.e., he had no grounds for drawing his conclusions as to what my views were on Russian affairs generally, on either of them" And in order to avoid any misinterpretation, Marx, in this very letter, replied to the question as to the way his theory could apply to Russia. This reply clearly shows that Marx evaded a reply to the question as such, refrained from examining the facts about Russia, which alone could decide the question.

"If Russia is tending to become a capitalist nation after the example of the West European countries—and in the past few years she has made no small effort in this respect—she will not succeed without having first transformed a good part of her peasants into proletarians." (Cf *Marx Engels Correspondence*, Letter No 167—*Ed Eng ed*)

One would think that this is perfectly clear the question was precisely whether Russia was striving to become a capitalist

* Marx had A. Herzen in mind—*Ed*

nation, whether the ruination of her peasants was the process of creation of the capitalist system, of the capitalist proletariat, and Marx replied that, "if" she is striving to become a capitalist nation she will have to transform a good proportion of the peasantry into proletarians. In other words, Marx's theory is to investigate and explain the evolution of the economic systems in certain countries and its "application" to Russia merely means *investigating* Russian relationships of production and their evolution by *utilising* the accepted methods of *materialism* and *theoretical* political economy¹

The working out of a new methodology and politico economic theory marked such gigantic progress in social science, such a tremendous stride in the socialist movement that the principal theoretical problem that rose up before Russian Socialists almost immediately after the appearance of *Capital* was the problem of the "destiny of capitalism in Russia", around this problem the most heated controversies arose and in accordance with it the most important programme postulates were decided. And it is a remarkable fact that when a separate group of Socialists appeared (about ten years ago) which answered the question regarding the capitalist evolution of Russia in the affirmative and based this decision on the data of Russian economic conditions—it did not encounter any direct and definite criticism of the material issue, any criticism which, based on the same methodological and theoretical principles, gave a different explanation of this data.*

Having undertaken a crusade against the Marxists, the "friends of the people" likewise advance their arguments without investigating the facts. As we have seen in the first article, they make shift with phrases. Moreover, Mr Mikhailovsky does not miss an opportunity to display his wit in teasing the Marxists about their lack of unanimity, about their not having agreed among themselves as to what they should say. And "our celebrated" Mr N K Mikhailovsky laughs heartily over his own jokes about "genuine"

¹ I repeat that this conclusion could not but be clear to all those who had read *The Communist Manifesto*, *Poverty of Philosophy* and *Capital* and a special explanation was required only for the benefit of Mr Mikhailovsky

and "not genuine" Marxists. It is perfectly true that there is not complete unanimity among the Marxists. But, in the first place, Mr Mikhailovsky does not present this fact correctly, and secondly, this absence of unanimity does not reveal the weakness, but the strength and vitality of Russian Social Democracy. The fact of the matter is that the characteristic feature of recent times is that Socialists are approaching Social Democratic views by various ways and, therefore, while unreservedly agreeing with the fundamental and principal postulate—that Russia represents a bourgeois society which has grown up out of the serf system, that its political form is the class state and that the only way to put an end to the exploitation of the toilers is through the class struggle of the proletariat—they differ on many questions of detail both in regard to the methods of presenting the case and in the interpretation of this or that phenomenon in Russian life.¹ I can therefore delight Mr Mikhailovsky beforehand by stating that, within the limits of the main postulate just mentioned which all Social Democrats accept, differences of opinion exist among Social Democrats even on the questions that have been touched upon in these brief remarks, for example, the Peasant Reform, the economics of peasant farming and *kustar* industries, the renting of land, etc. The unanimity of people who were content with the unanimous acceptance of "lofty truths" such as—that the Peasant Reform *could have* opened for Russia a peaceful path of proper development, that the state *could have* called not upon the representatives of the interests of capitalism, but upon the "friends of the people", that the village commune *could have* socialised agriculture together with the manufacturing industries which the *kustar* *could have* developed into large scale production, that *people's* renting of land supported *people's* economy—this tender and touching unanimity has been replaced by disagreements among people who are seeking for an explanation of the *real*, the *present* economic organisation of Russia as a system of definite relationships of production, an explanation of its *real* economic evolution, of its political and other superstructures.

¹ Lenin here refers to the so called "legal Marxists." See note to page 330.—Ed. Eng. ed.

And if such work, which, from various angles, leads to the acceptance of a common postulate, which undoubtedly leads also to joint political activity and for that reason gives all those who accept this postulate the right and duty to call themselves *Social-Democrats*, still leaves a wide field for difference of opinion on a large number of questions of details, which are solved in different ways, it merely reveals the strength and vitality of Russian Social Democracy.¹

Moreover, the conditions under which this work has to be carried on are as bad as can possibly be imagined there is not, and there cannot be, an organ that would unite the various branches of the work, in view of the police conditions prevailing, private intercourse is extremely hampered. Under these circumstances, it is quite natural that Social Democrats should not be able to come to an understanding among themselves in regard to details, that they should contradict each other.

This is very funny, is it not?

Some surprise may be caused by a reference in Mr Krivenko's "polemics" against the Social Democrats to certain "neo Marxists". Some readers might think that a split has taken place among the Social Democrats, and that "neo Marxists" have separated from the old Social Democrats. But nothing of the kind has happened. No one has anywhere or ever publicly criticised the theory and programme of Russian Social Democracy in the name of Marxism, or has advocated any other kind of Marxism. The fact of the matter is that Messrs Krivenko and Mikhailovsky have been listening to drawing room gossip about the Marxists, have been paying heed to various liberals who try to cover up their inanity

¹ For the very simple reason that these questions have *not been solved* up till now. Indeed, the assertion that "the people's renting of land supports people's economy" cannot be called a solution of the renting of land problem nor can the following description of the system by which the peasant cultivated the landlord's land with his own implements be called such: "the peasant proved to be stronger than the landlord," who "sacrificed his independence for the benefit of the independent peasant" "the peasant has torn large scale production out of the hands of the landlord" "the people are victorious in the struggle to determine the form of agriculture." This liberal, empty phrasemongering is to be found in *The Destiny of Capitalism*, written by "our celebrated" Mr V. V.

with Marxism and, with their characteristic wit and tactfulness, they set out with this intellectual stock in trade to "criticise" the Marxists. It is not surprising, therefore, that this "criticism" should consist of nothing but a chain of curiosities and filthy innuendoes.

"To be consistent," argued Mr. Krivenko, an affirmative reply should be given to this (the question as to 'whether we should strive for the development of capitalist industry') and "we should not shrink from buying up the peasants' land or from the opening of shops and dram shops—we should rejoice at the success of the numerous innkeepers in the Duma¹ and assist a still larger number of buyers of peasants' grain."

This is really funny. Try to explain to such a "friend of the people" that the exploitation of the toilers everywhere in Russia is capitalist by its very nature, that the prosperous muzhiks and land and grain dealers should be included in the category of representatives of capitalism according to such and such political economic symptoms which prove the bourgeois character of the disintegration among the peasantry—why, he would raise a terrific howl, call it outrageous heresy, shout about blindly accepting West European formulas and abstract schemes (while at the same time most carefully evading the actual content of the "heretical" argument). And when it is necessary to depict the "horrors" which the wicked Marxists are introducing, then lofty science and pure ideals may be thrown aside, then it is permissible to admit that dealers in peasants' grain and in peasants' land are indeed representatives of capitalism and not only "people who love to enjoy other people's goods."

Try to prove to such a "friend of the people" that the Russian bourgeoisie has not only already become everywhere the master of the labour of the people by the mere fact that the means of production are concentrated in its hands, but that it is also bringing pressure to bear upon the government, giving rise to, compelling and determining the bourgeois character of its policy—why, he would fly into a rage, begin to shout about the omnipotence of our government, that only by a fatal misunderstanding and

¹ *I.e., City Duma—Ed. Eng. ed.*

unlucky chance does it "call upon" only representatives of the interests of capitalism and not the "friends of the people," that it is artificially implanting capitalism. But under cover of this noise and fury they are themselves compelled to recognise the innkeepers in the Duma, *i.e.*, one of the elements of the very government which is alleged to stand above classes, as representatives of capitalism. But, gentlemen, are the interests of capitalism in Russia represented only in the "Duma" and only by "innkeepers"?

As for filthy innuendoes, we have heard quite enough of these from Mr Mikhailovsky, and we hear them now from Mr Krivenko, who, for example, in his desire to annihilate the hated Social Democrats relates that "some of them go into the factories" (that is, when they can get soft jobs as technicians or office workers) "on the plea that they do so exclusively for the purpose of accelerating the capitalist process." There is no need, of course, to reply to such things, which are positively indecent. All that one can do is to put a full stop here.

Continue in the same spirit, gentlemen, continue without fear! The imperial government, the very government which, as you have just told us, has already taken measures (which, however, suffer from certain defects) to save the people from utter ruin, will take measures, which will be free from all defects, to save you from being exposed in your banality and ignorance. "Cultured society" will continue as hitherto, in the intervals between *vyaziga* pie and green baize tables, to talk with great gusto about the "younger brother" and to devise humane projects for "improving" his condition, its representatives will be pleased to learn from you that in taking up positions as *Zemski Nachalniki*, or other jobs superintending the purses of the peasants, they display a developed consciousness of civic requirements and duties. Continue! Not only are you assured of peace of mind but also of approval and praise from the lips of Messieurs the Burenins

* * *

In conclusion, it will not be superfluous, perhaps, to reply to a question which in all probability has occurred to more than

one reader, viz, was it worth while devoting all this attention to people of this kind? Was it worth while replying so thoroughly to this stream of liberal and censor protected abuse which they are pleased to call polemics?

I think it was worth while, not for their sake, of course, and not for the sake of the "cultured" public, but for the sake of the useful lesson which Russian Socialists can and should learn from this attack. This attack provides most striking and convincing proof that the time in the social development of Russia when democracy and socialism in Russia were merged into one inseparable and indissoluble whole (as was the case for example in the time of Chernyshevsky) has gone never to return. At the present time there are absolutely no grounds whatever for the idea which Socialists here and there still cling to and which has a very harmful effect upon their theories and practice, viz, that in Russia there is no profound qualitative difference between the ideas of the democrats and those of the Socialists.

Quite the contrary is the case—a wide gulf separates these two sets of ideas and it is high time that Russian Socialists understood this, that they understood that a complete and final rupture with the ideas of the democrats is *inevitable and imperatively necessary*.

Indeed let us examine what the Russian democrat was in the times which gave rise to this idea, and what he has become. The "friends of the people" provide sufficient material to enable us to make this comparison.

In this connection, of extraordinary interest is Mr Krivenko's attack on Mr Struve who, in a German publication wrote an article in opposition to Mr N—on's utopianism (An article entitled *Zur Beurteilung der kapitalistischen Entwicklung Russlands*,¹ in the *Sozialpolitisches Centralblatt*, III, No 1, Oct 2, 1893.) Mr Krivenko attacks Mr Struve for, as he alleges, including in the category of "national socialism" (which he regards as of a "purely utopian nature") the ideas of those who "stand for the commune and allotments." This terrible accusation of being a Socialist drives our respected author to fury.

¹ An Estimation of the Capitalist Development of Russia—Ed Eng ed

'Really' he exclaims, 'we have no others (apart from Herzen, Chernyshevsky and the Narodniki) who stood for the commune and allotments? What about those who drew up the Peasant Laws, which placed the commune and the economic independence of the peasantry at the basis of reform the investigators of our history and of contemporary social conditions who supported these principles and almost the whole of our serious and respectable press which also supported these principles—are all these the victims of the illusion known as 'national socialism'?"

Calm yourself, most worthy "friend of the people"! You were so scared by the awful accusation of being a Socialist that you did not even take the trouble to read carefully Mr Struve's "little article." Indeed, what a crying injustice it would be to accuse those who stand for "the commune and allotments" of being Socialists! Pray, what is there socialistic in this? Socialism is a protest and struggle against the exploitation of the toilers, a struggle for the complete abolition of this exploitation, while to "stand for allotments" means being in favour of the peasants having to buy out all the land which had been at their disposal. But even if they are not in favour of the peasants having to buy out the land, and are in favour of the peasants remaining in possession of the land they possessed before the Reform without compensation, even then there would be nothing socialistic about them because it is precisely peasant ownership of land (which had arisen in the course of the feudal period) that has been everywhere in the West, as in Russia,¹ the basis of bourgeois society. What is there socialistic about "standing for the commune," i.e., protesting against police interference in the customary methods of distributing the land, when everyone knows that exploitation of the toilers goes on and is generated within this commune? This is stretching the word "socialism" to mean anything, perhaps Mr Pobyedonostsev² will be called a Socialist next!

Mr Struve is not by any means guilty of committing such an awful injustice. He talks about the "utopian nature of the national socialism" of the *Narodniki* and we are able to judge of those whom he includes among the *Narodniki* by the fact that

¹ This is proved by the disintegration among the peasantry

² A pronounced reactionary Procurator of the Holy Synod.—Ed. Eng. e.

he refers to Plekhanov's *Our Differences*¹ as polemics against the Narodniki. There is not the slightest doubt that Plekhanov engaged in polemics with Socialists, with people who have nothing in common with the "serious and respectable" Russian press. Hence, Mr Krivenko had no right to ascribe to himself that which was ascribed to the Narodniki. If he really wanted to know what Mr Struve's position was, I am surprised he did not pay attention to and translate for *Russkoye Bogatstvo* the following passage in Mr Struve's article:

'As capitalist development proceeds, the philosophy just described (the philosophy of the Narodniki) 'must become groundless. It will either degenerate (*wird herabsinken*) 'into a rather pale reformist trend capable of compromising and seeking compromise' promising shoots of which have long been observed or it will admit that real development is inevitable and draw the theoretical and practical conclusions that logically follow from this—in other words, will cease to be utopian."

If Mr Krivenko has no inkling where the shoots of the trend that is only capable of compromise are to be found, then I would advise him to glance at *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, at the theoretical views of that magazine which represent a pitiful attempt to piece together fragments of Narodnik doctrine with the recognition of the capitalist development of Russia, at its political programme, the purpose of which is to improve and restore the economy of small producers on the basis of the present capitalist system.²

¹ The title of a book by G. Plekhanov in which he criticised *Narodnaya Volya* and the views of the Narodniki, written in 1884.—Ed.

² *Ziemlich blasse kompromissfähige und kompromissüchtige Reformrichtung*—I think this can be translated into Russian as *kulturnicheski opportunist* (uplift opportunism).—Ed. Eng. ed.)

³ Generally speaking Mr Krivenko cuts a sorry figure in his attempt to wage war against Mr Struve. He betrays a sort of infantile impotence to put forward any serious argument against his opponent and also infantile irritation. For example, Mr Struve says that Mr N—on is a "utopian" and gives very distinct reasons for doing so: 1) because he ignores the "real development of Russia," 2) because he appeals to "society" and to the "state," failing to understand the class character of our state. What reply does Mr Krivenko make to this? Does he deny that our development is really capitalist? Does he say that it is something else? Does he say that our state is not a class state? No. He prefers to ignore these questions and with comical passion to gird against "stereotyped" phrases which he has himself invented. Another example. In addition to charging

Generally speaking, one of the most characteristic and remarkable phenomena of our social life recently has been the degeneration of Narodism into philistine opportunism

In fact, if we examine *Russkoye Bogatstvo's* programme—the regulation of migration and the renting of land, cheap credit, exhibitions, warehouses, improvement of technique, *artels* and communal tillage—we will find that it is indeed very widespread among the whole of the “serious and respectable press,” i.e. the whole of the liberal press except for the organs of serfdom and the reptile press. The idea that these measures are useful, urgent, “innocuous” has become deep rooted among the intelligentsia and has become extremely widespread. One meets it in the provincial sheets and newspapers, in all the *Zemstvo* works of research, symposiums, descriptive writings, etc., etc. If *this* is to be regarded as Narodism, then undoubtedly its success is enormous and indisputable

But it is not Narodism at all (in the old customary meaning of that term), and its success and the great extent to which it has spread has been achieved by vulgarising Narodism, by transforming social revolutionary Narodism, which is sharply opposed to our liberalism, into uplift opportunism which is becoming merged with this liberalism and which expresses only the interests of the petty bourgeoisie

In order to become convinced of this it is only necessary to turn to the above described pictures of disintegration among the peasants and *kustars*—and these pictures do not by any means depict single or new facts, they simply represent an attempt to

Mr N—on with failing to understand the class struggle, Mr Struve reproaches him with having committed grave errors in theory in the sphere of “purely economic facts.” He points out, among other things, that, in speaking of the smallness of the non agricultural population Mr N—on “fails to observe that the capitalist development of Russia will eliminate the difference between 80 per cent (rural population in Russia) and 44 per cent (rural population in America) and this indeed, may be said to be its historical mission” Mr Kriyenko 1) garbles this by saying that “our” (?) mission is to divorce the peasant from the land, when the point Mr Struve makes is simply that capitalism tends to reduce the rural population, and 2) without saying a single word on the subject at issue (whether a capitalist system is possible that would not tend to reduce the rural population), talks a lot of nonsense about “erudite persons,” etc

express in terms of political economy the "school" of "sharks" and "labourers," the existence of whom in our rural districts is not denied even by our opponents. It goes without saying that "Narodnik" measures can only serve to strengthen the petty bourgeois, or else (*artels* and communal tillage) represent miserable palliatives the pitiful experiments which the liberal bourgeois so tenderly cultivate everywhere in Europe for the simple reason that they do not in the least affect the "school" itself. For this very reason not even men like Yermolov and Witte need oppose progress of this kind. On the contrary. They would be only too glad if you kept it up, gentlemen! They will even grant you money for your "experiments," if only they divert the "intelligentsia" from revolutionary work (emphasising antagonisms, explaining them to the proletariat, attempts to bring these antagonisms on to the high road of direct political struggle) to patching up antagonisms, conciliation and unity. Oh, keep on doing it, gentlemen, by all means!

We will deal for a moment with the process which led to this degeneration of Narodism. When it first arose, in its original form, this theory was a rather symmetrical one, starting out with the concept of a special form of national life it was based on the belief in the communist instincts of the "village commune" peasant and for that reason regarded the peasantry as the direct champions of socialism—but it lacked theoretical analysis, confirmation by the facts of Russian life, on the one hand, and experience in applying a political programme based on these assumed qualities of the peasant, on the other.

The development of the theory proceeded along these two lines, theoretical and practical. Theoretical work was directed mainly towards studying the form of *landownership* in which they wished to see the rudiments of communism, and this work resulted in the accumulation of a wealth of facts of the most varied kind. But this wealth of material which dealt mainly with the forms of *landownership*, completely obscured from the eyes of the investigators the *economics* of the countryside. This was all the more natural, firstly, because the investigators lacked a fixed theory regarding the method of social science, a theory that would

explain the necessity for singling out and giving special study to relationships in production and, secondly, the material collected served as direct evidence of the immediate needs of the peasantry, their immediate misfortunes which had a depressing effect upon peasant economy. All the attention of the investigators was concentrated on studying these misfortunes, the lack of land, the high taxes and other payments, lack of rights, the wretchedness and oppression of the peasants. All this was described and studied and explained with such a wealth of material, in such minute detail that had our government not been a class government, had its policy been determined not by the interests of the ruling classes, but by an impartial consideration of the "needs of the people," it would, of course, have been convinced a thousand times of the necessity of removing these misfortunes. The naive investigators, believing in the possibility of "persuading" society and the state, were completely submerged in the details of the facts they had collected and lost sight of one thing, the political economic structure of the countryside, they lost sight of the main background of the form of economy that was really being depressed by these direct and immediate misfortunes. Naturally, the result was that defence of the interests of the system of economy that was being depressed by the lack of land, etc., turned out to be the defence of the interests of the class in whose hands this system of economy was concentrated and which was the only class that could hold on and develop in the given social and economic relationships prevailing *within* the village commune under the economic system prevailing in the country.

Theoretical work directed towards the study of the institution which was to serve as the basis and support for the abolition of exploitation led to the drawing up of a programme which expresses the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, the very class upon which the exploiting system rests.

At the same time, practical revolutionary work also developed in an altogether unexpected direction. Belief in the communist instincts of the muzhik naturally demanded that the Socialists abandon politics and "go among the people." A large number of energetic and talented people undertook to carry out this pro-

gramme, but practice proved to them how naive was the idea about the communist instincts of the muzhik. Incidentally, it was decided that it was not a matter of the muzhik, but of the government—and the whole of the work was then concentrated on fighting the government, but it was only intellectuals, and *workers* who sometimes joined them, who carried on this fight. At first this fight was waged in the name of socialism and was based on the theory that the people were ready for socialism and that it would be possible, merely by seizing power, not only to bring about a political revolution but also a social revolution. Lately, however, this theory is apparently becoming discredited and the fight the *Narodnaya Volya* waged against the government is being transformed into a struggle waged by radicals for political liberty.

Hence, from the other side also, the work led to results which were the very opposite to the starting point, from the other side also, there emerged a programme which expressed only the interests of radical bourgeois democracy. Strictly speaking, this process has not yet been completed, but it has already become clearly defined. This development of Narodism was quite natural and inevitable, because the doctrine was based on the purely mythical conception of a special (communal) system of peasant economy, the myth dissolved when it came into contact with reality and peasant socialism was transformed into radical democratic representation of the petty bourgeois peasantry.

I will give examples of the evolution of a democrat

'We must see to it,' argues Mr. Krivenko "that instead of a universal man we do not get an all-Russian jellyfish filled only with a vague ferment of good sentiments but incapable of real self-sacrifice, incapable of doing anything durable in life." The moralising is excellent but let us see what it is applied to. "In regard to the latter," continues Mr. Krivenko 'I am aware of the following vexing fact' in the South of Russia there lived some young people "who were inspired by the very best intentions and by a love for their younger brother, the greatest attention and respect was shown to the muzhik—he was given precedence over almost everybody they ate with him out of one spoon so to speak; they treated him to jam and biscuits they paid him higher prices for the things they bought from him than were paid elsewhere they gave him money—as a loan, as a 'tip' or just without any pretext at all—they told him how things were managed in Europe and about European associations, etc. In the same locality there lived a young German named Schmidt, a manager of an estate, or rather a simple gardenor,

a man completely lacking in humanitarian ideas a real, narrow, formal, German soul (*sic?*!!), etc. Three or four years passed and these people separated to go their different ways. Another twenty years or so went by and the author, visiting the locality again, learned that Mr Schmidt (as a reward for his useful activities gardener Schmidt is promoted to Mr Schmidt) had taught the peasants how to cultivate vineyards from which they obtain a small income" from 75 to 100 rubles a year and because of that they had 'kind memories of him, but that the gentlemen' who were merely imbued with kind sentiments towards the muzhik but who had done nothing material (1) for him, had been completely forgotten."

If we calculate the time we will find that the events described occurred about 1869-70, *i.e.*, approximately at the very time when the Russian socialist Narodniki tried to introduce into Russia the most advanced and most important feature of "European association"—the International *

Of course, the impression created by Mr Krivenko's story is obviously too sharp and so he hastens to soften it by saying

I do not want to suggest, of course that Schmidt is better than these gentlemen. I merely point out why. In spite of all his defects he left a more lasting impression on the locality and on the population than they did" ('I do not say that he is better. I say that he left a more lasting impression'—what nonsense is this?!) 'Nor do I say that he did anything important, on the contrary, I quote what he did as an example of a minute deed which cost him no effort, but which was a very effective deed for all that

His excuse, as you see, is a very ambiguous one, but that is not the point, the point is that the author, in contrasting the fruitlessness of one form of activity to the success of another form apparently does not suspect that there is a fundamental difference between the trends of these two forms of activity. This is the salt that gives piquancy to this story which so characteristically defines the features of the contemporary democrat

The young men who talked to the muzhik about "European ways and European associations" apparently strove to rouse in this muzhik a desire for the reorganisation of the form of social life (the conclusion I draw may be wrong, but everyone will agree, I think, that it is a perfectly legitimate one, for it inevitably follows from Mr Krivenko's story as related above), they wanted to rouse him for the social revolution against contemporary society which, side by side with universal rejoicing over all sorts of liberal

progress, gives rise to such shameful exploitation and oppression of the toilers "Mr Schmidt," however, like a true businessman, merely wanted to help other businessmen to improve their business—and nothing more. How can any comparison be made between these two diametrically opposite trends of activity? It is like trying to draw a comparison between the failure of a person who is trying to destroy a certain structure with the success of a person who is trying to bolster it up! In order to draw a comparison that would have any sense at all, Mr Krivenko should have enquired why the efforts of the young men who went among the people in order to rouse the peasants for revolution were so unsuccessful—whether this was not due to the fact that they erroneously believed that the "peasants" represented the toiling and exploited section of the population, whereas the peasantry do not represent a special class (an illusion which can only be explained by the reflection of the influence of the epoch of the fall of serfdom when the peasantry did indeed come out as a *class*, but it was a class in *serf* society), for it contains within itself bourgeois and proletarian classes—in a word, he should have examined the old socialist theories and the Social Democratic criticism of these theories. But instead of doing that Mr Krivenko exerts himself to the utmost to prove that "Mr Schmidt's deeds" "were undoubtedly far more effective." But my dear "friend of the people," what's the use of trying to force an open door? Nobody doubts this for a moment. Cultivate vineyards and get an income of 75 to 100 rubles per annum from them—what can there be more effective? ¹

And then the author proceeds to explain that if one farmer sets up a vineyard, that will be isolated activity, but if several farmers do so—it will be common and widespread activity which will convert a small affair into a real and proper thing, *as, for example*, A. N. Engelhardt, who not only used phosphate on his own farm, but induced others to do the same.

¹ You should have tried to suggest this "effective" work to the young men who talked to the muzhik about European associations! You would have got a welcome and a reply that you did not bargain for! You would have been as terrified of their ideas as you are now terrified of materialism and dialectics!

Now isn't that democrat magnificent!

We will quote another example of the arguments that are used in connection with the Peasant Reform. What was the attitude of the democrat of the above mentioned epoch when democracy and socialism were inseparable, *i.e.*, Chernyshevsky, toward the Peasant Reform? Unable to express his opinion openly, he *remained silent*, but in a circumlocutory way he described the reform that was then being prepared as follows

'Let us assume that I was interested in taking measures to protect the provisions out of which your dinner is made. It goes without saying that if I were prompted to do this by my kind disposition towards you, then my zeal would be based on the assumption that the provisions belonged to you and that the dinner prepared from these provisions would be wholesome and beneficial for you. Imagine my feelings, then, when I learn that the provisions do not belong to you at all and that for every dinner prepared from them you are charged a price *which not only exceeds the cost of the dinner* (this was written *before* the Reform was passed. And Messieurs the Yuzhakovy *now* assert that the fundamental principle of the Reform was to give security to the peasants!!) "*but which you are able to pay only with extreme difficulty*. What thoughts will enter my head when I make this very strange discovery?"

How stupid I was to worry about a matter for the usefulness of which the conditions were not guaranteed! Who but a fool would take measures to preserve certain property in certain hands without first satisfying himself that the property will pass to those hands and on favourable terms? Far better if these provisions were wasted for they can *bring only harm* to my friend! *Far better to abandon the who's business that will only bring you ruin!*

I have emphasised the passages that most strikingly reveal how well and profoundly Chernyshevsky understood the situation of his time, how well he understood what the payments the peasants had to make meant and the antagonisms between social classes in Russia. It is also important to note his ability to expound such purely revolutionary ideas in the censored press. He wrote the same thing in his illegal works, but without this circumlocution. In *A Prologue to a Prologue*, Volgin says, actually expressing Chernyshevsky's idea

"Let the cause of emancipating the peasants be transferred to the landlords' party. It won't make much difference."¹

¹ I am quoting from Plekhanov's article, *Chernyshevsky*, in *Sotsial Demokrat*.

And in reply to the retort of his interlocutor that on the contrary, there was an enormous difference because the landlords' party was opposed to allotting land to the peasants, he says very emphatically

'No not enormous but insignificant. It would have been enormous had the peasants obtained land without having to pay compensation. There is a difference between taking a thing from a man and leaving it with him, but to take payment for what you leave him is the same as taking it from him. The difference between the plan proposed by the landlords' party and that proposed by the progressives is that the former is simpler and more blunt. For that reason it is even better. Less red tape and, in all probability, fewer burdens for the peasants. *Those peasants who have money will buy land. What's the use of compelling the peasants who have no money to buy land? It will only ruin them. Buying out in instalments—is buying all the same.*

It required the genius of a Chernyshevsky to understand so clearly at that time, when the Peasant Reform was being introduced (when its significance was not properly understood even in Western Europe), its fundamentally bourgeois character, to understand that even at that time Russian "society" and the Russian "state" were ruled and governed by social classes which were irrevocably hostile to the toilers and which undoubtedly predetermined the rumination and expropriation of the peasantry. Moreover, Chernyshevsky understood that the existence of a government which serves as a screen for the antagonistic social relationships is a terrible evil which makes the position of the toilers ever so much worse.

"To tell the truth," continues Volgin, "*it will be better if they were emancipated without land*" (I.e., since the serf-owning landlords are so strong, it would be better if they acted openly, straightforwardly and said all that they had in mind than that they should conceal their serf-owning interests behind the compromises of a hypocritical absolutist government.)

"The question is presented in such a way that I can find no reason for getting excited even on the question as to whether the peasants will be emancipated or not, let alone on the question as to who will emancipate them, the liberals or the landlords. There is no difference, to my mind. If anything the landlords are better."

The following is a passage from *An Unaddressed Letter*:

"They say emancipate the peasants. Where are the forces that can do this? Those forces do not exist yet. It is useless taking up a cause when the forces are lacking to fight for it. You see what this is

leading to they will begin to emancipate Judge for yourselves as to what will come of it, what comes of taking up a task that is beyond one's powers. You will damage the cause—the result will be an abomination”

Chernyshevsky understood that the Russian serf owning, bureaucratic state was incapable of emancipating the peasants, *i.e.*, of overthrowing the serf owners, that it was only capable of creating an “abomination,” a miserable compromise between the interests of the liberals (buying out in instalments is buying all the same) and the landlords, a compromise calculated to deceive the peasants with the vision of security and freedom, but which would in fact ruin them and place them at the mercy of the landlords. And he protested against and cursed the Reform, desired it to fail, wanted the government to get entangled in its equilibristics between the liberals and the landlords and so hasten the collapse that would bring Russia out on to the high road of the open class struggle *

And now, when Chernyshevsky's brilliant vision has become a fact, when the history of the past thirty years has ruthlessly swept aside all economic and political illusions, our contemporary “democrats” wax eloquent about the Reform, regard it as a sanction for a “people's” industry, contrive to find proof in it of the possibility of finding some other way out that would *avoid* the social classes which are hostile to the toilers. I repeat, their attitude toward the Peasant Reform is the most striking proof of the manner in which our democrats have become profoundly bourgeois. These gentlemen have learned nothing, but they have forgotten a great deal.

As a parallel I will take *Otechestvennye Zapiski* for 1872. I have already quoted above a passage from the article, *The Plutocracy and its Foundations*, which dealt with the liberal achievements (which serve to conceal the interests of the plutocracy) of Russian society in the very first decade after the “great emancipating” Reform.

“If formerly this author wrote in this very article, “people were to be found who snivelled over reforms and lamented for the good old times, no such people are to be found now. Everybody is pleased with the new order of things, everybody is happy and calm,”

and then the author goes on to show that "literature itself is becoming the organ of the plutocracy," advocating the interests and desires of the plutocracy "under cover of democracy." Examine this argument a little more closely. The author is displeased with the fact that "everybody" is satisfied with the new order of things created by the Reform, that "everybody" (the representatives of "society" and of the "intelligentsia," of course, and not the toilers) is happy and calm notwithstanding the obviously antagonistic, bourgeois features of the new order of things. People fail to observe that liberalism merely serves to screen the "freedom to appropriate," at the expense of and the injury to the mass of the toilers. And he protests against this. It is precisely this protest that is characteristic of the Socialist and valuable in his argument. Observe that this protest against plutocracy concealed by democracy contradicts the general theory to which the magazine subscribes. The magazine denies that there are any bourgeois features, elements or interests in the Peasant Reform, it denies the class character of the Russian intelligentsia and of the Russian state, it denies that there is a soil for the development of capitalism in Russia, nevertheless, it cannot but sense and feel capitalism and the bourgeoisie. And to the extent that *Otechestvennye Zapiski*, sensing the antagonisms in Russian society, fought against bourgeois liberalism and democracy—to that extent it fought in the cause common to all our pioneer Socialists who, although they did not understand these antagonisms, nevertheless, were conscious of their existence and desired to fight against the very organisation of society which gave rise to them—to that extent *Otechestvennye Zapiski* was progressive (from the point of view of the proletariat, of course). The "friends of the people" forgot all about this antagonism, lost all sense of the fact that in Holy Russia "under the cloak of democracy" there lies concealed the pure blooded bourgeois, and that is why they are now reactionary (in relation to the proletariat), for they try to obscure the antagonisms, and talk, not about the struggle but about conciliation, cultural activity.

But, gentlemen, did the Russian clear browed liberal, the democratic representative of the plutocracy of the 'sixties cease to be

the ideologist of the bourgeoisie in the 'nineties only because his brow became beclouded with civic grief?

Does "freedom of appropriation" on a large scale, freedom to appropriate big credits, big capital, big technical improvements, cease to be liberal, i.e., bourgeois, assuming the present social and economic relationships remain unchanged, merely because its place is taken by the freedom to appropriate small credits, small capital, small technical improvements?

I repeat, it is not that they have changed their opinions under the influence of a radical change of views or a radical change in the order of things. No, they have simply forgotten.

Having lost the only feature that at one time made their predecessors progressive, notwithstanding the unsoundness of their theories and their naive and utopian outlook on reality, the "friends of the people" have learnt absolutely nothing throughout the whole of this period. And yet, quite apart from a politico-economic analysis of Russian conditions, the mere political history of Russia for the past thirty years should have taught them a great deal.

At that time, in the epoch of the "'sixties," the power of the self-owners was broken: they suffered not final defeat, it is true, but nevertheless such a decisive defeat that they had to depart from the stage. On the other hand, the liberals raised their heads. Streams of liberal phrases began to flow about progress, science, virtue, combating untruth, national interests, national conscience, national forces, etc., etc.—the very phrases which our radical snivellers vomit forth in their moments of depression in their *salons*, which our liberal phrasemongers utter at anniversary dinners and in the pages of their magazines and in the columns of their newspapers. The liberals proved to be so strong that they altered "the new order of things" in their own way, not altogether, of course, but to a considerable degree. Although the "clear light of the open class struggle" did not shine in Russia at that time, nevertheless, it was lighter than it is now, so that those ideologists of the toiling classes who had not the faintest idea as to what the class struggle meant, who preferred to dream about a better future rather than *explain* the abominable present, even they could not

help seeing that plutocracy was hiding behind liberalism, and that the new order of things was a bourgeois order. The very fact that the serf owners were removed from the stage and no longer diverted attention to more crying topics of that day, no longer prevented the new order of things from being seen in its (relatively) pure form, enabled this to be seen. But, although the democrats of that time knew how to condemn plutocratic liberalism, they were not able, however, to understand it and explain it scientifically, they did not understand that it was inevitable under the capitalist system of organisation of our social economy, they did not understand the progressive character of the new system of social life compared with the old serf system, they failed to understand the revolutionary role of the proletariat which the new system created, and they limited themselves to "snorting" at these "liberties" and "humanitarianisms," they imagined that the bourgeois element was a casual phenomenon and expected that some other social relationships would reveal themselves in the "national system."

And history revealed to them new social relationships. The serf owners, not completely crushed by the Reform, which was terribly mutilated in their interests, revived (for an hour) and strikingly demonstrated these other than bourgeois relationships in the form of such unbridled, incredibly senseless and brutal reaction that our democrats caught fright and subsided, and instead of going forward and changing their naive democracy, which was able to sense the bourgeois element but was not able to understand it, into Social Democracy, they went back to the liberals, and now they boast that their snivelling, or rather, I wanted to say their theory and programme, is shared by "the whole of the serious and respectable press." One would have thought that the lesson was a very thorough one: the illusions of the old Socialists concerning a special system of national life, the socialist instincts of the people, the casual character of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, became too obvious, one would have thought that it was now time to look facts straight in the face and admit that no other social and economic relationships except bourgeois and moribund serf relationships have existed or now exist, in Russia, and that, therefore, there is no other road to socialism except through the

labour movement But these democrats learned nothing, and the naive illusions of petty bourgeois socialism gave way to practical and sober petty bourgeois progress

Now, when these ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie come forward as representatives of the interests of the toilers, these theories are positively reactionary They obscure the antagonisms in contemporary Russian social and economic relationships and argue as if things could be improved by measures for "raising," "improving," etc., to be applied to all, as if it were possible to reconcile and unite They are reactionary because they depict our state as something standing above classes, and therefore fit and capable of rendering serious and honest aid to the exploited population

Finally, they are reactionary because they totally fail to understand the necessity for a struggle, a desperate struggle on the part of the toilers themselves for their emancipation According to the "friends of the people," they themselves may be able to arrange everything The workers need not worry a bit Why, one technician has already visited the offices of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* and they nearly succeeded in working out a "scheme" to "introduce capitalism into the life of the people" Socialists must *once and for all* break with all petty bourgeois ideas and theories—*this is the principal lesson* that is to be learned from this attack

I want you to note that I say break with petty bourgeois ideas and not with the "friends of the people" and not with their ideas—because there can be no rupture between what has never been connected The "friends of the people" are only one of the representatives of one of the trends of this sort of petty bourgeois socialist ideas And if, in this case, I draw the conclusion that it is necessary to break with petty bourgeois socialist ideas, with the ideas of old Russian peasant socialism *generally*, it is because the attack launched against the Marxists by the representatives of the old ideas, who have been scared by the growth of Marxism, has induced them to depict these petty bourgeois ideas in particularly complete and bold relief Comparing these with modern socialism and with the facts of contemporary Russian life we see with astonishing clarity how flat these ideas have become, to what extent they have lost their integral theoretical basis and have sunk to

pitiful eclecticism, to the level of an ordinary uplift, opportunist programme. It may be said that this is not the fault of the old ideas of socialism as such, but the fault of these gentlemen, whom no one would dream of calling Socialists, but it seems to me that such an argument would be quite unsound. Everywhere, I have tried to show that such a degeneration of the old theories was inevitable, everywhere, I have tried to devote as little space as possible to criticism of these gentlemen in particular and to devote as much space as possible to the general and fundamental postulates of old Russian socialism. And if Socialists are of the opinion that I have not properly, exactly or fully enunciated these postulates, my reply to them is please, gentlemen, explain these postulates yourselves as they should be explained!

Indeed, no one would be more pleased to enter into polemics with the Socialists than the Social Democrats.

Do you really think that we find any pleasure in replying to the "polemics" of these people and that we would have entered into polemics with them had there not been a sharp, direct and persistent challenge on their part?

Do you really think that we do not have to force ourselves to read and re-read and to swot over this repulsive mixture of official liberal phrases and philistine morality?

Surely, we are not to blame for the fact that only such people now take it upon themselves to expound these ideas. I want you to note also that I speak of the necessity of a rupture with the petty bourgeois ideas of socialism. The petty bourgeois theories we discussed above are *absolutely* reactionary *in so far as* they are put forward as socialist theories.

But if we understand that there is absolutely nothing socialistic about these theories, that they utterly fail to explain the exploitation of the toilers and, therefore, are totally useless as a means for their emancipation, that as a matter of fact all these theories reflect and vindicate the interests of the petty bourgeoisie—then our attitude towards them must be different, then we must put the question, *What should be the attitude of the working class toward the petty bourgeoisie and its programme?* And it will be impossible to reply to this question unless the dual character of this

class is taken into consideration (in Russia this duality is particularly marked owing to the fact that the antagonism between the big bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie is less developed) It is a progressive class in so far as it puts forward general democratic demands, *i.e.*, fights against all survivals of the epoch of mediævalism and serfdom, it is a reactionary class in so far as it fights to maintain its position as a petty bourgeois class and to retard, to turn back the general development of the country from the bourgeois direction Reactionary demands, as, for example, the inalienability of allotments, as well as the many other projects for placing a guardianship over the peasants, are usually put forward on the plausible pretext of protecting the toilers, as a matter of fact, of course, they only make their conditions worse while at the same time they hamper them in their struggle for their emancipation A strict distinction must be drawn between these two sides of the petty bourgeois programme and, while denying that these theories in any way bear a socialistic character and while combating their reactionary sides, we must not forget about the democratic part of their programme I will quote an example in order to show that the complete repudiation of petty bourgeois theories by Marxists does not prevent them from including democratic demands in their programme, on the contrary, it calls for stronger insistence on these demands than ever Above we mentioned the three main postulates which were the stock in trade of the representatives of petty-bourgeois socialism, *viz.*, lack of land, high land purchase payments and the tyranny of the administration.

There is absolutely nothing socialistic in the demand for the abolition of those evils, for they do not in the least explain the causes of expropriation and exploitation, and their removal would not in the least affect capital's oppression of labour But the removal of these evils would purge this oppression of its mediæval attributes, which serve to intensify it, it would facilitate labour's direct struggle against capital and, for that reason, as a democratic demand, will be energetically supported by the workers Speaking generally, the question of payments and taxes is one to which only a petty bourgeois would attach particular importance, but in Russia in many respects, the payments made by the peasants are

simply survivals of serfdom such, for example, are the land payments, which should be immediately and completely abolished, such, for example, are those taxes which the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie have to pay, but from which the "nobility" are exempted. Social Democrats will always support demands for the removal of these survivals of mediæval relationships which cause economic and political stagnation. The same thing must be said in regard to lack of land. I have already proved in detail above the bourgeois character of the complaints on this score. But there is no doubt, however, that the land enclosures permitted under the Peasant Reform positively robbed the peasants for the benefit of the landlords and rendered a service to this great reactionary force directly (by seizing the peasants' lands) and indirectly (by the artful manner in which the peasant allotments were apportioned). Social Democrats will most strenuously insist on the immediate return to the peasants of the land of which they have been deprived, and the complete expropriation of the landlords—the bulwark of serf institutions and traditions. This latter point, which coincides with the nationalisation of the land, contains nothing socialistic because the farmer relationships, which are already arising in this country, would flourish much more quickly and to a larger extent if the land were nationalised, but it is extremely important in the democratic sense as the only measure that will finally break the power of the landed nobility. Finally, only people like Messieurs Yuzhakov and V. V., of course, can talk of the peasants' lack of rights as being the cause of the expropriation and the exploitation of the peasants, but not only is the tyranny of the administration over the peasantry beyond a doubt, it is something more than simply tyranny, it is treating the peasants as the "base rabble" who by their very nature must be subject to the noble landlords, to whom the right to enjoy common civic rights is given only as a special favour (colonisation,¹ for example), and whom any pompadour can

¹ One cannot help recalling here the purely Russian insolence of a serf owner with which Mr. Yermolov, now Minister of Agriculture, in his book, *Bad Harvests and National Calamities* protests against the settling of the peasants on new territory. This, he says, cannot be regarded as rational from the point of view of the state when in European Russia the

order about as if they were inmates of a workhouse. Social Democrats will unhesitatingly join in the demand for the complete restoration of the civic rights of the peasants, for the complete abolition of all privileges for the nobility, the abolition of the bureaucratic tutelage over the peasantry and for self government for the peasantry.

Generally speaking Russian Communists, the followers of Marxism, should more than anyone else call themselves *Social-Democrats* and never, in their activities, forget the enormous importance of democracy.¹

In Russia, the remnants of mediæval, semi self institutions are still so very strong (compared with Western Europe), they impose such a heavy yoke upon the proletariat, and upon the people generally, and retard the growth of political thought among all estates and classes, that one cannot refrain from urging the tremendous importance for the workers of the struggle against all self institutions, against absolutism, the estates and the bureaucracy. Every effort must be made to explain to the worker in the greatest possible detail what a terrible, reactionary force these institutions represent, how they increase the power of capital over labour, how they degrade the workers, how they retain capital in its mediæval forms which, while conceding nothing to the modern, industrial forms as far as the exploitation of labour is concerned, add to this exploitation enormous difficulties in the struggle for emancipation. The workers must understand that unless these pillars of reaction² are overthrown it will be utterly impossible for them to

landlords are suffering from a shortage of labour. What indeed do the peasants exist for if not to feed by their labour the idle landlords and their high placed hangers on?

¹ This is a very important point. Plekhanov is quite right when he says that our revolutionaries have two enemies: old prejudices which have not yet been eradicated on the one hand, and a narrow conception of the new programme on the other.

² A particularly imposing reactionary institution, and one our revolutionaries have paid relatively little attention to, is our native *bureaucracy* which *de facto* rules the Russian state. Its ranks reinforced mainly by commoners, this bureaucracy is both in origin and in the purpose and character of its activities profoundly bourgeois but absolutism and the enormous political privileges of the landed aristocracy have given it particularly harmful qualities. It is a weathercock which sees its supreme task in combining the interests of the landlord and the bourgeois. It is a Yudushka

wage a successful struggle against the bourgeoisie, because as long as they exist the Russian rural proletariat, whose support is absolutely essential if the working class is to attain victory, will never cease to be a wretched and cowed creature, capable only of acts of sullen desperation and not of sensible and sturdy protest and struggle. And that is why it is the imperative duty of the working class to fight side by side with radical democracy against absolutism and the reactionary estates and institutions—and Social Democrats must urge the workers to do this while not for a moment ceasing to explain to them that it is necessary to wage a struggle against these institutions only as a means of facilitating the struggle against the bourgeoisie, that the achievement of general democratic demands is necessary for the working class only as a means of clearing the road to victory over the chief enemy of the toilers, *viz*, capital, an institution which is purely democratic in its nature but which, in Russia, is strongly inclined to sacrifice its democracy and enter into alliance with reaction in order to suppress the workers and to retard the labour movement still further.

What has been said, I think, sufficiently defines the attitude of the Social Democrats towards absolutism and political liberty and also towards that tendency, which has been growing particularly strong lately to "amalgamate" and "unite" all the revolutionary factions for the purpose of winning political liberty.¹

This is a rather peculiar and characteristic tendency.

It is peculiar because the proposal for "unity" does not come from a definite group, or definite groups, with definite pro

who takes advantage of his serfowning sympathies and connections to fool the workers and peasants and on the pretext of "protecting the economically weak" and acting as their "guardian" to protect them from the kulak and usurer, passes measures which reduce the toilers to the position of "base rabble," surrenders them completely to the serfowning landlord and makes them more defenceless against the bourgeoisie. It is a most dangerous hypocrite who, having learned from the experience of the West European masters of reaction, skillfully conceals its Arakcheyev designs with the slogan of phrases about loving the people [Yudushka is a character in Shchedrin's *The Goloulov Family*, typifying the pious, hypocrite Arakcheyev, a militarist of the time of Alexander I.—Ed Eng. ed.]

¹ This refers to the followers of *Narodnoye Pravo* [*The People's Rights*]. See note to p. 369.—Ed

grammes, which are identical on this point or that. If that were so, the question of unity could be decided in each separate case, it would be a concrete question that could be decided by the representatives of the groups that were to unite. But in that case there would not have been a special tendency in favour of "amalgamation." The proposal for unity, however, comes from people who became divorced from the old, but who have not yet attached themselves to the new, the theory on which the fighters against absolutism have based themselves up till now is obviously crumbling and destroying the conditions of solidarity and organisation which are essential for the struggle. And so, apparently, these "amalgamators" and "unifiers" think that the easiest thing to do is to create such a theory and reduce it all to a protest against absolutism and a demand for political liberty, while evading all the other socialist and non socialist problems. It goes without saying that this naive fallacy will inevitably be refuted by the very first attempts that are made to unite.

But this tendency in favour of "amalgamation" is characteristic because it expresses one of the latest stages in the process of transformation of militant Narodism into political radical democracy, which process I have tried to outline above. It will be possible to firmly unite all the non Social Democratic revolutionary groups under the banner mentioned only when a durable programme of *democratic* demands has been drawn up, which will put an end to the old prejudice about the peculiar position of Russia. Of course, Social Democrats are of the opinion that the formation of such a democratic party would be a useful step forward, and their work in opposition to Narodism should facilitate the formation of such a party, should facilitate the eradication of all prejudices and myths, it should help to group all the Socialists under the banner of Marxism and enable all the other groups to form a democratic party.

But, of course, the Social Democrats could not "amalgamate" with such a party, for they consider that it is necessary to organise the workers into an independent workers' party, but the workers would most strenuously support any struggle the democrats would put up against reactionary institutions.

The degeneration of Narodism to the level of a very ordinary theory of petty bourgeois radicalism—which (degeneration) is so strikingly demonstrated by the "friends of the people"—reveals what a serious mistake is being committed by those who call upon the workers to fight against absolutism without at the same time explaining to them the antagonistic character of our social relationships as a consequence of which even the ideologists of the bourgeoisie stand for political liberty, without explaining to them the historic role of the Russian workers as the fighters for the emancipation of all the toilers

The Social Democrats are often reproached with wanting to monopolise the theory of Marx whereas, it is argued, his economic theory is accepted by all Socialists. But the question arises, what is the use of explaining to the workers the form of value, the nature of the bourgeois system and the revolutionary role of the proletariat if, in Russia, the exploitation of the toilers is not due to the bourgeois system of organisation of economy, but, say, to the lack of land, payments, and the tyranny of the administration?

What is the use of explaining the theory of the class struggle to the workers if that theory cannot even explain their relationship to the manufacturers (capitalism in Russia is artificially implanted by the government), let alone the relationship of the mass of the "people," which does not belong to the factory worker class which has arisen?

How can the economic theory of Marx and the deduction drawn from it, *viz*, the revolutionary role of the proletariat as the organiser of communism through the medium of capitalism, be accepted, if efforts are made to find ways to communism other than capitalism and the proletariat which it has created?

Obviously, to call upon the workers to fight for political liberty under such conditions would be tantamount to calling upon them to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the progressive bourgeoisie, for it cannot be denied (it is characteristic that even the Narodniki and the followers of *Narodnaya Volya* did not deny this) that political liberty will primarily serve the interests of the bourgeoisie and will not improve the conditions of the workers, but only improve the conditions for their struggle against this

very bourgeoisie I say this in opposition to those Socialists who, while they do not accept the theory of the Social Democrats, carry on their agitation among the workers, having become convinced empirically that only among the workers can revolutionary elements be found. The theory of these Socialists contradicts their practice and they make the very serious mistake of distracting the workers from their task of *organising a socialist workers' party*.¹

This mistake naturally arose at a time when the class antagonisms of bourgeois society were as yet quite undeveloped, when they were suppressed by serfdom, when the latter gave rise to a unanimous protest and struggle on the part of the whole of the intelligentsia, which, in turn, gave rise to the illusion that the whole of our intelligentsia was particularly democratic and that there was no profound difference between the ideas of the liberals and those of the Socialists. Now, however, when economic development has made such great progress that even those who formerly denied that there were grounds for the development of capitalism in Russia admit that we have entered precisely the capitalist path of development, illusions on this score are no longer possible. The composition of the "intelligentsia" is as clearly defined now as is the composition of society engaged in the production of material values while the latter is ruled and governed by the capitalist, the "tone" in the former is given by the rapidly growing horde of career seekers and mercenaries of the bourgeoisie, an "intelligentsia" contented and quiet, which has abandoned all wild dreams and which knows very well what it wants. Our radicals and liberals do not deny this, on the contrary, they emphasise it and strain every nerve to prove how immoral this is, to condemn

¹ One can arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary to rouse the workers for the fight against absolutism by two methods: *either* by regarding the workers as the only fighters for the socialist system and hence, to regard political freedom as one of the means of facilitating their struggle. That is the attitude of the Social Democrats. *Or* to turn to the workers as those who suffer most from the present system who have nothing to lose and who can most determinedly fight against absolutism. But that will mean compelling the workers to drag at the tail of the bourgeois radicals, who refuse to see the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie because of the solidarity of the whole "people" against absolutism.

it, to break it up, to shame it and to destroy it. These naive efforts to make the bourgeois intelligentsia *ashamed* of being bourgeois are as ridiculous as the efforts of our philistine economists to frighten our bourgeoisie (pleading the experience of "elder brothers") by warning them that they are heading towards the ruin of the people, towards poverty, unemployment and starvation among the masses, this sitting in judgment on the bourgeoisie and its ideologists calls to mind the court that was held to try the pike and which condemned it to death by drowning!¹ Beyond these stand the liberal and radical "intelligentsia" who pour out streams of phrases about progress, science, truth, the people, etc., who like to lament over the passing of the 'sixties, when there was no discord, depression, despondency and apathy and when all hearts were aflame with democracy.

With their characteristic simplicity, these gentlemen refuse to understand that the solidarity that prevailed at that time was called forth by the material conditions of the time, which can never return: serfdom equally oppressed all—the serfowner's bailiff, himself a serf, who had saved up a bit of money and wanted to live in contentment, the shrewd muzhik who hated the landlord because of the dues he had to pay him, because he interfered in his business and tore him away from his work, the proletarian domestics and the impoverished muzhik, who was sold into bondage to the merchant, all suffered from serfdom: the merchant, the manufacturer, the worker, the *kustar* and the artisan. The only tie that linked all these people together was that they were all hostile to serfdom, beyond that line, the sharpest economic antagonisms commenced. To what extent must one lull oneself with sweet dreams to fail to this very day to see these antagonisms, which have now become enormously developed, to weep for the return of the times of solidarity, when the realities of the situation demand struggle, demand that everyone, who does not desire to be a *willing* or *unwilling* time server of the bourgeoisie, shall take his stand on the side of the proletariat!

If you refuse to believe the pompous phrases about the "interests of the people" and dig deeper into the matter, you will find

¹ From a fable by Krylov—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the purest ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, who dream of improving, supporting and restoring their ("people's" in their jargon) economy by various innocent, progressive measures, and who are totally incapable of understanding that on the basis of present relations of production the only effect these measures can have is to proletarianise the masses more and more. We cannot but be grateful to the "friends of the people" for having done so much to reveal the class character of our intelligentsia and, by that, fortifying the theory of the Marxists that small producers are petty bourgeois. They will inevitably hasten the disappearance of the old illusions and myths that have for so long confused the minds of Russian Socialists. The "friends of the people" who mauled these theories, wore them threadbare and soiled them to such an extent that Russian Socialists who held to these theories are confronted with the dilemma—either to overhaul them once again, or to abandon them completely and leave them to the gentlemen who with smug solemnity announce *urbi et orbi* that the rich peasants are buying improved implements, who with a serious mien assure us that we must welcome those who have grown tired of sitting at green baize tables. And they talk in the same strain about "a people's system" and the "intelligentsia" not only with a serious air but in pretentious, pompous phrases about broad ideals, about presenting problems of life in an ideal manner!

The socialist intelligentsia can expect to perform fruitful work only when it abandons illusions and begins to seek support in the actual and not the desired development of Russia, in the actual and not the possible social and economic relationships. Moreover, its *theoretical* work should be directed towards the concrete study of all forms of economic antagonisms in Russia, the study of all their connections and sequence of development, it must expose these antagonisms wherever they have been concealed by political history, by the peculiarities of legal systems and by established theoretical prejudices. It must present a complete picture of our conditions as a definite system of relationships in production and show that the exploitation and expropriation of the toilers are inevitable under this system, and point to the way out of this system that has been indicated by economic development.

This theory, based on a detailed study of Russian history and conditions, must meet the requirements of the proletariat—and if it satisfies the requirements of science, then the awakening, protesting thoughts of the proletariat will inevitably guide this thought in the channels of Social Democracy. The more the working out of this theory advances, the more rapidly will Social Democracy grow, because the most cunning guardians of the present order will be impotent to prevent the awakening of the thoughts of the proletariat, for this very order necessarily and inevitably leads to the intensified expropriation of the producers, to the continuous growth of the proletariat and of its reserve army of unemployed—simultaneously with the increase in social wealth, with the enormous growth of productive forces and the socialisation of labour by capitalism. Although a great deal has yet to be done to work out this theory, the Socialists will certainly fulfil this task, for this is assured by the extent to which materialism, the only really scientific method which demands that every programme shall be a precise formulation of an actual process, is spread among them, it is assured by the success which Social Democracy, which has adopted these ideas, has achieved—a success which has so stirred our liberals and democrats that, as a certain Marxist has put it, their journals have ceased to be dull.

By emphasising the necessity, the importance and the immensity of the theoretical work Social Democrats must carry on, I do not in the least wish to suggest that this work must take precedence over *practical work*¹, still less do I suggest that the latter be postponed until the former is finished. Only those who admire the "subjective method in sociology" and the followers of utopian socialism could arrive at such a conclusion. Of course, if the task of Socialists is presumed to be to seek

¹ On the contrary, the practical work of propaganda and agitation must always take precedence because: 1) theoretical work only provides the replies to the problems which practical work raises, and 2) for reasons over which they have no control, Social Democrats are too often compelled to confine themselves to theoretical work not to attach the highest value to every moment they can give to practical work whenever the opportunity for this occurs

"other (than the actual) paths of development" for the country, then, naturally, practical work will become possible only when some genius of a philosopher will have discovered these "other paths", on the other hand, the discovery and indication of these paths will mark the close of theoretical work, and the work of those who are to direct the "fatherland" along the "newly discovered" "other paths" will commence. The position is altogether different when the task of the Socialists is understood to mean that they must be the ideological leaders of the proletariat in its genuine struggle against real enemies, who stand on the real path of present social and economic development. In these circumstances theoretical and practical work merge into a single task, which the veteran German Social Democrat Liebknecht aptly described as

Studieren, propagandieren, organisieren

It is impossible to be an ideological leader without performing the above mentioned theoretical work, just as it is impossible to be one without directing this work to meet the requirements of the cause, without propagating the deductions drawn from this theory among the workers and helping to organise them.

Presenting the task in this way will guard Social Democracy against the defects from which groups of Socialists frequently suffer, *viz.*, dogmatism and sectarianism.

There can be no dogmatism where the supreme and sole criterion of a doctrine is—whether or not it corresponds to the actual process of social and economic development, there can be no sectarianism when the task undertaken is to assist to organise the proletariat, when, therefore, the role of the "intelligentsia" is reduced to the task of making special leaders from among the intellectuals unnecessary.

Hence, notwithstanding the difference of opinion that exists among Marxists on various theoretical questions, the methods of their political activity have remained unchanged from the very time the group arose, to this day.

The political activities of Social Democrats consist of assisting the development and organisation of the labour movement in

Russia, of transforming it from the present state of sporadic attempts at protesting, "riots" and strikes lacking a leading idea, into an organised struggle of the *whole* of the Russian working *class* directed against the bourgeois regime and striving towards the expropriation of the expropriators and the abolition of the social system based on the oppression of the toilers. At the basis of these activities lies the general conviction among Marxists that the Russian worker is the sole and natural representative of the whole of the toiling and exploited population of Russia.¹

He is the natural representative because, *by its very nature*, the exploitation of the toilers in Russia is, *everywhere capitalist*, if we leave out of account the moribund remnants of serf economy, the only difference is that the exploitation of the mass of producers is petty, scattered and undeveloped, whereas the exploitation of the factory workers is on a large scale, socialised and concentrated. In the first mentioned case, exploitation is still clothed in mediæval forms, in various political, juridical and social pendants, tricks and devices which prevent the toiler and his ideologist from seeing the nature of the system which oppresses him, and from seeing the way out of this system. In the latter case, however, exploitation is fully developed and emerges in its pure form without any confusing trappings. The worker can no longer fail to see that it is *capital* that is oppressing him, that he has to wage a struggle against the capitalist *class*. And this struggle, which is a struggle for the satisfaction of his immediate economic needs, for the improvement of his material conditions, inevitably demands that the workers organise, and the struggle itself inevitably becomes a war not against individuals, but against a *class*, the very class which not only in the factories, but everywhere oppresses the toilers. That is why the factory worker is none other than the foremost representative of the whole of the

¹ The representatives of peasant socialism, the Narodniki in the broad sense of the term, thought that the man of the future in Russia was the muzhik. The Social Democrats think that the man of the future in Russia is the worker. This is how the point of view of the Marxist was formulated in a certain manuscript.

exploited population, and in order that he may fulfil his function as a representative in the organised and sustained struggle, it is not at all necessary to try to tempt him with certain "perspectives", all that is required for this purpose is that *his position be explained to him*, that the political and economic structure of the system which oppresses him, that the necessity and inevitability of class antagonisms under this system be explained to him. The position which the factory worker occupies in the general system of capitalist relationships makes him the sole fighter for the emancipation of the working class, because only the higher stage of development of capitalism, large-scale machine industry, creates the material conditions and the social forces that are necessary for this struggle. In all other places, where the forms of development of capitalism are low, these material conditions do not exist, production is broken up into thousands of tiny enterprises (and they do not cease to be fragmentary *enterprises* even under the most equalitarian forms of communal landownership), the exploited, in the majority of cases, still possess tiny enterprises and for that reason they attach themselves to the very bourgeois system which they should be fighting this retards and hinders the development of the social forces that are capable of overthrowing capitalism. Fragmented, individual, petty exploitation binds the toilers to a particular place, disunites them, prevents them from appreciating their class solidarity, prevents them from uniting and from understanding that they are exploited not by this or that individual, but by the whole economic system. Large scale capitalism, on the contrary, inevitably breaks all the worker's ties with the old society, with a particular locality and with a particular exploiter, it unties him, compels him to think and puts him in conditions which enable him to commence the organised struggle. It is on the working class that the Social-Democrats concentrate all their attention and all their activities. When the advanced representatives of this class will have mastered the ideas of scientific socialism, the idea of the historical role of the Russian worker, when these ideas become widespread and when durable organisations arise among the workers which will transform the present sporadic economic war of the workers

into a conscious class struggle—then the Russian *workers* will rise at the head of all the democratic elements, overthrow absolutism and lead the *Russian proletariat* (side by side with the proletariat of all countries) along the straight road of open political struggle towards the victorious communist revolution

1894

THE ECONOMIC CONTENT OF NARODISM AND THE CRITICISM OF IT IN MR STRUVE'S BOOK *

THE REFLECTION OF MARXISM IN BOURGEOIS LITERATURE

P STRUVE *Critical Remarks on the Question of the Economic
Development of Russia*, St Petersburg, 1894

EXCERPT FROM CHAPTER III

THE PRESENTATION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BY THE NARODNIKI AND BY MR. STRUVE

HERE we have to deal in detail, firstly, with an incorrect view (or a clumsy expression?) of the author concerning the followers of Marx and, secondly, with the formulation of the tasks of the economic criticism of Narodism

Mr Struve says that Marx pictured the transition from capitalism to the new social system in the form of the sudden fall, the collapse of capitalism (He thinks that "certain passages" in Marx give grounds for this view, as a matter of fact, it runs through *all the works* of Marx) The followers of Marx fight for reforms "An important correction was made" to the point of view of Marx of the 'forties, and instead of the "chasm" which separated capitalism from the new society, a "number of transitional stages" were admitted **

We cannot under any circumstances admit that this is correct No "correction" whatever, either important or unimportant, has been made to Marx's point of view by the "followers of Marx" The fight for reforms does not in the least imply a "correction," does not in the least modify the doctrine of the chasm and sudden fall, because this struggle is waged with a frankly and definitely admitted aim *vi*, to reach the "collapse", and the fact that this required "a number of transitional stages"—from one phase of

the struggle to another, from one stage to the next—was admitted by Marx himself in the 'forties when he said, in the *Communist Manifesto*, that the movement towards the new system cannot be separated from the labour movement (hence, from the struggle for reforms) and when he himself, in conclusion, proposed a number of practical measures

If Mr Struve intended to point to the *development* of Marx's point of view, he was, of course, right. But then, this would not be a "correction" to his views, but the very opposite: it would be their *application*, their *realisation*.

Nor can we agree with the author's attitude towards Narodism

"Our Narodnik literature," he says, "seized upon the contrast between national wealth and popular welfare, social progress and progress in distribution" (P. 131.)

Narodism did not "seize upon" this contrast, but merely registered the fact that in post Reform Russia the same contrast was to be observed between progress, culture, wealth and—the liberation of the producer from the means of production, the diminution of the producer's share in the product of the labour of the people and the growth of poverty and unemployment, which caused this contrast to be made also in the West.

"Owing to its humane and philanthropic character, this literature immediately decided the question in favour of popular welfare, and as certain popular economic forms (the village commune, *artels*) apparently embodied the ideals of economic equality and in this way guaranteed the popular welfare, and as the progress of production under the influence of increased exchange held out no promise for these forms, for it abolished their economic and psychological foundations, the Narodniki, pointing to the sad experience of the West in regard to industrial progress, which is based on private property and economic liberty, opposed to commodity production, i.e., capitalism, the so called 'people's industry,' which was to guarantee the popular welfare, as a social and economic ideal for the preservation and further development of which the Russian intelligentsia and the Russian people should fight."

This argument clearly reveals the flaw in Mr Struve's thesis. Narodism is depicted as a "humane" theory which "seized upon" the contrast between national wealth and the poverty of the people and "decided the question" in favour of distribution because "the experience of the West" "held out no promise" for

the popular welfare. And the author begins to argue against this "solution" of the question, forgetting that he is arguing only against the idealistic, and moreover, the naive, contemplative cloak of Narodism and not against its content, forgetting that he, by the very fact that he presents the question in the same professorial manner in which the Narodniki usually present it, commits a serious error. As we have already stated, the *content* of Narodism reflects the point of view and the interests of the Russian small producer. The "humane, philanthropic" character of the theory is due to the downtrodden condition of our small producer who has suffered severe misfortunes both from the "old nobility" system and traditions,¹ and from the oppression of big capital. The attitude of Narodism towards the "West" and its influence upon Russia was, of course, determined, not by the fact that it "seized upon" this or that idea coming from the West, but by the conditions of life of the small producer. He saw opposed to himself large scale capitalism which was borrowing West European technique, and being oppressed by it, conceived naive theories, according to which it was not capitalist economics that determined capitalist politics but that capitalist politics determined capitalist economics, and which declared that large scale capitalism was something alien to Russia, something imported from abroad. The fact that he was tied to his separate, small enterprise prevented him from understanding the true character of the state, and he appealed to the state to help to develop small ("people's") industry. The undeveloped state of class antagonisms characteristic of Russian capitalist society resulted in the theory of the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie being put forth as representing the interests of labour in general.

Instead of revealing the absurdity of the manner in which the Narodniki present the question and showing that the manner in which they "solved" the question was determined by the material conditions of life of the small producer, the author himself, in his own presentation of the question, betrays a dogmatism which reminds one of the Narodniki's *choice* between economic and social progress.

¹ I.e., The tsarist system — Ed

"The task of criticism of the economic principles of Narodism is to prove the following

1) "Economic progress is a necessary condition of social progress the latter emerges historically from the former and, at a certain stage of development, organic interaction between, mutual determination of these two processes should manifest itself, and in fact does manifest itself" (P 133)

Speaking generally, this statement is, of course, quite correct. But, if anything, it defines the task of criticism of the sociological rather than the economic principles of Narodism, in essence, this is the doctrine, formulated in another way, that the development of society is determined by the development of the productive forces which we discussed in chapters I and II. For the criticism of the *economic principles* of Narodism, however, it is inadequate. The question must be formulated concretely, it must be reduced from progress in general to the "progress" of capitalist Russian society, to the wrong conception of *this* progress which gave rise to the ridiculous Narodnik fables about *tabula rasa*,¹ about "people's industry," about Russian capitalism not having ground for development, etc. Instead of saying interaction should manifest itself between economic and social progress, they should show (or at least indicate) the definite symptoms of social progress in Russia and the *particular* economic roots of this progress, which the Narodniki fail to see.²

2) "For that reason, the question of organising production and the degree of productivity of labour takes precedence over the question of distribution, under certain historical conditions, when the productivity of the labour of the people is extremely low, both absolutely and relatively, the predominant importance of the factor of production makes itself felt very acutely"

The author here bases himself on Marx's doctrine of the subordinate importance of distribution. As an epigraph to chapter

¹ The clean slate. This refers to the Narodnik view that Russian economy in itself was free from capitalism, that capitalism in Russia was imported and artificial.—Ed

² It may be argued that I am running too far ahead, for did not the author say that he intended gradually to proceed from general questions to concrete questions which he was examining in chapter VI? The point is, however, that the abstractness of Mr. Struve's criticism, to which I refer, is a distinguishing feature of the *whole* of his book—of chapter VI and even of the concluding part. What requires correction most of all is precisely his method of *presentation of questions*.

IV he quotes a passage from Marx's criticism of the Gotha Programme in which Marx contrasts vulgar socialism to scientific socialism, which does not attach great importance to distribution and which explains the social system by the organisation of the *relations of production* and which considers that a given system of organisation of relations of production already includes a definite system of distribution * As the author quite justly remarks, this idea runs like a thread through the whole of Marx's teachings and it is extremely important for the purpose of understanding the petty bourgeois content of Narodism But the second part of Mr Struve's sentence greatly obscures this idea, particularly because of the vague term, "the factor of production," which he uses Some confusion may arise as to the sense in which this term is to be understood The Narodnik adopts the point of view of the small producer whose explanations of the misfortunes from which he suffers are very superficial, for example, he is "poor" while his neighbour, the merchant, is "rich", the "authorities" only help the big capitalist, etc , in a word they are due to the character of the system of distribution, to mistakes in policy, etc What point of view does the author oppose to that of the Narodnik? Is it the point of view of the big capitalist who looks down with contempt upon the miserable little enterprise of the peasant *kustar* and who is proud of the high degree of development of his own industry, proud of the "service" he has rendered by raising the absolutely and relatively low level of productivity of the labour of the people? Or is it the point of view of his antipode, who is already living in relationships that are so developed that he is no longer satisfied with references to policy and distribution, who is beginning to understand that the causes lie much deeper, in the very organisation (social) of production, in the very system of social economy based on the principles of individual property under the control and guidance of the market? This question might quite naturally arise in the mind of the reader, the more so that the author sometimes employs the term "factor of production" side by side with the word "economy" (cf p 171 the Narodniki "ignore the factor of production to a degree that is tantamount to denying the ex

istence of any system of economy"), and the more so that the author sometimes, in comparing "irrational" with "rational" production, obscures the relationship between the small producer and the producer who has become completely divorced from the means of production. It is perfectly true that from the *objective point of view* this does not diminish the correctness of the author's exposition and that it is easy for anyone who understands the inherent antagonism of the capitalist system to picture the situation from the point of view of the latter relationship. But, as it is well known that Messieurs the Russian Narodniki do not understand this, it is much more desirable in controversy with them to have ideas expressed more definitely and completely and to have as few as possible of too general and abstract postulates.

As we tried to show by a concrete example in chapter I, the whole distinction between Narodism and Marxism lies in the *character of their criticism of Russian capitalism*. In criticising capitalism, the Narodnik thinks it is sufficient to prove the existence of exploitation, the interaction between exploitation and politics, etc. The Marxist, however, thinks it necessary to explain and also to link together the phenomena of exploitation as a system of certain relations in production, as a special social and economic form, the laws of the functioning and development of which have to be objectively studied. In criticising capitalism, the Narodnik thinks it sufficient to condemn it from the point of view of his ideals, from the point of view of "modern science and modern ethical ideas." The Marxist, however, thinks it necessary to trace in detail the classes that are formed in capitalist society, he considers only such criticism valid as is made from the point of view of a definite class, criticism that is based not on the ethical judgment of "individuals," but on the precise formulation of the social process that is actually taking place.

If, in taking this as the starting point, we tried to formulate the tasks of the criticism of the economic principles of Narodism, they would be defined approximately as follows:

It must be shown that the relation between large scale cap

italism in Russia and "people's industry" is that as between a completely developed phenomenon and an undeveloped one, as between a higher stage of development of capitalist social formation and a lower stage¹, that the divorcement of the producer from the means of production and the appropriation of the product of his labour by the owner of money is to be explained, both in the factory as well as even in the village commune, not by politics, not by distribution, but by the relations in production which inevitably arise under the commodity system, by the formation of classes whose interests are antagonistic, which characterises capitalist society², that the conditions (small production) which the Narodniki desire to raise to a higher level, avoiding capitalism, already contain capitalism and the antagonism of class interests and class conflicts peculiar to capitalism, but in its worst form, which hampers the independent activity of the producer, and that for that reason the Narodniki, in ignoring the social antagonisms which have already arisen and in dreaming about "other paths for the fatherland," are utopian reactionaries, because large scale capitalism only serves to develop, to purge and make clear the content of these antagonisms which exist all over Russia

Closely connected with the too abstract formulation of the tasks of the economic criticism of Narodism is the authors' further presentation of his case in the course of which he argues

¹ An analysis of the economic side should of course, be supplemented by an analysis of the social, juridical, political and ideological superstructure. The failure to understand the connection between capitalism and "people's industry" gave rise to the idea among the Narodniki that the Peasant Reform, the state, the intelligentsia, etc., were *non class* in character. A materialist analysis which reduces all these phenomena to the class struggle, must show concretely that our Russian post Reform "social progress" was only the result of capitalist 'economic progress'.

² A 're examination of the facts' of Russian economic conditions especially those from which the Narodniki obtain the material for their school girl dreams, i.e., peasant and *kustar* economy, should show that the cause for the oppressed condition of the producer lies not in distribution ('the muzhik is poor, the merchant is rich'), but in the very relations in production, in the very social organisation of present day peasant and *kustar* economy. This will show, in its turn, that even in 'people's' industry the question of the organisation of production takes precedence over the question of distribution.

about the "inevitability" and "progressive character," not of Russian capitalism, but of West European capitalism. Without going directly into the question of the economic content of the Narodnik doctrine, there is much that is interesting and instructive in this argument. More than once, voices have been heard in Narodnik literature expressing distrust towards the West European labour movement. This was most strikingly expressed during the controversy which Messrs Mikhailovsky and Co (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1893-94) recently waged against the Marxists. We have not seen any good in capitalism yet, Mr Mikhailovsky wrote at that time.¹

The absurdity of these petty bourgeois views are excellently proved by the data quoted by Mr Struve, the more so that these data are taken from the latest bourgeois literature, which cannot by any means be accused of exaggeration. The passages quoted by the author show that, in the West, everybody, even the bourgeois, realises that the transition of capitalism to a new social and economic formation is inevitable.

The socialisation of labour by capital has progressed to such an extent that even bourgeois literature loudly proclaims the necessity of "planned organisation of national economy." The author is quite right when he says that this is a "sign of the times," a sign of the complete disintegration of the capitalist system. Of extreme interest are the statements he quotes not only of bourgeois professors, but even of conservatives, who are compelled to admit that which to this very day Russian radicals wish to deny, *viz*, that the labour movement was created by the ma-

¹ We cannot refrain from mentioning that, in replying to Mr Struve, Mr Mikhailovsky says that Engels betrays "self admiration" when he says that the dominating, overwhelming fact of present times, which makes the present day better than any other epoch and which justifies the history of its origin, is the labour movement in the West.

This positively atrocious reproach hurled at Engels is extremely characteristic of contemporary Russian Narodism.

These people talk a lot about "people's truth," they know how to talk to our "society" and to badger it for making a wrong selection of the path for the fatherland, they are able to sing sweetly about "now or never" and to sing this for "ten, twenty, thirty years and more," but they are absolutely incapable of understanding the all embracing significance of the independent action of those in whose name these sweet songs were sung.

terial conditions that were created by capitalism and not "simply" by culture, or other political conditions

After all that has been said, it is hardly necessary to deal at length with the author's arguments that distribution can make progress only if it is based on rational production. Clearly, the meaning of this postulate is that only large scale capitalism based on rational production can create conditions for the producer in which he can raise his head, to think and to care for *himself* and for those who, owing to the backward state of production, do not live in such conditions

Just a word or two about the following sentence which occurs in Mr Struve's book "The extreme inequality of distribution, which retards economic progress, was not created by capitalism capitalism inherited it" from the epoch which romanticists picture as flowing with milk and honey (P 159) This is true if by that the author merely wanted to say that unequal distribution existed even before capitalism, which Messieurs the Narodniki are inclined to forget. If, however, he wanted to deny that capitalism has increased this inequality, then it will not be true. Under serfdom there was not and there could not be that sharp inequality that exists between the absolutely impoverished peasant or tramp and the bank, railway and industrial magnates who have arisen in post Reform capitalist Russia

* * *

We will pass to chapter V. Here the author describes "Narodism as an economic philosophy." "The Narodniki," in the opinion of the author, are the "ideologists of natural, self-sufficing economy and primitive equality" (P 167)

We cannot agree with this description. We will not repeat here the arguments we advanced in chapter I proving that the Narodniki are the ideologists of the small producer. In that chapter we showed that it was precisely the material conditions of life of the small producer, his transitory, intermediary position between the "masters" and the "workers" that explains why the Narodniki fail to understand class antagonisms and the queer mixture of progressive and reactionary points in their programme

Here we will merely add that the former, *i.e.*, the progressive side of Narodism, approaches West European democracy and for that reason the brilliant description of democracy given over forty years ago in connection with events in French history can be entirely applied to it.

The democrat, because he represents the petty bourgeoisie—a *transitional* class in which the interests of two classes are simultaneously blunted—arrogates to himself a position of superiority to class conflicts. Democrats admit that they are faced by a privileged class, but they think that they themselves in conjunction with all the rest of the nation constitute the 'people. What they represent is the *right of the people*, what interests them is the *popular interest*. Consequently when a struggle is impending they see no reason for studying the interests and attitudes of the various classes or for carefully reckoning up the forces at their own disposal.¹ If it should turn out that their interests are inadequate and their supposed power is impotent, they ascribe their defeat to the activities of pernicious sophists who have spread disunion and have split up the indivisible people into a number of mutually hostile factions² or the whole plan wrecked by some error of detail or on this occasion an unforeseen accident ruined the scheme. Whatever happens, the democrat comes forth unspotted after the most shameful defeat, just as he was a blameless innocent before he entered the battle, defeat merely fortifies his conviction of ultimate victory: there is no reason why he and his party should abandon their old outlook for nothing more is requisite than that circumstances should come to their aid" (*Der achtzehnte Brumaire* u.s.w., S. 39³).

That the description of the Narodniki as ideologists of natural self-sufficing economy and primitive equality is wrong is proved by the very examples which the author himself quotes. "As a *curiosity* it is worth mentioning," says Mr Struve, "that to this

¹ This is exactly like the Russian Narodniki. They do not deny that there are classes in Russia which are antagonistic to the producer but they lull themselves with the argument that these "pirates" are insignificant compared with the "people" and refuse to make a careful study of the position and interests of the respective classes, they refuse to examine whether the interests of certain categories of producers are interwoven with the interests of the "pirates" and thus weaken the power of resistance of the former against the latter.

² In the opinion of the Russian Narodniki, the pernicious Marxists are to blame because they artificially implant capitalism and its class antagonisms on the soil on which the flowers of "social mutual adaptation and "harmonious activity" bloomed so beautifully (Mr V V, quoted by Struve, p. 161).

³ Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, International Publishers, N. Y., 1920, p. 62—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

day Mr N—on calls Vasilchikov a liberal economist" (P 169) If we examine the *real essence* of this appellation we will find that it is not a curiosity in the least Vasilchikov has in his programme the demand for cheap and widespread credit. Mr N—on cannot fail to see that on the soil of capitalist society, as Russian society is, credit can only serve to strengthen the bourgeoisie, will lead to "the development and consolidation of capitalist relationships" (*Outlines*, p 77) Vasilchikov, like all the Narodniki, by the practical measures he proposes, represents the interests solely of the petty bourgeoisie The only thing that is curious about this is that Mr N—on, sitting as he does side by side with the publicists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, has "to this day" failed to observe that they are exactly the same type of little "liberal economists" as is Prince Vasilchikov Utopian theories easily reconcile themselves in practice with petty bourgeois progress This description of Narodism is still further confirmed by Golovachev who admits that to distribute allotments indiscriminately is absurd and suggests that "cheap credits be provided for the toilers" In criticising this "astonishing" theory, Mr Struve calls attention to the absurdity of the theory, but he appears not to have observed its petty bourgeois content.

End of 1894

DRAFT AND EXPLANATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY *

DRAFT PROGRAMME

A

1 LARGE factories and works are developing more and more rapidly in Russia, ruining the small *kustars* and peasants and converting them into propertyless workers, driving more and more people into the towns and into factory and industrial villages

2 This growth of capitalism implies an enormous increase in wealth and luxury among a handful of manufacturers, merchants and landowners and a still more rapid increase of poverty and oppression among the workers. The improvements in production and machinery introduced by the large factories, while serving to increase the productivity of social labour, at the same time serves to increase the power of capital over the workers, to increase unemployment and, simultaneously, the defencelessness of the workers

3 But, while increasing the oppression of labour by capital to the highest degree, the big factories have created a special class of workers who obtain the opportunity of waging a struggle against capital because the very conditions of their lives destroy all their ties with their own enterprises and, combining the workers by common labour and shifting them from factory to factory, unite together large masses of workers. The workers begin to wage their struggle against the manufacturers by means of strikes, and a strong desire to unite springs up among them. Out of separate uprisings of workers arises the struggle of the Russian working class

4 The working class struggle against the capitalist class is a struggle against all classes that live on the labour of others, and

against all exploitation. This struggle can end only in the transition of political power to the hands of the working class and the transference of all the land, implements, factories, machines and mines to the whole of society for the purpose of organising socialist production, under which all that which is produced by the workers and all improvements in production will be for the benefit of the toilers themselves.

5 In its nature and aims the Russian working class movement forms part of the international working class movement.

6 The principal obstacle in the struggle of the Russian working class for its emancipation is the absolutist autocratic government with its irresponsible officials. Relying on the privileges enjoyed by the landlords and capitalists, and on pandering to their interests, it keeps the lower orders in a state of complete lack of rights, and by that hampers the labour movement and retards the development of the whole of the people. For that reason, the struggle of the Russian working class for its emancipation inevitably gives rise to a struggle against the absolute power of the autocratic government.

B.

1 The Russian Social Democratic Party declares its task to be—to assist this struggle of the Russian working class by developing the class consciousness of the workers, by helping them to organise and by teaching them the real aims of the struggle.

2 The struggle of the Russian working class for its emancipation is a political struggle and its first aim is to achieve political liberty.

3 For that reason, the Russian Social Democratic Party, while remaining part of the labour movement, will support every social movement against the absolute power of the autocratic government, against the privileged class of landed aristocracy and against the survivals of serfdom and the estate system which restrict free competition.

4 On the other hand, the Russian Social Democratic Party will wage war against all attempts to bestow on the toiling classes the guardianship of the absolutist government and its officials.

and to retard the development of capitalism and, hence, the development of the working class

5 The emancipation of the working class must be the task of the working class itself

6 The Russian people need, not assistance from the absolutist government and its officials, but emancipation from their tyranny

C

On the basis of these views, the Russian Social Democratic Party demands first of all

1 The convocation of a *Zemski Sobor* of the representatives of all citizens for the purpose of drawing up a Constitution *

2 Universal and direct suffrage for all Russian citizens who have reached the age of 21, without distinction of religion and nationality

3 Freedom of assembly, right of association and the right to strike

4 Freedom of the press

5 Abolition of the estates and complete equality of all citizens before the law

6 Liberty of conscience and equal rights for all nationalities
The transference of the registration of births and deaths to independent civil officials who shall be independent of the police

7 The right of every citizen to lay a charge against any official in the courts without having first to complain to the higher officials

8 The abolition of passports, complete liberty to move from place to place and to settle in other parts of the country

9 Liberty to engage in any trade or occupation and the abolition of the guilds **

D

For the workers, the Russian Social Democratic Party demands

1 The establishment of industrial courts in all branches of industry, the judges to be elected in equal number by the capitalists and the workers respectively.

2 The legal restriction of the working day to eight hours

3 The legal prohibition of night work and night shifts Prohibition of the employment of children under fifteen years of age

4 The legislative enactment of rest days and holidays

5 The extension of factory laws and factory inspection to all branches of industry over the whole of Russia and also to state factories and to *kustars* working in their own homes

6 That factory inspectors occupy an independent position and shall not be subordinate to the Ministry of Finance That members of the industrial courts enjoy equal rights with factory inspectors in regard to the supervision of the application of the factory laws

7 That payment of wages in goods be everywhere completely prohibited

8 That representatives of the workers be elected to supervise the proper drawing up of wage rates, the rejection of bad work, the expenditure of money collected in fines, and the housing conditions of the workers at the factories

That a law be passed to the effect that the total deductions from wages for whatever purpose (fines, deductions for bad work, etc.) shall not exceed ten kopeks per ruble of wages earned

9 That a law be passed making the employer responsible for injury to the workers, the onus of proof that the injury was due to the fault of the worker to be placed on the employer

10 That a law be passed making it compulsory for employers to maintain schools and provide medical service for the workers

E

For the peasants the Russian Social Democratic Party demands

1 The abolition of land purchase payments, the peasants to be compensated for payments already made The peasants to be compensated for all payments made to the state in excess of what was due

2 The restoration to the peasants of the land that was cut off from their holdings in 1861,

3 Complete equality of dues and taxes imposed on peasant and landlord lands

4 The abolition of the system of collective responsibility¹ and the repeal of all laws that restrict the peasants in the disposal of their land

EXPLANATION OF THE PROGRAMME

The programme is divided into three main sections. The first section enunciates the views upon which the other sections of the programme are based. This section explains the position the working class occupies in modern society, the meaning and significance of its struggle against the manufacturers and the political position of the working class in the Russian state.

The second section explains the *tasks of the Party* and points out what its attitude is to other political trends in Russia. It explains what activities the Party and all those workers who understand their class interests should engage in and what their attitude towards the interests and strivings of other classes in Russian society should be.

The third section contains the practical demands of the Party. This section is divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section contains demands for general political reforms. The second sub-section contains the demands and programme of the working class. The third sub-section contains demands for the benefit of the peasants. Certain preliminary explanations of these sub-sections are given below before proceeding to deal with the practical part of the programme.

A 1. The programme first of all mentions the rapid growth of big factories and works because this is the most outstanding phenomenon in modern Russia which is completely changing all the old conditions of life and particularly the conditions of life of the toilers. Under the old conditions, almost all the wealth was produced by small masters who represented the overwhelming majority of the population. The population lived stationary lives

¹ In the event of a peasant failing to pay taxes or other imposts, the whole village was held responsible—*Ed Eng cd*

in villages and produced the greater part of their products either for their own use or for a small market consisting of the surrounding villages which had little connection with neighbouring markets. These same small masters worked for the landlords who compelled them to produce products mainly for their (the landlords') own use. The home made materials were given to be made up into articles to artisans who also lived in the villages or else travelled about the neighbourhood taking work to do.

Since the emancipation of the serfs, however, the conditions of life of the mass of the people have undergone a complete change. big factories have arisen to take the place of the small artisans' workshops and the number of these factories has grown with remarkable rapidity, they have squeezed out the small masters and transformed them into wage workers, they have compelled hundreds and thousands of workers to work together and produce enormous quantities of goods which are sold over the whole of Russia.

The emancipation of the peasants abolished the immobility of the population and placed the peasants in such conditions that they were no longer able to obtain their livelihood from the small plots of land that were left to them. Large masses of the people went forth to seek employment in the factories, on the railways which were being built and which were linking up the various parts of Russia and carrying the goods manufactured in the big factories to all parts of the country. Large numbers went to seek employment in the towns as builders of factories and commercial buildings or supplying fuel for the factories or preparing materials for them. Finally, large numbers were employed at work in their own homes, which they obtained from merchants and manufacturers who had not yet managed to enlarge their enterprises. Similar changes took place in agriculture. The landlords began to produce grain for sale. Large grain growers arose among the peasants and merchants, and hundreds of millions of pounds of grain began to be sold abroad. A demand for wage workers was created and hundreds of thousands and millions of peasants abandoned their tiny plots of land and went to work as agricultural labourers and day labourers for the new masters who

produced grain for sale These are the changes that the programme describes when it says that the big factories and works ruin the small *kustar* and peasants, and transform them into wage workers The place of small production everywhere is taken by large scale production, and in the latter the masses of workers are simply hired labourers who work for wages for the capitalist, who owns large amounts of capital, builds large workshops, buys large quantities of raw materials and who puts into his own pocket the profits obtained from the mass production carried on by the combined workers Production becomes capitalist production which ruthlessly crushes all the small masters, breaks up their stationary life in the villages and compels them to wander from one part of the country to another as mere labourers, to sell their labour power to the capitalist A continuously increasing part of the population becomes completely divorced from the country and from agriculture, and collects in the towns and factory and industrial villages and there forms a special class which owns no property, a class of proletarians who live only by selling their labour power

These, then, are the enormous changes in the life of the country that have been brought about by the large factories and works small production has been supplanted by large scale production, the small masters have been transformed into wage workers What do these changes signify for the toiling population as a whole, and what are they leading to? This is explained in the next part of the programme

A 2 The replacement of small production by large scale production is accompanied by the replacement of small amounts of capital in the hands of individual masters by enormous amounts of capital, insignificant profits by enormous profits, running into millions That is why the growth of capitalism always leads to the growth of luxury and riches In Russia, a whole class has arisen of big financial magnates, manufacturers, railway owners, merchants and bankers, a whole class of people who live on the interest from their capital which they lend to the manufacturers, the big landlords have become enormously rich from the payments the peasants have to make for their land, they take advan

tage of the lack of land to raise the rents of the land they lease to peasants, they build up on their estates large sugar refineries and alcohol distilleries. Luxury and extravagance have reached unprecedented dimensions among this class of the rich, and the main streets of the large towns are lined with their princely palaces and luxurious castles. But, as capitalism grows, the conditions of the workers become worse. Even if earnings did increase here and there after the emancipation of the peasants, the increase was not very much and did not last long, because the mass of starving people who fled from the villages forced down the price of labour, whereas the prices of means of subsistence continuously rose, so much so that even with increased wages the workers were able to buy less than they were able to do before, it became more and more difficult to find employment and alongside the luxurious palaces of the rich (or in the suburbs) the workers' hovels increased in number, the workers were compelled to live in cellars, in overcrowded, damp and cold tenements and sometimes even in dugouts near where new factory premises were being built. Capital continues to grow, forcing down the workers more and more, converting them into paupers, compelling them to give up all their time to the factory and driving their wives and children into the factory. This, then, is the first change to which the growth of capitalism leads: an enormous amount of wealth is accumulated in the hands of a small group of capitalists, while the masses of the people are converted into paupers.

The second change is the substitution of large scale production for small production, which led to considerable improvements in production. In place of production carried on by individual workers, each in his own small workshop, large numbers of workers are collected to work together in a single factory, for a single landlord, or for a single contractor. Collective labour is far more productive than individual labour and it enables goods to be produced far more easily and quickly. But all the benefits of these improvements go to the capitalist who pays the workers the same miserable wages as before and pockets all the fruits of the combined labour of the workers. The capitalist

becomes more powerful and the worker becomes weaker, because he becomes accustomed to perform a single operation and finds it difficult to change his occupation

Another and far more important improvement in production is *machinery* which the capitalist introduces. The productivity of labour increases manifoldly as a result of the employment of machinery, but the capitalist turns all the advantages of this against the worker, because machines require less expenditure of physical labour, and so women and children can be employed for lower wages. Taking advantage of the fact that fewer workers are required when machines are employed, the capitalist turns masses of the workers out into the streets and uses the unemployed in order still further to enslave the workers, to lengthen the working day, to deprive the worker of his rest at night and to convert him into a mere adjunct to the machine. Unemployment, which has been created by the machine and which is continuously growing, is now causing the worker to become completely defenceless. His skill loses all value, his place can easily be taken by a simple labourer who quickly becomes accustomed to the machine and who is willing to take the job at lower pay. If the worker makes any attempt to defend himself against the constant encroachments of the capitalist, he is discharged. Standing alone, the worker is powerless against the capitalist, the machine threatens to crush him.

A 3 In our explanation of the last point we showed that the worker, standing alone, is powerless and defenceless against the capitalist who introduces machines into his factory. The worker must at all costs find some means of resisting the capitalist, in order to defend himself. And such a means he finds in *unity* with his fellows. Powerless when alone, the worker becomes a power when he unites with his fellows, unity enables the workers to put up a fight against the capitalist and to resist his encroachments.

Unity becomes a necessity for the worker who is confronted by the big capitalist. But is it possible to unite a mass of people who are strangers to each other even if they do work in the same factory? The programme indicates the conditions which

prepare the workers for unity and which develop in them the ability to unite. The conditions are the following: 1) the big factory employing machinery, at which work has to be carried on all the year round, destroys the workers' ties with the land and with their farms, and converts them into complete proletarians. When the worker owned his own farm on a small plot of land he was disunited from his fellows, each worker had to some extent his special interest separate from the interests of his fellows, and this prevented them from uniting. When the worker becomes divorced from the land this obstacle falls away. 2) Furthermore, the joint labour of hundreds and thousands of workers accustoms them to discuss their needs jointly, to joint action and clearly demonstrates the identity of position and interest of the whole mass of workers. 3) Finally, the fact that the workers go from one factory to another enables them to compare conditions at various factories and thus become convinced that exploitation exists in all factories, they are able to learn from the experience of other workers, from their conflicts with the capitalists, and in this way the unity and solidarity of the workers become strengthened. All these conditions, taken together, have led to the result that as a consequence of the rise of big factories the workers are beginning to unite. Among the Russian workers, this unity finds most frequent and strongest expression in strikes. (We will explain later on why our workers are unable to unite in unions or friendly societies.) The more the big factories and works develop, the more frequent, persistent and stubborn do workers' strikes become, because the more powerful the pressure of the capitalist becomes the more necessary is it for the workers to resist. As the programme states, strikes and separate uprisings of workers represent a widespread phenomenon in Russian factories at the present time. However, as capitalism grows and strikes become more frequent, the latter become inadequate. The employers take common measures against strikes, they form employers' federations, they recruit workers from other places, they appeal for assistance to the state, which helps them to crush the resistance of the workers. It is no longer a single employer that confronts the workers in a particular factory, but the *whole capi-*

talist class, and the government, which helps it. The whole *capitalist class* enters into battle against the whole *working class*, they strive to devise common measures to combat strikes, they bring pressure to bear upon the government to pass laws against the workers, they remove their factories to more remote districts, they give work out to be done in workers' homes and resort to a thousand and one devices against the workers. The unity of the workers in a single factory, or even in a single branch of industry, is no longer adequate to resist the whole capitalist class, it becomes absolutely necessary to exert the joint efforts of the *whole of the working class*. Thus, out of separate rebellions of workers, there grows the struggle of the whole of the working class. The struggle between the workers and the employers is transformed into a *class struggle*. All the employers are united by a common interest, *viz*, to keep the workers in subjection and to pay them the lowest possible wages. And the employers realise that they can achieve their aims only by uniting the efforts of the whole of the employing class, only by being able to bring influence to bear upon the government. The workers are similarly united by a common interest, *viz*, not to allow the capitalists to crush them, to defend their right to live a human existence. And the workers also become convinced that they too must combine to secure joint action on the part of the whole class—the working class—and that for this it is necessary to bring influence to bear upon the government.

A 4 We have explained how and why the struggle between the factory workers and the factory owners becomes a class struggle, a struggle between the working class, the proletariat, and the capitalist class, the bourgeoisie. The question arises, what significance has this struggle for the whole of the people, for all the toilers? Under modern conditions, to which we referred in explaining point 1, production carried on with the aid of wage workers squeezes out small production more and more. The number of people who obtain their livelihood by *wage labour* rapidly increases, and not only does the number of permanent factory workers increase, but so also does the number of peasants who are obliged to seek employment as wage labourers in order to sus

tain themselves. At the present time, wage labour, working for a capitalist, is the most widespread form of labour. The domination of capital over labour has spread to masses of the population not only in industry, but also in agriculture. Now the big factories develop this very exploitation of wage labour, which lies at the foundation of modern society, to the highest stage. All the methods of exploitation, which all capitalists employ, in all branches of industry, and from which the whole mass of the working population of Russia suffers, are, as it were, concentrated in the factory, are intensified, become the general rule, are applied to all sides of the life and labour of the workers, they form a whole system by which the capitalists sweat the workers. To explain this we will quote an example: usually, a hired labourer rests, ceases work on a holiday, if one is being celebrated in the district in which he is employed. But this is not the case in the factory, when a factory owner hires a worker, he orders him about as he likes, he does not pay the least attention to the workers' customs and habits of life, his family affairs, or his intellectual requirements. The factory owner compels the worker to work whenever he thinks fit, compels the worker to adapt his life to the requirements of the factory, to break his rest and, if work is done in shifts, to work at night and on holidays. All the abuses that can be imagined in regard to the working day are employed, and in addition to that, the factory employer introduces his own "rules and regulations" which the workers are compelled to obey. The factory regulations seem to be drawn up for the deliberate purpose of squeezing out of the worker the utmost possible amount of labour that can be squeezed out of him in the shortest possible time and then to throw him on the scrap heap. Take another example: everybody who applies for a job undertakes, of course, to obey the employer and to do all he tells him to do. But in agreeing to carry out certain temporary work, the worker does not surrender his will, if he finds that the demands of the employer are unfair or excessive, he leaves him. The factory owner, however, demands that the worker shall completely surrender his will, he introduces discipline, compels the worker to rise to go to work at the sound of a bell and to cease work at the sound of a bell, he claims the

right to punish the worker, and if he violates any of the rules which he, the factory owner, himself has introduced, he fines him or deducts part of his wages. The worker becomes part of a huge machine, he must be obedient, enslaved and have no will of his own, exactly like the machine.

Take a third example. Those who hire themselves to a master are very often dissatisfied with him and complain about him to the courts or to the authorities. Both the authorities and the courts usually decide the case in favour of the master, they support his side. But this protection of the interests of the employers is not based on any rule or law, it is due to the fact that the officials like to oblige, sometimes they will defend a case more, sometimes less, they will decide a case unfairly in favour of the employers either because they are friendly with him or because they do not know the conditions under which the worker has to work and because they do not understand the worker. Every case of such injustice is determined at each separate dispute that a worker has with his employer and by each individual official. The factory, however, unites such a large number of workers, and oppression assumes such wide dimensions that it becomes impossible to judge each case separately. General rules are laid down, laws are passed to regulate the relations between employer and employed, which laws become obligatory for all. In these laws, the protection of the interests of the employers is reinforced by state authority. Instead of the injustice of individual officials, we get an unjust law. For example, rules are laid down that in the event of the worker staying away from work, he not only loses his wages for the time he is away, but he is fined in addition, but when an employer compels a worker to lose time, he does not pay him anything, an employer may discharge a worker for being rude, but the worker cannot leave his employment if the employer is rude, the employer has the right to impose fines, to make the worker work overtime, etc.

All these examples show in what manner the factory increases the exploitation of the workers and makes this exploitation universal, transforms it into a "system." Whether he likes it or not, the worker is compelled to deal not with an individual employer

and his will and oppression, but with the tyranny and oppression of the whole of the employing class. The worker realises that his oppressor is not some individual capitalist, but the whole capitalist class, because the same system of exploitation prevails in all factories. An individual capitalist does not even dare to violate this system: if, for example, he did take it into his head to reduce the hours of labour in his factory it would cost him more to produce his goods than it would cost the capitalist who compels his workers to work longer hours for the same pay. In order to improve his conditions the worker has now to deal with a whole social system based on the exploitation of labour by capital. It is not only the injustice of individual officials that the worker has to contend with, but the injustice of the state, which protects the whole of the capitalist class and which passes laws which are obligatory for all, for the benefit of this class. Thus, the fight between the factory workers and the factory owners inevitably becomes a fight against the whole capitalist class, against the whole social system based on the exploitation of labour by capital. That is why the workers' struggle acquires social significance, it becomes a fight in the name of all the toilers against all classes which live on the labour of others. That is why the workers' struggle opens up a new epoch in Russian history and marks the dawn of the emancipation of the workers.

What does the rule of the capitalist class over all the workers rest on? It rests on the fact that all the factories, mines, machines and tools are the private property of the capitalists, on the fact that they own enormous tracts of land (more than one third of the land of European Russia belongs to less than a half million landlords). The workers, who own no tools or raw materials, are compelled to sell their labour power to the capitalists who pay them only so much as is sufficient to maintain them, and all that the workers produce over and above that, goes into the pockets of the capitalists. Thus the capitalists pay the workers for only part of the time they work, the rest they appropriate for themselves. The increase of wealth that comes from combining the labour of large masses of workers, or from improvements in the methods of production, goes to the capitalists, and the workers,

who toil from generation to generation, remain propertyless proletarians as before. Hence, there is only one way of putting an end to the exploitation of labour by capital, and that is to abolish private ownership in the means of production and to transfer all the factories, workshops, mines and all the large landed estates to society as a whole and to carry on industry on socialist lines under the management of the workers themselves. The goods produced by common labour will then be used for the benefit of the workers, and all wealth produced over and above that which is required for their maintenance will be used to satisfy the requirements of the workers themselves for the fullest development of all their capabilities and the equal enjoyment of all the benefits of science and art. That is why the programme states that this is the inevitable outcome of the struggle between the working class and the capitalists. For this it is necessary that political power, that is to say, the power to govern the state, shall pass from the hands of the government which is under the influence of the capitalists and landlords, or from the hands of the government which consists of the elected representatives of the capitalists, into the hands of the working class.

This is the ultimate aim of the struggle of the working class, this constitutes the conditions for its complete emancipation. This is the aim towards which the class conscious, united workers must strive, but in Russia the workers encounter enormous obstacles which hinder them in their struggle for emancipation.

A 5 The fight against the rule of the capitalist class is now being waged by the workers in all European countries as well as in America and Australia. The unity and solidarity of the working class is not confined to a single country or a single nationality: the workers' parties of various countries loudly proclaim that the interests and aims of the workers of all countries are identical. They gather at congresses, put forward common demands to the capitalist class in all countries: they fix a common day to celebrate the international festival of the united proletariat which is striving for its emancipation (May 1), and rally the working class of all nationalities and of all countries into a single, great workers' army. The amalgamation of the workers of all

countries is essential because the capitalist class does not restrict its rule over the workers to a single country. Commercial intercourse between the various states is becoming ever closer and more widespread. Capital is constantly passing from one country to another. The banks, these enormous storehouses of capital, which gather capital from all parts and distribute it in the form of loans to the capitalists, are being transformed from national into international institutions and are gathering capital from all countries and loaning it to the capitalists of Europe and America. Enormous joint stock companies are now being formed to conduct capitalist enterprises not only in single countries, but in several countries at once, international capitalist companies are now being formed. The domination of capital is becoming international. That is why the struggle of the workers in all countries for their emancipation can be successful only when it is waged jointly against international capital. That is why the German, Polish and French workers are the comrades of the Russian workers in the struggle against the capitalist class, whereas the Russian, Polish and French capitalists are their enemies. Lately, the foreign capitalists have been eagerly investing their capital in Russia, they are establishing branch factories here and are forming companies for the purpose of establishing new enterprises in Russia. They are flinging themselves hungrily upon a young country in which the government is even more friendly and obliging to capital than elsewhere and where the workers are less united and less able to resist them than in western countries where the standard of living and, therefore, wages is lower, so that the foreign capitalists can obtain higher profits here than they ever dreamed of obtaining in their own countries. International capital is reaching out to Russia. The Russian workers are stretching out their hands to the international labour movement.

A 6 We have already shown how the big factory intensifies the oppression of labour by capital to the highest degree, how it gives rise to a whole system of exploitation, how the worker, in resisting the oppression of capital, inevitably begins to realise the necessity for all the workers to unite for a struggle to be waged jointly by the whole of the working class. In this struggle

against the capitalist class the workers come into conflict with the laws of the state which protect the capitalists and their interests

But if the united workers are able to compel the capitalists to make concessions, and to resist the capitalists, then they should be able, by their united efforts, to influence the laws of the state, to secure their modification That is what the workers in all countries do But the Russian workers are unable to bring direct influence to bear upon the state The conditions of the workers in Russia are such that they lack the most elementary civil rights They cannot gather together, they cannot jointly discuss their affairs, they cannot form unions, nor publish their declarations, in short the laws of the state are not only drawn up in the interests of the capitalists, but they positively deprive the workers of all opportunity of influencing legislation and securing a change in the law This is due to the fact that in Russia (and in Russia alone of all the states of Europe) there exists to this day the absolute power of an autocratic government, *i.e.*, a system of government under which the tsar alone, at his own discretion, has the power to pass laws, which are obligatory for all, and only officials appointed by the tsar have the right to administer these laws The citizens have no right to take part in the passing of laws, or to discuss them, or to propose new laws, or to demand the repeal of old laws. They have no right to demand that officials give an account of their administration, to supervise their activities or to bring them before the courts Citizens have not even the right to discuss the affairs of the state they dare not organise meetings or associations without the permission of these very officials Thus, the officials are irresponsible in the fullest sense of the word, they represent, as it were, a caste placed over the citizens The irresponsibility and tyranny of the officials, and the fact that the population is completely deprived of a voice in public affairs, gives scope to such crying abuses on the part of the officials and to such a violation of the rights of the common people as perhaps has no parallel in any other European country

Thus, according to the law, the Russian government is absolutely unrestricted, it appears to be completely independent of the people and to stand above all estates and classes But if that is

really so, why does the law and the government take the side of the capitalists in all conflicts between the workers and the capitalists? Why do the capitalists find more and more support in proportion as their number and their wealth increase—whereas the workers encounter more and more resistance and oppression?

The fact of the matter is that the government does not stand above classes, but takes under its protection one class against another, it protects the propertied class against the propertyless class, the capitalists against the workers. The absolutist government would be unable to govern so large a state if it did not grant all sorts of privileges and favours to the propertied classes.

Although, according to the law, the government is absolutely unrestricted and independent, in point of fact, the capitalists and the landlords have a thousand means by which to influence the government and the affairs of the state. They have their legally recognised estate institutions, societies of the nobility, merchants' societies, commercial and industrial committees, etc. Their elected representatives either directly secure appointments as officials and take part in the administration of the state (for example, the Marshals of the Nobility), or are invited to become members of government institutions. For example, the factory owners are allowed by law to attend the meetings of the Factory Inspection Department, and to elect their representatives to this Department. But they do not confine themselves to this direct participation in the administration of the state. At the meetings of their societies, they discuss the laws of the state and draw up laws, the government usually asks their opinion on various questions that arise, submits to them the draft of laws that may be under consideration and asks for their suggestions.

The capitalists and the landlords convene national congresses at which they discuss their affairs, devise various measures to benefit their class, petition, in the name of all the landed nobility, in the name of the "All Russian Merchantry," for the passing of new laws and the modification of old ones. They are able to discuss their affairs in newspapers because, however strict the censorship may be, the government would never dare dream of depriving the propertied classes of the right to discuss their affairs

They have every access to the highest representatives of the state and find it easier to discuss the acts of tyranny of minor officials and to secure the repeal of some particularly restrictive law or regulation. And while in no other country are there so many laws and regulations, such unexampled police tutelage of the state, which provides for the minutest detail and which stultifies all social life, as there are in Russia, neither is there another country in the world in which these bourgeois regulations are violated and these police laws evaded so easily, merely by the gracious sanction of the higher officials, as they are in this country. And this gracious sanction is never refused.

B 1. This is the main and most important point in the programme, because it explains what the activities of the party which defends the interests of the working class and the activities of all class conscious workers must be. It explains how the striving towards socialism, the striving to abolish the age long exploitation of man by man must be linked up with the popular movement which arises from the conditions of life that are created by the big factory.

The Party in its activities must assist the class struggle of the workers. The task of the Party is not to invent some fashionable method of helping the workers, but to join the workers' movement, to bring light to that movement and assist the workers in the struggle which they have already started themselves. It is the task of the Party to defend the interests of the workers and represent the interests of the whole of the labour movement. What form must this assistance to the workers in their struggle take?

The programme says that this assistance must take the form of, first, developing the class consciousness of the workers. We have already shown how the workers' struggle against the factory owners becomes the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

What we have said in this connection explains what is meant by class consciousness. Class consciousness means that the workers understand that the only way to improve their conditions and to secure their emancipation is to fight against the class of capitalists.

and factory owners that was created by the big factories. Further more, class consciousness means that the workers understand that the interests of all the workers in the given country are identical, that all the workers represent a single class, separate from all other classes. Finally, class consciousness means that the workers understand that in order to achieve their aims, the workers must strive to influence the affairs of state in the same way as the landlords and the capitalists influence it and strive to influence it still more.

How do the workers learn to understand this? They learn to understand this from the very struggle they have begun to wage against the factory owners, which is developing more and more, becoming more acute and spreading to a larger and larger number of workers as the big factories develop. At one time, the hostility of the workers towards the capitalists expressed itself merely in a vague feeling of hatred for their exploiters, in a vague consciousness of their oppression and slavery and in a desire to *avenge themselves* on the capitalists. At that time, the struggle found expression in isolated uprisings of workers during which the workers wrecked the factories, destroyed machinery, assaulted the factory managers, etc. This was the *first*, the initial form of the labour movement, and this was a necessary form, because hatred for the capitalist has always served everywhere as the stimulus which roused in the workers a desire to defend themselves. But the Russian labour movement has outgrown this initial form. Instead of being merely imbued with a vague feeling of hatred towards the capitalist, the workers have already begun to understand the antagonism of interests between the working class and the capitalist class. Instead of a vague sense of oppression, they have begun to understand *how* capital oppresses them, and they are now rising against this or that form of oppression, putting a limit to the oppression of capital and defending themselves against the greed of the capitalist. Instead of merely avenging themselves on the capitalist they are now fighting for concessions, they are beginning to place demand after demand before the capitalists for improvements in the conditions of labour, increases in wages and against the increase in the hours of labour. Every

strike concentrates all the attention and all the efforts of the workers first on one and then on another evil from which the working class is suffering. Every strike gives rise to a discussion of these evils and helps the workers to appraise them, to understand where the oppression of the capitalists comes in, in the particular case, and to learn how to fight against this oppression. Every strike gives more experience to the whole of the working class. If the strike is successful, it reveals the strength that lies in the unity of the workers and stimulates others to take advantage of the success of their fellow workers. If the strike fails, then the workers discuss the reasons for its failure and seek to apply better methods of struggle. The fact that the workers all over Russia have now begun to fight unswervingly for their everyday needs, to fight for concessions, for an improvement in their conditions of life, for better wages and shorter hours, is indicative of the tremendous progress the Russian workers have made, and that is why the Social Democratic Party and all class conscious workers should concentrate their attention on this struggle and do all they can to assist it. This assistance can be given by pointing out to the workers the most pressing needs on which the struggle should be concentrated, by explaining the causes which particularly worsen the conditions of this or that section of the workers and by explaining the factory laws and regulations, the violation of which (and the fraudulent devices of the capitalists) subjects the workers to twofold plunder. Help must be given by more precisely and definitely expressing the demands of the workers and by making them public, by selecting the most favourable moment for resistance, by selecting the methods of struggle, by discussing the situation and the relative strength of the contending sides, by discussing whether better methods of struggle can be devised (perhaps a written statement to the employer, an appeal to the factory inspector, to the medical officer, according to circumstances if they are such as do not permit a strike to be called, etc.)

We have said that the fact that the Russian workers have now commenced such a struggle is evidence of the enormous progress they have made. This struggle places the labour movement on the

straight road and serves as the guarantee for its further success. From this struggle the masses of the workers learn first to recognise and understand the various methods to which the capitalists resort to exploit the workers, to see the connection between these methods and the law, their own conditions of life and the interests of the capitalists. In examining the various forms and cases of exploitation, the workers learn to understand the significance and the essence of exploitation as a whole, they learn to understand the nature of the social system which is based on the exploitation of labour by capital. Secondly, in this struggle the workers test their strength, learn to unite, they learn to understand the necessity and importance of unity. The expansion of this struggle and the growing frequency of conflicts inevitably lead to the struggle assuming wider dimensions, to the development of the sense of unity and solidarity, first among the workers in a given locality and then among the workers throughout the whole country, among the whole working class. Thirdly, this struggle develops the political consciousness of the workers. The conditions of the masses of the workers are such that they have neither the leisure nor the opportunity to ponder over questions concerning the state. But the workers' struggle against the factory owners for their everyday demands automatically and inevitably, confronts the workers with questions concerning the state, that is, political questions, questions as to how the Russian state is governed, how laws and regulations are passed, and whose interests they serve. Every industrial conflict inevitably brings the workers into conflict with the laws and with the representatives of the state. In these struggles the workers hear "political speeches" for the first time. First, perhaps, they hear the factory inspector explaining to them that the trick by which the factory owner has cheated them is based on an exact interpretation of regulations which have been sanctioned by the competent authorities, and which leave the factory owner free to cheat the workers, or that the oppression of the factory owner is quite lawful, because he is only enjoying his rights, acting within such and such a law, which has been sanctioned by the state and protected by it. In addition to the political explanations of the factory inspectors, we some

times get still more useful "political explanations" from a Cabinet Minister who reminds the workers about the feelings of "Christian love" which are due the factory owner for the millions he has accumulated from the labour of the workers. Afterwards, to the explanations of the representatives of the state, and to the fact that the workers have learned at first hand on whose side the state is, are added the leaflets, or other forms of information, distributed by the Socialists so that the workers get a complete political education during the course of such a strike. They not only learn to understand the special interests of the working class, but also the special place the working class occupies in the state. This, then, is the assistance the Social Democratic Party can render to the class struggle of the workers: it must develop the class consciousness of the workers by helping them in the struggle for the satisfaction of their immediate needs.

The second form of assistance is, as the programme states, to help the workers to organise. The struggle which we have just described necessarily demands that the workers organise. Organisation is necessary in strikes in order that they may be conducted more successfully, in order to be able to collect money for the strikers, in order to establish workers' funds, in order to carry on agitation among the workers, in order to distribute leaflets, declarations, manifestoes, etc., among them. Organisation is still more necessary in order to protect the workers from the persecution of the police and the gendarmes, in order to conceal from the latter all the connections and lines of communication, in order to organise the supply of books, pamphlets, newspapers, etc. To render assistance in all this--such is the second task of the Party.

The third task is to explain the real aims of the struggle, *i.e.*, to explain to the workers what the exploitation of labour by capital means, on what it rests, why private ownership of the land and the means of production leads to the impoverishment of the masses of the workers, compels them to sell their labour power to the capitalists and to surrender to them all the wealth they produce over and above what is required for their own maintenance and to explain, further, how this exploitation inevitably

leads to the class struggle between the workers and the capitalists, in what conditions this struggle is waged and what its ultimate aims are—in short, to explain what has been briefly outlined in the programme

B 2 What do we mean when we say that the struggle of the working class is a political struggle? We mean that the workers cannot wage the struggle for their emancipation without striving to influence affairs of state, to influence the administration of the state, the passing of laws. The Russian capitalists have long understood the necessity of influencing the state and we have shown how, in spite of all hindrances placed in their way by the police laws, they have found a thousand ways of influencing the state authorities, and how these authorities serve the interests of the capitalists. From this it logically follows that the workers cannot wage their struggle, cannot even secure a permanent improvement in their lot, unless they are able to influence the state

We have said already that the workers' struggle against the capitalists must inevitably bring them into conflict with the government, and the government itself is doing its utmost to prove to the workers that only by fighting and by united resistance can the workers influence the state. This was most strikingly proved by the big strikes which took place in Russia in 1885-86.* The government immediately set to work to examine the regulations governing workers, immediately passed new factory acts which conceded the urgent demands of the workers (for example, regulations were passed limiting the amount of fines and providing for the proper payment of wages), and similarly in the present strikes (1896),** the government has taken immediate action, for it has realised that arrests and deportations are not enough, and that it is ridiculous to try to stuff the workers with stupid homilies about the generosity of the factory owners. (See circular to the factory inspectors issued by the Minister of Finance, Witte, in the spring of 1896.) The government has realised that "the united workers represent a force that has to be reckoned with," and so it has already begun to revise the factory laws, and is convening a conference of chief factory inspectors in St. Petersburg.

burg to discuss the question of shortening the working day and of making other unavoidable concessions to the workers

Thus we see that the struggle between the working class and the capitalist class must necessarily be a political struggle. In deed, this struggle is already exercising influence upon the government and is acquiring political significance. But the more the labour movement develops, the more clearly and sharply will the workers' complete lack of political rights, to which we referred above, the complete impossibility for the workers to influence the government openly and directly, be felt. Therefore, the most urgent thing the workers must do, the first thing the working class must aim at in bringing its influence to bear upon the government is to *achieve political liberty*, i.e., the guarantee by law (Constitution) that all citizens will be able directly to participate in the administration of the state, to secure for all citizens the right to assemble freely, to discuss their affairs, to influence the state affairs through the medium of associations and the press. The achievement of political liberty is becoming the "*urgent task of the workers*," because without it the workers have not, and cannot have, any influence in the affairs of the state, and for that reason must inevitably remain a degraded and voiceless class totally without rights. And if already, when the struggle and the organisation of the workers are but just beginning, the government is hastening to make concessions to the workers in order to stop the further growth of the movement, there can be no doubt that when the workers rally and organise under the leadership of a single political party they will be able to compel the government to surrender, they will be able to win for themselves, and for the whole Russian people, political liberty!

In preceding parts of the programme, reference was made to the place the working class occupies in modern society and in the modern state, to the aim of the struggle of the working class and to the tasks of the political party that represents the interests of the workers. Under the absolutist government that rules in Russia, open political parties do not, and cannot, exist, but there are political trends which express the interests of other classes and which exercise influence upon public opinion and upon the

government. Hence, in order to define the position of the Social Democratic Party, we must now explain what its attitude is towards the other political trends in Russian society, in order that the workers may be able to determine who can be their allies, up to what limits they can be allies, and who are their enemies. This is explained in the next two points in the programme

B 3 The programme declares that the allies of the workers are, firstly, all those strata of society which oppose the unlimited power of the autocracy. In view of the fact that this absolute power is the principal obstacle in the workers' struggle for their emancipation, it logically follows that it is in the interest of the workers to support every social movement that is directed against absolutism, i.e., the unlimited power of the government. The more capitalism develops, the more profound become the antagonisms between the bureaucratic administration and the interests of the propertied classes, the interests of the bourgeoisie. The Social Democratic Party declares that it will support all strata and categories of the bourgeoisie that oppose the absolutist government.

It is infinitely more to the advantage of the working class that the bourgeoisie shall *directly influence* state affairs rather than that they should continue the present method of bringing their influence to bear through the medium of a horde of venal and outrageous officials. It is much more to the advantage of the workers that the bourgeoisie should influence politics *openly* rather than that they should do so in the present *concealed* way, through the alleged omnipotent, "independent" government which reigns "by the grace of God" and bestows its "bounties" on the suffering and labour loving landlords and on the poverty stricken and oppressed factory owners. The workers need an *open struggle* against the capitalist class in order that the whole of the Russian proletariat may see for what interests the workers are fighting, so that it may learn to wage this struggle properly, so that the designs and strivings of the bourgeoisie may not be hidden in the ante rooms of grand dukes and in the drawing rooms of senators and cabinet ministers, behind the closed doors of the

chancellories of government departments, so that they shall be forced to come out into the open and let everyone see who really influences the policy of the government, and what the capitalists and landlords are striving for. Hence, down with all that which secures the influence the capitalist class is now exercising! Hence, support for all and every representative of the bourgeoisie who opposes the officials, the bureaucratic administration and the absolutist government! But, in declaring its support for every social movement in opposition to absolutism, the Social Democratic Party does not separate itself from the labour movement, because the working class has its own special interests that are opposed to the interests of all other classes. While supporting all the representatives of the bourgeoisie in the struggle for political liberty, the workers must remember that the propertied classes can be their allies only temporarily, that the interests of the workers and of the capitalists cannot be reconciled, that the workers are interested in abolishing the absolutist government only in order to be able to wage their struggle against the capitalist class openly and widely.

Furthermore, the Social Democratic Party declares that it will support all those who revolt against the privileged class of the landed nobility. The landed nobility in Russia are regarded as the first estate in the realm. Survivals of their feudal power over the peasantry still oppress masses of the people. The peasants are still bound to the land in order that the landlords may not suffer a shortage of cheap and docile labourers. The peasants are still, like people without rights and minors, placed at the mercy of officials who guard the pockets of the bureaucracy, who interfere in the lives of the peasants to see that they "regularly" pay the land annuities, or dues, to the feudal landlords, to see that they do not dare to "evade" working for the landlord, that they do not dare to migrate to other districts and in this way, perhaps, compel the landlords to hire labourers from outside who will not be so cheap and so crushed by poverty as those at home. As a reward for the heroic exploit of compelling millions and tens of millions of peasants to slave for them, and of keeping them in a state of disfranchisement, the landlords enjoy the highest privi-

leges in the state. It is mainly the landed nobility who fill the highest positions in the state (and according to the law, the nobility have most right to government service), aristocratic land lords are nearest to the Court and are thus better able than any one else to bend the policy of the government in their own favour. They take advantage of their close proximity to the government in order to plunder the Treasury and to receive out of public funds gifts and grants amounting to millions of rubles either in the form of large estates as a reward for service or in the form of "concessions"¹

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¹ The mimeographed copy of the manuscript ends here —Ed

THE TASKS OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

THE second half of the 'nineties is marked by a remarkable animation in the presentation and solution of Russian revolutionary questions * The appearance of a new revolutionary party, the *Narodnoye Pravo*,¹ the growing influence and successes of the Social Democrats, the evolution of the *Narodnaya Volya*,² all this has given rise to a lively discussion of programme questions in socialist study circles—of intellectuals and of workers—as well as in illegal literature In connection with the latter, reference should be made to *An Urgent Question*, and the *Manifesto* (1894) of the *Narodnoye Pravo* Party, to the *Leaflet of the Narodnaya Volya Group*, to the *Rabotnik* ³ published abroad by the League of Russian Social Democrats, to the growing activity in the publication of revolutionary pamphlets in Russia, principally for workers, and the agitational activities of the Social Democratic League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class in St Petersburg in connection with the famous St Petersburg strikes of 1896,** etc

At the present time (end of 1897), the most urgent question, in our opinion, is the question of the *practical* activities of Social Democrats We emphasise the *practical* side of Social Democracy, because its theoretical side apparently has already passed the most acute period when its opponents stubbornly refused to understand and when strong efforts were made to suppress the new trend as soon as it appeared, on the one hand, and the period of passionate self defence of the principles of Social Democracy, on the other Now, the *main and fundamental features* of the theoretical views of the Social Democrats are sufficiently clear.

¹ *People's Rights*—Ed Eng ed.

² *People's Will*—Ed Eng ed

³ *Worker*—Ed Eng ed

This, however, cannot be said in regard to the *practical* side of Social Democracy, to its political *programme*, its methods of activity, its tactics. It is precisely in this sphere, it seems to us, that mutual misunderstanding prevails most, which prevents complete *rapprochement* with Social Democracy on the part of those revolutionaries who, in theory, have completely renounced the principles of the *Narodnaya Volya*, and, in practice, are either induced by the very force of circumstances to begin to carry on agitation and propaganda among the workers and, even more than that, to organise their work among the workers on the basis of the *class struggle*, or else strive to put *democratic* tasks at the basis of their whole programme and revolutionary activities. Unless we are mistaken, the latter description applies to the two revolutionary groups which are operating in Russia at the present time, in addition to the Social Democrats, *viz.*, the followers of *Narodnaya Volya* and the followers of *Narodnoye Pravo*.

We think, therefore, that it is particularly opportune to try to explain the *practical* tasks of the Social Democrats and to give the reasons why we think that their programme is the most rational of the three programmes that have been presented, and why we think that the arguments that have been advanced against it are based very largely on a misunderstanding.

The object of the practical activities of the Social Democrats is, as is well known, to lead the class struggle of the proletariat and to organise that struggle in both its manifestations: socialist (the struggle against the capitalist class for the purpose of abolishing class society and of organising socialist production) and democratic (the fight against absolutism for the purpose of winning political liberty for Russia and the democratisation of the political and social system in Russia). We said "*as is well known*" advisedly, for, indeed, from the very first moment it arose as a separate social revolutionary tendency, Russian Social Democracy has always definitely stated that this was the object of its activities, has always emphasised the dual character and content of the class struggle of the proletariat and has always insisted on the inseparable connection between its socialist and democratic tasks—a connection which is strikingly expressed in the name

which it has adopted Nevertheless, to this day, Socialists are often to be encountered who have a most distorted conception of the Social Democrats and charge them with ignoring the political struggle, etc We will try, therefore, to describe both sides of the practical activity of Russian Social Democracy

We will begin with socialist activity One would have thought that the character of Social Democratic activity in this respect would have become quite clear since the Social Democratic League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class in St Petersburg began its activities among the St Petersburg workers The socialist work of Russian Social Democrats consists of propagating the doctrines of scientific socialism, of spreading among the workers a proper understanding of the present social and economic system, its foundations and its development, an understanding of the various *classes* in Russian society, of the mutual relations between these classes, the struggle between them, of the role of the working class in this struggle, the attitude of this class towards the declining and developing classes, towards the past and the future of capitalism, of the historical task of international Social Democracy and of the Russian working class Inseparably connected with propaganda is *agitation*¹ among the workers, which naturally comes to the forefront in the present political conditions in Russia, and with the present level of development of the masses of workers * Agitating among the workers means that the Social Democrats take part in all the spontaneous manifestations of the struggle of the working class, in all the conflicts between the workers and the capitalists over the working day, wages, conditions of labour, etc Our task is to merge our activities with the practical everyday questions of working class life, to help the workers to understand these questions, to draw the attention of the workers to the most important abuses, to help them to formulate their demands to the employers more precisely and practically, to develop among the workers a sense of solidar

¹ The distinction between *propaganda* and *agitation* is as follows *Propaganda* is the work of explaining in detail certain problems to a restricted circle; *agitation* is the work of explaining concrete issues to the masses—
Ed Eng ed

ity, to help them to understand the common interests and the common cause of all the Russian workers as a single class representing part of the international army of the proletariat. To organise study circles for workers, to establish proper and secret connections between these and the central group of Social Democrats, to publish and distribute literature for workers, to organise correspondence from all centres of the labour movement, to publish agitational leaflets and manifestoes and to distribute them, and to train a corps of experienced agitators—such, in the main, are the manifestations of the socialist activity of Russian Social Democracy.

Our work is primarily and mainly concentrated on the factory urban workers. The Russian Social Democrats must not dissipate their forces, they must concentrate their activities among the industrial proletariat, which is most capable of imbibing Social Democratic ideas, is the most developed class intellectually and politically, and the most important from the point of view of numbers and concentration in the important political centres of the country. Hence, the creation of a durable revolutionary organisation among the factory, the urban, workers is one of the first and urgent tasks that confronts the Social Democrats, and it would be very unwise indeed to allow ourselves to be diverted from this task at the present time. But, while recognising that it is important to concentrate our forces on the factory workers and decry the dissipation of forces, we do not for a moment suggest that Russian Social Democrats should ignore other strata of the Russian proletariat and the working class. Nothing of the kind. The very conditions of life of the Russian factory workers compel them very often to come into very close contact with the *kustars*, i.e., the industrial proletariat outside of the factory, who are scattered in the towns and villages and whose conditions are infinitely worse than those of the factory workers. The Russian factory workers also come into direct contact with the rural population (very often the factory worker has his family in the country) and, consequently, cannot but come into contact with the rural proletariat, with the vast mass of professional agricultural labourers and day labourers, and also with those ruined peasants

who, while clinging to their miserable plots of land are engaged in working to pay the rent (*otrabotka*) and in casual employment, which is also wage labour. Russian Social Democrats think it inopportune to send their forces among the *kustars* and rural labourers, but they do not intend to leave them uncared for, they will try to enlighten the advanced workers on questions affecting the lives of the *kustars* and rural labourers, so that when they come into contact with the more backward strata of the proletariat they will imbue them with the ideas of the class struggle, of socialism, of the political tasks of Russian democracy in general and of the Russian proletariat in particular. It would not be practical to send agitators among the *kustars* and rural labourers when there is still so much work to be done among the urban factory workers, but in a large number of cases Socialist workers involuntarily come into contact with these rural artisans and they must be able to take advantage of these opportunities and understand the general tasks of Social Democracy in Russia. Hence, those who accuse the Russian Social Democrats of being narrow minded, of trying to ignore the mass of the toilers and to interest themselves entirely in the factory workers, are profoundly mistaken. On the contrary, agitation among the advanced strata of the proletariat is the surest and only way to rouse (in proportion as the movement expands) the whole of the Russian proletariat. By spreading socialism and the ideas of the class struggle among the urban workers, we shall inevitably cause these ideas to flow in the smaller and more scattered channels. To achieve this, however, it is necessary that these ideas shall become deep rooted in better prepared soil, and that the vanguard of the Russian labour movement and of the Russian revolution shall be thoroughly imbued with them. While concentrating its forces among the factory workers, the Russian Social Democrats are prepared to support those Russian revolutionaries who, in practice, are beginning to base their socialist work on the class struggle of the proletariat, but they make no attempt to conceal the fact that practical alliances with other factions of revolutionaries cannot and must not lead to compromises or concessions on matters of the *ory*, of the programme or the flag. Convinced that the only revo

lutionary theory that can serve as the banner of the revolutionary movement at the present time is the theory of scientific socialism and the class struggle, the Russian Social Democrats will exert every effort to spread this theory, to guard against its false interpretation, and will combat every attempt to bind the young labour movement in Russia with less definite doctrines. Theoretical reasoning *proves* and the practical activity of the Social Democrats *shows* that all *Socialists* in Russia should become *Social Democrats*.

We will now deal with the *democratic* tasks and with the democratic work of the Social Democrats. We repeat, once again, that this work is *inseparably* connected with socialist work. In carrying on *propaganda* among the workers, the Social Democrats *cannot* ignore political questions and they would regard any attempt to ignore them or even to push them into the background as a profound mistake and a departure from the fundamental principles of international Social Democracy. Simultaneously with propaganda in favour of scientific socialism, Russian Social Democrats consider it to be their task to carry on propaganda among the masses of the workers in favour of *democratic ideas* to spread an understanding of what absolutism means in all its manifestations, its class content, the necessity for overthrowing it, of the impossibility of waging a successful struggle for the cause of labour without achieving political liberty and the democratisation of the political and social system of Russia. In carrying on *agitation* among the workers concerning their immediate *economic* demands, the Social-Democrats link this up with agitation concerning the immediate political needs, grievances and demands of the working class, agitation against the tyranny of the police, which manifests itself in every strike, in every conflict between the workers and the capitalists, agitation against the restriction of the rights of the workers as Russian citizens in general and as the most oppressed and most disfranchised class in particular, agitation against every prominent representative and flunkey of absolutism who comes into direct contact with the workers and who clearly reveals to the working class its state of political slavery. Just as there is not a question

affecting the economic life of the workers that cannot be utilised for the purpose of economic agitation, so there is not a political question that cannot serve as a subject for political agitation. These two forms of agitation are inseparably bound up with each other in the activities of Social Democrats like the two sides of a medal. Both economic and political agitation are equally necessary for the development of the class consciousness of the proletariat, and economic and political agitation are equally necessary in order to guide the class struggle of the Russian workers, for every class struggle is a political struggle. Both forms of agitation, by awakening class consciousness among the workers, by organising them and disciplining and training them for united action and for the struggle for the ideals of Social Democracy, will give the workers the opportunity to test their strength on immediate questions and immediate needs, will enable them to force their enemy to make partial concessions, to improve their economic conditions, will compel the capitalists to respect the organised might of the workers, compel the government to give the workers more rights, to give heed to their demands, keep the government in constant fear of the hostile temper of the masses of the workers led by a strong Social Democratic organisation.

We have shown that there is an inseparable connection between socialist and democratic propaganda and agitation and that revolutionary work in both spheres runs parallel. Nevertheless, there is an important difference between these two forms of activity and struggle. The difference is that, in the economic struggle, the proletariat stands absolutely alone against the landed nobility and the bourgeoisie, except for the help it receives (and then not always) from those elements of the petty bourgeoisie which gravitate towards the proletariat. In the democratic, the *political* struggle, however, the Russian working class does not stand alone, all the political opposition elements, strata of the population, and classes, which are hostile to absolutism and fight against it in one form or another, are taking their place by its side. Side by side with the proletariat stand all the opposition elements of the bourgeoisie, or of the educated classes, or of the petty bourgeoisie, or of the nationalities, or religions and sects which

are persecuted by the absolutist government. The question naturally arises, 1) what should be the attitude of the working class toward these elements, and 2) should it not combine with them in the common struggle against absolutism? All Social Democrats admit that the political revolution in Russia must precede the socialist revolution, should they not therefore combine with all the elements in the political opposition to fight against absolutism and put socialism in the background for the time being? Is not this essential in order to strengthen the fight against absolutism?

We will examine these two questions.

The attitude of the working class, as the fighter against absolutism, toward all the other social classes and groups that are in the political opposition is precisely determined by the fundamental principles of Social Democracy as expounded in the famous *Communist Manifesto*. Social Democrats support the progressive social classes against the reactionary classes, the bourgeoisie against representatives of privileged and feudal landownership and the bureaucracy, the big bourgeoisie against the reactionary strivings of the petty bourgeoisie. This support does not presuppose, and does not require, any compromise with non-Social Democratic programmes and principles—it is support given to an ally against a *particular* enemy. Moreover, the Social Democrats render this support in order to accelerate the fall of the common enemy, they do not expect anything *for themselves* from these temporary allies, and concede nothing to them. The Social Democrats support every revolutionary movement against the present social system, they support all oppressed peoples, persecuted religions, oppressed estates, etc., in their fight for equal rights.

Support for all political opposition elements will be expressed in the propaganda of the Social Democrats by the fact that in showing that absolutism is hostile to the cause of labour, they will show that absolutism is hostile to the various other social groups, they will show that the working class is with these groups on *this or that question, on this or that task, etc.* In their agitation this support will express itself in that the Social Democrats will take advantage of every manifestation of the police

tyranny of absolutism to point out to the workers how this tyranny affects all Russian citizens *generally*, and the representatives of the particularly oppressed estates, nationalities, religions, sects, etc., in particular, and especially how that tyranny affects the *working class*. Finally, in practice, this support is expressed in that the Russian Social Democrats are prepared to enter into alliance with revolutionaries of other trends for the purpose of achieving certain partial aims, and this preparedness has been proved on more than one occasion.

This brings us to the second question. While pointing out that one or other of the various opposition groups are in unison with the workers, the Social Democrats will always put the workers in a special category, they will always point out that the alliance is temporary and conditional, they will always emphasise the special class position of the proletariat which to-morrow may be the opponent of its allies of to-day. We may be told "this may *weaken* all the fighters of political liberty at the present time." Our reply will be this will *strengthen* all the fighters for political liberty. Only those fighters are strong who rely on the *appreciation* of the real interests of definite *classes*, and any attempt to obscure these class interests, which already play a predominant role in modern society, will only serve to weaken the fighters. That is the first point. The second point is that in the struggle against autocracy the working class must single itself out from the rest, for it *alone* is the truly consistent and unreserved enemy of absolutism, it is *only* between the working class and absolutism that compromise is impossible, *only* in the working class has democracy a champion without reservations, who does not waver, who does not look back. The hostility of all other classes, groups and strata of the population towards autocracy is not *absolute*, their democracy always looks back. The bourgeoisie cannot but realise that industrial and social development is retarded by absolutism, but it fears the complete democratisation of the political and social system and may at any time enter into alliance with absolutism against the proletariat. The petty bourgeoisie is two-faced by its very nature, on the one hand it gravitates towards the proletariat and to

democracy, on the other hand it gravitates towards the reactionary classes, tries to hold up the march of history, is likely to be caught by the experiments and flirtations of absolutism (for example, the "people's politics" of Alexander III), is likely to conclude an alliance with the ruling classes against the proletariat in order to strengthen its own position as a class of *small property owners*. Educated people, and the "intelligentsia" generally, cannot but rise against the savage police tyranny of absolutism, which persecutes thought and knowledge, but the material interests of this intelligentsia tie it to absolutism and the bourgeoisie, compel it to be inconsistent, to enter into compromises, to sell its oppositional and revolutionary fervour for an official job, or a share in profits and dividends. As for the democratic elements among the oppressed nationalities and the persecuted religions, everybody knows and sees that the class antagonisms within these categories of the population are much more profound and powerful than is the solidarity among all classes in these categories against absolutism and for democratic institutions. The proletariat alone can be—and because of its class position cannot but be—consistently democratic, the determined enemy of absolutism, incapable of making any concessions, or of entering into any compromises. The proletariat alone can act as the *vanguard* in the fight for political liberty and for democratic institutions, firstly, because political tyranny affects the proletariat most, for there is nothing in the position of that class that can in any way ameliorate this tyranny, it has no access to the higher authorities, not even to the officials, it has no influence on public opinion. Secondly, the proletariat alone is capable of bringing about the *complete* democratisation of the political and social system, because such democratisation would place the system in the hands of the workers. That is why the *merging* of the democratic activities of the working class with the democratic aspirations of the other classes and groups would *weaken* the forces of the democratic movement, would *weaken* the political struggle, would make it less determined, less consistent, more likely to compromise. On the other hand, if the working class is singled out as the vanguard in the fight for democratic institutions, it will

strengthen the democratic movement, will strengthen the struggle for political liberty, for the working class will stimulate all the other democratic and political opposition elements, will push the liberals towards the political radicals, it will push the radicals towards an irrevocable rupture with the whole of the political and social structure of present society. We said above that all *Socialists* in Russia should become *Social Democrats*. We will now add all true and consistent *democrats* in Russia should become *Social Democrats*.

To illustrate what we mean we will quote the following example. Take the institution of the *chinovnik*, the bureaucracy, as representing a class of persons who specialise in work of administration, who occupy a privileged position compared with the people. Everywhere, from autocratic and semi-oriental Russia to cultured, free and civilised England, we see this institution, representing an essential organ of bourgeois society. Fully corresponding to the backwardness of Russia and to the absolutism which reigns in it are the *complete lack of rights* of the people before the officials, and the completely uncontrolled privileges of the bureaucrats. In England there is powerful popular control over the administration, but even there that control is *far from being complete*, even there the bureaucracy has managed to preserve not a few of its privileges, is not infrequently the master and not the servant of the people. Even in England we see that powerful social groups support the privileged position of the bureaucracy and hinder the complete democratisation of this institution. Why? Because it is in the interests of the proletariat alone to *completely* democratise it, the most progressive strata of the bourgeoisie defend certain of the prerogatives of the bureaucracy, protest against the election of all officials, against the complete abolition of the property qualification, against making officials directly responsible to the people, etc., because these strata realise that the proletariat will take advantage of complete democratisation in order to use it *against* the bourgeoisie. This is the case also in Russia. Numerous and varied strata of the Russian people are opposed to the omnipotent, irresponsible, corrupt, savage, ignorant and parasitic Russian bureaucracy, but,

except for the proletariat, not *one* of these strata would agree to the complete democratisation of the bureaucracy, because all these strata (bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, the "intelligentsia" generally) have some connections with the bureaucracy, because all these strata are *kith and kin* of the Russian bureaucracy. Everyone knows how easy it is in Holy Russia for a radical intellectual or socialist intellectual to become transformed into a *chinovnik* of the imperial government, a *chinovnik* who salves his conscience with the thought that he will "do good" within the limits of office routine, a bureaucrat who pleads this "good" in justification of his political indifference, his servility towards the government of the knout and *nagaika*. The *proletariat* alone is unreservedly hostile towards absolutism and to the Russian bureaucracy, the *proletariat* alone has no *connections* with these organs of aristocratic bourgeois society, the proletariat alone is capable of entertaining irreconcilable hostility towards and of waging a determined struggle against it.

In advancing our argument that the proletariat, led in its class struggle by Social Democracy, is the vanguard of Russian democracy, we encounter the very widespread and very strange opinion that Russian Social Democracy puts political questions and the political struggle in the background. As we see, this opinion is the very opposite of the truth. How is this astonishing failure to understand the principles of Social Democracy, which have been so often enunciated and which were enunciated in the very first Russian Social Democratic publications, in the pamphlets and books published abroad by the "Emancipation of Labour" group, to be explained? In our opinion, this astonishing fact is to be explained by the following three circumstances.

First, the general failure of the representatives of old revolutionary theories to understand the principles of Social Democracy because they are accustomed to build up their programmes and plans of activity on the basis of abstract ideas and not on the basis of an exact calculation of the real classes operating in the country and placed by history in certain relationships. It is precisely the lack of such a realistic discussion of the *interests* that support Russian democracy that could give rise to the opinion

that Russian Social Democracy leaves the democratic tasks of the Russian revolutionaries in the shade

Second, the failure to understand that by uniting economic and political questions and socialist and democratic activities into one whole, into the single *class struggle of the proletariat*, the democratic movement and the political struggle are not weakened, but strengthened, that it is brought closer to the real interests of the masses of the people, for political questions are thereby dragged out of the "stuffy studies of the intelligentsia" into the street, among the workers and labouring classes, the abstract ideas of political oppression are thereby translated into the real manifestations of this oppression from which the proletariat suffers most of all, and on the basis of which the Social Democrats carry on their agitation. Very often it seems to the Russian radical that instead of calling upon the advanced workers to join the political struggle, the Social Democrat points to the task of developing the labour movement, of organising the class struggle and thereby *retreats* from democracy, pushes the political struggle into the background. If this is *retreat*, it is the kind of retreat that is meant in the French proverb *Il faut reculer pour mieux sauter!*¹

Third, this misunderstanding arose from the fact that the very term "political struggle" means something different to the followers of *Narodnaya Volya* and *Narodnoye Pravo* from what it means to the Social Democrat. The Social Democrat conceives the political struggle differently from the way it is conceived by the representatives of the old revolutionary theories, their conception of it is much *broader*. A striking illustration of this seeming paradox is provided by *Narodnaya Volya Leaflet*, No 4, Dec 21 (9), 1895. While heartily welcoming this publication, which testifies to the profound and fruitful thinking that is going on among the modern followers of *Narodnaya Volya*, we cannot refrain from mentioning P. L. Lavrov's article, *Programme Questions* (pp. 19-22), which strikingly reveals another conception of the political struggle entertained by the old style followers of *Narodnaya Volya*.² "Here," writes P. L. Lavrov, speaking of the relations

¹ Retreat in order to leap further forward—Ed. Eng. ed.

² P. L. Lavrov's article in No 4 is, in fact, only an "excerpt from a long

between the *Narodnaya Volya* programme and the Social Democratic programme, "one thing and one thing alone is material, viz, is it possible to organise a strong workers' party under absolutism apart from a revolutionary party which is directed against absolutism?" (p 21, col 2), also a little before that (in col 1) "to organise a Russian Workers' Party under the reign of absolutism without at the same time organising a revolutionary party against this absolutism" We totally fail to understand these distinctions which seem to be of such cardinal importance to P L Lavrov What? A "Workers' Party *apart from* a revolutionary party which is directed against absolutism?" But is not a workers' party a revolutionary party? Is it not directed against absolutism? This queer argument is explained in the following passage in P L Lavrov's article "A Russian Workers' Party will have to be organised under the conditions of absolutism with all its charms If the Social Democrats could succeed in doing this without at the same time organising a political *conspiracy*¹ against absolutism, with all the conditions of such a *conspiracy*, then, of course, their programme would be a fit and proper programme for Russian Socialists, for the emancipation of the workers by the efforts of the workers themselves would then be achieved But this is very doubtful, if not impossible" (p 21, col 1) That is the whole point! To the followers of *Narodnaya Volya*, the term, political struggle, is synonymous with political *conspiracy*! It must be confessed that in these words P L Lavrov has managed to display in striking relief the fundamental difference between the tactics in political struggle adopted by the followers of *Narodnaya Volya* and those adopted by Social Democrats The traditions of Blanquism, of conspiracies, are very strong among the followers of *Narodnaya Volya*, so much so that they cannot conceive the political struggle except in the form of political con

letter written by him for *Materials* We have heard that this letter was published abroad in full this summer (1897) as well as a reply by Plekhanov We have seen neither the one nor the other Nor do we know whether No 5 of *Narodnaya Volya Leaflet*, in which the editors promised to publish an editorial article on P L Lavrov's letter, has been published yet Cf No 4, p 22, col 1, footnote,

¹ Our italics.

espionage The Social Democrats do not hold to such a narrow point of view, they do not believe in conspiracies, they think that the period of conspiracies has long passed away, that to reduce the political struggle to a conspiracy means to restrict its scope greatly, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it means selecting the most inefficient method of struggle Everyone will understand that P L Lavrov's remark, that "the Russian Social Democrats take the activities of the West as an unflinching model" (p 21, col 1), is nothing more than a debating trick, for as a matter of fact Russian Social Democrats have never forgotten the political conditions that prevail in Russia, they have never dreamed of being able to form an open workers' party in Russia, they never separated the task of fighting for socialism from the task of fighting for political liberty But they have always thought, and continue to think, that this fight must be waged not by conspirators, but by a revolutionary party that is based on the labour movement They think that the fight against absolutism must be waged not in the form of plots, but by educating, disciplining and organising the proletariat, by political agitation among the workers, which shall denounce every manifestation of absolutism, which will pillory all the knights of the police government and will compel this government to make concessions Is this not precisely the kind of activity the St Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class is carrying on? Does not this organisation represent the embryo of a revolutionary party based on the labour movement, which leads the class struggle of the proletariat against capital and against the absolutist government without hatching any plots, and which derives its strength from the *combination* of the socialist struggle with the democratic struggle into a single, indivisible, class struggle of the St Petersburg proletariat? Have not the activities of the League shown, notwithstanding the brief period they have been carried on, that the proletariat led by Social Democracy represents an important political force with which the government is already compelled to reckon and to which it hastens to make concessions? The haste with which the Act of June 14 (2), 1897, was passed and the content of that Act * reveal its significance as a forced concession

to the proletariat, as a position won from the enemy of the Russian people. This concession is a concession only in miniature, the position won is only a very small one, but remember that the organisation of the labour movement that succeeded in obtaining this concession is neither very broad nor stable, nor of long standing, nor rich in experience and resources. As is well known, the League of Struggle was formed only in 1895-96, and the only way it has been able to appeal to the workers has been in the form of mimeographed or lithographed leaflets. Can it be denied that an organisation like this, uniting at least the important centres of the labour movement in Russia (the St Petersburg, Moscow and Vladimir areas, the southern area, and also the most important towns like Odessa, Kiev, Saratov, etc.), having at its disposal a revolutionary organ and possessing as much authority among the Russian workers as the League of Struggle has among the St Petersburg workers—can it be denied that such an organisation would be a very important political factor in contemporary Russia, a factor that the government could not ignore in its home and foreign policy? By leading the class struggle of the proletariat, developing organisation and discipline among the workers, helping them to fight for their immediate economic needs and to win position after position from capital, by politically educating the workers and systematically and unswervingly pursuing absolutism and making life a torment for every tsarist bashi-bazouk who makes the proletariat feel the heavy paw of the police government—such an organisation would at one and the same time adapt itself to the conditions under which we would have to form a workers' party and be a powerful revolutionary party directed against absolutism. To discuss beforehand what methods this organisation is to apply in order to strike a decisive blow at absolutism, whether, for example, it would prefer rebellion, or a mass political strike, or some other method of attack, to discuss these things beforehand and to decide this question now would be empty doctrinairism. It would be behaving like generals who called a council of war before they had recruited their army, had mobilised it, and before they had begun the campaign against the enemy. When the army of the proletariat unswerv-

ingly, under the leadership of a strong Social Democratic organisation, fights for its economic and political emancipation, that army will itself indicate to the generals the methods and means of action. Then, and then only, will it be possible to decide the question of striking a decisive blow against absolutism, for the problem depends on the state of the labour movement, on its dimensions, on the methods of struggle developed by the movement, on the character of the revolutionary organisation that is leading the movement, on the attitude of other social elements towards the proletariat and towards absolutism, on the state of home and foreign politics—in short, it depends on a thousand and one things which cannot be determined and which it would be useless to determine beforehand.

That is why the following argument by P. L. Lavrov is also unfair:

'If they (the Social Democrats) have somehow or other not only to group the forces of labour for the struggle against capital but also to rally revolutionary individuals and groups against absolutism then the Russian Social Democrats will *in fact* (author's italics) adopt the programme of their opponents the *Narodnaya Volya*ists no matter what they may call themselves. Differences of opinion concerning the village commune, the destiny of capitalism in Russia and economic materialism are very unimportant matters of detail as far as real business is concerned, which either facilitate or hinder the solution of individual problems: individual methods of preparing the main points, but nothing more. (Page 21, col. 1.)

It seems funny to have to enter into an argument about that last postulate—that difference of opinion on the fundamental questions of Russian life and of the development of Russian society, on the fundamental questions of the conception of history, may seem to be only matters of "detail"! Long ago it was said that without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement, and it is hardly necessary to prove this truth at the *present time*. The theory of the class struggle, the materialist conception of Russian history and the materialist appreciation of the present economic and political situation in Russia, the recognition of the necessity to reduce the revolutionary struggle to the definite interests of a definite class and to analyse its relation to other classes—to describe these great revolutionary questions as "details"

is so utterly wrong and comes so unexpectedly from a veteran of revolutionary theory that we are almost prepared to regard this passage as a *lapsus*¹ As for the first part of the tirade quoted above, its unfairness is still more astonishing To state in the press that Russian Social Democrats only group the forces of labour for the purpose of fighting against capital (*i.e.* only for the economic struggle¹) and that they do not rally revolutionary individuals and groups for the struggle against absolutism implies either that the one who makes such a statement does not know the generally known facts about the activities of the Russian Social Democrats or that he does not want to know them Or perhaps P L Lavrov does not regard the Social Democrats who are carrying on practical work in Russia as "revolutionary individuals" and "revolutionary groups"? Or (and this, perhaps, is more likely) when he says, "struggle" against absolutism, does he mean only hatching plots against absolutism? (Cf p 21, col 2 "it is a matter of organising a revolutionary *plot*," our italics) Perhaps, in P L Lavrov's opinion, those who do not engage in political plotting are not engaged in the political struggle? We repeat once again opinions like these fully correspond to the ancient traditions of ancient *Narodnaya Volya*ism, but they certainly do not correspond either to modern conceptions of the political struggle or to present day conditions

We have still to say a few words about the followers of *Narodnoye Pravo* P L Lavrov is quite right, in our opinion, when he says that the Social Democrats "recommend the *Narodnoye Pravo*ists as being more frank," and that they are "prepared to support them without, however, merging with them" (p 19, col 2), he should have added however as franker democrats, and to the extent that the *Narodnoye Pravo*ists come out as consistent democrats Unfortunately, this condition is more in the nature of the desired future than the actual present The *Narodnoye Pravo*ists expressed a desire to free the tasks of democracy from Narodism and from the obsolete forms of "Russian socialism" generally, but they themselves have not yet been freed from old prejudices by a long way; and they proved to be far from consistent when

¹ A slip —Ed

they described their party, which is exclusively a party for political reforms, as a "social (??!) revolutionary" party (*cf* their manifesto dated March 3 [Feb 19], 1894), and declared in their manifesto that the term "people's rights"¹ implies also the organisation of "people's industry" (we are obliged to quote from memory) and thus introduced, on the sly, Narodnik prejudices. Hence, P. L. Lavrov was not altogether wrong when he described them as "masquerade politicians" (P. 20, col. 2). But perhaps it would be fairer to regard *Narodnoye Pravo* ism as a transitional doctrine, to the credit of which it must be said that it was ashamed of the native Narodnik doctrines and openly entered into polemics against those abominable Narodnik reactionaries who, in the face of the police ridden class government of the autocracy, have the impudence to speak of economic, and not political, reforms being desirable (*Cf* *An Urgent Question*, published by *Narodnoye Pravo* Party). If, indeed, the *Narodnoye Pravo* Party does not contain anybody except ex-Socialists who conceal their socialist banner on the plea of tactical considerations, and who merely don the mask of non-socialist politicians (as P. L. Lavrov assumes, p. 20, col. 2)—then, of course, that party has no future whatever. If, however, there are in the party not masquerade, but real non-socialist politicians, non-socialist democrats, then this party can do not a little good by striving to draw closer to the political opposition elements among our bourgeoisie, striving to arouse political consciousness among our petty bourgeoisie, small shopkeepers, small artisans, etc.—the class which, everywhere in Western Europe, played a part in the democratic movement and which, in Russia, has made particularly rapid progress in cultural and other respects in the post-Reform epoch, and which cannot avoid feeling the oppression of the police government and its cynical support of the big factory owners, the financial and industrial monopolist magnates. All that is required is that the *Narodnoye Pravo* ists make it their task to draw closer to various strata of the population and not confine themselves to the "intelligentsia" whose impotence, owing to their isolation from the real interests of the masses, is even admitted in *An Urgent Question*.

¹ Literally: *Narodnoye Pravo*.—Ed

For this it is necessary that the *Narodnoye Pravo* ists abandon all aspirations to merge heterogeneous social elements and to eliminate socialism from political tasks, that they abandon that false pride which prevents them from drawing closer to the bourgeois strata of the population, i.e., that they not only talk about a programme for non socialist politicians, but act in accordance with such a programme, that they rouse and develop the class consciousness of those social groups and classes for whom socialism is quite unnecessary, but who, as time goes on, more and more feel the oppression of absolutism and realise the necessity for political liberty

* * *

Russian Social Democracy is still very young. It is but just emerging from its embryonic state in which theoretical questions predominated. It is but just beginning to develop its practical activity. Instead of criticising the Social Democratic theory and programme, revolutionaries in other factions must of necessity criticise the *practical activities* of the Russian Social Democrats. And it must be admitted that the criticism of the practical activities differs very sharply from the criticism of theory, so much so, in fact, that the comical rumour went round that the St. Petersburg League of Struggle is not a Social Democratic organisation. The very fact that such a rumour could be floated shows how unfounded is the charge, that is being bandied about, that the Social Democrats ignore the political struggle. The very fact that such a rumour could be floated shows that many revolutionaries who could not be convinced by the *theory* held by the Social Democrats are beginning to be convinced by their practice.

Russian Social Democracy has still an enormous field of work open before it that has hardly been touched yet. The awakening of the Russian working class, its spontaneous striving after knowledge, unity, socialism, for the struggle against its exploiters and oppressors, become more strikingly revealed every day. The enormous success which Russian capitalism has achieved in recent times serves as a guarantee that the labour movement will grow uninterruptedly in breadth and depth. Apparently, we are now passing through the period in the capitalist cycle when industry is

"flourishing," when business is brisk, when the factories are working to full capacity and when new factories, new enterprises, new joint stock companies, railway enterprises, etc., etc., spring up like mushrooms. But one need not be a prophet to be able to foretell the inevitable crash (more or less sudden) that must succeed this period of industrial "prosperity." This crash will cause the ruin of masses of small masters, will throw masses of workers into the ranks of the unemployed, and will thus confront all the masses of the workers in an acute form with the questions of socialism and democracy which have already confronted every class conscious and thinking worker. Russian Social Democrats must see to it that when the crash comes the Russian proletariat will be more class conscious, more united, able to understand the tasks of the Russian working class, capable of putting up resistance against the capitalist class—which is now reaping a rich harvest of profits and which always strives to throw the burden of the losses upon the workers—and capable of taking the lead of Russian democracy in the resolute struggle against the police absolutism which fetters the Russian workers and the whole of the Russian people.

And so, to work, comrades! Let us not waste precious time! Russian Social Democrats have much to do to meet the requirements of the awakening proletariat, to organise the labour movement, to strengthen the revolutionary groups and the contacts between them, to supply the workers with propaganda and agitational literature, to unite the workers' circles and Social Democratic groups scattered all over Russia into a single *Social Democratic Labour Party!*

A PROTEST BY RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

*At a meeting of Social Democrats, seventeen in number, held at a certain place (in Russia), the following resolution was passed and it was resolved to publish it and to submit it to the comrades for their consideration **

A TENDENCY has been observed among Russian Social Democrats recently to depart from the fundamental principles of Russian Social Democracy that were proclaimed by the founders and front rank fighters—the members of the “Emancipation of Labour” Group—as well as in the Social Democratic publications of the Russian labour organisations of the ‘nineties. The *Credo*¹ reproduced below, which is presumed to express the fundamental views of certain (“young”) Russian Social Democrats, represents an attempt systematically and definitely to expound ‘new views.’ The following is the *Credo* in full

‘The handicraft and manufacture period in the West left a sharp impress on the whole of subsequent history and particularly on the history of Social Democracy. The fact that the bourgeoisie was obliged to fight for free forms, the striving for release from the guild regulations which fettered production, made the bourgeoisie a revolutionary element everywhere in the West it began with *liberté, fraternité, égalité*,² with the achievement of free political forms. By these gains however, as Blumack expressed it, they drew a bill on the future payable to their antipodes—the working class. Almost everywhere in the West, the working class, as a class, did not capture the democratic institutions—they used them. Against this it may be argued that the working class took part in revolutions. A reference to history will refute this opinion because precisely in 1848 when the consolidation of Constitutions³ took place in the West, the working class consisted of the urban artisan element, represented urban democracy, a factory proletariat hardly existed while the proletariat employed in large-scale industry (the German weavers—Hauptmann. The Weavers of Lyons⁴) represented a wild mass capable only of rioting, but not

¹ Confession of faith—Ed

² Liberty, fraternity, equality—Ed Eng ed

of advancing any political demands. It can be definitely stated that the Constitutions of 1848 were won by the bourgeoisie and the small urban artisans. On the other hand, the working class (artisans, handicraftsmen, printers, weavers, watchmakers etc.) since the Middle Ages have been accustomed to membership in organisations in mutual aid societies, religious societies, etc. This spirit of organisation still exists among the skilled workers in the West and sharply distinguishes them from the factory proletariat who submit to organisation badly and slowly and are capable only of forming loose organisations (temporary organisations) and not permanent organisations with rules and regulations. These skilled handicraftsmen comprised the core of Social Democratic parties. Thus the following picture was obtained: on the one hand, relatively easy and complete opportunity for political struggle; on the other hand, the opportunity for the systematic organisation of this struggle with the aid of the workers who had been trained in the period of manufacture. It was on this basis that theoretical and practical Marxism grew up in the West. The stimulus was given by the parliamentary political struggle with the prospect—only superficially resembling Blanquism but of a totally different origin—with the prospect of capturing power on the one hand and the *Zusammenbruch* (cataclysm)* on the other. Marxism was the theoretical expression of the prevailing practice of the political struggle which prevailed over the economic struggle. Both in Belgium and in France but particularly in Germany, the workers organised the political struggle with incredible ease but organised the economic struggle with enormous difficulty and tremendous friction. Even to this day the economic organisations are extraordinarily weak and unstable (this does not apply to England) compared with the political organisations and everywhere *laissent à désirer quelque chose*¹. While the energy in the political struggle had not yet been completely exhausted *Zusammenbruch* was an essential organisational *Schlagwort*² destined to play an extremely important historical role. The fundamental law that can be discerned in studying the labour movement is the line of least resistance. In the West, this line was political activity and Marxism in the form in which it was formulated in the *Communist Manifesto* was the best possible form the movement could assume. But when all energy had been exhausted in the political struggle, when the political movement had reached a point of intensity beyond which it was difficult and almost impossible to lead it (the slow increase in votes lately, the apathy of the public at meetings, the note of despondency expressed in literature) on the other hand the ineffectiveness of parliamentary action and the entry into the arena of the uneducated masses of the unorganised and almost unorganisable factory proletariat gave rise in the West to what is now called Bernsteinism,³ the crisis of Marxism.

¹ Leave much to be desired—*Ed Eng ed*

² Catchword—*Ld Eng ed*

³ Bernstein the German reformist who revised the theories of Marx in such a manner as to rob them of their revolutionary content in fact to negate them entirely. Also known as revisionism—*Ed Eng ed*,

It is difficult to imagine a more logical process of development of the labour movement from the period of the *Communist Manifesto* to the period of Bernsteinism and a careful study of the whole of this process can determine with astronomical exactitude the outcome of this "crisis". Reference is made here of course, not to the defeat or victory of Bernsteinism, that is of little interest, reference is made to the fundamental change in practical activity that has been gradually taking place for a long time within the parties.

This change will place not only in the direction of conducting the economic struggle with greater energy and of consolidating the economic organisations, but also and this is the most important in the direction of a change in the attitude of the parties towards other opposition parties. Intolerant Marxism, negative Marxism primitive Marxism (whose conception of the class division of society is too schematic), will give way to democratic Marxism and the social position of the parties in modern society must undergo a sharp change. The party will recognise society, its narrow corporative and, in the majority of cases sectarian tasks will be widened to social tasks, and its striving to seize power will be transformed into a striving for change, a striving to reform present day society in a democratic direction adapted to the present state of affairs with the object of protecting the rights (all rights) of the toiling classes in the most successful and fullest way. The concept of politics will be enlarged to truly social significance and the practical demands of the moment will acquire greater weight and will be able to count on receiving greater attention than they have been getting up to now.

From this brief description of the process of development of the labour movement in the West, it is not difficult to draw conclusions for Russia. In Russia, the line of least resistance will never tend in the direction of political activity. The incredible political oppression that prevails gives rise to much talk about it and it is on this that attention is concentrated, but it will never result in action being taken. While in the West, the fact that the workers were drawn into political activity served to strengthen and crystallise the weak forces of the workers, in Russia, on the contrary, these weak forces are confronted with a wall of political oppression, and not only do they lack a practical path on which to fight this oppression and hence a path for their development but they are systematically strangled and cannot even give forth weak shoots. If to this we add that the working class in our country has not inherited the spirit of organisation that the fighters in the West inherited, the picture will be a gloomy one that is likely to drive into despondency the most optimistic Marxist who believes that an extra factory chimney stack, by the very fact that it exists, will bring great prosperity. The economic struggle too is hard, infinitely hard but it is possible to wage it. It is in fact being waged by the masses themselves. By learning to organise in the midst of this struggle, and coming into constant conflict with the political regime in the course of it, the Russian worker will at last create what may be called the form of the labour movement, the organisation or organisations that will best conform to Russian conditions. It can now be said with certainty that the Russian labour movement is still in the amoeba state and has not yet

created any form the strike movement, which is going on with all types of organisation cannot yet be described as the crystallised form of the Russian movement, whereas the underground organisations are not worth consideration even from the mere quantitative point of view (quite apart from the question of their utility under present conditions)

"That is the situation. If to this we add the famine and the ruination of the countryside, which give rise to the *Streikbrecher*,¹ and consequently to even greater difficulties in the way of raising the masses of the workers to a more tolerable cultural level, then well, what is the Russian Marxist to do? The talk about an independent workers' political party is nothing more nor less than the product of the attempt to transplant alien tasks and alien results to our soil. At present, the Russian Marxist presents a sad spectacle. His practical tasks at the present time are paltry, his theoretical knowledge in so far as he utilises it *not as an instrument for research*, but as a scheme for activity, is worthless for the purpose of fulfilling even those paltry practical tasks. Moreover these borrowed schemes are harmful from the practical point of view. Our Marxists forget that the working class in the West entered the field of political activity after it had already been cleared and consequently are too contemptuous of the radical or liberal opposition activity of all other non labour strata of society. The slightest attempt to concentrate attention on public manifestations of a liberal political character rouses the protests of the orthodox Marxists who forget that a number of historical conditions prevent us from being Western Marxists and compel us to be Marxists of another type applicable to and necessary for Russian conditions. Obviously, the fact that every Russian citizen lacks political feeling and sense cannot be compensated by talk about politics or by appeals to a non-existent power. This political sense can only be acquired by training *i.e.* by participating in the social life (however un-Marxian this social life may be) that is offered by Russian conditions. However opportune (temporarily) negations may have been in the West, they are harmful in Russia because negations coming from something that is organised and having real power is one thing, whereas negations coming from an amorphous mass of disoriented individuals is another thing.

There is only one way out for the Russian Marxist: he must participate, *i.e.* assist in the economic struggle of the proletariat and take part in liberal opposition activity. As a 'negator,' the Russian Marxist came on the scene very early, and this negation weakened that share of his energy that should be used in the direction of political radicalism. For the time being this is not terrible, but if the class scheme prevents the Russian intellectual from taking an active part in social life and removes him to too great a distance from opposition circles, it will be a serious loss to all those who are compelled to fight for constitutional forms separately from the working class which has not yet put forward political tasks. The political innocence of the Russian Marxist intellectual which is concealed by mental exercises in political topics may land him in a mess."

¹ Blackleg, scab —Ed Eng ed.

We do not know whether there are many Russian Social Democrats who share these views. But there is no doubt that ideas of this kind have their adherents and that is why we feel obliged to protest categorically against such views and to warn all comrades of the danger of Russian Social Democracy being diverted from the path that it has already chosen for itself, *viz.*, the formation of an independent political workers' party which shall be inseparable from the class struggle of the proletariat, and which shall have for its immediate aim the winning of political liberty.

The above quoted *Credo* represents, firstly, "a brief description of the process of development of the labour movement in the West," and, secondly, "conclusions to be drawn for Russia."

First of all, the conception of the history of the West European labour movement presented by the authors of the *Credo* is entirely wrong. It is not true to say that the working class in the West did not take part in the struggle for political liberty and in political revolutions. The history of the Chartist movement and the revolutions of 1848 in France, Germany and Austria prove the opposite. It is absolutely untrue to say that "Marxism was the theoretical expression of the prevailing practice of the political struggle which prevailed over the economic struggle." On the contrary, "Marxism" appeared when non political socialism prevailed ("Owenism," "Fourierism," "true socialism") and the *Communist Manifesto* immediately opposed non political socialism. Even when Marxism came out fully armed with theory (*Capital*) and organised the celebrated International Workingmen's Association,¹ the political struggle was by no means the prevailing practice (narrow trade unionism in England, anarcho and Proudhonism in the Latin countries). The great historic merit of Lassalle in Germany lay in the fact that he transformed the working class from a tail of the liberal bourgeoisie into an independent political party. Marxism linked up the economic and the political struggles of the working class into a single inseparable whole, and the efforts of the authors of the *Credo* to separate these two forms of struggle represent their most clumsy and deplorable departure from Marxism.

¹ / *c* the First International. See explanatory note to page 397.—Ed

Furthermore, the authors of the *Credo* are utterly wrong in respect to the present state of the West European labour movement and to the theory of Marxism, under the banner of which that movement is marching. To talk about the "crisis of Marxism" is merely to repeat the nonsensical phrases of the bourgeois hacks who are doing all they can to exaggerate every disagreement among the Socialists in order to provoke a split in the socialist parties. The notorious Bernsteinism—in the sense that it is understood by the general public, and by the authors of the *Credo* in particular—is an attempt to narrow the theory of Marxism, an attempt to convert the revolutionary workers' party into a reformist party, and as was to be expected, this attempt was strongly condemned by the majority of the German Social Democrats. Opportunist trends have more than once revealed themselves in the ranks of German Social Democracy, and on every occasion they have been repudiated by the Party, which loyally guards the principles of revolutionary international Social Democracy. We are convinced that every attempt to transplant opportunist views to Russia will encounter an equally stern resistance on the part of the great majority of Russian Social Democrats.

Similarly, there can be no suggestion of a "radical change in the practical activity" of the West European workers' parties, in spite of what the authors of the *Credo* say the tremendous importance of the economic struggle of the proletariat, and the necessity for such a struggle, was recognised by Marxism from the very outset, and even in the 'forties Marx and Engels opposed the utopian socialists who denied the importance of this struggle.

When the International Workingmen's Association was formed about twenty years later, the question of the importance of trade unions and of the economic struggle was raised at the very first Congress of the Association, at Geneva in 1866.* The resolution adopted at that Congress definitely referred to the importance of the economic struggle and, on the one hand, warned the Socialists and the workers against exaggerating the importance of this struggle (which the English workers were inclined to do at that time) and against underestimating its importance (which the French and the Germans, particularly the Lassalleans, were in

clined to do), on the other The resolution recognised the trade unions to be not only a natural, but also an essential phenomenon under capitalism and regarded them as being extremely important as a means of organising the working class for its daily struggle against capital and for the abolition of wage labour The resolution declared that the trade unions must not devote attention exclusively to the "immediate struggle against capital," must not remain outside of the general political and social movement of the working class, they must not pursue "narrow" aims, but must strive for the complete emancipation of the vast masses of the oppressed toilers Since that time, the workers' parties in the various countries have more than once discussed the question and, of course, will discuss it again and again, as to whether to devote more or less attention at the given moment to the economic or the political struggle of the proletariat, but, in principle, the question stands today as it was presented by Marxism The conviction that the class struggle must necessarily combine the political and the economic struggle has permeated the very flesh and blood of international Social Democracy Moreover, the experience of history has incontrovertibly proved that the absence of liberty, or the restriction of the political rights of the proletariat, always leads to the necessity of putting the political struggle in the fore front

Still less can there be any suggestion of any serious change in the attitude of the workers' parties towards the other opposition parties In this respect, too, Marxism has laid down the correct position, which is equally remote from exaggerating the importance of politics, from conspiracies (Blanquism, etc) and from decrying politics or reducing it to opportunist, reformist patching up of the social system (anarchism, utopian and petty bourgeois socialism, state socialism, professorial socialism, etc) The proletariat must strive to form independent, political workers' parties, the main aim of which must be the capture of political power by the proletariat for the purpose of organising socialist society The proletariat must not regard the other classes and parties as a "homogeneous reactionary mass" * on the contrary, it must take part in the whole of political and social life, support the progress-

five classes and parties against the reactionary classes and parties, support every revolutionary movement against the present system, must champion the interests of every oppressed nation or race, of every persecuted religion, disfranchised sex, etc. The arguments the authors of the *Credo* advance on this subject merely reveal a desire to obscure the class character of the struggle of the proletariat, a desire to weaken this struggle by a senseless "recognition of society," to reduce revolutionary Marxism to a humdrum reformist trend. We are convinced that the overwhelming majority of Russian Social Democrats will totally reject this distortion of the fundamental principles of Social Democracy. Their incorrect premises regarding the West European labour movement led the authors of the *Credo* to draw still more erroneous "conclusions for Russia."

The assertion that the Russian working class "has not yet put forward political tasks" simply reveals ignorance of the Russian revolutionary movement. Even the North Russian Labour League formed in 1878 * and the South Russian Labour League formed in 1879 ** put forward the demand for political liberty in their programmes. After the reactionary 'eighties, the working class repeatedly put forward similar demands in the 'nineties. The assertion that "the talk about an independent workers' political party is nothing more nor less than the product of the attempt to transplant alien tasks and alien results to our soil" reveals a complete failure to understand the historical role of the Russian working class and the tasks of Russian Social Democracy. Apparently, the programme of the authors of the *Credo* inclines to the idea that the working class, "following the line of least resistance," should confine itself to the economic struggle while the "liberal opposition elements" fight for "constitutional forms" with the "participation" of the Marxists. The carrying out of such a programme would be tantamount to political suicide for Russian Social Democracy, tantamount to greatly retarding and restricting the Russian labour movement and the Russian revolutionary movement (for us the two latter terms are synonymous). The mere fact that it was possible for a programme like this to appear shows how well grounded were the fears expressed by one of the

front rank fighters of Russian Social Democracy P B Axelrod, when, in writing on this prospect at the end of 1897, he said

"The labour movement keeps to the narrow rut of purely economic conflicts between the workers and employers and in itself, taken as a whole, is not of a political character, but in the struggle for political liberty the progressive strata of the proletariat follow the revolutionary circles and factions formed by the so-called intelligentsia (Axelrod, *The Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social Democrats*, Gonnova, 1898, p 19)

Russian Social Democracy must declare determined war against the whole circle of ideas expressed in the *Credo*, for these ideas lead to this prospect becoming a fact. Russian Social Democrats must exert every effort to create another prospect, depicted by P B Axelrod in the following words

"The other prospect Social Democracy will organise the Russian proletariat in an independent political party which will fight for liberty *partly, side by side and in alliance with* the bourgeois revolutionary factions (if such exist), and partly by recruiting directly into its ranks, or securing the following of the most democratic and revolutionary elements of the intelligentsia" (*Ibid*, p 90)

At the time P B Axelrod wrote the above lines the declarations made by Social Democrats in Russia showed clearly that the overwhelming majority of them adhere to the same point of view * It is true that one paper published by the St Petersburg workers, *Rabochaya Mysl*,¹ seemed to incline toward the ideas of the authors of the *Credo* when, unfortunately, in a leading article on its programme (in issue No 1, Oct, 1897) it expressed the utterly erroneous idea, which runs counter to Social Democracy, that the "economic basis of the movement" may be "obscured by the effort constantly to keep in mind political ideals" At the same time, however, another newspaper published by St Petersburg workers, the *St Petersburgski Rabochy Listok*,² (No 2, Sept, 1897), emphatically expressed the opinion that "the overthrow of the autocracy can be achieved only by a well organised and numerically strong workers' party" and that "organised in a strong party" the workers will "emancipate themselves, and the

¹ *Workers' Thought*,—Ed Eng ed

² *St. Petersburg Workers' Sheet*—Ed. Eng ed,

whole of Russia, from all political and economic oppression" A third newspaper, the *Rabochaya Gazeta*,¹ in its leading article in issue No 2 (Nov., 1897), wrote "The fight against the autocratic government for political liberty is the immediate task of the Russian labour movement" "The Russian labour movement will increase its forces tenfold if it comes out as a single, harmonious whole, with a common name and a symmetrical organisation" "The separate workers' circles should combine into a single, common party" "The Russian workers' party will be a Social Democratic party" That the overwhelming majority of Russian Social Democrats fully share the convictions expressed by *Rabochaya Gazeta* is seen from the fact that the Congress of Russian Social Democrats which was held in the spring of 1898 formed the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, published the Manifesto of the Party and recognised the *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the official organ of the Party * Thus, the authors of the *Credo* are retreating an enormous distance from the stage of development which Russian Social Democracy has already achieved and which has been registered in the *Manifesto of the RSDLP* Although the desperate persecution of the Russian government has led to the temporary subsidence of the activities of the Party at the present time and to the cessation of its official organ, the task of all Social Democrats is to exert every effort finally to consolidate the Party, to draw up the Party programme and to revive its official organ In view of the wavering of opinion that is evidenced by the fact that programmes like the above examined *Credo* can appear, we think it particularly necessary to emphasise the following fundamental principles that were expounded in the Manifesto and which are of enormous importance for Russian Social Democracy

First Russian Social Democracy "desires to be and remain a class movement of the organised masses of workers" Hence it follows that the motto of Social Democracy must be to help the workers not only in their economic, but also in their political struggle, to carry on agitation not only in connection with immediate economic needs, but also in connection with all mani

¹ *Workers Gazette*—Ed Eng ed

festations of political oppression, to carry on propaganda not only in support of the ideas of scientific socialism, but also in support of the ideas of democracy. The only banner the class movement of the workers can have is the theory of revolutionary Marxism, and Russian Social Democracy must see that it is further developed and put into practice, and at the same time they must protect it against those distortions and vulgarisations to which "fashionable theories" are often subjected (and the successes which revolutionary Social Democracy in Russia has achieved have made Marxism a "fashionable" theory). While concentrating all its efforts at the present time on activity among factory workers and mine workers, Social Democrats must not forget that with the expansion of the movement they must also recruit into the ranks of the masses of the workers they organise the home workers, artisans, agricultural labourers and the millions of ruined and starving peasants.

Second "On his strong shoulders the Russian worker must and will bear the cause of winning political liberty." Having made the overthrow of absolutism its immediate task, Social Democracy must come out as the vanguard in the fight for democracy and this fact alone compels it to give every support to all the democratic elements of the population of Russia and to win them as allies. Only an independent workers' party can serve as a firm bulwark in the fight against the autocracy, and only in alliance with such a party, only in supporting it, can all the other fighters for political liberty display their activities.

Third and last "As a socialist movement and trend, the RSDLP continues the cause and traditions of the whole of the preceding revolutionary movement in Russia setting the task of winning political liberty as the greatest of the immediate tasks of the Party as a whole, Social Democracy is marching towards the goal that was clearly indicated long ago by the glorious fighters in the old *Narodnaya Volya*." The traditions of the whole preceding revolutionary movement demand that the Social Democrats shall at the present time concentrate their efforts on the organisation of the Party, on strengthening its internal discipline, and on developing the technique of secrecy. If the fighters in the old

Narodnaya Volya managed to play an enormous role in the history of Russia in spite of the narrowness of the social strata which supported the few heroes, and in spite of the fact that that movement did not have a revolutionary theory as its banner, then Social Democracy, relying on the class struggle of the proletariat, will succeed in becoming invincible "The Russian proletariat will throw off the yoke of autocracy in order, with still greater energy, to continue the struggle against capital and the bourgeoisie for the complete victory of socialism"

We invite all groups of Social Democrats and all workers' circles in Russia to discuss the above quoted *Credo* and our resolution, and to definitely express their opinion on the question raised in order that all differences may be removed and in order that the work of organising and strengthening the R S D L P may be accelerated

Groups and circles may send their resolutions to the League of Russian Social Democrats Abroad which, on the basis of point 10 of the decision of the Congress of Russian Social Democrats held in 1898, is a part of the R S D L P and its representative abroad *

Autumn 1899

EXPLANATORY NOTES

P 4 (13) * *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* was written for *Granat's Encyclopædic Dictionary* in 1908 but was forbidden by the tsarist censorship and was published for the first time in 1918 in pamphlet form. Although this essay was not written in the period covered by the present volume, it is included here because it summarises the characteristics of the agrarian relationships and their development in the Russian countryside prior to 1905, which were the main premises for the first Russian revolution.

In writing the essay Lenin to a large extent utilised the material he had given in a number of his previously written works particularly in his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* and his *Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution 1905-07*. On the basis of this material he in this essay and in the two works mentioned above, deals with a number of problems in the agrarian theory of Marxism-Leninism, lays down the basis of the Bolshevik agrarian programme in the conditions of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Hence, in addition to its general theoretical and historical importance, this essay is still of political importance for those countries which are marching to their October *via* the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which will abolish the strong survivals of feudalism and serfdom in the rural districts in those countries.

The work of drawing up the Bolshevik agrarian programme, which serves as the basis of the agrarian section of the programme of the Communist International, was begun long before the Revolution of 1905 and it was linked up with the problems of the development of capitalism in Russia, its penetration and growth in agriculture and the role of and interrelationships between developing capitalism and the survivals of serfdom in the rural districts. It was around these questions that the struggles which marked the eve of the twentieth century in Russia, between the main schools of public thought such as the revolutionary Marxists, the Narodniki (or Populists) and the liberal bourgeois writers, a forerunner of whom was the so called 'legal Marxist' P. Struve mainly centred.

The struggle of the revolutionary Marxists in Russia was led by Lenin, and in a number of works written in the nineties of the last century he gave a brilliant analysis of the development of the new capitalist relationships that had arisen and laid down the theoretical basis of that struggle. Brilliantly applying the teachings of Marxism and on the basis of precise data, he proved that Russia had already taken the path of capitalist devel-

opment, and he dealt particularly with agrarian relationships and with the shifting of classes that was taking place in the rural districts as a result of the growth of capitalism

Notwithstanding the survivals of serfdom that still existed in agriculture in Russia capitalism marched forward overcoming all obstacles. This process of capitalist development and the growth of the productive forces in agriculture resulting from it, necessarily affected landlord economy "Capitalism is quite obviously beating a path for itself in this field," said Lenin. On the other hand a process of capitalist differentiation took place among the rural population the middle stratum was being washed away," as it were the population gravitating to two opposite poles—the rural capitalist and the rural proletarian. This process went on in spite of the retarding influence of the village commune and *otrabotki*, or payment of rent by labour. Lenin deals in greater detail with these two latter features of rural life in Russia at that time in his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (in this volume), in which he completely smashes the argument of the Narodniki that the development taking place in the Russian countryside was not capitalist

The further development of capitalism at a more rapid pace and the increasing disintegration of the old social forms came into conflict with the survivals of serfdom, primarily with feudal landlordism

The feudal landlords, who owned enormous tracts of land cultivated this land, not on the basis of modern technically equipped enterprises, but with the aid of the peasants' labour and implements in the form of *otrabotki*. They took advantage of the extreme poverty of the surrounding peasantry who had so little land that they were unable to obtain a livelihood on it and were therefore compelled to work for the landlord under conditions of bondage and for miserable pay. As Lenin said "Under this system the landlord is not like the capitalist employer who owns money and all the necessary instruments of labour. Under this system the landlord is like a usurer, who takes advantage of the poverty of a neighbouring peasant and acquires his labour almost for nothing." The result of carrying on agriculture by such a system was that its productivity was extremely low. Thus, the yield on these large landlord estates was even lower than that on the small peasant farms

From this Lenin drew the conclusion that "the break up of the old system of landownership, both landlord and peasant landownership, became an absolute economic necessity." And he linked up this "absolute economic necessity" with the necessity for the break up of this old system of land ownership also for the purpose of clearing the road for the broad development of the class struggle not only in the towns, but also in the rural districts, and for winning the poor stratum of the peasantry and the rural proletariat to the side of the urban proletariat in this struggle. The development of capitalist relationships in the countryside beneath the shell of the survivals of serfdom had prepared a fertile field for this.

Both the liberal Narodniki of the 'nineties and the Narodniki of the subsequent period *i.e.*, the Socialist Revolutionaries, failed to understand the significance of the role of the development of capitalism in agriculture, nor could they understand it. They denied that capitalism was developing in the Russian countryside. They were of the opinion that capitalism in general in Russia was artificially implanted from above by the tsarist government, and they asserted that there was no ground for the development of capitalism in Russia generally, and in the rural districts in particular. They regarded capitalism as an evil which was artificially breaking up what they called 'people's production,' *i.e.*, the village commune, the *artel* or co-operative workshop, etc., which they alleged was being created by the 'people,' *i.e.*, the peasants. In lauding this 'people's production' the Narodniki of the 'nineties, and later the Socialist Revolutionaries, obscured the fact that capitalism was growing in the rural districts on the basis of small peasant farming, that the rural population was being split up into a rural poor and rural proletariat, on the one side, and a class of 'kulaks,' or capitalist farmers on the other and that it was precisely this that was breaking up the village commune and in fact transforming it into a means of tying the peasant to the land and placing him in bondage to the landlord. Hence, the Narodniki did not advocate the class struggle of the proletariat, allied with and leading the poor stratum of the rural population, against the bourgeoisie, and for the dictatorship of the proletariat as a means of victoriously combating the alleged artificial transplantation of capitalism in Russia, but advocated the method of assisting society and the state to develop their imaginary 'people's production' (the Narodniki of the 'nineties) or else equal land tenure and the development of co-operatives without the proletariat capturing power and without the proletariat leading the peasant masses (the Socialist Revolutionaries). This is what the Narodniki called "socialism."

As a matter of fact, this sort of socialism was nothing more nor less than an expression of the strivings of the small producer to preserve and consolidate small enterprise under capitalism. In other words it was a reactionary utopia. Actually, it could only serve the development of capitalism and, consequently, the development of the rural bourgeoisie (the kulaks). As a matter of fact the Narodniki of the 'nineties were already championing the interests of the rural bourgeoisie while the Socialist Revolutionaries began by championing the interests of the toiling peasantry, and, finally, in 1917, became transformed into a genuinely kulak party. Lenin waged an unceasing struggle against the reactionary and alleged "socialist" utopias of the Narodniki, and this struggle runs like a thread through his works on the agrarian problem and, of course, through this essay. Unlike Plekhanov and the Mensheviks generally Lenin, in criticising the theories of the Narodniki, was able to distinguish its democratic traits, which expressed the strivings of the mass of the peasantry to seize the land of the landlords and also to abolish the rule of the landlords in

the state. Hence, Lenin and Lenin's party the Bolsheviks, called upon the whole of the peasantry to unite with the proletariat in the fight to overthrow the rule of the landlords, and they were prepared to enter into a *bloc* with the Narodnik parties (the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Trudoviki or Labourites) for the purpose of waging this struggle, while continuing to insist on the necessity for the proletariat exercising the hegemony or leadership in the struggle.

It was not only against the Narodniki that Lenin, in the nineties of the last century, waged a struggle on the question of the development of capitalism in Russia in general and in the Russian countryside in particular. Among those who were contending against the Narodniki were the "legal Marxists" [so called because they did not belong to or work in the illegal Marxist organisations—*Ed Eng ed*], led by Peter Struve. (For further details of Struve see note to page 456.) These 'legal Marxists' were in actual fact the representatives of the interests of the rising bourgeoisie cloaked in the garb of Marxism, and instead of presenting the Marxian view that capitalism was progressive in comparison with the pre-capitalist forms of economy from the point of view of the interests of the proletariat, they began to praise capitalism as such. They obscured the fact that capitalism was a system of exploiting the toiling masses of the rural population, and instead of advocating class war against capitalism they urged that it was necessary to learn from the capitalists. Lenin fought as strenuously against the bourgeois position taken up by the 'legal Marxists' as he fought against the reactionary utopias of the Narodniki. As against the position of the 'legal Marxists' he gave his own appraisal of the progressive nature of capitalism from the point of view of the development of the class struggle in town and country for the overthrow of capitalism and for the establishment of socialism.

It was precisely from this point of view that Lenin, from the outset of his activities, approached the question of the abolition of the survivals of serfdom in the Russian countryside. He regarded the abolition of the survivals of serfdom as nothing more nor less than the first step in the proletarian struggle for socialism, as a necessary stage in the victory of the proletarian revolution.

The question of how to abolish the survivals of serfdom, these obstacles to the development of the productive forces of capitalist Russia by which class and by what methods they were to be abolished, was, from the point of view of the proletariat, a very important question connected with the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. The correct, consistently revolutionary presentation of the question on the basis of the driving forces of the revolution logically led to the slogans formulated by the Bolsheviks in the Revolution of 1905.

The development of capitalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century presented two alternative methods of solving the agrarian problem in Russia and abolishing the survivals of serfdom, the first was what

Lenin called the "Prussian path," by which he meant the systematic plunder of the village communes by the kulaks, the rich peasants and land lords and the impoverishment, pauperization, of the mass of the rural population. By this method, as Lenin said, mediæval agrarian relationships are not abolished at one stroke, but are gradually adapted to capitalism, which for a long time preserves these semi-feudal features." Although this method creates the possibilities for the development of productive forces, nevertheless, the progress is slow and takes place in a way that is very painful for the masses of the peasantry. Before the Revolution of 1905 this method was supported by the liberal bourgeoisie who had connections with the landlords. After the 1905 Revolution it was adopted as the deliberate policy of the Stolypin government and supported by a considerable section of the landlord class who had become convinced as a result of the revolution that they could no longer preserve the relationships of serfdom in the rural districts.

The other way is what Lenin called the "American path" which would lead to the rise of a class of farmers like that in America. This, however, would entail the abolition of feudal landownership by *revolutionary* means. The revolutionary struggle of the peasantry against the survivals of serfdom and against the feudal landlords in fact, represented the struggle for this path of capitalist development. In the conditions that prevailed in pre-revolutionary Russia this path implied the revolutionary solution of the agrarian problem, the bourgeois democratic revolution.

The revolutionary proletariat was interested in precisely such a solution of the agrarian problem in Russia. The rapid and thorough abolition of the survivals of serfdom would remove the enemy of the whole of the peasantry, *viz*, the landlords, and would bring the toiling masses of the countryside, primarily the poor peasants and the agricultural labourers, face to face with the principal enemy of the proletariat, *viz* the bourgeoisie, including the rural bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, the kulaks. This would have caused the wide development of the class struggle against capitalism in the rural districts under the leadership of the proletariat and, consequently, a rapid transition from the bourgeois democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. Hence the proletariat, led by the Bolshevik Party, had to lead the struggle of the whole of the peasantry for the "American path" of capitalist development, for the complete abolition of the survivals of serfdom and for final victory over the landlords and the landlord autocracy, and direct this struggle along the channel of rapid transition from this victory to the victory over the bourgeoisie. Hence, the Bolshevik, Leninist appraisal of the bourgeois democratic revolution as a peasant revolution led by the proletariat, which, under the leadership of the proletariat grows into the socialist revolution. Hence the slogan which the Bolsheviks advanced in this revolution: revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The most consistent means for the abolition of all the survivals of serf

dom in Russia was the demand for the nationalisation of the land *i.e.*, the abolition of private property in land and its transformation into state property. Following in the footsteps of Marx, Lenin supported this demand and showed what it really meant under the capitalist system. Of course, in so far as the land is transferred to the bourgeois state the nationalisation of the land does not abolish capitalism. On the contrary, it clears the road for it. It is quite understandable therefore, that the revolutionary peasantry and their ideologists, in fighting against the landlords, strove for the nationalisation of the land, although they did not always realise that

At the same time, however, the nationalisation of the land completely eradicates the survivals of serfdom in the rural districts. It opens up the widest possibilities for the development of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie and as it strikes a very severe blow at one of the principal forms of private property, it also serves the proletariat and the poor stratum of the rural population as a powerful stimulus to the struggle for the abolition of all capitalist property in the means of production, *i.e.* as a stimulus to the socialist revolution. Thus in the midst of a bourgeois democratic revolution which is capable of growing into a socialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat, the nationalisation of the land is one of the measures for this transition and one of the first steps towards socialism. Lenin developed the demand for the nationalisation of the land during the Revolution of 1905-07 and spoke in support of it at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the RSDLP (1906). He also advocated it in a number of the works he wrote in the period between 1905 and 1908, and in the present essay

*P 4 (F 20) ** The Reform of 1861 did not grant the peasant the right of ownership of his land, even if he had occupied it from time immemorial. The land was declared to be the property of the landlord and according to the law of February 19, 1861, the latter had to allot land to the peasants. But the terms on which the land was let were extremely onerous for the peasants.

Two categories of peasant allotments were created—a lower category and a higher category. In the non Black Earth Belt, the higher category ranged from three to seven dessiatins (a dessiatin is 270 acres) and the lower category, from one to two and one third dessiatins. In the Black Earth Belt the allotments ranged from two and three fourths dessiatins to six dessiatins in the higher category, and from eleventh-twelfths of a dessiatin to two dessiatins in the lower category. The peasants had to pay a certain price for the right to use these allotments, which they paid off in instalments, but until they had paid off the allotment price they remained in the position of "temporarily bonded" peasants, *i.e.*, as a matter of fact, they remained serfs and were obliged to perform labour in payment of rent, to pay quit rent, etc. According to the letter of the law the peasant was free to choose whether he would take an allotment or not, and the

allotment price was regarded as being the payment price for the land only. In actual practice however, the landlord enjoyed the right to keep the peasant in a state of temporary bondage or grant him an allotment at a price. The latter was more profitable for the landlord, as the land was valued at a price which, in fact, meant that the peasant had not only to pay for the right to use the land, but also for his release from serfdom.

The allotment price was 57 per cent higher than the purchase price of the land in the Black Earth Belt and 125 per cent higher in the non-Black Earth Belt, and instead of paying a total of 544,000,000 rubles as they would have done if they had had to pay at the purchase price of the land, the peasants as a whole, paid 867,000,000 rubles. The burden of the allotment payments was so enormous that the peasants were unable to pay, and a huge amount of arrears accumulated. Allotment payments were abolished only in 1905 as a result of the revolution in that year. But they were abolished only after the peasants had already paid more than half a billion rubles over and above the exorbitant price that had been fixed for the allotments.

PAGE 20 ** Otrezki, literally "cut off". When the serfs were emancipated in 1861 and the holdings which they had been cultivating for the serf-owning landlords were allotted to them, the landlords cut off the best parts of these holdings, including pastures and other services and appropriated them to themselves. [For the sake of convenience the Russian term is used throughout the text.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*] The amount of land of which the peasants were deprived by means of the *otrezki* at the time of their "emancipation" was very considerable, and the more valuable the land the larger were the *otrezki*. Thus in 15 gubernias in the non-Black Earth Belt where the land is not so fertile, the peasants were deprived of 4 per cent of their holdings, whereas in the Black Earth Belt the *otrezki* amounted to 28 per cent of the peasant holdings. The *otrezki* were also largest on the largest estates. For example, in the Saratov Gubernia on estates up to 1,000 dessiatins the *otrezki* amounted to 30 per cent of the peasant holdings, whereas on estates exceeding 1,000 dessiatins they amounted to 50 per cent. The *otrezki* were a means of subjecting the peasants to extreme exploitation, first because they caused severe land hunger among the peasantry and second because the *otrezki* were wedged in between the peasants' allotments so that the latter could not till their land conveniently without trespassing and so were obliged to rent the *otrezki* at exorbitant rents.

PAGE 95 * Lenin wrote *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* during the years 1896-98 at the height of the theoretical controversy between the Marxists and the Narodniki, under very exceptional circumstances. He had thought of writing this book for some time and had already conceived its general outline, but had not the opportunity to get down to the work. In December, 1895 he was arrested, and he took advantage of his enforced leisure to start on the book. In January, 1896, he wrote to his

sister asking her to arrange to have books sent to him. The number of books to read in order to collect material for this work was truly enormous and all sorts of cunning devices had to be resorted to in order to get them to him. Lenin completed his book while in exile in Siberia in the village of Shushensk Minusinsk Uyezd, in 1898.

This book based on a wealth of statistical material, which Lenin himself studied and worked up represents an unexcelled example of the application of the Marxian method in the investigation of the development of the economy and class relationships in a particular country. It shows also how, *in the hands of a Marxist*, the material collected and compiled by liberal bourgeois economists and statisticians gives an entirely different picture from that presented by the latter and leads to entirely different conclusions. It presents an all-sided and complete picture of the development of capitalism in pre-revolutionary Russia, and as such completely exposes the theoretical unsoundness and the reactionary and utopian character of the economic doctrines of the Narodniki.

Lenin wrote this book a few years before the Revolution of 1905, and it lays down in fact the economic basis for defining the character and the driving forces of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia and its prospects of growing into a socialist revolution. By that it laid the basis for the Bolshevik programme and strategy of that revolution and in particular for the Bolshevik solution of the agrarian problem in Russia. In his preface to the second edition of this book written in 1907, Lenin says that "the correctness of the analysis of the social and economic structure of Russia given in this work on the basis of economic research and the critical study of statistical information is now" (*i.e.*, the period of the Revolution of 1905-07—*Ed.*) "confirmed by the open political action of all classes in the course of the revolution." This book also reveals the general laws of the development of capitalism in conditions when strong survivals of serfdom are preserved and, in particular, it reveals the laws of development of capitalism in the rural districts under these conditions. For this reason it is a valuable contribution to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, which was subsequently still further enriched by a number of other works on economics by Lenin. This makes this work indispensable for the study of the theoretical, programmatic and strategical principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The controversy between the Marxists and the Narodniki at that time centred around the question as to the path of development of Russia by which was meant the old Russian Empire with its great variety of economic systems. The Marxists maintained that the development and reorganisation of the country was proceeding along the lines of transition from serfdom to capitalism, that capitalism was winning the predominant position in the economy of the country and that Russia was already a capitalist country with strong survivals of serfdom. On the other hand, the Narodniki held that Russian capitalism was being artificially implanted by the tsarist government and therefore was weak and puny and had no future; that Russia

could avoid the capitalist path of development by developing what they called 'peoples production' based on the village commune and agricultural and handicraft co operative societies

After examining a mass of statistical data and Zemstvo researches which the Narodnik writers before him had usually handled in a tendentious manner, Lenin showed that Russia was developing capitalistically not only in one or two districts but throughout the whole country, and that this development was only being retarded by the survivals of serfdom. The central issue that Lenin advanced, and the one that gave rise to most controversy was the question of the formation of the home market as an essential condition for the development of capitalism in Russia. In this he refuted the argument advanced by the Narodniki that Russian capitalism could only develop further if Russia had a foreign market.

Lenin points out that the Marxian critique of capitalism differs from that of the Narodnik critique in that while the latter merely asserts that capitalism is a system of exploitation, Marxism shows how this exploitation springs from the very system of productive relationships of capitalism and the whole development of the social and economic system. While the Narodniki merely condemn the capitalist system from the point of view of social ideals the Marxist must study the classes that arise in the capitalist system which fight and which, in this fight, create the foundations of a new social system. Neither the Narodniki nor Struve, who criticised the Narodniki, emphasised the class struggle, which is a necessary condition for the creation of new social relationships.

In *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* Lenin sums up the controversy between the Marxists and the Narodniki on the prospect of the capitalist development of Russia and finally and completely shatters the Narodnik theory. This book served as a manual and reference book for the revolutionary Marxists at the end of the 'nineties and was a powerful intellectual weapon in the armoury of the younger generation of the Party.

Apart from its significance as a weapon in the struggle for the correct Marxian conception of the development of the economy of and class relationships in Russia this book was also an important factor in the controversies that raged in the Social Democratic movement outside of Russia. In the nineties of the last century a wide discussion was taking place among the German Social Democrats on the fundamental principles of Marxism, including the agrarian problem. The German revisionists argued that the laws of development of capitalism in agriculture differed from those generating in industry and that the concentration of capital was not so great in the former as in the latter in view of the vitality of small peasant farming. Lenin in this book smashes these revisionist theories, which in Russia were defended by the 'legal Marxist' Bulgakov and the Narodniki Chernov and others. He deals in great detail with this in his works, *Capitalism in Agriculture*, *New Data on the Laws of Capitalism in Agriculture* and *The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx.'* (Selected Works, Vol XII)

PAGE 101 * "People's production (or people's industry) and "artificial capitalism" are meaningless terms employed by the Narodniki and characterise their theory. Not being able to deny that capitalism was growing in Russia, but denying that capitalist relationships, i.e., wage labour were becoming predominant, they asserted that this was a casual phenomenon in Russia artificially transplanted from Western Europe and that Russia would proceed along its own non-capitalist path of development.

According to the Narodniki the basis of society would be "people's industry" by which they meant peasant communal economy and small handicraft industry.

PAGE 101 ** The Narodniki believed that the most effective bulwark against the growth and development of capitalism in Russia were the village communes with their patriarchal, natural, self-sufficing economy, in which wage labour and private property in land were supposed not to exist. In Narodnik literature, therefore, the village commune is treated as the principal 'bulwark' against capitalism. Lenin in analysing the village commune, revealed the process of disintegration and the growth of capitalist and labour elements taking place within it and proved that it was not by any means a 'popular bulwark' against capitalism but a pernicious survival of serfdom which bound the peasant to the landlord and the landlord to the autocracy. He showed that it hindered the development of capitalism as do all feudal survivals, but that, in spite of it, capitalism was progressing and breaking down the natural self-sufficing and semi-self-sufficing systems of economy that stood in its way.

PAGE 263 * Lenin's work, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats*, was written in 1894 and published illegally. Only part I and part III of this are available for publication. Part II was lost and has not been found to this day. In this book, Lenin attacks the Narodniki whom the Social Democrats were fighting at that time.

Capitalism which had become fairly well developed in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, was beginning gradually to penetrate into agriculture. The landlords, in whose hands economic and political power was concentrated, tried to adapt their economic system, which was based on serf labour, to the new conditions. The powerful peasant movement which broke out at that time compelled them to introduce the so-called "Great" Reform of 1861. This half-hearted measure, however, which was carried out in the interests of the landlords and against the interests of the peasants, merely served to retard the further development of capitalism. In so far as the Reform was carried out by the government of the autocracy, wrote Lenin, "the peasants, after being 'liberated' found themselves reduced to beggary, they passed from a state of slavery to the landlords into a state of bondage to the very same landlords and their henchmen."

The peasantry could not become reconciled to this position. The interests of the peasantry demanded not reforms carried out from above by the land lords, but the revolutionary seizure of the land and the overthrow of the power of the landlords. But the peasants at that time did not know *how* to fight, nor had the proletariat yet developed into an independent and organized class that could show the peasants *how* to fight. Centuries of slavery, Lenin writes in his article *The Peasant Reform and The Proletarian Peasant Revolution* had so crushed and stultified the peasants that they were incapable of anything at the time the Reform was passed except sporadic and isolated rebellions or rather riots, unenlightened by any political consciousness. The mood of the peasantry their desire to throw off the yoke of the landlord was expressed by a small group of intellectuals, college students, the so called "commoners," sons and daughters of petty officials, teachers and the lower clergy. Among these, revolutionary sentiments and the desire to overthrow the autocracy grew.

These revolutionary intellectuals and the first and foremost among them N. G. Chernyshevsky propagated the idea of a peasant revolution. These revolutionaries regarded the "people" the peasantry (hence the term *Narodniki*, from the word *Narod* meaning "the people"), as the masses who were to make the revolution. They pictured the peasantry as the class of the future and peasant economy as the best form of economic relationships they believed that the village commune was the foundation of future socialist society. Consequently, the *Narodnik* revolutionaries were utopian socialists.

The *Narodnik* movement became widespread. Its adherents believed that the masses of the peasantry, deceived by the autocracy would rise in rebellion. In the minds of the *Narodniki*, the idea of a peasant revolution was combined with the idea of "peasant" socialism, to which, they believed, Russia was tending without having to pass through the stage of capitalism, through which Western Europe had to pass.

The *Narodnik* ideology took shape mainly under the influence of M. Bakunin and P. Lavrov.

The "rebels," as the *Narodnik* followers of the celebrated anarchist M. Bakunin were called believed that the transition to socialism would take place on the basis of the existing village communes, but that it was necessary to overthrow the state, which was destroying these communes. The people, they argued, were by their very nature rebels, opposed to the state. They could be and should be roused to rebellion in order to overthrow the exploiters, destroy the state and establish what the Bakuninists conceived as a non-state federation of free communes, which they called socialism. In a number of places they tried to rouse the peasants to rebellion, but were unsuccessful.

The followers of Lavrov believed that it was first of all necessary to raise the cultural and intellectual level of the people. Although Lavrov did not altogether deny the importance of political liberties and paid considerable

attention to the class struggle of the European proletariat he nevertheless attached greater importance to socialist propaganda conducted by 'critically minded individuals'

In the seventies of the last century large circles of the youth were imbued with Narodnik ideas. All were imbued with the desire to serve the people, to help them to emerge from their condition of poverty and ignorance. The so called movement of 'going among the people' commenced. Hundreds of intellectuals abandoned their studies and their homes, donned peasant or working men's clothes and went into the countryside to live among the people and carry on education and propaganda work among them. The autocracy retaliated to this movement with severe acts of repression. However, no big mass movement arose out of this 'going among the people'. The peasantry did not rise in rebellion. But contact with the peasantry, the study of socialist theories, mainly those emanating from Western Europe, and, finally, their persecution by the autocratic government, stimulated these young intellectuals to seek for other methods of struggle. The "going among the people" was a peaceful, educational movement in the main, but the next stage of the movement was marked by the creation of a revolutionary organisation, *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom).

Organised in the period of 1876 and 1878 the *Zemlya i Volya* group became the centre of the Narodnik movement and represented a serious attempt to establish a revolutionary party in Russia. The failure that attended the work of agitation among the peasantry and the persecution by the government impelled the revolutionaries to adopt terroristic methods. Terror became a method of political struggle. Very soon, however, differences arose within the ranks of the *Zemlya i Volya* concerning methods of revolutionary work: one group advocated carrying on agitational work among the peasants and workers, while another group urged that all efforts be concentrated upon delivering terroristic blows against the government for the purpose of compelling it to make political concessions. These differences led to a split in *Zemlya i Volya* which took place at the Voronezh Congress in 1879. One group separated to form what was known as the *Cherny Peredel* (Black Redistribution). It clung to the old Narodnik traditions and proclaimed the slogan of general redistribution of all the land. The other group formed the *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will) Party, which openly adopted the methods of terroristic struggle against the autocratic government and the immediate aim of which was to overthrow tsarism by seizing power.

The *Narodnaya Volya*, like all the Narodniki, believed that socialism could be achieved through the medium of the village commune. In order to achieve socialism, they believed, it was necessary to bring about an "economic revolution" which would transfer all the means of production to the toilers. But unlike the Narodniki of the 'seventies they held that while Europe was on the verge of such an economic revolution, Russia had first to pass through a political revolution in order to overthrow the autocracy.

The revolutionary Narodniki regarded the workers as those who had

only temporarily abandoned the plough, peasants who had put on city clothes. But in carrying on their work among the workers they found that the latter were more susceptible to socialist propaganda than the peasants; that the workers made the best revolutionaries and Socialists, and that they represented the best field in which to carry on their work. Plekhanov, who at that time was still a Narodnik rebel," went to the Cossack *stanitsa* (village) of Kamensk in the hope that the unrest that prevailed there would grow into a big rebellion like those of Pugachev and Stenka Rasin. He had to confess, however, that the peasant uprising was a failure, that the peasants acted in a disunited manner and failed to display the necessary persistence. When, some time later, the strike among the workers employed at factories on the banks of the Obvod Canal in St. Petersburg broke out, Plekhanov could not help observing the solidarity, persistence, the high degree of class consciousness and understanding of the aims of the struggle displayed by these "rebels."

The *Narodnaya Volya* concentrated their main efforts on terroristic acts, and particularly on what they called "central" acts of terror, that is to say, against the tsar. On March 1, 1881, they organised the assassination of the tsar. After this, however, they found themselves at a deadlock. The tsar was killed, but the popular rebellion that they had expected did not ensue. The autocracy quickly recovered from the heavy blow and passed to the offensive. The path of terror, of acts of individual heroism, proved to lead nowhere.

The 'Black Redistribution' organisation existed for a few years and then fell to pieces, for socialist propaganda continued to be a failure in the rural districts, whereas successful work among the workers led to the path of political action. In 1883, a number of the leaders of the 'Black Redistribution' organisation abandoned Narodnik views, recognised the class struggle of the proletariat as an independent struggle and formed the 'Emancipation of Labour' group.

The more the working class grew, the more the basis of Narodnik views was undermined.

By the 'nineties, capitalism had penetrated the rural districts to an extraordinary extent. It broke up the village commune and accelerated the process of class differentiation among the peasantry. The labour movement spread, and at the same time the Narodnik movement became disintegrated. A number of the Narodniki abandoned their former views and joined the Social Democrats. Others, mainly those of the *Narodnaya Volya*, put socialism in the background and the political struggle in the foreground of their activities and becoming disillusioned in regard to the efficacy of terroristic methods, abandoned the revolutionary struggle and became bourgeois reformists. Still others tried to rejuvenate Narodnik principles with injections of Marxism, which, of course, they failed to understand.

In those years the intellectuals, and principally the students, were faced with the alternative of choosing between the Marxian and Narodnik ideal.

ogies In those circumstances as Lenin wrote opposing the principles of the Narodniki and advocating Marxism meant "a determined and final rupture with all petty bourgeois ideas and theories" Lenin in attacking the Narodniki proved that their actions were now reactionary, that they were dragging the movement backward

The principal 'liberal Narodnik' writers—Mikhailovsky Yuzhakov, N—on and V V—argued that Russian capitalism was an artificial creation that in Russia capitalism destroyed the productive forces and was only a source of evil

The Narodniki failed to understand that capitalism marked enormous progress compared with the semi-serf relations that were so powerful at that time They attacked the Marxists for regarding capitalism as progressive and argued that this was tantamount to justifying capitalism They failed to understand that the Marxists were more profound and far sighted and that, in its development, capitalism created its own grave digger—the proletariat

This brings us to another error under which the Narodniki laboured they failed to understand that society is divided into classes they did not see the class struggle they did not appreciate the role of the proletariat as a separate class. On the other hand they ascribed special qualities to the intellectuals, put them as it were, "above" all classes, and believed that they were the principal driving force of history

Colonisation, the reorganisation of the Peasants Bank the organisation of rural co-operative workshops (*artels*), cheap credit these were the measures advocated by the liberal Narodniki in order to save peasant farming As a matter of fact, these were bourgeois measures, only an insignificant minority of the peasants could profit by credits and banks and the co-operative workshops either fell to pieces, or else were converted into rural capitalist enterprises

The liberal Narodniki of the 'nineties *i.e.* the years when the broad labour movement began to develop, retreated from the positions of the revolutionary Narodniki of the seventies.

Lenin's criticism of the principles of the Narodniki differs greatly from that of the "legal Marxists" and also from that of Plekhanov The 'legal Marxists' criticised the petty bourgeois views of the Narodniki from the bourgeois point of view from the point of view of those who defend the development of capitalism Plekhanov criticised the Narodniki for their reactionary utopian views, for their desire to turn back the wheels of the economic development of Russia, but he failed to observe the other side of this petty bourgeois movement *viz.* the desire to defend the democratic interests of the peasantry in their struggle against the 'privileged landlords' and against the survivals of serfdom The attitude taken by Lenin quite definitely advanced the idea of an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in a bourgeois democratic revolution, under the leadership of the proletariat

An analysis of the economic views of the Narodniki is given in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, in this volume

PACF 281 * In their controversies with the Social Democrats, the Narodniki in the nineties accused the former of having renounced the ideals of the fathers," i.e. the traditions of the old revolutionary Narodniki who called for the fight against tsarism and the bourgeoisie. They were of the opinion that by carrying on agitation concerning matters affecting the economic conditions of the workers, the Social Democrats were abandoning the political struggle against the autocracy. (Most often however they regarded the "Economists," i.e. those Social Democrats who considered that the working class should concern itself only with economic questions and leave politics alone, as the only true representatives of Marxism.) When the Social Democrats argued that capitalism was more progressive than the survival of serfdom, the Narodniki wrongly accused them of being the champions of capitalism.

PACF 285 * Gladstone's Land Bills. The Bills introduced in the British Parliament by Prime Minister Gladstone affecting land tenure in Ireland. According to the Land Act of 1870, in the event of a landlord cancelling the lease of a tenant before the lease had expired, he had to compensate the tenant for the improvements he had made on the land. This Act also created an opportunity for the tenants to purchase their holdings. The Gladstonian Land Acts did not solve the agrarian problem in Ireland; their whole purpose was by making slight concessions to the Irish peasants, to cut the ground from under the revolutionary movement.

PACF 285 ** In 1883, 1884 and 1889 the German Chancellor, Bismarck, introduced social insurance laws for workers as a means of counteracting the growth of socialism among the working class. Only a section of the working class was brought under the Insurance Act, and the financial burden of this insurance was put mainly on the workers themselves.

PACF 292 * Zemsky Sobor, or National Assembly, the assembly of the representatives of the *Bojars*, the nobility and of a section of the merchants, convoked by the tsars of Muscovy to discuss important political affairs and questions of war and peace. This assembly was established in the sixteenth century and existed for 150 years, being convoked only at long intervals. In the latter half of the nineteenth century the question was again raised of establishing a representative institution and the historic name of *Zemsky Sobor* was adopted for it. By this term the liberals had in mind a sort of restricted parliament. The *Narodnaya Volya*ists, however, implied by this term a fully empowered constituent assembly.

PACF 293 * This refers to a letter written by Marx to the editor of *Otechestvennye Zapiski* (*Home Notes*) in 1877. The letter deals with the

question as to whether Russia would pass through the capitalist stage of development or would pass straight to socialism without passing through the capitalist stage. In this letter Marx wrote

"In the postscript to the second German edition of *Capital*—I speak of a great Russian critic and man of learning" (i.e., Chernyshevsky—Ed.) "with the high consideration he deserves. In his remarkable articles this writer has dealt with the question whether, as her liberal economists maintain Russia must begin by destroying *la commune rurale* [the village commune] in order to pass to the capitalist regime, or whether, on the contrary she can without experiencing the tortures of this regime appropriate all its fruits by developing *ses propres données historiques* [the particular historic conditions already given her]. He pronounces in favour of this latter solution

After paying his tribute to Chernyshevsky Marx goes on to say 'If Russia continues to pursue the path she has followed since 1861' (i.e. the path of capitalist development—Ed.), she will lose the finest chance ever offered by history to a nation in order to undergo all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime.' (Cf *Marx Engels Correspondence*, Letter No 167.)

Marx and Engels also, wrote a number of other letters and articles on the question of the economic development of Russia (including their introduction to the Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto*). In all these writings the founders of scientific communism express the opinion that if the village commune in Russia did not undergo further destruction—and at that time it was breaking up very considerably—then it might serve as a stepping stone to communism. In other words, if Russia did not develop along capitalist lines, then the village commune could serve as a means whereby she could pass to communism. They were of the opinion that a necessary condition for this was a socialist revolution in the West and the overthrow of the autocracy in Russia. But Marx and Engels immediately added that Russia had already made big strides towards capitalism.

In 1892 Engels wrote to N—on that he did not see that the "results of the industrial revolution that is taking place before our very eyes in Russia differ in any way from those we see or saw in England, Germany, or in America."

The Narodniki tried to interpret Marx's letter to mean that he supported their point of view, beginning with Chernyshevsky. They particularly tried to make capital of Marx's letter to the editor of *Otechestvennye Zapiski* and that is why Lenin dealt with that letter and exposed their attempts to misinterpret it. The Narodniki did not understand the ideas of Marx and Engels which were that countries having a pre capitalist social system can develop along non capitalist lines only on the condition that the proletarian socialist revolution is victorious in the big capitalist countries. This idea was still further developed by Lenin (See also the *Programme of the Communist International*.)

PAGE 291 * The "Emancipation of Labour" Group One of the first Social Democratic organisations and founder of Social Democracy in Russia It was formed in Switzerland in 1883 by members of the 'Black Re distribution' group then in exile—George Plekhanov, Paul Axelrod, Vera Zasulich, Leo Deutsch and V Ignatov

In its theoretical activity, the 'Emancipation of Labour' Group subjected to criticism the theory and practice of revolutionary Narodism of the 'seventies and eighties and in the works of Plekhanov laid the theoretical foundations for the rising Social Democratic and labour movement in Russia In 1884 Plekhanov drew up the first draft programme which, however, still bore the impress of survivals of Narodism (overestimation of the role of the intelligentsia, recognition of terror, etc) and also of Lassalleism (advocacy of co operative workshops) The second draft programme drawn up by Plekhanov in 1887 was more in line with the Marxian point of view and included the demand that the workers capture political power But both at that time and later, in the nineties there were elements of opportunism in the views of the members of the group, particularly in those of Plekhanov and still more so in those of Axelrod, which subsequently developed into Menshevism

One of the first things the group tried to do was to establish contacts in Russia, but it was not successful in its organisational activities The group published the Library of Modern Socialism which included the works of Marx and Engels (*Communist Manifesto* *Ludwig Feuerbach*, etc), and also the works of Plekhanov (*Socialism and the Political Struggle Our Differences* etc)

In 1888 the group formed the *Russian Social Democratic League* which united the Russian Social Democrats abroad The League published a magazine called *The Social Democrat*, which was edited by the group With the development of Marxism and the Social Democratic movement in Russia in the nineties the "Emancipation of Labour" Group tried to enlarge its organisational contacts In 1895 Lenin established contact with the group in the name of the St Petersburg League of Struggle When Lenin and the other active members of the St Petersburg League of Struggle had served their term of exile, they assisted by the 'Emancipation of Labour' Group founded the newspaper *Iskra* (*The Spark*)

The "Emancipation of Labour" Group was dissolved at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1903

PAGE 306 * Lenin here refers to the Russian section of the First International which was formed in 1870 This section was grouped around N Utin in Geneva Its organ was *Narodnoye Deyelo* (*The People's Cause*) The group did not have much influence in Russia The ideology of the group was not very distinct and in the main approximated to early Narodnik views It is interesting to note that Marx was authorised to represent Russia in the First International

P 16 F 310 * In the controversy which then raged around the question of the Peasant Reform, i.e., the emancipation of the serfs Chernyshevsky was almost the only writer who consistently championed the interests of the peasantry against the encroachments of the landlords. Taking the widest possible advantage of the legal possibilities he wrote a series of articles on the peasant question His appeal, *To the Gentry's Peasants*, was a piece of direct revolutionary propaganda, in which he called upon the peasants to organise and prepare for armed rebellion For this manifesto he was sentenced to penal servitude in Siberia

P 16 F 330 * The article *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr Struve's Book* was published in a symposium entitled *Materials on the Characterisation of Our Economic Development*, which was confiscated and destroyed by the tsarist censorship The article was an attack on the 'legal Marxists' In the beginning of the 'nineties, when the rapid development of capitalism clearly proved the unsoundness of Narodnik theories a change took place in the ideology of a section of the Russian intelligentsia The ideas of Marxism began to spread widely in Russia The Narodnik ideology, which until that time had prevailed among the intelligentsia and particularly among the revolutionary intelligentsia, was attacked not only by the 'Emancipation of Labour Group and the illegal Social Democratic circles which began to spring up at that time, to one of which Lenin belonged—but also by the so called "legal Marxists"

The 'legal Marxists' were bourgeois thinkers who tried to utilise Marxism for the purpose of justifying the class interests and tasks of the bourgeoisie Russia at that time was very rapidly becoming transformed into a capitalist country, and, accordingly, the bourgeoisie tried to play the leading role in the economic, cultural and political life of the country The 'legal Marxists' reflected the ideology of the progressive strata of the rising bourgeoisie and their striving towards hegemony amidst the conditions of the increasing capitalist development of the country It was precisely this striving for hegemony that the 'legal Marxists' expressed, and in their struggle against the Narodniki they used Marxism in order to prove that capitalism and the bourgeoisie were inevitable and progressive

But genuine Marxism not only explained and proved that capitalism was inevitable and progressive compared with serfdom and its survivals in tsarist Russia, it also proved that there were inherent contradictions in capitalism which would destroy it Genuine, revolutionary Marxism proved that capitalism and the bourgeoisie create their own grave digger, viz., the proletariat, which in fighting for the socialist revolution, will establish its dictatorship and build socialist society This revolutionary substance of Marxism was obliterated by the "revisions" which the "legal Marxists" introduced into Marxism One of the most important works published by the "legal Marxists" was that published in 1894 entitled *Critical Observations on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*, by P B Struve,

In this book, Struve under the cloak of Marxism, obviously distorts Marxism. The only one to oppose Struve at that time was Lenin, in the above mentioned article.

In this article Lenin attacks the liberal bourgeois distortions of Marxism. The article is based on a lecture Lenin delivered in the autumn of 1894 to a small circle at which Struve was present entitled *The Reflections of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature*. In this lecture Lenin attacked Struve much more strongly than in the article. This attack was modified somewhat in the article partly for reasons of the censorship and partly for the sake of the 'alliance' with legal Marxism in the common fight against the Narodniki.

After Lenin had expressed his criticism of Struve the latter, for a time, turned to the Left (in fact, he wrote the *Manifesto of the First Congress of the RSDLP*) but later, like all the 'legal Marxists' he went still further in his 'refutations' of Marx. The ideological connection between Russian 'legal Marxism' and West European revisionism is obvious. Lenin defined the class nature of 'legal Marxism' as the reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature', in other words, he regarded it as a bourgeois school of thought. With his usual penetration Lenin realised that the 'legal Marxists' were the future bourgeois liberals. It is characteristic that Plekhanov did not foresee this. The latter did not oppose the 'legal Marxists' until they had actually gone over openly to the camp of the bourgeoisie. This was not accidental on the part of Plekhanov, the future leader and theoretician of Menshevism. Lenin showed that the successive Right opportunist trends in Russian Social Democracy, including Menshevism, were the continuation of 'legal Marxism'. "Legal Marxism," Economism and Menshevism" Lenin wrote, "represent various forms of the manifestation of the same historical trend", in other words, 'legal Marxism' was the first link in the chain of opportunism which ultimately assumed the form of Menshevism, which is the reflection of the bourgeois influence upon the proletariat.

'Legal Marxism' renewed its ideological armoury to correspond to the evolution of the Russian bourgeoisie. In the beginning of the twentieth century the 'legal Marxists' came out openly in opposition to Marx and preached idealism. On the eve of the Revolution of 1905, 'legal Marxists,' like Struve became the leaders of the liberal movement. Struve became the leader of the Zemstvo Constitutionalists (Emancipation League) and editor of their organ (1904-05). In the Revolution of 1905, the ex-'legal Marxists' formed the nucleus of the Constitutional Democratic Party. The independent action of the proletariat in the Revolution of 1905 and its hegemony in the revolutionary struggle drove the ex-'legal Marxists' to counter-revolution and mysticism. In the period of reaction they participated in publishing the counter-revolutionary magazine, *Vekhi* (*Land marks*), which waged a scurrilous campaign against the revolution and supported the repressive measures of the autocracy. During the World War they particularly Struve, came out as the ideologists of Russian imperial

ism, and during the Revolution of 1917 they were out and out counter revolutionaries. The part of the article given in this volume presents the theoretical lines of Lenin's controversy with Struve.

PAGE 330 ** In opposing the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism Struve expressed the same ideas as those expressed by the revisionists. All the revisionists declared that Marx of the 'forties was one thing while the later Marx, who had become wiser,' was another. The revisionists and Struve said that they could not accept what Marx and Engels wrote in the *Communist Manifesto* viz., "In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat."

From the very beginning Engels regarded Struve as an apologist of capitalism who looked at the transition from capitalism to socialism from the reformist point of view. In a letter to N—on written in 1893 Engels said "Where he" (Struve) 'is decidedly wrong is in comparing the present state of Russia with that of the United States in order to refute what he calls your pessimistic views of the future' (i.e. the intensification of the class struggle in capitalist society, crises etc.—Ed) 'He says the evil consequences of modern capitalism in Russia will be as easily overcome' (i.e., without fierce class struggle.—Ed) 'as they were in the United States' (*Marx Engels Correspondence*, Letter No 225)

PAGE 334 * The Gotha Programme. The programme of the German Social Democratic Party adopted in 1875 at its Congress in Gotha. At this Congress, the two socialist parties which had existed hitherto, i.e. the Lassalleans (opportunists) and the Eisenachers (in the main, Marxists), united to form the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Marx very strongly criticised this programme. In his pamphlet, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, he wrote: "Vulgar socialism (and with it a section of the democrats) has taken over from bourgeois economics the method of treating and considering distribution as being independent of the methods of production and thereby representing socialism as turning principally on distribution." (Cf *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, pp 32-33, our italics—Ed)

Struve quoted the above passage from Marx's pamphlet as an epigraph to his book, but he omitted the words we have emphasised.

PAGE 341 * This draft programme was written by Lenin while he was in prison at the end of 1895, several months after, while still in prison, he wrote the explanation to the programme. The work was passed out of the prison in the summer of 1896. It was written in invisible ink between the lines of a book. The object of the draft programme was to form a angle,

centralised, national Social Democratic Party in Russia and it was written for the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. While broadly enunciating the tasks of the economic struggle the draft also very distinctly formulates the tasks of the political struggle. The leading postulates of this draft programme are the development of the class consciousness of the proletariat, the fight for the transference of political power to the working class, the fight for socialism, the fight against the autocracy and against the bourgeoisie.

PAGE 343* By convoking the *Zemsky Sobor* or National Assembly Lenin meant convoking a Constituent Assembly (See note to page 292)

PAGE 343** Guilds. Close corporations of master handicraftsmen which existed in Europe in the Middle Ages, introduced into Russia to some extent in the eighteenth century. The object of the guilds was to protect the monopoly of the craft for the members of the guild. They maintained a strict and complicated system of rules to which those desiring to follow the particular craft were obliged to conform. In order to become a master craftsman the craftsman had first to pass through a period of apprenticeship and then serve as a journeyman and in passing from one stage to the other he had to undergo a severe test of skill. The guilds were one of the obstacles to the development of capitalism and of the class struggle in industry.

PAGE 361* The most important event in the labour movement in Russia in the 'eighties was the strike at the Morozov textile mills in 1885. The strike was called forth by the semi-serf conditions of exploitation to which the workers in these mills were subjected. The strike was well organised and was led by class conscious workers who had been trained as a result of the socialist propaganda carried on in the 'seventies. The leaders of the strike were arrested and tried, but were acquitted. As a result of the strike the government passed the Factory Act of June 15 1896. The Act prohibited strikes but made it compulsory for the employers to pay wages at least once a month, prohibited the payment of wages in goods or coupons, prohibited the employers from imposing fines exceeding one ruble for being absent from work and ordered that the money obtained from fines be put into a workers' welfare fund. In the very next year, however, all the "concessions" contained in this Act were nullified by a number of reservations.

PAGE 361** The strikes which took place in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1896 were called forth by the following circumstances: to celebrate the coronation of Nicholas II, the employers declared a holiday and closed the factories. The workers demanded to be paid for the time lost during this compulsory holiday. The employers refused to concede to this demand,

and 30,000 weavers and spinners came out on strike. The strike lasted about three weeks. The dimensions and organised character of the strike not only made an impression on the Russian workers but also on the English and German workers. The demands put forward during the strike were not of a narrow craft character but were such as affected the conditions of all workers. The demands were a shorter working day, workers control of the fund, etc. Political demands were also put forward. Certain of the economic demands were granted and others, the employers promised to consider. This promise was not kept and in the beginning of 1897 strikes broke out again in a number of mills. The government tried to crush the strike of 1896 by a series of repressive measures. Nearly 1,000 strikers were arrested and deported from St. Petersburg. Witte, the Minister of Finance, issued an appeal to the strikers not to pay any heed to 'anonymous letters,' by which he meant the manifestoes issued by the League of Struggle (Cf. note to page 369**). In reply to Witte, the League issued a manifesto in which it said to the strikers: 'The government is now talking with us, a thing it never did before. Let us spurn its appeals and continue our arduous but glorious cause.'

1890-1899* The nineties witnessed the rapid industrial development of Russia. Heavy industry grew up and foreign capital flowed into the country on a large scale. The mining and metallurgical industries immediately came to the forefront. The rapid concentration of industry took place. New districts became industrialised one after another, such as the Donets Basin. Towns grew rapidly and the railway system spread. Capital more than ever penetrated into agriculture, the conditions appeared for the creation of the internal market.

The ranks of the proletariat increased also. The industrial boom affected the proletariat, the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. Class consciousness began to develop. The strike movement created favourable ground for the growth of Marxian influence and for the development of the activity of the Social Democratic organisations. The Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, which sprang up in several of the big industrial centres in the 'nineties, passed from propaganda to mass agitation. Among the radical and revolutionary intelligentsia who in the seventies were mainly under the influence of Narodnik views a process of class differentiation began to take place as a consequence of these events, one section went over to the side of the liberal bourgeoisie and another section went over to the side of Marxism.

As early as 1893 the *Narodnoye Pravo* (People's Rights) Party was formed. This was a Narodnik party led by M. A. Nathanson. It expounded its programme in the pamphlet mentioned by Lenin, *An Urgent Question*, and in the *Manifesto of the "Narodnoye Pravo" Party*. They criticised the purely cultural work of the majority of the Narodniki of the late 'eighties and early 'nineties, and proclaimed as their main task the struggle for polit-

ical liberty and for a 'Constitution' i.e. for the restriction of the tsarist autocracy by a popular assembly. By renouncing socialism although not openly, and by recognising the necessity of fighting for a Constitution the *Narodnoye Pravo* hoped to influence the opposition and liberal elements.

The change in the outlook of the revolutionary groups of the intelligentsia was most strikingly expressed by the manner in which they turned to wards Marxism. Lenin mentioned one of these groups i.e. the so called

Fourth *Narodnaya Volya* Leaflet' group which was formed in 1891. This group, which published the *Narodnaya Volya* Leaflets, possessed a well organised printing plant, in which the publications of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, and incidentally the works of Lenin, were also printed. This group more and more departed from Narodism and approached closer to Marxism. It carried on work among the workers and as a result of this contact with the workers it gradually came over to the side of Social Democracy. Leaflet No. 4 was almost a Social Democratic document.

Among the events which marked the rise of the revolutionary movement and its turn towards Social Democracy, Lenin includes the appearance of the magazine, *Rabotnik* (*The Worker*), published abroad by the League of Russian Social Democrats and edited by the 'Emancipation of Labour' Group (Cf. note to page 401.) Lenin participated in the work of organising the publication of this magazine.

1863-69 ** On his arrival in St. Petersburg in 1893, Lenin established contacts with a group of Social Democrats that was carrying on propaganda work among the St. Petersburg workers. Very soon Lenin assumed a leading position in this group. In 1894-95 the group was transformed into a strong organisation which later adopted the name of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. The League developed energetic propaganda activity in the factories and was able to make use of the 'legal Marxists' for the purpose of winning the revolutionary minded intellectuals away from the influence of Narodism. The leading part it played in the strikes of 1895 and 1896 particularly helped the League to grow, become strong and acquire considerable influence among the masses of the workers. During this 'spontaneous upheaval,' as Lenin called it, the League issued a number of manifestoes and leaflets, members of the League personally took part in leading the strikes, which for the first time enabled the Social Democratic organisation to establish fairly close contact with the mass labour movement.

Lenin himself took an active and leading part in the work of the League. In particular, he wrote a number of pamphlets at the request of the League, for example *What the 'Friends of the People' Are, etc., On Fines, Strikes*, a number of manifestoes and a draft programme. While in prison (he was arrested on the night of December 24, 1895), he continued to lead the League and wrote a number of works which he managed to smuggle out of prison.

The St Petersburg League of Struggle passed from the stage of carrying on propaganda for the ideas of socialism among small groups of class conscious workers to the stage of carrying on wide agitation among the mass of the proletariat in connection with their economic and general conditions of life, and linked up this agitation and call for struggle against capitalism and the bourgeoisie with the political struggle against the autocracy

The leading group of the League in the period 1894 to 1896 (Lenin, Krzhizhanovsky, Martov, Vaneyev Starkov, Radchenko and others), was known as the 'old men' in contradistinction to the young men," the future "Economists. In 1896 nearly all the "old men" were arrested and the leadership of the League passed into the hands of the 'young men'

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PAGE 371 * Simultaneously with the numerical growth of the Social Democratic movement in the 'nineties, a change took place in its tactics and in the character of its work. The work carried on hitherto in exclusive study circles, in which a comparatively few advanced workers obtained political education, gave way to mass agitation. A Kremer, one of the members of a Jewish Social Democratic circle in the town of Vilna, wrote a pamphlet entitled *On Agitation*, which was edited by J. O. Martov. This pamphlet, even in manuscript form, passed from hand to hand among the workers and became widely known. In this pamphlet the authors argued that the time had come for the Social Democratic organisation to emerge from the narrow confines of study circles and plunge into the thick of the proletarian masses to take up agitational work on economic questions among the workers. In this fight for new tactics, however, they went to the extreme and put the political struggle somewhat in the background.

PAGE 383 * The Act of June 14 (June 2, old style), 1897, providing for a shorter working day, was passed by the government after the St. Petersburg textile strikes of 1895-96. This Act was analysed in a detailed and popular manner by Lenin in his pamphlet, *The New Factory Act*. This pamphlet was regarded at the time by the 'Emancipation of Labour' Group as the best piece of working class literature ever written. In it Lenin explains why the Act was passed, traces its history and shows that the forces that compelled the government to make concessions were "the St. Petersburg workers and the big strikes they organised in 1895-96." During these strikes definite demands were put to the government and the League of Struggle distributed manifestoes and leaflets among the workers.

The Act of June 14 (June 2, old style), 1897, restricted the working day to 11½ hours and introduced a compulsory Sunday holiday. In his pamphlet Lenin analysed this Act in detail and showed how insignificant were the concessions the government made and how easily the capitalists and the officials could evade even these. "But the very fact that the Act was passed," Lenin wrote, "is a tribute to the success of the labour movement and will give an impetus to the further development of the movement."

PACE 390 * The protest of the seventeen Social Democrats was written by Lenin in the autumn of 1899, while he was in exile. In addition to Lenin, it was signed by N. K. Krupskaya, V. V. Starkov, G. M. Krzhizhnikov, Z. P. Nevzorova, P. P. Lepeshinsky, F. V. Lengnik and other Social Democrats then in exile. This protest was called forth by the publication of a document that later became known as the *Credo*, or confession of faith of the opportunist section of Russian Social Democracy at that time known as the "Economists". The Economists held that the main task of the working class was to fight for their every day economic needs and denied that the revolutionary political struggle of the proletariat was of any importance. Instead of the tasks of overthrowing the autocracy, of capturing political power and of the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society, the reformists advanced the tasks of reforming the existing order in a liberal democratic direction. The fact that they adopted a reformist platform brought the Economists close to the "legal Marxists". The "legal Marxists" adapted the theories of Marxism to the political interests of the bourgeoisie, but the Economists not only adapted the theories of Marxism to these interests but also to the *practice* of the labour movement. The *Credo* formulated in the most logical manner the position taken up by the Economists, it advised the workers to confine themselves to the struggle for economic improvements and to leave the political struggle to the bourgeois liberals. The *Credo* was written by E. Kuskova, who advocated Economist views among the Marxist intelligentsia in St. Petersburg.

The advocacy of Economist views in Russia coincided with the spread of revisionism in Western Europe. The popularity which Bernstein's book, *The Prerequisites of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy*, enjoyed was due to the fact that a rather strong opportunist trend had already arisen in the labour movement at that time (the nineties of the last century), and Bernstein's attack on orthodox Marxism was the most striking expression of that trend at that time. Economism was a Russian variety of revisionism and the Russian branch of international opportunism.

The origin of Economism is explained in Lenin's article *The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement* in Volume II of *Selected Works*. An extensive review and criticism of Economism will be found in *What Is To Be Done?*, also in Volume II.

PACE 390 ** The revolutions of 1848 in France, Germany, Austria and other countries in Western Europe were bourgeois revolutions. The revolutionary tide was set flowing by the February revolution in France which overthrew Louis Philippe and his government which represented the interests of the big financial bourgeoisie. In this revolution a big role was played by the working class which, as Karl Marx said, "won it [the republic] by force of arms, put the stamp of its class upon the new creation, and proclaimed the social republic". When the bourgeoisie, represented by the National Constituent Assembly, proclaimed its rule and declared

that the demands of the workers were sheer utopia, "the proletariat answered by the June Insurrection, the most outstanding event in the history of European civil wars" (Karl Marx *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, pp 30 32) This insurrection was suppressed by the bourgeoisie aided by the petty bourgeoisie. In the other European countries the revolutions of 1848 were directed against the rule of the landlords and the monarchy and the survivals of serfdom. In Germany, the main driving force of the revolution was the working class actively assisted by the peasantry, but the leadership of the revolutions in these countries, including Germany, was in the hands of the bourgeoisie for the working class was still relatively weak, and in none of these countries was it led by a party of any strength. Nevertheless the bourgeoisie, frightened by the June Insurrection of the workers of Paris and by the mass movements in their own respective countries, compromised with the landlords and the monarchy. As a result, the popular mass movements were crushed in all these countries and the revolutions of 1848 resulted only in some restriction of the power of the monarchy, in the bourgeoisie being given the right to take part in the legislature in some relief for the peasantry in their bondage to the landlords, although this bondage was by no means abolished, and in some restriction, although not abolition, of the political privileges of the landed aristocracy.

P 46F 390 *** The rebellion of the Lyons weavers broke out in 1831 as a result of the desperate poverty to which the workers had been reduced by the shameless exploitation of the employers. For several days the rebels were in power in the city. However, lacking sufficient political and organizational leadership, the movement disintegrated and was crushed with the aid of government troops. The motto of the rebels was *Live to Labour or Fighting Die*. A movement similar to this in Germany was that of the strike of the weavers of Silesia in 1844, which was called forth by the terrible poverty which the handweavers suffered through unemployment caused by the competition of the machine. The strike was suppressed. This strike was made famous by the German playwright, Gerhart Hauptmann, in his play *The Weavers*.

P 46F 391 * The *Zusammenbruch* (cataclysm) theory is the theory that the collapse of capitalist society is inevitable as a result of the proletarian revolution. Edward Bernstein, the German revisionist, so called because he tried to revise the theories of Marx, declared in opposition to this theory that the development of modern society will proceed by gradual change. The class antagonisms between the working class and the capitalist class, he said, will gradually disappear and the transition to socialism will take place by capitalism gradually merging into socialism. In the opinion of the revisionists, this process commenced in the nineties of the last century, and in proof of this they pointed to the extension of factory legislation, the increasing opportunities for the working class to achieve its

aims in a legal manner the increase in its legal rights etc From this they drew the conclusion that the Social Democratic movement should not pursue a policy that leads to 'cataclysm' i.e., to revolution should not strive to capture political power by violence that is by revolutionary means but should work within the limits of bourgeois society co-operate with the bourgeoisie and achieve socialism piecemeal, bit by bit, by agreement with the bourgeoisie

PACF 395 * The first Congress of the International Workingmen's Association (the First International) took place in Geneva Switzerland September 3-8 1866 Sixty delegates were present representing 22 sections and 11 affiliated societies principally the Swiss trade unions Organisation ally, the First International was based on the principle of democratic centralism. Its leading body was the General Council, which was elected by the Congress and headed by Karl Marx

The main business of the first Congress was to adopt the statutes of the International and to lay down the principles upon which it was to work. The items on the agenda of the Congress were international mutual aid in the struggle between labour and capital the trade unions the co-operative movement shortening the working day, international credit, taxation etc The resolution to which Lenin refers was based on the memorandum submitted by the General Council and drawn up by Marx, *Trade Unions in the Past Present and Future* In this memorandum, the trade unions were described not only as organisations for the purpose of waging the economic struggle, but also for the purpose of waging the political struggle against the capitalist system as a whole (Cf Steklova's *History of the First International* p 79 et sup)

PACF 396 * The idea that all classes except the proletariat, represented "a homogeneous reactionary mass" was expressed in the programme adopted by the Congress of the Social Democratic Party of Germany held at Gotha in 1875 This opinion, like many of the opportunist ideas was borrowed from Lassalle In his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (International Publishers, N Y 1933, pp 33-34) Marx strongly criticises this formula and quotes the following passage from the *Communist Manifesto*: "Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie to day, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry the proletariat is its special and essential product." After explaining in what respect the bourgeoisie is revolutionary and why the proletariat is revolutionary in relation to the bourgeoisie Marx goes on to say "But the *Manifesto* lays down then that the lower middle class if by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat' From this point of view it is thus nonsense again that they together with the bourgeoisie and the feudal class into the bargain, form 'only a homo

geneous reactionary mass' in opposition to the working class" By lower middle class Marx implied the small manufacturers, small traders, handicraftsmen and peasant proprietors

At the Erfurt Congress of the Party which took place in 1891 a new programme was adopted from which this formula in the Gotha programme, criticised by Marx, was omitted

The idea that all classes except the proletariat represented a homogeneous reactionary mass was also borrowed from Lassalle by Trotsky Precisely from this view logically follows one of the main features of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist theory of 'permanent revolution'—the ignoring of the role of the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the idea that when the proletariat comes into power it must inevitably come into conflict with the peasantry the repudiation of the possibility of an alliance between the proletariat and the middle peasantry under the dictatorship of the proletariat A similar error in regard to the allegation that the non-proletarian toilers, including the peasantry, represented a homogeneous reactionary mass" was committed by Rosa Luxemburg and other 'Left radicals,' in the European Social Democratic movement

PAGE 397 * The North Russian Labour League was formed by St. Petersburg workers in 1878 and was led by a mechanic named Obnorsky and a carpenter named Stepan Khalturin The League declared that its programme was similar to that of the socialist parties in Western Europe and advocated international solidarity between the Russian workers and the workers of other countries In its ideas the League approximated to Narodism for example it attached great importance to the village commune Nevertheless, its immediate aim was the struggle for political liberty and it urged the necessity for an independent labour movement In 1878-79 the League took an active part in strikes and issued manifestoes to the strikers At that time it had a membership of 200 workers In February it issued one number of *Rabochaya Zarya* (*Workers Dawn*) the first labour newspaper to be published in Russia

PAGE 397 ** Lenin mentions the South Russian Labour League formed in 1879 (i.e. the organisation led by Kovalskaya and Shchedrin) Evidently, this was a slip The first workers socialist organisation in Russia was the South Russian League formed in Odessa in 1875 by E. O. Zaslavsky Probably, this is the organisation Lenin had in mind This organisation had a membership of from 200 to 250 workers The main item in the programme was the winning of political liberty for the purpose of facilitating the struggle for socialism The League carried on extensive propaganda activity, but it was suppressed by the government in the very year it was formed The workers who had been influenced by the propaganda of the League subsequently helped to form the numerous revolutionary organisations that sprang up

PAGE 398 * Lenin quotes the ideas of Axelrod on the tactics to be pursued by Social Democracy to reinforce his own position on this question. This does not mean that Lenin completely shared Axelrod's views. He agreed with the latter only in so far as he opposed the point of view of the Economists and recognised the necessity for waging the political struggle. But even at that time differences of opinion were arising between Lenin and Axelrod on the question of tactics. At the time the *Protest* was written, Lenin also wrote that, in fighting against the Economists Axelrod went to the other extreme. He ignored the practical demands of the proletariat and criticised the revolutionary Social Democrats for being contemptuous of bourgeois liberalism, by that, as it were, he "obscured the independent and more determined position which the proletariat occupied in the political struggle. This indicates that as early as 1899 Lenin observed and pointed to the dangerous tendencies in Axelrod's pamphlet which later in 1903-04, were further developed, and completely determined the Menshevik tactics of subservience to the liberals.

PAGE 399 * The first Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party took place in Minsk in March, 1898. The organisations represented at it were the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev and Ekaterinoslav Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and the Jewish Labour League (known as the Bund). The Congress lasted three days. It was resolved that all the organisations enumerated above amalgamate and form the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. A Central Committee was elected consisting of B. Edelman, A. Kremer and S. Radchenko. The question of the programme was not discussed. In the name of the Congress a manifesto was issued in which were enunciated the main tasks of the socialist movement in Russia which confronted the independent labour movement. The manifesto advanced the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolutionary movement against tsarism, emphasised the tasks of the fight against absolutism and linked up the political struggle with the general socialist tasks of the labour movement. The manifesto declared that "The proletariat in Russia can win political liberty for itself only by its own efforts. The nearer we get to the East, the weaker, more cowardly and despicable politically is the bourgeoisie and the greater are the cultural and political tasks that fall to the proletariat. On its strong shoulders the Russian working class must and will carry the cause of winning political liberty. This is a necessary step but only the first step towards the fulfilment of the great historic mission of the proletariat to create a social system in which there will be no exploitation of man by man. The Russian proletariat will throw off the yoke of autocracy in order, with still greater energy, to continue the struggle against the bourgeoisie until the final victory of socialism is achieved."

The Congress decided to adopt the *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*), which was published in Kiev, as the central organ of the Party.

However, the government succeeded in suppressing the organisation immediately after the Congress came to a close. Not only were the members of the Central Committee arrested but so also were nearly all the delegates at the Congress and the editor of *Rabochaya Gazeta*. The printing press of the latter was closed. It was a long time before the organisation recovered from this blow.

The first Congress had not yet united the Party into a single organic whole. The local committees still remained disconnected from each other. The importance of this Congress lay in the fact that it was the first step toward the formation of a national, independent, political party of the proletariat in Russia.

PAR 401 * The League of Russian Social Democrats Abroad was an organisation formed at the end of 1894 by the 'Emancipation of Labour' Group to unite the Social Democrats who were then in exile abroad. It was a purely propagandist organisation its function being to publish Social Democratic pamphlets and periodical literature for Russia. At first, the League was entirely under the leadership of the 'Emancipation of Labour' Group which edited all the publications of the League right up till the first Congress of the Party (November 1898). At that Congress the 'Emancipation of Labour' Group disagreed with the majority on the question of the immediate tasks of the labour movement. At that time the Economists obtained the upper hand in the League. The Economist trend represented by its organ *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Cause of Labour*), took definite political shape in 1900 and at the second Congress of the League, held in April, 1900 there was a split. The members of the 'Emancipation of Labour' Group, together with the members of the League who supported them, left the Congress, resigned from the League and formed a separate revolutionary organisation known as the *Sotsial Demokrat*. In October 1901, a Congress was convened of representatives of the branches of *Iskra* and *Zarya* abroad of the *Sotsial Demokrat* organisation and of the League of Russian Social Democrats Abroad for the purpose of amalgamating these organisations but no agreement was reached at the Congress. Later all the revolutionary Social Democratic elements abroad united in the League of Russian Revolutionary Social Democrats Abroad (known as the *Liga*) which was formed immediately after the above mentioned attempt at unity had failed. The League of Russian Social Democrats Abroad together with its organ *Rabocheye Dyelo* continued to exist as the expression and advocate of Right opportunist views in Russian Social Democracy (so called Economism, i.e., the view that the workers should interest themselves only in economic question and leave politics to the bourgeoisie). It was dissolved together with other separate organisations and groups at the Second Congress of the Party.

